NaheBitiThePhilosophyandProcessofGrassrootsReconciliationandJustice - PDF document

1 NaheBiti:ThePhilosophyandProcessofGrassr
NaheBiti:ThePhilosophyandProcessofGrassrootsReconciliation(andJustice)inEastTimor«sioBabo-SoaresUNTAETandtheEastTimoresehavepursuedformalreconciliationprocessesaspartofthenation-buildingeffortinnewlyindependentEastTimor.Theseformalreconciliationprocessesaimforclosureandoperateintherealmofnationalpolitics.Inthemeantimelocalcommunitieshavebeendealingwiththeissuesofreintegratingrefugeesandrebuildingsocialrelationshipsthroughaninventiveadaptationoftraditionalpracticesofreconciliation.Incontrasttotheformalelite-levelstrategies,thegrassrootsstrategiesaremoreconcernedwithprocessthanformaloutcomes.Keywords:EastTimor;Reconciliation;Refugees;RestorativeJustice;Dualism;UnitedNations;Post-ConßictThispaperexaminestheconceptof‘reconciliation’asemployedintheEastTimoresenationalpoliticalarenapost-1999byboththeUnitedNationsAdministrationinEastTimor(UNTAET)andtheEastTimoresepoliticalleadership.ItexaminesreconciliationaspursuedthroughformalcriminaljusticeproceduresanditscontributiontotheeffortstosettledifferencesamongtheEastTimorese.Ihopetoshowtheissuesandlimitssurroundingthisstyleof‘reconciliation’bycomparingandcontrastingitwiththeconceptofnahebiti(literally,stretchingthemat),alocalEastTimoreseequivalentof‘reconciliation’whichembracesthenotionofmeeting,discussionandagreementinordertoreachaconsensusamongopposingfactions.Itformspartofagrandprocessthataimstolinkthepastandthefutureandtobringsocietyintoanultimatestateofsocialstabilitywherepeace,tranquillityandhonestyprevail.Thus,nahebitiisanevolvingprocesswhichseeksultimatelytoachievea sioBabo-Soares,TheAsiaFoundation,Dili,EastTimor.Tel:61(0)261252162.Fax:61(0)261254896.Email:dionisio@tafat.orgTheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropologyVol.5,No.1,April2004,pp.15 ISSN1444-2213(print)/ISSN1740-9314(online)2004TheAustralianNationalUniversityDOI:10.1080/1444221042000201715 stablesocialorderwithinsocietyandhasnonecessaryconnectionwiththestate’smanagementofcriminaljustice.Thispaperwillarguethatthisvillage-levelconceptofachievingpeaceandstabilitycouldbefittedintothebroadconceptofstatejustice.TheaimofEastTimorese‘reconciliation’istwofold.Firstly,itisacross-borderconcerntofacilitatepeacebetweenpro-Independenceleadersandsupportersandleadinganti-Independencesupporters,themajorityofwhomremain‘displaced’inIndonesianWestTimor.AsecondaimistosettledifferencesamongthewiderEastTimoresepopulationlivingwithintheirnation’sborders.IreferheretotheexistingfactionsinEastTimorwhoremaindividedonthebasisoftheirpastassociationswithpoliticalgroupswhichtookupdifferingpositionsinthestruggleforindepe

2 ndence.Withregardtothefirstaim,thepro-an
ndence.Withregardtothefirstaim,thepro-andanti-IndependencesupportersdispersedfollowingtheUnitedNations-sponsored1999referenduminEastTimorinwhichalmost80percentofthepopulationvotedtoseparatefromIndonesia.Mostoftheanti-Independencefactionalleadersandtheirsupporters,aswellasordinarycitizens,wereforcedtotakerefugeinIndonesianWestTimorunderthreatfromarmedmilitias.SubsequentlymostofthecivilianpopulationhasreturnedtoEastTimor.However,formerleadinganti-Independencesupporters,suspectedmilitiasandtheirfamilieswhoarebelievedtohavebeenatleastpartiallyinvolvedinthedestructioncontinuetoliveinWestTimor.Fearingretaliatoryactsbytheircountrymen,theserefugeesremainreluctanttoreturntoEastTimor.Officialfigurespointto45,000refugeesstillremaininginWestTimorasofMarch2002,butunofficialfiguresestimatethisfiguretobearoundThecontinuingpresenceofsomanyrefugeesinWestTimorisseenasconstitutingasecuritythreattoEastTimor.Awareofthis,EastTimoreseleadersparticularlytheIndependenceleader,andfirstpresident,JoseAlexandreXananaGusmahaveworkedtopromotereconciliationbetweentheformerpro-andanti-Independencesupporters.Gusma˜ohastravelledtoWestTimortoassuretheremainingEastTimoreserefugeesthatitissafetoreturnhome,andheiswidelyacceptedastheonlyfigurewiththestatureandcredibilityrequiredtofacilitatesuchaproject.Cross-borderreconciliationhasbeenemphasised,sinceitisperceivedthatformeranti-IndependencesupportersinWestTimormightseektodestabiliseEastTimorinthefuture.Notallreconciliationiscross-borderinnature.WithinEastTimorthereresidegroupsstillinconflict.Primeissuesheredatebacktotheperiodaroundthebriefcivilwarin1975wherethousandsofpeoplewerekilledandtheirpropertystolenordestroyed.DuringtheperiodofresistanceagainstIndonesia,197499,hundredsofarbitrarykillingsoccurredamongtheEastTimorese,andvengeanceandretaliatoryfeelingsremainstrongasnoonehaseverfacedformaljusticewithregardtotheviolentcrimesofthisperiod.Notsurprisingly,accusationsandallegationscontinuetohauntthepoliticalprocessasbothpoliticiansandordinaryciviliansinvolvedinsuchordealsaccuseeachother.Certainly,thereisgrowingdemandthatthoseresponsibleforpasteventsbeheldaccountablesoastoavoidsettingabadprecedentforthecountry’sfuturelegalsystem.D.Babo-Soares BeforethecountrymovedtowardsIndependencein2002,UNTAETissuedRegulation2001/10toestablishaSouthAfrican-styleCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation(CRTR).TheCRTRisexpectedtoincludethecrimescommittedbetween1974and1999intheiragenda.Officialreconciliationisconcernedwithresolvingpoliticaldifferencesamongthepoliticalelitessinceemphasishasbeen

