in Transport Passenger Aircraft Presented to Aviation Industry By Fire Safety Branch Federal Aviation Administration Date 06222017 First and Foremost Fire Prevention Aircraft are Designed Certified and Operated with the Philosophy of ID: 704277
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Slide1
Safe Transport of PEDs in Transport Passenger Aircraft
Presented to:
Aviation Industry
By:
Fire Safety Branch
Federal Aviation Administration
Date:
06/22/2017Slide2
First and Foremost: Fire Prevention!
Aircraft are Designed, Certified, and Operated with the Philosophy of Preventing Accidents, which includes
Preventing Any and All Fires from Occurring.
2Slide3
Cargo Fire Incidents (2002-2012)N Registered Aircraft
3 Incidents (2 Fires)Hair spray released in compartmentOverheating electronic unit that was on.Flashlight that was on and overheated
3
Passenger Aircraft – Class “C” CompartmentsSlide4
Why are PEDs with Lithium Batteries an Added Risk?
Lithium batteries are both an ignition source and a fuel.Lithium batteries have been a fire source in the cabin.Lithium battery fires
may reduce the effectiveness of the fire suppression
system.
They produce hydrogen gas when in thermal runaway.
Thermal runaway can propagate from cell to cell unless cooled
.
4Slide5
5
Tablets in a Galley Cart
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S5_Galley_Cart.wmvSlide6
6
Lithium Ion Batteries in a Cargo Container
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S6_LIB_CargoContainer.wmvSlide7
Why do cells go into thermal runaway and start fires?
Over chargedDischarge too fastOverheatingInternal short (defective cell)Damage (punctured, dropped, etc.)
7Slide8
Fire Suppression SystemHalon system is the second line of defense.
Designed for fires likely to occurLithium batteries were not considered in design of system.Halon system may or may not be effective in controlling PED fires, i.e.,
the reliability
of the system is negatively influenced by
PED fires.
8Slide9
Why Might Halon Not be Effective?Thermal runaway can propagate from cell to cell, and Halon is not a good cooling agent.
Cells in thermal runaway produce hydrogen, and the design concentrations of halon will not provide protection from a hydrogen explosion.
9Slide10
Lithium Ion Battery Vent Gas Mixture
10Lithium batteries in thermal runaway produce flammable gasses and create significant hazards for aircraft.
The three most prevalent gases are carbon dioxide (30.1 %), hydrogen (27.6 %), and carbon monoxide (22.9
%).
Lithium
ion battery vent gas mixture
by
percent
concentration:
30.10% CO
2
2.21% C
2
H
4
27.60% H
2
1.57% C
4
H
10
22.90% CO
1.17% C
2
H
6
6.37% CH
4
0.56% C
4
H
8
4.48% C
3
H
6
0.27% C
3
H
8Slide11
Results (Large Scale Tests)
11Test with 5.28%
Halon
6 second time window
Test without suppression
Test with 10.43%
Halon
11Slide12
Effectiveness May Be Scenario Dependent
Fire buildup before detectionFire buildup before design concentration of agent penetrates containerFire involves other cargo
12Slide13
13
Aerosol Can Explosion in a Class D Cargo Compartment
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S13-S120_Aerosol_Can_Class_D.wmvSlide14
Why are Passenger PEDs a Greater Risk Than When Shipped by The Manufacturer?
From Manufacturer:Batteries not installed (unit always off).Batteries at reduced state of charge (most at 30%).Items are Marked and protected from damage.From Passenger:
Batteries installed (unit might be in sleep mode).
In most cases batteries are highly charged.
Minimal protection from damage.
Used (and potentially abused).
14Slide15
Gas Volume vs State of Charge15Slide16
How to Mitigate or Reduce the Risk?Prevention
Prevent the fireContain the event within one laptop packageControlControl a PED fire such that the halon system can effectively suppress and contain the fire within the compartment.
16Slide17
PreventionOperational Procedures:
Laptops must be off. Much greater risk if on or in standby/sleep mode (can overheat the battery).Packaged to prevent damage. (Any damage increases the risk of a fire).Others as determined under Control.
