Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations

David Albright

ISIS

November 3, 2013

Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st Century

Sponsored by the American

Physical Society Forum on Physics/Society & GWU Elliott SchoolSlide2

Photo of Natanz, DigitalGlobeSlide3

Natanz Plant, September 2002Slide4

Fordow

Centrifuge

FacilitySlide5

Arak Heavy Water (IR-40) ReactorSlide6

6

Kalaye ElectricSlide7

Natanz

Pilot

Plant IR-1 Centrifuge CascadesSlide8
Slide9
Slide10
Slide11

3.5% LEU Production at

Natanz

Fuel Enrichment PlantSlide12

Cumulative 3.5% LEU ProductionSlide13
Slide14

Taking Stock, August 2013

LOCATION

3.5%

LEU

product

3.5%

LEU

feed

19.75%

LEU

product

FEP

9,704

kg

N/A

N/A

PFEP

N/A

1,455

kg

178

kg

FFEP N/A

1,422

kg

195

kg

GROSS TOTAL

9,704

kg

2,877

kg

373

kg

NET TOTAL

6,774

kg* 2,877 kg

186 kg (in hex form)**

Slide15

Advanced Centrifuge Deployment:

Natanz

Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)Slide16

Breakout to Enough Weapon-Grade Uranium for a

Nulear

WeaponSlide17

Estimating Breakout Timelines

Illustrative

IR-1

centrifuge

plant to make

weapon-grade uranium (WGU),

based on a four

Step, Khan-Type Centrifuge Plant

24 cascades (164 P1s/cascade) make 3.5% LEU--3,936 P1s

8 cascades (164/cascade) make 20% from 3.5%--1,312 P1s

4 cascades (114/cascade) 20 to 60%--456 P1s

2 cascades (64/cascade) 60 to 90%--128 P1s

Total: 38 cascades with 5,832 P1s

Iranian cascades are not ideal and their performance and output is modeled by Houston Wood and Patrick

Migliorini

from University

of Virginia’s Mechanical & Aerospace

Engineering Department in collaboration with ISIS.Slide18

Production of WGU in a Breakout at Declared Enrichment Sites

2009 Nuclear weapons capability achieved

in that Iran has enough IR-1 centrifuges and 3.5 percent LEU (about 1,500 kg 3.5 LEU hexafluoride to produce 25 kg weapon-grade uranium in a breakout in about 4,593 enriching IR-1 centrifuges. It would take longer than six months

August 2012-breakout time

using

Natanz

only (IR-1 centrifuges being installed in

Fordow

) was

2.5-4.1 months

with three-step process, 9,330 IR-1 centrifuges, a stock of 91 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, and use of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride (in three-step process)

August 2013-Breakout time with enriching IR-1 centrifuges only is 1.3-2.3 months

, with three step process with 10,092 IR-1 centrifuges, 186 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, and use of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. [3.1-3.5 months with 3.5 percent LEU only, no near 20 percent LEU]

August 2013-Breakout time for scenario using all installed IR-1 centrifuges is 1.0 to 1.6 months

with three step process as above but with 18,454 IR-1 installed centrifuges and 186 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. [1-9-2.2 months with 3.5% LEU only and no near 20% LEU]

Note:

calculational

methods changed somewhat from Fall 2012 estimates to fall 2013 estimatesSlide19

Key Questions for Negotiations

How to extend breakout times?

How to cap the Iranian centrifuge program and ensure that it will not expand during the next 5-10 years?

How to increase the chance of finding a secret centrifuge

or plutonium separation plant? How to establish adequate transparency in general, including Iran addressing the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons efforts?

How to trade Iranian concessions for sanctions relief?

The United States anticipates obtaining an interim agreement followed several months later by a long-term agreement that will verifiably ensure that Iran will not build nuclear weapons.

What will an interim deal look like?Slide20

Minimal Goals of an Interim Agreement

Stopping production of near 20 percent LEU; mothballing or disabling 6 cascades involved in making near 20 percent LEU at

Natanz

and

Fordow

Reducing stocks of near 20 percent LEU, particularly those in hexafluoride form

Achieving the principle that Iran’s centrifuge program would be capped to below a certain size for the long term. Initially, there should be freezes in the numbers of installed and enriching centrifuges.

Cancelling the Arak heavy water reactor project

Developing a baseline of information about Iran’s gas centrifuge program, including its centrifuge manufacturing complex, a detailed declaration of any centrifuge plants under construction or planned, and Iran’s total inventory of centrifuges

Expanding IAEA monitoring, including remote camera monitoring of centrifuge plants and implementation of early notification of construction of new facilities (code 3.1)

Ensuring that Iran understands that significant sanctions relief requires that Iran address fully and cooperatively the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s alleged past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons.Slide21

Alleged Military Dimensions

IAEA has considerable evidence of Iranian work on nuclear weapons prior to 2004 and some evidence suggesting that some of that work continued afterward and may continue today.

Western intelligence agencies are united in assessing with high confidence that Iran had a nuclear weapon program prior to 2004. They are less united about any such work after 2004.

There is general agreement that the Iranian regime has not decided to build a nuclear weapon. There is less agreement whether Iran will refrain from building a

nulear

weapon in the future

Little hope of significant sanctions relief if Iran does not come clean about its past activities and address cooperatively and fully the IAEA’s concerns.Slide22

Visits Associated with Resolving Concerns about Military Dimensions

Iran will need to allow the IAEA to visit several

sites and interview a range of experts and officials

in order to address their concerns.

The IAEA has identified several sites to Iran, but so far

Iran has

refused the IAEA’s requests to visit these particular sites.

One set

involves workshops that were involved in making mock-ups of missile re-entry vehicles suitable to hold a nuclear warhead.

Another

of those is a site at the

Parchin

military complex that is alleged to have been involved in undertaking high explosive tests related to the development of nuclear weapons

. After

the IAEA asked to visit

this site early

2012, Iran undertook extensive excavation and reconstruction at this site, compromising the IAEA’s ability to settle this issue.

Iran will need to address the

Parchin

issue to the satisfaction of the IAEA, which will inevitably involve more than simply allowing a

visit

.Slide23

Parchin: Before and After