John A. Lauder Monitoring Nuclear Agreements with North Korea, (and Iran and Russia): - PowerPoint Presentation

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John A. Lauder

Monitoring Nuclear Agreements with North Korea, (and Iran and Russia): Applying Lessons From the Past to the New Digital Age

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Negotiating and Implementing Effective Nuclear Agreements is a Vital But Seemingly Intractable Task

There are Best Practices from Prior Agreements that Present Instructive Lessons for Effective Verification and NonproliferationLessons from the Perspective of an Intelligence Officer & Current Advisor on Monitoring Measures Will Focus on the Challenges of Monitoring an Agreement and on the Role of Intelligence in Monitoring.

Premise and Scope of Presentation

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The Challenge

Nuclear Agreements with North Korea, Iran, and Others are at an Critical Juncture.A Recent Economist Article Characterized the Current Environment as “Nuclear Disarmageddon”.

Nearly All Concur That Nuclear Agreements Should Include Effective Verification and Monitoring Measures.

What Should Be Those Measures?

What Does the History of Previous International Agreements Teach Us About How to Achieve Effective Verification?

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To What Extent has the National Security Community Forgotten, or Gotten Rusty on, Proven Methodologies for Monitoring?Is the Current Generation of Monitors Adequately Trained and Prepared?

Are New Open Source Data and Tools Being Appropriately Integrated into Monitoring and Verification PlansIs the Current Funding and Vector of R&D Related to Monitoring Adequate?Is Our Consideration of Monitoring Framed within a Larger Strategic Context?

Discussion Questions

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Monitoring is gathering information

relevant to compliance assessments through intelligence methods (undefined National Technical Means in agreements), diplomatic means, and negotiated measures such as information exchanges and on-site inspectionsVerification is the process of reaching policy judgments about the extent and significance of compliance and the determination of how to resolve ambiguities or evidence of noncompliance

Key Definitions

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Horizontal Proliferation is the Spread of WMD Capabilities to States or Non-State Actors Who Don’t Already Have Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Weapons

Vertical Proliferation is the Development of New Types of Weapons and Enhanced Capabilities by States with Current WMD ProgramsAgreements Help Foster Strategic Stability or Even Roll-back After Proliferation Occurs

Agreements Are a Path Toward Preventing or Restraining Proliferation

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Integration of Military & Economic Sticks and Negotiated Carrots -- Informed by an Anticipatory Comprehensive Strategy

Dual-Track Approaches (Nuclear Posture Review)

Attention to Danger of Unattended Consequences

Executive and Congressional (Largely Bipartisan) Emphasis

International Commitment

Substantial Resources for Monitoring

Effective Agreement Monitoring Management

Active Monitoring Expert Participation in Formulation, Negotiation, Ratification, and Implementation of Agreements

Recognized Leadership and Accountability

Proven Methodology for Monitoring

Illustrative Factors Behind Prior Successes

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Successful and Credible Intelligence Support to Arms Control Helped Manage the End Game of the Cold War

US in Particular Built Eye-Watering Intelligence Capabilities for Monitoring

These Capabilities Were Later Adapted for Use On Other National Security Issues

Prior Monitoring Art and Transparency Measures Have Refined Approaches, Methodologies, and Definitions that Remain Relevant to Future Agreements

Negotiations and Agreements of the 70s, 80s, and 90s Established International Precedents and Shared Understandings

A Legacy of Success

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Combination of Negotiated Measures and National Technical Means Break Tough Challenges Into Manageable Pieces

Data Exchanges and Notifications Provide Normal Baseline and the Functional Equivalent of a Tax Return

Routine Inspections and Cooperative Measures Provide Scrutiny of Geographic Locations Where Cheating Would Be Easiest

Challenge Inspections Available As Forcing Events and to Gather Data on Compliance Concerns

NTMs and Covert Intelligence Look for Anomalies Across Areas and Cover the Backdoor During Inspections

Synergy Sought Among Diplomatic, Inspections, Investigative, and Other Approaches

All the Above Orchestrated by an Agreement Monitoring Manager

Ensures the Pieces Work Together

Flags Issues for the Policy Community

Key Elements of Successful Monitoring Strategy

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Detects “Militarily Significant” NoncomplianceCreates Synergy in Discovery of Relevant Activities Among Negotiated Measures, International Inspections, National Intelligence Means, and Publically Available Information

Establishes Consultative Mechanisms for Anomaly and Dispute ResolutionBuilds Greater Transparency and Enhances Channels of Communication

Attributes of An Effective Monitoring Regime

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After Detection, What?