17Slide18
Contain the Event within One Laptop Package
Package a laptop or group of laptops into a “fire hardened package” such that, if a cell in one of the laptops goes into thermal runaway, the resultant fire will be contained within the package.Logistics at the airportCost
Weight
18Slide19
Control:
Use of Fire Containment CoversTesting shows effectivenessLogisticsCost
Weight
Use of Fire Hardened Containers
Testing shows effectiveness
Cost
Availability
19Slide20
Control:Improve effectiveness of Halon system
Optimal Placement of Laptops?Best way to maximize halon at the laptop fire?Quickest way to detect fire in container?
20Slide21
Summary:Understand Risks
Minimize RisksDetermine if Minimized Risks are Acceptable
21Slide22
PED Removed from
PAX Cabin
Airline Collects and Packages PED
Passenger puts PED in Checked Baggage
OR
PED can be verified as “Off”
THE ASSUMPTIONS BELOW ARE BASED
ONLY
ON CYLINDRICAL ION CELLS
(POUCH AND METAL CELLS HAVE NOT
B
EEN EVALUATED YET)
Box can easily Ignite & Spread to Others
Boxes can be grouped together
(Segregated from other Cargo and Hazardous Materials
Good
chance of Halon System control (
if
system is working 100% as certified
Fair
chance Class D Compartment (no Halon) could control
Mitigations exist to control or contain fire from one box (Fire Resistant Box, Covers, and Fire Hardened ULDs)
Mitigation would improve Class C chance of control to
Very Good
and Class D to
Good
Little Control for being “Off” or Damage Protection
Bag may or may not contain fire
(% unknown, many variables)
Bags may contain other Hazardous Materials; e.g. Aerosol Cans
Bags
without
Hazardous Materials:
Good*
chance Halon system can control (if system working 100% as certified.
Fair-Poor
chance Class D compartment (no Halon) could control
Bags
with
Hazardous Materials:
Poor
chance Class D compartment (no Halon) could control.
Fair to Poor
chance Halon system can control (if system working 100% as certified)
No good mitigations presently available to improve chance of control.
1
2
3
1
2
Federal Aviation
Administration
*
Note: The air carrier collecting the PED provides a higher likelihood that the PED will be completely powered down. Passenger control may not be as effective.Slide23
What Has Been Learned from TestingBased on Laptops Powered by 18650 Cylindrical Cells
When packaged in a cardboard box with bubble wrap:If a cell goes into thermal runaway the fire can easily penetrate the box
and
potentially spread.
There
are commercially available
packages (e.g. boxes)
that will easily contain the fire.
The
Halon system in a
Class C Compartment
, if working as certified, can control the fire of boxes packed in a ULD.
Explosive
gases
might still be present
Class
D
Compartments
might (not) control that same fire.
Explosive gas might still be
present
23Slide24
What Has Been Learned from TestingBased on Laptops Powered by 18650 Cylindrical Cells
When packed in passenger bags:If a cell goes into thermal runaway the fire may penetrate the bag.
Depends
on many factors, including, packing density, materials in bag, type of bag and available air in bag.
If
other
Haz
. Mat.(such as aerosol cans) is in the bag an explosion can occur, not related to the gases from the battery.
An
explosion can occur before
Halon,
in a
Class
C
compartment
, would be discharged and reach a 3% suppression concentration in a ULD.
A Class
D compartment would provide
no protection
from an explosion
24Slide25
What Has Been Learned from TestingBased on Laptops Powered by 18650 Cylindrical Cells
Large scale test demonstrated:About 2 minutes from agent discharge until 3% suppression concentration was reached within a ULD
.
That time will depend on many factors, including agent discharge time, load factor of the compartment, leakage rate of the compartment and tightness of the ULD
.
A Halon system in a class c compartment, if working as certified, can control the fire of boxes packed in a ULD
.
A Halon system in a class c compartment, if working as certified, might not provide enough agent inside a ULD in time to suppress an explosion of an aerosol can caused by a laptop battery fire
.
