NATOStrategy documents - PDF document

1 NATOStrategy documents NATOSTRATEGY Ed
NATOStrategy documents NATOSTRATEGY Edited by Dr. Gregory W. PedlowChief, Historical OfficeNATO International Staff Central Archives ORDDr. Javier SolanaSecretary GeneralNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization THE EVOLUTION OF NATO STRA,1949-1969Dr. Gregory PedlowChief, Historical OfficeSupreme Headquarters Allied Powers Eur MC 319.10.1949ea MC 3/119.11.1949ea MC 3/228.11.1949p.41The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area DC 629.11.1949p.49The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area DC 6/11.12.1949p.57The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area DC 6/216.1.1950p.65The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

2 MC 3/328.3.1950p.71Portuguese objection
MC 3/328.3.1950p.71Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1) TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 III TOStrategy documents 1949-1969IV MC 3/428.3.1950p.75ench proposal to amend D.C. 6/1 regarding certain lines of communication MC 1428.3.1950p.85Strategic Guidance for the North Atlantic Regional Planning DC 1328.3.1950 (and decision 1.4.1950)p.107North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium T DC 6/31.4.1950p.179Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1) DC 6/424.5.1950p.183Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1) MC 3/5(Final)3.12.1952p.185The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

3 MC 14/1(Final)9.12.1952p.193Strategic Gu
MC 14/1(Final)9.12.1952p.193Strategic Guidance [supersedes DC 13 and MC 14] MC 48(Final)22.11.1954p.231The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years MC 48/1(Final)9.12.1955p.251The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strears - Report N¡2 13.12.1956p.269Directive to the NATO Military Authorities MC 14/2(Rev)(Final Decision)23.5.1957p.277Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area MC 48/2(Final Decision)23.5.1957p.315Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept DPC/D(67)2311.5.1967p.333Decisions of Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session MC 14/3(Final)16.1.1968p.345Overall Strategic Concept for the Def

4 ense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi
ense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area MC 48/3(Final)8.12.1969p.371es to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 V y to begin the process of identifying and reviewing NACouncil decided to declassify NA vier SOLANASecretary GeneralThe North Atlantic Treaty Organisation TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 VII THE EVOLUTION OF NATO STRATEGY1949-1969byDr. Gregory W. PedlowChief, Historical OfficeSupreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 IX TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 XI The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty inWashington on 4 April 1949 was the firststep in the development of a comprehens

5 i-ve strategy for the new Alliance.Artic
i-ve strategy for the new Alliance.Article 3of the treaty called for the signatories toÒmaintain and develop their individual andcollective capacity to resist armed attackÓ,while Article 5 stated that Òthe Partiesagree that an armed attack against one ormore of them in Europe or America shallbe considered an attack against them allÓand in such an event,each of them wouldexercise the right of individual or collectiveself-defence.Article 9 then began the pro-cess of giving the Alliance an organisationalstructure by establishing the North AtlanticCouncil (NAC) and calling for it to Òset upsuch subsidiary bodies as may be necessa-ry;in particular it shall establish immediate-ly a defence

6 committee which shall recom-mend measur
committee which shall recom-mend measures for the implementation ofArticles 3 and 5.ÓOnce the process of ratifying the Treatywas completed in August 1949,the NorthAtlantic Council (at that time composedy of the Foreign Ministers of the mem-ber nations) set about creating the structu-re that would be needed to carry out theprocess of planning for collective selfdefen-ce,a key aspect of which would be theelopment of an overall strategicconcept for the Alliance.In September1949 the Council created the DefenceCommittee (DC),which was composed ofthe Defence Ministers of the memberthe Defence Committee was tas-ked with drawing up unified defence plansfor the North Atlantic area.The Councilals

7 o created the Military Committee (MC),ma
o created the Military Committee (MC),made up of the Chiefs of Staff of the mem-ber nations,along with a three-nation exe-cutive body known as the Standing Group(SG) tasked to oversee the military plan-ning process while the Military Committeewas not in session(1).The Alliance did notyet have an integrated military commandstructure;instead there was a looser com-mittee system with five Regional PlanningGroups composed of representatives fromthe member nations.Chart 1 shows theNATO structure that had come into exis-tence by the end of 1949(2).The new NATO bodies immediately setabout developing an overall strategy for theAlliance.One of the key factors that wouldbe considered in this proces

8 s was the useof nuclear weapons to defen
s was the useof nuclear weapons to defend the NorthAtlantic area.At this time most Westernmilitary planners believed that NATO wasy inferior in conventional militarystrength to the Soviet Union and its EasternEuropean satellites.This perception,alongwith the United StatesÕpreeminence in thenuclear field,therefore profoundly influen-ced the development of NATO strategy.Initial Strategic Planning, The first NATO strategy document wasknown as ÒThe Strategic Concept for theDefense of the North Atlantic AreaÓ.Aninitial draft bearing this title was preparedby the Standing Group on 10 October1949 as document SG 1 and then circula-ted to their Chiefs of Staff for comments.After incorporating a

