U nderstanding the Issues and Procedures This training will provide the following information An understanding of the issues associated with Dual Use Research in the life sciences A framework for the requirements of both entities and individuals under Federal policies ID: 931008
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Slide1
Stanford UniversityDual Use Research of Concern in the Life Sciences
U
nderstanding the Issues and Procedures
Slide2This training will provide the following information:
An understanding of the issues associated with Dual Use Research in the life sciences
A framework for the requirements of both entities and individuals under Federal policies
A list of key responsibilities for Stanford University and its researchers
A process to ensure compliance regarding Dual Use Research of Concern
Slide3Dual Use Research (DUR) vs
Dual Use
Research of Concern (DURC)
DUR
Research conducted for legitimate
purposes
that generates information, technologies, and/or products that can be utilized for both benevolent and harmful purposes
DURC
A subset of research, as defined by the Federal government, that has the greatest potential for generating information that could be readily misused to threaten public health and national security has been termed “dual use research of concern” or DURC
The United States Government (USG) is presently limiting the scope of DURC policies to a subset of 15 biological agents and toxins that are considered Select Agents and are regulated by the US Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Additionally there are 7 categories of experiments that come under DURC.
Slide4Biological Agents*
/toxins
*
and Experimental Effects that are covered by DURC
Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic)
Bacillus
anthracis
Botulinum neurotoxin Burkholderia mallei Burkholderia pseudomallei Ebola virus Foot-and-mouth disease virus Francisella tularensis
Marburg virus
Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus Rinderpest virus Toxin-producing strains of Clostridium botulinum Variola major virus Variola minor virus Yersinia pestis
* Only attenuated
strains of the agents that are
excluded from
the Select
Agent list and inactive forms of botulinum neurotoxin are exempt from these regulations. For additional information contact Stanford Biosafety (esegal@Stanford.edu, 650.725.1473)
Slide5Biological Agents/toxins and Experimental Effects that are covered by DURC
Categories of experiments:
Enhances
the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin;
Disrupts
immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization against the agent or toxin without clinical or agricultural justification;
Confers
to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitates their ability to evade detection methodologies; Increases the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate the agent or toxin; Alters the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin; Enhances the susceptibility of a host population to the agent or toxin; or Generates or reconstitutes an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin listed on previous slide.
Yes
Slide6Research That A PI Thinks May Meet the Definition of DURC
An Institutional Review Entity (
IRE
,
at Stanford it is the Administrative Panel on Biosafety (APB
)) must identify the risks associated with the potential misuse of the information, technologies, or products that may be generated.
Included in this assessment are the following:The ways in which knowledge, information, technologies, or products from the research could be misused to harm public health and safety, agriculture, plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.
The ease with which the knowledge, information, technologies, or products might be misused and the feasibility of such misuse. The magnitude, nature, and scope of the potential consequences of misuse. Yes
Yes
Slide71+1≠ 2Is it DURC?
There may
be
instances in which an
Institutional Review
Entity determines that the research:
(a) directly involves nonattenuated forms of one or more of the listed agents, and
(b) produces, aims to produce, or is reasonably anticipated to produce one or more of the listed experimental effectsHowever the IRE also determines that the research in question does not meet the definition of DURC (and is therefore not subject to additional oversight). In this case the PI must notify the IRE in the future if, for whatever reason (e.g., changes in the research, new discoveries), he or she believes that the research should be reconsidered by the IRE because it may now meet the definition of DURC. The IRE will review the research, including any new information, and determine whether the research is DURC.
Slide8Research not currently covered by DURC
The use of any of the listed agents in attenuated forms;
The use of the genes from any of the listed agents;
In
silico
experiments (e.g., modeling experiments, bioinformatics approaches) involving the biology of the listed agents; or Research related to the public, animal, and agricultural health impact of any of the listed agents (e.g., modeling the effects of a toxin, developing new methods to deliver a vaccine, developing surveillance mechanisms for a listed agent).
Slide9Research Subject to
DURC Policies
Requires additional Federal and local oversight and risk mitigation strategies to address dual use concerns
Yes
Yes
Yes
Slide10Overview of the Process for Institutional DURC Oversight
Institution implements approved risk mitigation plan and provides ongoing oversight
P
PI
I
PI conducts and communicates research according to risk mitigation plan
APB
PI
Slide11DURC Oversight: A Shared Responsibility Throughout the Research Continuum
Communicates findings responsibly
Identifies DURC, develops risk mitigation plan with institution
Reviews progress reports for DURC
Provides advice and guidance on communicating findings
Federal Oversight
Institutional Oversight
Slide12Investigator Responsibilities
Contact Stanford Biosafety
if you will be using a Biological Agent/Toxin identified as covered under DURC
Be knowledgeable
about and comply with
all institutional and Federal policies and requirements for oversight of DURC
Conduct DURC in accordance with the risk mitigation planContinue
to assess research to determine if, at any time, the research becomes subject to the policyEnsure that laboratory personnel conducting research have received education and training on DURCCommunicate DURC in a responsible manner, throughout the research process, not only at the point of publication and is in compliance with the risk mitigation plan approved by the appropriate Federal funding agency
Slide13Resources