25Slide26
Laptop Packaged in Box FireA laptop was equipped with a heater attached to battery pack to initiate thermal runaway
The laptop was wrapped in bubble wrap and placed in a cardboard box The heater was activated to induce thermal runaway
26Slide27
Battery Pack and Heater
27Slide28
Laptop Wrapped in Bubble Wrap
28Slide29
Closed Box with Heater Power Cord and Thermocouple
29Slide30
Laptop Packaged in Box Test
30
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S30_LaptopBoxTest.wmvSlide31
Post Test
31Slide32
Observations
Each cell that went into thermal runaway produced a pressure pulse and a puff of smoke.
The third cell produced visible flames and a short time later the box
ignited.
The remaining cells went into thermal runaway as the laptop and box continued to
burn.
The fire continued to smolder until the
residual flames
self extinguished
approximately 30
minutes from test initiation.
32Slide33
Test Configured to Simulate a Class C Cargo Compartment
33381 cubic foot test chamber.
32 cubic foot ULD
Halon system installed with 5% initial concentration and 3% maintained concentration
Forced leakage rate 10 cubic feet/minute
60-70 % cargo loading by volumeSlide34
Halon Concentration TestHalon was measured in two locations:
Outside the ULD near mid chamber height.Inside the ULD near mid chamber height.7.5 lb Halon discharge yields 5% in the chamber when empty.
Peak concentration is higher due to chamber loading.
Additional Halon added as concentration depleted to maintain 3-4
%.
34Slide35
Laptop Fire Test with Halon
36 laptops, Emirates style packaging.Charged to 100%.Packed in bubble wrap inside Emirates style box.Laptop in Position 9 was fitted with a heater to induce thermal runaway.
Halon
was discharged
when visible smoke
was observed.
3% Halon concentration was maintained for duration of test.
35Slide36
Results: Laptop Fire with Halon
Heater was energized at time 0.Thermal runaway was detected at 8:21.Smoke was observed at 8:21.Halon was discharged at 9:50.Halon maintenance began at 15:30.
Peak Halon concentration in the chamber was 9.25%.
Peak Halon concentration in the ULD was 7.65%.
Test terminated after 60 minutes.
36Slide37
Results: Laptop Fire with HalonSoot visible on the boxes above the laptop in thermal runaway in box 9.
Bottom of box 9 burned through.37Slide38
Results: Laptop Fire with Halon
Laptop in Thermal Runaway:Bubble wrap on top was charred.Bubble wrap on bottom was consumed.All cells in battery pack went into thermal runaway.
38Slide39
Results: Laptop Fire with HalonLid of box 10, located directly below box 9, was penetrated.
39Slide40
Results: Laptop Fire with HalonLaptop in box 10:
Bubble wrap melted.Laptop was charred.Temperature data for this laptop indicated the interior of the laptop never exceeded 100°F.
40Slide41
Observations- Laptop TestHalon was able to penetrate the simulated ULD and achieve a sufficient concentration to suppress the fire.
The laptop in thermal runaway generated enough heat to char and penetrate the bottom of the box and the top of the box below it.There was no propagation of thermal runaway to adjacent laptops
41Slide42
Single Laptop Box with Americase Insulation
Thermal insulation was scavenged from previous Americase over pack tests
The undamaged insulation was fitted
in to
a cardboard laptop shipping box
The laptop was fitted with a heater to initiate thermal runaway and a thermocouple to monitor
temperature.
Battery
charge was 100% nominal.
The laptop was wrapped in bubble wrap and placed in the box.
The box was closed, flaps inserted, but not taped.
42Slide43
Single Box with Added Insulation
43Slide44
Laptop and Bubble Wrap
44Slide45
Sides Folded, Top Panel Installed
45Slide46
Ready for Test
46Slide47
Single Laptop Box withAmericase Insulation
47
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S47_Americase_Single_Laptop.wmvSlide48
Post Test: No Signs of Scorching.
48Slide49
Post Test
49Slide50
Post Test: Underside of Insulation Scorched
50Slide51
Bubble Wrap Burned and Melted
51Slide52
Battery Compartment
52Slide53
Post Test: Bottom Foil Damaged, Ceramic Liner Underneath was Undamaged
53Slide54
ObservationsBox released some smoke but retained structural integrity.
