ot the first Sufi to articulate this point - PDF document

ot the first Sufi to articulate this pointÑmany Sufis expressed similar views well before Ibn al-ÔArab"Õs time.3 But what 55 ontology has been described as pantheistic. Fina Ibn al-ÔArab$Õs Ontology: Necessary and Impossible Existence For Ibn al-ÔArab", Being and God are inseparable.6 In other words, Being and God are, in actuality, identical. Being cannot not be and this is how GodÕs existence is defined: He is the w"jib al-wuj'd (the necessarily existent).7 It may also be noted that the word wuj'd, meaning ÒBeingÓ or Òexistence,Ó can also mean Òfinding.Ó The primary meaning of the trilateral Arabic root W J D is Òto findÓ and in the passive form (wujida) it means Òto be found.Ó This has many implications, for it denotes that the One who Is, is also the One who finds. At the same time, the One who Is, is also the One who is found. Through wuj'd, creatures can find God, because God is Being and everything that exists necessarily participates in some mode of being; nothing in the created order escapes GodÕs Being. What this means is that there is no other type of existence but that it receives its existence from Him. GodÕs Being is necessary and therefore all the other things in their Òontological indigenceÓ8 depend on Him for their existence, or all the things in the created order have some form of existence, which is, in a way, ÒborrowedÓ from God.9 But how, exactly, does GodÕs Being differ from that of the rest of the created order? Ibn al-ÔArab" tells us that GodÕs existence has two aspects: non-manifest Being 8 Mu*y" al-D"n Ibn al-ÔArab", al-Fut'!"t al-makkiyya, trans. Claude Addas in The Voyage of No Return, trans. David Streight (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 29. 9 See William Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-ÔArab$Õs Cosmology (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 12Ð13. From here onward this work will be abbreviated as S 57 impossible things are abs ) and thus, the exact opposite of Absolute Being: The Real possesses the attribute of Being and the attribute of Necessary Being through Himself. His contrary is called absolute nonexistence (al-Ôadam al-mu#laq), and it possesses an attribute through which it is called ÒimpossibleÓ (mu!"l). Because of this attribute, it never receives existence. So it has no share in existence, just as the Necessary Being through Himself has no share in nonexistence.12 Thus, absolute non-being is the polar opposite of Absolute Being. Absolute Being is necessary, for it is that which cannot not be, whereas absolute non being is possible being, which is the realm of the possible existents or possible things. For Ibn al-ÔArab", the possible things are equivalent to the cosmos or Òeverything other than God.Ó13 That is, the possible things are in an intermediate state, an isthmus (barzakh) between necessary and impossible existence. The reason for this is given in the following passage of the Fut'!"t: If the possible thing were an existent which could not be qualified by nonexistence, then it would be the Real. If it were a nonexistence which could no 59 when they become entified, they take on relative existence.21 When God wants to existentiate them, He orders them to become through the divine fiat expressed in the QurÕ!n: Be! (35:7). This is an act of kindness since the possible things begged God for existence: ÒTh there is no difference. However, each immutable entity, when existentiated, acts as a locus (ma%har) for GodÕs manifestation (%uh'r) or se ). As Ibn al-ÔArab" himself explains in the Fut'!"t: The existence of the possible thing is necessary through Him, since it is His locus of manifestation, and He is manifest within it. The possible entity is concealed (mast'r) by the Manifest within it. So manifestation and the Manifest become qualified by possibility.23 Although there are many loci of manifestation, it is GodÕs wuj'd that permeates all of them. Along with this, Ibn al-ÔArab" upholds the idea put forth before his time, that the divine self-disclosure never repeats itself. Because of His divine Vastness, God continually creates, perpetually permeating the cosmos with His wuj'd. This is why Ibn al-ÔArab" speaks of creation as being in a state of perpetual renewal (tajd$d al-khalq). Since all things in the cosmos are Òontologically indigent,Ó they depend on the One who is infinitely rich for their existence at every single moment.24 21 Addas, Voyage, 88. 22 Ibn al-ÔArab", Fut'!"t, 3:306.19, trans. Chittick, SPK, 86. 23 Ibid., 2: 61 its preparedness and the fact that it is a locus of manifestation for Him.Ó28 Thus, the immutable entities become entified through the divine fiat and receive their particular realities through the divine names, receiving the names in accordance with their preparedness. The names are innumerable since the existent things, as objects o 29 The names are all subsumed under the divine name Allah, which is the Òall-comprehensive name.Ó30 The name Allah itself, like the name a!ad (One) is not manifest. However, as William Chittick points out, a!ad and Allah, although designating the Essence, are also slightly different. A!ad is Òas close as we can get to a name that denotes the Essence Itself.Ó31 On the other hand, Allah Òdesignates the divine Essence inasmuch as It comprehends all attributes in an exclusive manner.Ó32 Thus, God is known through the multiplicity of His names, but He is never known as Allah or as a!ad. From one side 28 Ibn al-ÔArab", Fut'!"t, 2:122.14, trans. Chittick, S , 66. 31 Chittick, SDG, 53. 63 themselves ÒexistÓ from the perspective of the cosmos being not He, but they do not exist from the perspective of the cosmos being He. Defining Pantheism Before beginning to discuss Ibn al-ÔArab"Õs ontology and the question of pantheism, the term ÒpantheismÓ must be defined. The English word ÒpantheistÓ was first used by John Toland (d. 1722), who identified himself as a pantheist, but did not employ the term Òpantheism.Ó36 Toland taught that the cosmos and God were identical The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 11, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: OED. 39 Ibid. 40 Hartshorne, ÒPantheism and Martinich, ÒPantheism,Ó The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 604; Keith Yandell, ÒPantheism,Ó The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 7, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), 202. 65 Monism of Ibn al-ÔArab$. In fact, Husaini was guided through his research by Orientalists such as Miguel As’n Palacios, who himself used a host of misleading terms to ÒclassifyÓ Ibn al-ÔArab"Õs writings.45 Scholars have a -systematic thinker, and label it within the framework of our own points of reference and terminology, we would be grossly misrepresenting him. Needless to say, the 67 means that there is nothing at all by which He can be identified, disclosures, then it would not in any way imply that God is somehow diffuse throughout the universe. This is because His self-disclosures occur through His divine names, or through His manifest Being, not His Absolute, non-manifest Being. This is why there does remain a distinction be ical to them in their essences. On the contrary, He is He and the things are Ibn al-ÔArab", Fut'!"t: 2:484.23, trans. Chittick, SPK, 90.