3 placedonbridgingpoliticaldifferencesbetw
placedonbridgingpoliticaldifferencesbetweenpro-andanti-Independenceleadershipandsupporters.ThegoaloftheprojectistobringtogetherEastTimoresefromdifferentpoliticalperspectivesattheleadershiplevelbecauseitisbelievedthiswillpersuadethemajorityofsupportersofbothfactionstoreconcile.ThisincludespoliticalleadersstilllivinginrefugeecampsinWestTimor.Inthisprocessofelite-drivenreconciliationlittleattentionhasbeengiventohealingthewoundsofthewiderpopulationresultingfrompastconflict.Thehigh-levelreconciliationnotonlyrequirestimeandpatiencebutalsoinvolvescomplexbureaucraticprocedures,highcostsandpoliticalgoodwill,dedicationandcommitmentfromallinvolved.Furthermore,thelimitedinvolvementofpeopleatthegrassrootslevelmakesitseemmorelikepartial(oneparty)reconciliation,andnotacomprehensive(inclusive)reconciliation.ManyseetheseshortcomingsexpressedinthefactthatviolenceisstilltakingplaceinvariouspartsofEastTimoramongthenon-decision-makingelementsinthesociety.ThestreetfightingbetweenopposingpoliticalfactionsinJanuary2002(SuaraTimorLorosae,5and6January2002)andthemilitiaincursionon4January2003wereevidenceofthefailedelitereconciliation.(Table1summarisesthedifferencesbetweenthetwostylesofreconciliation.)TheNeedforGrassroots-LevelReconciliationHowto‘reintegrate’refugeesbackintotheirsocietiesoforigin?Inthepast,somevoluntaryreturneesexperiencedreprisalsupontheirreturntoEastTimor,includingseriousinjuryanddeath.However,theideaof‘reconciliation’isbeginningtotakeholdamongtheEastTimoreseand,atthetimeofwritingthispaper,awidecross-sectionofthenation’scitizensinterestedinhavingtheircountrymenreturnareactivelyparticipatingintheprocess.Thepointtonoteisthatforalongtimethemajorityofthepopulationfeltmarginalisedfromparticipatinginreconciliationatgrassrootslevel.ThefactthatnotonesinglepoliticalleaderineitherEastorWestTimoreverinvolvedthemselvesingrassrootsreconciliationuntillate2001didnothelpthissituation.NoteventheresistancebodyCNRTConselhoNacionaldeResistenciaTimorense(NationalCouncilofEastTimoreseResistance),whichhasbeenthedefactogovernmentinruralareaswasinvolvedinreconciliationatthislevel.However,certainindividualsandgroupsbeganlookingforalternatives,giventheperceivedshortcomingsofelitereconciliation.First,localnon-governmentorganisations(NGOs)tooktheinitiativetofosterreconciliationatthegrassrootslevel.Likewise,othersectionswithinEastTimoreseTheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology societyconductedtheirownprocessesof‘reintegration’ofrefugeesintotheirowncommunityupontheirreturntoEastTimor.Manyassociatedmeetingstookplacealongtheborderbe

