Struggles over scale: cumulative impact assessment and Liqu - PowerPoint Presentation

Slide1

Struggles over scale: cumulative impact assessment and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects

Derrick Hindery, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor

Departments of International Studies and Geography

University of

Oregon

dhindery@uoregon.edu

Research funding

: Wayne Morse Center for Law and Politics, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, University of Oregon Office of Research and Faculty Development, Departments of Geography and International StudiesSlide2

Introduction

Early 2000s: industry push for LNG “import” projects (backed by FERC, DOE)

Mobilization, challenges brought by environmental / human rights orgs.: “RACE” Coalition

Several cancelled not b/c of upstream cumulative impacts (Russia, Peru etc.) but b/c of domestic safety, security, environment concerns

2007: fracking boom



“flip” from import to export

 increased mobilization around upstream impacts of fracking in US, CanadaSlide3

LNG increasingly prominent with US gas boomSlide4

Struggles over cumulative impact assessment

Groups critical of LNG pressing for comprehensive regional and national-scale assessment of LNG’s cumulative impacts (including fracking)

Significant political, legal resistance by industry developers, backed by FERC, DOE

Paper examines struggle over assessment across various scales, looking at rise of LNG as global commodity that “provides an opportunity to witness in real time the ‘historic’ processes through which the multi-scalar geographies of a ‘global’ commodity are produced.” (Bridge, 2004: 395)Slide5

Emerging scholarship to fill gap in research on resource geographies related to gas

Much work to date focused on single case studies

exceptions involving comparative research (e.g. Bebbington and Bury, In Press; Perreault and Valdivia, 2010; Sawyer and Gomez 2012)

Little on impacts or mobilization across the supply-chainSlide6

Forthcoming (In press) Synergistic impacts of gas and mining development in Bolivia’s Chiquitanía: the significance of analytical scale. In Subterranean Struggles: New Dynamics of Mining, Oil, and Gas in Latin America, Anthony Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury (eds.) Austin: University of Texas Press. (Expected publication Summer/early Fall 2013)Slide7
Slide8

Construction of Enron (Ashmore) and Shell’s Cuiab

á

Pipeline through the Chiquitano Forest

(626 kms. Long)

Photo

by Derrick Hindery, November 1999Slide9

Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2006

Don Mario gold mine controversy, involving

Enron (now Ashmore), Shell,

the World Bank (IFC) and ousted President

Gonzalo Sanchez

de LozadaSlide10

Photo by Bolivian organization CEADES, September, 2002

Excavation of trench for 4 km “feeder” pipeline to tap Cuiabá pipeline (to fuel Don Mario gold mine)Slide11

4 km “feeder” pipeline from Cuiabá pipeline to mineSlide12

Photo by Bolivian organization CEADES, September 2002Slide13

Pipes delivering gas at Don Mario gold mine

Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2008Slide14

Pipeline veers toward

mine (map by Danny Redo)Slide15

Synergistic impacts of

Cuiabá

pipeline & Don Mario gold mineSlide16

Logging mill along road to Don Mario mine

Photo

by Derrick Hindery,Slide17

“We are observing unauthorized loggers, wood thieves and narcotraffickers using the mine’s road and [the logging company’s] road, which are in very good conditions ... And this was one of the reasons we established a guard post, to be able to control outsiders passing through the area. But this didn’t work out as the post was destroyed. The company didn’t say anything further about the subject.” - Chiquitano community memberSlide18

Other synergies: Ipias power plant, IDB highway,

Mutun

, IIRSASlide19

Cumulative assessment for hydrocarbons projects commonly poor

Often absent

(e.g. on Russia’s Sakhalin II Gas and Oil Pipeline see

Norlen

, 2005 and Johnston and

Kozloff

, 2005)

Or inadequate

(e.g. on Ecuador’s Heavy Crude Pipeline (

Oleoducto

de

Crudos

Pesados

(OCP) see Soltani and Koenig, 2005; on Peru’s Camisea gas project see Bebbington and Bury, In Press;

Goldzimer

, 2005; Griffiths, 2007; Hearn 2007; Johnston and

Kozloff

, 2005; Pratt 2007; Pratt, In

Press)XSlide20

Cumulative impacts are significant and multiplicative

environmental, social and economic impacts of singular projects

combine



generate synergies that

are not always predictable and may be multiplicative and as serious or more serious than in

isolation (

Dourojeanni

, Barandiarán Gómez and

Dourojeanni, 2009)Slide21

Shifting geographies of mobilization around LNG: distancing and the rising significance of cumulative impactsWith fracking boom

 i

ncreasing criticism that FERC, industry not adequately assessing cumulative impacts (regional, national, global)

Critics confronting industry to show LNG terminals

linked

to fracking, as are cumulative impacts (e.g. fracking impacts, climate change, increased energy costs)Slide22

Jordan Cove LNG Terminal (Coos Bay, Oregon) and Pacific Connector PipelineSlide23

Increased attention on cumulative assessment as “distance” from impacts decreasesMore “distant” upstream or downstream impacts not prioritized by Sierra Club etc.