9 few minor editorialchanges into the doc
few minor editorialchanges into the document,the StandingGroup submitted the Strategic Concept tothe Military Committee as MC 3 on 19October 1949(3).As the Standing GroupÕstransmittal letter noted,MC 3 was Òdrawnup in broad terms which take into accountboth political and strategic considerationsÓ.The Standing Group added that in the futu-re it would issue Òmore detailed strategicguidance of a purely military natureÓfor useby the Regional Planning Groups.MC 3Õs main objective was Òadequate mili-tary strength accompanied by economy oft,resources and manpowerÓ.It istant to note that even the earliestdrafts of NATOÕs strategic concept alreadymentioned nuclear weapons.Thus MC 3Õssec

10 tion on ÒMilitary Measures to Implement
tion on ÒMilitary Measures to ImplementDefense ConceptÓcalled for the Alliance toÒinsure the ability to deliver the atomicbomb promptly.This is primarily a US res-ponsibility assisted as practicable by thenationsÓ.In addition to this proposed use quently. As a r. The other. In December 1950 the1950s. For an analysis ofgic issues. MC 3 is therthe SG series. The initial TOStrategy documents 1949-1969XII of nuclear weapons to defend the NorthAtlantic area,MC 3 called for the membernations to Òarrest and counter as soon aspracticable the enemy offensives againstNorth Atlantic Treaty powers by all meansavailable,including air,naval,land and psy-chological operationsÓ,noting that i

11 nitiallythe Òhard coreÓof ground power
nitiallythe Òhard coreÓof ground power wouldhave to come from the European nationswhile the others were mobilising.Othery measures included neutralisingy air operations,securing and control-ling the sea and air lines of communication,ending the main support areas andbases that would be essential to the defen-ce of the Alliance,and mobilising andexpanding the overall power of the Alliednations for Òlater offensive operations desi-gned to maintain the security of the NorthAtlantic Treaty areaÓ.Comments by the Military Committee andsome of the national delegations led tominor revisions in the document,which wasissued under the same title as MC 3/1 on19 November 1949 and MC 3/2 on 28Novem

12 ber 1949.MC 3/2Õs revised sectionon mil
ber 1949.MC 3/2Õs revised sectionon military measures strengthened thewording of the statement on nuclear wea-pons by stating that the Alliance shouldÒinsure the ability to carry out strategicbombing including the prompt delivery ofthe atomic bombÓ.At this point,however,MC 3/2 was not yet an approved NATOstrategy document,for it lacked the finalstep-Ministerial approval.On 29 NovyCommittee transmitted its strategicconcept to the Defence Committee asdocument DC 6,still with the title ofÒStrategic Concept for the Defense of theNorth Atlantic AreaÓ.The statement onthe Òprompt delivery of the atomic bombÓremained unchanged from MC 3/2,andwhen the Defence Committee met to dis- T 1 TOStr

13 ategy documents 1949-1969 1954), p. 27.
ategy documents 1949-1969 1954), p. 27. In 1951 y of Def TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 XIV y the Regional Planning GroupsDC 13 also set fÒsuch psychological measures as might beorces constituting the major eleof hostilitiesÓ. TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 pp. 344-347. For thein 1951. All military vided more specific strategic guidancefor use in defence planning;and DC 13,which included both of these aspects asell as considerable detailed regional plan-ning.It is important to note that the keyelements of NATO strategy,including theuse of atomic weapons to defend Europe,were thus already in place before the out-break of the Korean War. which also contained onehalf of anation of Ge

14 neral Dwight Dy the Canada-US Regional P
neral Dwight Dy the Canada-US Regional PlanningAlliance impro TOStrategy documents 1949-1969XVI Just as the Strategic Concept required revi-sion to reflect new Alliance members andganisational structures,so did theategic Guidance.In addition there hadbeen changes in intelligence estimates,andthe planning period had been extended to1956.The Standing Group therefore deci-ded to carry out a major revision of MC 14while at the same time incorporating mostof the information that had previously beencontained in DC 13.On 9 December 1952the Military Committee approved MC 14/1,ategic GuidanceÓ,which supersededboth MC 14 and DC 13.Approval by theNAC followed at the Ministerial Meeting inParis on