Fred Ikle’s Provocative Question from Foreign Affairs, Jan 1961Need to Plan How to React to Anomalies or Evidence of Significant NoncomplianceConsultative Mechanisms Useful First Step

Periodic Unclassified and Classified Reports on Significant Anomalies

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Consultative Mechanisms Can Explore Other Measures to Broaden Agreement Scope and Impact

INF-Like Restrictions and Monitoring of Iranian and North Korean MissilesInspection Exercises, Voluntary Transparency Measures, and Verification Technology Experiments with Iran and North Korea

CTR-Like Measures to Reduce Size of Iranian and North Korean Nuclear Complex and Redirect Scientists

Technical Regional Exchanges on Safety and Environmental Concerns

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Wide-Area, Persistent Surveillance in Permissive Environments

Precise, Geospatial AwarenessForensic Intelligence

Widely-Available Commercial Imagery and Radar

International Verification Institutions and Resources

Data Mining and Analytics

Social Media Sources (even on North Korea and Iran)

What Monitoring Capabilities Are More Robust than 20 Years Ago

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Broad Scope of Potential Agreements, Number of Participants/Stakeholders, and Objects of Verification, e.g.:

Increasingly MultilateralWarheads and Production of Material -- Not Just Counting Delivery VehiclesTactical as Well as Strategic Weapons

De-emphasis of Negotiated Monitoring and Data Declaration Measures

Requirement for Near Global Monitoring Coverage

For Example, Increased Demands on the Language Skills of Inspectors

Strategically Significant Noncompliance Would Occur At Lower Levels Than Detectable With Confidence

Why Current & Future Challenges Are Harder

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Stand-off Detection of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons

Assured Deep and Denied Area Penetration

Identification and Characterization of Underground Facilities

Mobile Targets

Inventory of Objects of Verification (Establishing the Baseline)

“Signal to Clutter” Problem

More Sophisticated Denial and Deception

Many US Monitoring Resources and Organizational Structures Have Atrophied or Been Redirected

No Longer Organizations Like ACIS and ACDA

Declining Numbers of Skilled and Experienced Practitioners of Monitoring

Less Attention to Strategy of Deterrence and on Nuclear Weapons in General

Competing Priorities on Current Intelligence and Support to Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Operations

Illustrative Challenges or Gaps

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Avoid Reopening Old US Bureaucratic and International Diplomatic Fights

Advocate Appropriate Priorities and FundingRecover Former Expertise and Best Practices Identify and Train the Next Generation of Practioners

Adapt Potential Contribution of New Monitoring Technologies and Expanded Range of Commercial and International Partners

Undertake More Rigorous Research and Development for Better Monitoring Tools

Yet, Don’t Fall in Love With Pure Technical Solutions

The Challenges Are Substantial and the Lead-Times Long

Need for Anticipation and a Comprehensive Plan

Necessary Actions for Meeting Future Challenges

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Effective Monitoring Has Implications Beyond the Agreements Themselves

Monitoring Measures Can Incentivize International and Crisis StabilityIn Forging Next Steps, Monitoring and Verification Need to Be:

Achievable at Reasonable Levels of Confidence

Routine

Cost Effective

Reciprocal in Balancing the Needs of Hiders and Finders

Art, as Well as Science

Team Sports

Need for Leadership

Take-Away Thoughts

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Back-up Slides

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Policy-Relevant Intelligence Products

At Best When Exquisitely Specific and Timely

Fusion of Multiple Intelligence Sources and Approaches

Often Highly Compartmented

Knowledge of Sources and Methods Valuable for Both Hiders and Finders

Expertise and Experience in the Process

Arcane Knowledge Often Not Present Elsewhere

Non-Partisan Credibility in the Ratification Process

What Intelligence Brings to the Table

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Consultative Mechanisms

Information Declarations, Inspections, and the Modalities of Sanction Relief Will Produce Many Questions Requires a Body for Discussion of Compliance and AnomaliesSuch Implementation Committees Have Been a Mainstay of Many Prior International Agreements

Consultative Bodies Normally Include Technical Experts Quietly Working the Geeky Details of Agreements, Largely Outside the Political Glare and Bureaucracies of Capitals

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Goal and Conduct of Inspections

Audit the Information Provided in Data DeclarationsProvide Ground-truth Situational Awareness of Nuclear Capabilities and IntentServe as Tripwires of Breakout Activities

Build Regional and Crisis Stability

To Achieve the Above, Inspections Need to Be Routine and Non-Accusatory

Nonconfrontational “Columbo” Style of Investigation

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