Increased attention to upstream impacts once “fracking” close to home emerged and was linked to LNG export terminalsSlide24

Battling over geographic uncertainty and linking LNG terminals to frackingFERC resisting cumulative fracking assessment b/c “does not regulate production or drilling or gathering of natural gas”

Env

. Orgs, State of Oregon, EPA disagree b/c fracking a significant effect, causally connected to LNG export terminalsSlide25

FERC’s argument: can’t do meaningful analysis b/c it can’t foresee the location, scope and timing of wells and associated infrastructure (e.g. well pads, pipelines and roads) that might be developed to supply LNG export terminals

-not possible to tie LNG exports to any particular shale formation

-could come from shale or conventional gas fields

-Fulbright and

Jaworski

, leading industry law firm:

“Developers would be well advised to avoid filing materials with agencies that link their projects to specific natural gas resources absent offsetting benefits for such claims” (2012)Slide26

Environmental groups and some state agencies counter:

-LNG projects trigger upstream gas production, “reasonably foreseeable,” supported by existing cases

-DOE’s own energy models make such predictions

-LNG industry literature acknowledges thisSlide27

Conclusion

With flip from import to export,

distant upstream impacts

abroad superseded

by upstream impacts, especially

fracking

, that have

immediate

impact on

local livelihoods

groups

critical of LNG have prioritized cumulative assessment more as “distance” from impacts decreases, and as they perceive local livelihoods to be

threatened

scalar

struggle over whether to

evaluate

impacts of

local

LNG terminals

vs

regional

, national and global effects of all connected projects

evident

in a legal battle over geographic certainty, and whether extraction can be linked to terminals Slide28

Additional slidesSlide29

NEPA’s definition of a cumulative impact:“the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action [i.e. project] when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.7). Cumulative impacts include indirect effects that “are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance [than direct effects], but are still reasonably foreseeable.” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a

)).

include indirect effects that “are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance [than direct effects], but are still reasonably foreseeable.” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a))Slide30

Cuiabá Pipeline Impacts

Failure on the part of multinational oil corporations and international financial institutions to comply with agreements to

title lands

of affected indigenous communities

Failure to provide

long-term compensation

as established in International Labor Organization Convention 169

Failure to include indigenous representatives

on the board of

conservation programs

(e.g. the Chiquitano Forest Conservation Program, governed by Enron, Shell, and four NGOs)

Secondary impacts

along pipeline routes (e.g. hunting, colonization, illegal logging, biopiracy and mining, due to lack of reforestation)

Direct social and environmental impacts

(e.g. soil erosion, degradation of wetlands, increased prostitution in local towns and increased alcoholism)Slide31

Indigenous mobilization

sent letter to WB/IFC (was 11% shareholder in the mine)

 $620,000 Indigenous Development Program

indigenous mobilization (letters, press, negotiations) included:

Pressuring mine to recognize 5 communities as “indigenous” (identity politics)

Denouncing mine for offering diesel and employment to leaders

Pressuring for more compensation (asked for 3.6

mn

initially)

“For me what the mine is providing is very little because the mine earns enough in one day, yet just gives us crumbs.”

Chiquitano

community memberSlide32

Tailings pond, Don Mario gold mine – drains to Pantanal Wetlands

Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2006Slide33

Tailings dam, Don Mario gold mine

Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2006Slide34

“Nobody tells us the truth. They themselves [the mine personnel] don’t want to notify us. They say it was something else and that it wasn’t the tailing pond that overflowed, but rather the fresh water reservoir, but I don’t think this is true because the fresh water reservoir is located higher and the tailing pond is lower. I don’t think the overflow would have gone another way. So I think it would really be worth it to assemble a more serious commission, go to the site and take samples for analysis, including soil samples a meter deep, perhaps deeper or shallower, as well as plant and water samples, and possibly hunt a nearby animal to analyze its tissue for contamination from the chemicals used to extract and clean the minerals.”

- Chiquitano community memberSlide35

Toxic Facilities and Poverty Levels in Long Beach, California

Source: EPA

Enviromapper

, April 2004

Proposed LNG TerminalSlide36

Toxic Facilities and Ethnicity in Long Beach, California

Source: EPA

Enviromapper

, April 2004

Proposed LNG TerminalSlide37

1 Mile

Proposed LNG Terminal, Long Beach, and Nearby Sources of Toxic Emissions

(Oil & Gas Wells, Toxic Release Inventory Sites, AB2588 Sites

1

, National Priority List Sites, and Leaking Underground Fuel Tanks)

Proposed LNG Terminal

1 Senate Bill AB2588 requires facilities to report air toxics emissions, ascertain health risks, to notify nearby residents of significant risks, and to reduce risk where significant

Map Produced by Derrick Hindery

NSlide38

Neoliberal Policies & the Entrance of Multinational Oil Corporations in Bolivia

1996: administration of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada implemented "Energy Triangle" to attract foreign investment in hydrocarbons:

a new Hydrocarbons Law:

Lowered taxes

allowed foreign oil corps. to engage in distribution, transportation, industrialization, and refining

Capitalization of the state oil company, YPFB

Bolivian govt. sold 50 percent of the equity in the state oil company, YPFB to various multinational oil corporations, including those analyzed in this case (Enron (now Ashmore), Shell)

Construction of Bolivia-Brazil pipeline

primary shareholders: Enron, Shell, PetrobrasSlide39

“Post” neoliberalism – business as usual

… with some reforms

governments from across the political spectrum continuing to pursue extractive models of development throughout Latin America

Little substantive change, but some improvements related to indigenous rights and environmental protection

e.g.’s

:

Ecuador

:

2008 Constitution grants rights to Nature as a social actor (

Hazlewood

, 2010;

Gudynas

2009)

Bolivia

: 2009 Constitution grants indigenous peoples and

campesinos

right to environmental & social oversight and monitoring of mining and hydrocarbons activities (Art .304)Slide40

Logging trucks use pipeline access roads (San Jose de Chiquitos, Bolivia)

Photo by Derrick Hindery, August 2007