15 15-18 December 1952.MC 14/1 was far more
15-18 December 1952.MC 14/1 was far more detailed than MC 14because the new document included manysubjects previously covered by DC 13,inclu-ding assumptions,estimated enemy capabili-ties,and courses of action.MC 14/1 statedthat the AllianceÕs overall strategic aim wasÒto ensure the defense of the NATO areaand to destroy the will and capability of theSoviet Union and her satellites to wage war,initially by means of an air offensive,while atthe same time conducting air,ground and seaoperationsÓ.Allied strategic air attacks woulduse Òall types of weaponsÓ.MC 14/1 alsoconsidered the possible impact of Òweaponsof mass destructionÓupon NATO force goalsand concluded that because Òthe co

16 nventio-nal NATO forces at present in be
nventio-nal NATO forces at present in being fall farshort of requirements,no relaxation can beallowed in their planned expansionÓduringthe period 1953-54.Hower,vaila-bility of such weapons and increased deliverycapability during the period 1954-56 maythen necessitate reevaluation of the require-ments for a successful defense of the NAT[North Atlantic Treaty] areaÓ.The New Look/New y ambitious Force Goals b T 2 TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 eafter cited asFRUS], 1952-1954, vol. 2,National Security Affairs,pp. 585-586, 593. For the o major studies to the StandingThe Most Effbined the latter study with submissions fromadmission of the Feder TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 OFor an eva

17 luation of themajor shift in NATOstrateg
luation of themajor shift in NATOstrategy that came withoval of MC 48,see Marc Trachtenbermation du syst-me de dŽfense occiden-tale: les Etats-Unis, laFrance et lÕOTAN,1949-1996, ed. byaisse (Paris,1996), pp. 115-126.PTO InformationService, Texts of FinalCommuniques 1949-oup(Brussels, no date), QNorth AtlanticCouncil, C-oblems,17 December 1954.XVIII apid ounning of Europe unless NA Discussions on Strate,With military technology and planningchanging so rapidly,the Council asked theMilitary Committee in December 1954 toÒcontinue to examine,in conformity withthe agreed strategic concept and within theresources which it is anticipated may bemade available,the most effective patte

18 rnof military strength for the next few
rnof military strength for the next few yearsÓand also to indicate to the member govern-ments Òhow the reassessment in MC 48 ofthe pattern of military strength shouldaffect national defense programsÓ(17).Thisrequest led the Military Committee to issueMC 48/1,ÒThe Most Effective Pattern ofNATO Military Strength for the Next FewYears - Report No.2Ó,on 26 September1955.The Military Representatives Com-mittee,acting on behalf of the MilitaryCommittee,approved the report on 14November 1955,and final approval by theMilitary Committee itself,following incor-poration of one amendment,came on 9December 1955.As the subtitle ÒReport No.2Óindicates,MC 48/1 did not supersede MC 48 buty provided

19 additional infThus MC 48/1 confirmed th
additional infThus MC 48/1 confirmed the forwardence strategy outlined in MC 48 butnoted that because of delays in the Germanmilitary contribution,effective implementa-tion of the forward strategy would notoccur before mid-1959 at the earliest.MC48/1 described the status of NATO militaryplanning and preparations for the conceptscontained in MC 48 and called for additio-nal priority improvements such as the pro-vision of adequate early warning,modernalert systems and air defence.Although the key decision to move towardsubstantial use of nuclear weapons toend the NATO area had already beentaken with the approval of MC 48 and MC48/1,there was still a need to reconcile thenew documents with

20 the older strategydocuments still in eff
the older strategydocuments still in effect (MC 3/5 and MC14/1,both dating from 1952).Thus in thesummer of 1956,the Standing Group andthe Military Committee began to work on TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 RWampler, NATOStrategic Planning, pp.35-38; Duffield, PowerRules, pp. 121-128.SNorth AtlanticCouncil, C-M(55)113(Revised),TO DefencePlanning: Note by theetary General, 8 December 1955.TWampler, NATOStrategic Planning, pp.36-37.During this periodNATOÕs forwarddeployed militaryces were known asthe ÓShieldÒ, while thece was consideredNATOÕs ÓSwordÒ. member nations wAlliance cannot be secured by means aloneÓ.Òpolitical directiof 13 December 1956 contained aAlliance and of eachence o

21 rcounting on the use of nsions or hostil
rcounting on the use of nsions or hostile local actions TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 Response IÒ. Beatrice ocused prle to dealsought to broaden the scope of such an incident or prolong it,a concept of limited war with the So TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 Republic of Germanyjoined LIVE OAK in1961], considerabledetail about Alliedplanning for theSecond Berlin Crisiscan be found in declas-sified national docu-ments, in particularfrom the UnitedKingdom and UnitedStates. See Gr the latter should be given copies of therecord of the present discussionÓ.MC 14/2and MC 48/2 together superseded the fourstrategic document that had until thenbeen in effect:MC 3/5,MC 14/1,MC 48and MC 48/1 [Ch