Individual laptop protection possible with a fire hardened box.Production boxes could be more user friendly and reusable.Successful containment.
54Slide55
Americase Oxygen Generator Overpack Tests
Three tests were conducted to evaluate the ability of off the shelf Americase oxygen generator overpacks to contain a laptop fire.All laptops were packed Emirates style.Test 1: The laptop rigged for thermal runaway was near the bottom of the overpack. Six laptops total.
Test 2
: The rigged laptop was in the middle.
Test 3
: Single box with Americase insulation.
55Slide56
Americase Laptop ContainmentTest 1
56Slide57
Initiating Laptop Wrapped inBubble Wrap (typical)
57Slide58
Six Boxed Laptops Placed in Americase Oxygen Generator Overpack
58Slide59
Overpack Sealed with Fiberglass Tape
Initiating Laptop in Number One Position
59Slide60
Post Test 1: No Smoke wasObserved During the Test.
60Slide61
Post Test 1: Some Soot Visibleon Box 5
61Slide62
Post Test 1: Initiating Laptop in Number One Box, No Damage to Lid
62Slide63
Post Test: Bottom of Laptop Box Number One Scorched and Penetrated
63Slide64
Americase Insulation Scorched, Top Surface Aluminum Penetrated, Ceramic Liner Intact.
64Slide65
Post Test: Initiating Laptop in Box #1, Bubble Wrap Scorched and Melted
65Slide66
Post Test: Laptop Battery Compartment
66Slide67
Observations
All laptops were at a nominal 100% charge.No smoke was observed escaping the
overpack
.
The laptop battery in thermal runaway was in direct contact with the
Americase
insulation.
The insulation protected the outer fiberboard box, no scorching or penetration.
The remaining five laptops and boxes were undamaged.
Successful containment.
Video not included, no visual data.
67Slide68
Americase Laptop Containment Test 2Initiating Laptop
in Position 368Slide69
Overpack was Observed Bulging as Laptop Cells went into Thermal Runaway, Some Smoke Observed.
69Slide70
Post Test: Some Soot Observed
70Slide71
Lid of initiating laptop in position 3 is undamaged (marked 1, but in position 3)
71Slide72
Post test. Initiating laptop and bubble wrap
72Slide73
Post test. Initiating laptop, underside.
73Slide74
Post test. Underside of box in position 3 containing initiating laptop
74Slide75
Post test. Top of box in position 1, directly under initiating laptop, scorched and penetrated
75Slide76
Post test. Bubble wrap on laptop in position 1 scorched and melted
76Slide77
Post test. Laptop in position 1 relatively undamaged
77Slide78
Observations
All laptops nominally 100% chargedSome smoke was observed as cells went into thermal runaway, overpack bulged (inflated) as each cell went off.
The initiating laptop in position 3 was severely burned.
The box in position 3 that contained the initiating laptop was penetrated on the bottom
The box directly below in position 1 was penetrated through the top.
78Slide79
ObservationsThe bubble wrap in the box in position 1 was scorched and melted
The laptop in the box in position 1 was relatively undamaged, the cells did not go into thermal runaway.There was no damage to the remaining boxes and laptops.
79Slide80
Americase Laptop Containment Test 2
80
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S80_Americase_Laptop_T2.wmvSlide81
AMSAFE Overpack Laptop Fire Containment Test
AMSAFE manufactures and sells these overpacks for the express purpose of shipping lithium-ion batteries and cells.
The overpack is constructed from the same materials used in the company’s pallet covers.
Previous testing here at the Tech Center has shown the overpack is capable of containing a fire involving 1000 lithium-ion 18650 cells.
AMSAFE has agreed to provide us with prototype pouches constructed from the same materials in a size suitable for single laptops for future testing.
81Slide82
AMSAFE Overpack Test
Laptops were packed in the same cardboard boxes used in previous test.Each laptop was wrapped in bubble wrap, inserted into the box, and the box flaps were closed. No tape was used.
One laptop located at the sidewall of the overpack was fitted with a heater in the battery pack to cause thermal runaway.
Seven laptops were used for this test.