22 art 3 traces the evolutionof NATOÕs str
art 3 traces the evolutionof NATOÕs strategy documents].The twonew strategy documents were issued infinal form on 23 May 1957.owing Disenchantment with e Retalia policy to TOStrategy documents 1949-1969XXII Pedlow, ÒLIVE OAKÓ,pp. 102-103; Sean M.Maloney,orlŠufer derFlexible Response,MilitŠrgeschichte,Jahrgang 7, Heft 1(1992), pp. 913.Address by Secretaryof Defense McNamaraat the Ministerial1962, in FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 8, NationalSecurity Policy, pp.440, 445-446. entional attack on of a Change in StragyReacting to the growing U.S.pressure for amodification of NATOÕs military strategy,theNATO Ministers meeting at Oslo on 8-10May 1961 Òinvited the Council in PermanentSessi

23 on,in close co-operation with the mili-
on,in close co-operation with the mili- T 3 TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 NATO InformationService, NATO FinalCommuniques, 1949-1974, p. 138.Steinhoff andPommerin,Strategiewechsel, pp. 92-93.Address by Secretaryof Defense McNamaraat the Ministerialin FRUS, 1961-1963,vol. 8, NationalSecurity Policy, pp.278, 280281.Paul Buteux, ThePolitics of NuclearConsultation in NATO,1965-1980(Cambridge, 1983),pp. 102-103; Steinhoffand Pommerin,Strategiewechsel, pp.100-102; CircularTelegram from theDepartment of State, 9 May 1962, in FRUS,1961-1963, WestEurope and Canada,pp. 389-393United KingdomPublic Record Office,DEFE 4/147, COS(62),fCommittee, 60th, 28 September 1962.Steinhoff andPommerin,Strategiew

24 echsel, p. 174. with a view to improwith
echsel, p. 174. with a view to improwith a view to impro()17 April 1962],which focusedon the issue of political control of nuclearweapons.The report concluded withrecommendations for consultation on theuse of nuclear weapons under varying cir-cumstances,with such use being virtuallyautomatic in the event of a Soviet nuclearattack but subject to consultation - if timepermitted - in the case of a full-scale Sovietconventional attack.In both cases theNATO nuclear response would be Òon thescale appropriate to the circumstancesÓ.Allof the nations except France,which did notwish to see NATO take any steps awayfrom the policy of massive retaliation,agreed with the report,which became theÒAthe

25 ns GuidelinesÓafter the SecretaryGenera
ns GuidelinesÓafter the SecretaryGeneral found compromise wording on theapplicability of these Guidelines that wasacceptable to France(32).In September 1962 Secretary General DirkStikker circulated a paper on NATODefense Policy [NDP/62/10,3 September1962] calling for an early resumption of theCouncilÕs discussion on NATO defenceissues,including the deployment of MediumRange Ballistic Missiles in NATO,the possi-bility of developing a NATO nuclear forceand the U.S.proposals for more flexibility inNATO nuclear strategy.The Stikker paperexpressed concern that Òbecause the inevi-tability of escalation of nuclear warfare isoften assumed,the idea is being encoura-ged that no choice is open be

26 tweenconventional defence and al-lout nu
tweenconventional defence and al-lout nuclearwarfare.Ó(33)This call for more flexibility wasnot supported by several NATO nations,and the issue was temporarily set aside dueto the pressure of events in the CubanMissile Crisis.Soon afterward,at the start of 1963,Secretary General Stikker began a majorNATO Force Planning Exercise designed torelate strategy,force requirements and theresources that the member nations wereable to provide.To provide Strategic gui-dance for this process,the NAC directedthe Military Committee to prepare anÒAppreciation of the Military Situation as ItAffects NATO up to 1970Ó.When comple-ted in September 1963,this documentknown as MC 100/1 (Draft) called for amu

27 ch greater degree of flexibility in Alli
ch greater degree of flexibility in Alliancestrategy.The document envisioned threestages of defence:an attempt to containaggression with conventional weapons,arapid escalation to the use of tacticalnuclear weapons under certain circum-stances,and a gradual strategic use ofnuclear weapons(34).MC 100/1 (Draft)Õs criticism of a trip-wirestrategy and its calls for flexibility in NATOÕsresponses to aggression (including the pos-sibility of limited tactical n TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 pp. 65-91. See also ucture in March 1966 Planning Committee in Ministerwhich had alreaould attempt to TOStrategy documents 1949-1969 ed MC 14/3 (ÒOvategic Conceptence of the Nor TOStrategy documents 1