82Slide83
Box 1 Contained the Heater
83Slide84
Closure Consists of Four Flapsand Three Buckles
84Slide85
AMSAFE Overpack Test85
https://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S85_AMSAFE_Test.wmvSlide86
Post Test: Some smoke escaped during the test, but no flames.
86Slide87
Some Soot was Visible
87Slide88
Hole Burned through Box 1 and Battery Cell was Visible
88Slide89
Second Hole Burned through Box 1
89Slide90
All Cells went into Thermal Runaway.
90Slide91
Inside of overpack charred adjacent to the initiating laptop (#1), material still intact
91Slide92
Some charring was visible on the outside of the overpack corresponding to interior charring.
92Slide93
ObservationsDuring the test flames were visible through overpack sides. Flames quickly self extinguished.
The AMSAFE overpack easily contained the laptop fire.There was no propagation of fire or thermal runaway to the other boxes.The AMSAFE overpack is a rugged, reusable, and easy to close and transport.
93Slide94
Laptop Luggage Test Overview
Luggage provided by TSL, fully loaded with various items of clothing, shoes, books and other personal items.Laptop fitted with heater and thermocouple to initiate thermal runaway.Laptop placed in bag with clothing items above and below the laptop.Thermal runaway is initiated and the bag monitored for smoke, open flames, and temperature.
94Slide95
Test 1: Soft Sided LuggageLuggage was opened, some contents removed and the laptop was placed inside.
The remaining contents were replaced on top of the laptop.
95Slide96
Test 1 ResultsThe laptop was put into thermal runaway.
Smoke was observed escaping the bagNo open flames were observed.Some charring of bag contents was found post test.
96Slide97
Test 2: Hard Sided LuggageLuggage prepared in same manner as test 1.
Large amounts of smoke were observed.No open flames were observed97Slide98
Test 2: Results
Considerable charring of contents.Some damage to inside of bag .Small penetration on the underside of the bag
98Slide99
Test 3: Soft Sided BagSmoke observed.
No open flames were observed.Charring of contentsDamage to inner liner
99Slide100
Test 4: Soft Sided Luggage Results
Smoke observed at thermal runaway.Bag was breached and open flames were observed.Hot vigorous fire developed.Bag completely destroyed.
100Slide101
Test 4: Soft Sided Luggage Results
101https
://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S101_Soft_Sided_Luggage.wmvSlide102
Test 5: Small Duffel Bag Results
Smoke observed.No open flames were observed.Charring of contentsSome slight burning/charring through to exterior of bag
102Slide103
ObservationsTightly packed suitcases seem to contain the laptop fire better than loosely packed suitcases
Laptop fire will spread to the suitcase contents if there is a sufficient air source, such as a hole in the bag.The type of bag contents has an effect on flammability.There does not appear to be a difference between soft sided and plastic hard sided bags in terms of containing a laptop fire.
Metal sided suitcases were not available for testing.
103Slide104
Test Setup: Simulate Class C Cargo Compartment
104381 cubic foot test chamber.
32 cubic foot ULD
Halon system installed with 5% initial concentration and 3% maintained concentration
Forced leakage rate 10 cubic feet/minute
60-70 % cargo loading by volumeSlide105
Halon Concentration Test
Halon was measured in two locations:Outside the ULD near mid chamber heightInside the ULD near mid chamber height7.5 lb
Halon discharge yields 5% in the chamber when empty
Peak concentration is higher due to chamber loading.
Additional Halon added as concentration depleted to maintain 3-4%
105Slide106
Laptop Fire Test with Halon
36 laptops, Emirates style packagingCharged to 100%Packed in bubble wrap inside Emirates style boxLaptop in position 9 fitted with a heater to induce thermal runaway
Halon discharged when visible smoke is observed
3% Halon concentration maintained for duration of test.
106Slide107
Results: Laptop Fire with Halon
Heater was energized at time 0.Thermal runaway was detected at 8:21Smoke was observed at 8:21Halon was discharged at 9:50Halon maintenance began at 15:30
Peak Halon concentration in the chamber was 9.25%
Peak Halon concentration in the ULD was 7.65%
Test terminated after 60 minutes
107Slide108
Results: Laptop Fire with HalonSoot visible on the boxes above the laptop in thermal runaway in box 9.
Bottom of box 9 burned through108Slide109
Results: Laptop Fire with HalonLaptop in thermal runaway
Bubble wrap on top charredBubble wrap on bottom consumedAll cells in battery pack went into thermal runaway
109Slide110
Results: Laptop fire with HalonLid of box 10, located directly below box 9, was penetrated.
110Slide111
Results: Laptop Fire with HalonLaptop in box 10
Bubble wrap melted.Laptop was charred.Temperature data for this laptop indicated the interior of the laptop never exceeded 100°F.
111Slide112
Observations: Laptop TestHalon was able to penetrate the simulated ULD and achieved a sufficient concentration to suppress the fire.
The laptop in thermal runaway generated enough heat to both char and penetrate the bottom of the box and the top of the box below it.There was no propagation of thermal runaway to adjacent laptops
112Slide113
Laptop/Aerosol Can Test 1
Laptop prepared as before.12 ounce aerosol can of hairspray strapped to laptop battery to ensure it stays in close proximityLaptop/can placed in hard sided suitcase
113Slide114
Laptop/Aerosol Can Test 1 Results
Thermal runaway of battery resulted in some smoking.Temp reading of aerosol can appears to have been affected by the TR event.This temperature remained well above 200F for ~15 minutes
No resulting explosion of can
114Slide115
Laptop/Aerosol Can Test 2
Laptop prepared as before.8 ounce aerosol can of dry shampoo strapped to laptop battery to ensure it stays in close proximityLaptop/can placed in
soft sided
suitcase
115Slide116
Laptop/Aerosol Can Test 2 Results
Fire observed almost immediately after first thermal runaway event.Fire rapidly grew and within 40 second can explodedFire continued to rapidly consume bag/contents
116Slide117
117
Laptop/Aerosol Can Test
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S117_Laptop_Aerosol_Can.wmvSlide118
ObservationsIf
an aerosol can is packed in a suitcase and a thermal runaway event occurs, there is the potential for an aerosol can explosion.
118Slide119
Effectiveness May Be Scenario Dependent
Fire buildup before detectionFire buildup before design concentration of agent penetrates containerFire involves other cargo
119Slide120
Aerosol Can in Class D Compartment
120
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S13-S120_Aerosol_Can_Class_D.wmvSlide121
121
Laptop in Box Lined With Fire Barrier Tested to G27 Proposed Standard
https://
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/temp/LT_FH/S121_G27_Test.wmvSlide122
Test Setup: Simulate class C cargo compartment
122381 cubic ft test chamber
32 cubic ft. ULD
Halon system installed. 5% initial concentration, 3% maintained
Forced leakage rate 10 cubic feet/minute
60-70 % cargo loading by volumeSlide123
Halon concentration testHalon was measured in two locations:
Outside the ULD near mid chamber heightInside the ULD near mid chamber height7.5 lb Halon discharge yields 5% in the chamber when empty
Peak concentration is higher due to chamber loading.
Additional Halon added as concentration depleted to maintain 3-4%
123Slide124
Luggage fire test with Halon5 bags of luggage, filled with misc. clothing and personal effects.
Ignition source in cardboard box filled with shredded paper placed in center positionHalon discharged when visible smoke is observed3% Halon concentration maintained for duration of test.
124Slide125
Results: Luggage fire test with Halon
Heavy smoke observed shortly after halon discharged – did not clear until after ~1 hourCardboard box not fully consumedSoot/smoke particles observable throughout pressure vessel post-test
125Slide126
Results: Luggage fire test with HalonPeak temperatures inside the 5 pieces of luggage ranged from 120 - 150
F2 of the 5 bags had minor charring.
126Slide127
Observations- Luggage test
Halon was able to penetrate the simulated ULD and achieve a sufficient concentration to suppress the fire.Fire did not propagate from cardboard box to the pieces of luggage, however some charring did occur.Heavy smoke throughout pressure vessel for the full hour duration of test due to likely smoldering fire within cardboard box.
Halon performed as expected
127