4 tweencitizensofthetwocountries(Indonesia
tweencitizensofthetwocountries(IndonesiaandEastTimor)withouttheconsentoflocalpoliticalleaders.LocalcommunityleaderspursueddirectcontactwithrefugeesthroughfamilyandcommunitymeanswherebypeoplewereencouragedtocontacttheirrelativesinWestTimordirectlyorviacommunitylinksandhencegettheprocessofrepatriationandreintegrationunderwayforthosewhowantedtoreturntoEastTimor.ThisgrassrootsapproachtorepatriatingrefugeesappearswidespreadandeffectiveandhasattractedtheinterestofpoliticalleaderssuchasXananaGusma˜o,MariAlkatiriandLu’Olo.InlateNovember2001,Gusma˜ousedhisofficetomeetrefugeesinKupang(WestTimor)andinlateMarch2002hewenttoAtambuatoasktherefugeestocomehome.Theinvolvementofthepoliticalleaderssuggestsaslowshiftinapproach,thusprovidingmoreroomforpeopleatthegrassrootsleveltobecomeinvolvedinthereconciliationprocess.Publicacknowledgmentofthesignificanceofreconciliationatthislevelisincreasing.Table1summarisesthetwodifferentmodelsofreconciliationdiscussedinthispaper.Groupsseekingtoreconcileatthegrassrootsleveldonotnecessarilybelongtotheelite;however,theyarefollowersofvariouspoliticalparties.Thus,althoughremainingontheperiphery,theirassociationwithdifferenturbanpoliticalgroupsinevitablycompelsthemtosharetheatmosphereofpoliticalrivalrythatisdevelopedatthecentre.ThedivisiongoesrightfromDili,thecapitalofEastTimor,totheruralvillages.Consciousofthisstructuraldivision,someruralEastTimoreseandlocalcommunityleadershavetriedhardtoexcludepoliticaldifferencesatthecentre(thecapital)fromreconciliationinitiativesatthegrassrootslevel.Theyarguethateachcommunityhasitsidiosyncrasies,thusneedingparticularhandlingappropriateinthelocalcontext.InvolvementofUNTAETandOtherOrganisationsItwouldbemisleadingtosidelineUNTAETinthereconciliationeffort.Since1999,UNTAETanditssisterorganisations,aswellasotherinternationalandlocal Table1ModelsofreconciliationModelsElitereconciliationGrassrootsreconciliationParticipantsPoliticalleader/appointeesLocalleadersationPoliticalsecurityBringingbackfamiliesOperationcostExpensieLessexpensiNatureExclusieInclusiApproachHigh-leelcontactGrassrootscontactSolutionPoliticalsolutionOpensolutionObjectieConsensusStablecommunitylifeLegitimacyApproedatthetopleelGrassrootsapproD.Babo-Soares organisations,havebeencloselyinvolvedintryingtorepatriaterefugeestoEastTimor.AdrawbackofthisprogramisthatithasbeenconductedatahighlevelbetweenIndonesiaandtheUN,ignoringthefactthatarmedmilitias,whofeltmarginalisedintheprocess,byandlargecontrolledtherefugeesinthecampsinWestTimor.Clearly,theIndonesiangovernmentwasnotabletocontrolthes

5 emilitias.Forexample,on6September2000,am
emilitias.Forexample,on6September2000,amobofmorethan100peopleledbyinfuriatedmilitialeadersattackedtheUNHCR(UnitedNationsHighCommissionforRefugees)officeinAtambua,WestTimor,andkilledthreeinternationalstaffUNTAETassigneditsformerdeputyadministratorN.ParameswarantodealspecificallywiththerefugeeissueonlyafterreceivingassurancesfromIndonesiathatthesafetyofitsstaffcouldbeguaranteed.Untillate2002,althoughitagreedinprincipletooperateinWestTimor,theUNHCRhadnotsetupapermanentofficetooverseerefugees.Nevertheless,untilmid-2002,exchangevisitsbothgroupandindividualamongthepoliticalleaderswereencouraged,paidforandfacilitatedbyUNTAET.Throughthiseffort,thesecondroundofrepatriationtookplace.Anunavoidableandseriousdrawbackofmassrepatriationofthistypeisthatreturneeswhowereperpetratorsofpreviousviolenceavoidedscrutiny.Thus,newproblemsarosewithregardtotheirsafetyaftertheyreturnedtoEastTimor.Likewise,dissatisfactiongrewovertheissueofjustice:canthesepeoplebeheldaccountableforthecrimescommittedinSeptember1999?UNTAETworkedhardtobringsomeoftheperpetratorstojusticebysettingupaseriouscrimespanelinthelocalcourttotrycasesthatfellunderthe‘seriousandagainsthumanity’category.On11December2001,thepanelconvictedtenmenofcrimesagainsthumanitychargesinLospalos.‘Thetenaccusedwerefoundguiltyofatleastoneofthesevenchargesandreceivedsentencesofbetween4yearsandthemaximum33years4monthsimprisonment.’Anumberofreconciliationtalksbetweentheeliteofpro-andanti-IndependencegroupswereheldinWashington,Tokyo,Singapore,Bali(Indonesia)andBaucau(EastTimor)afterSeptember1999butnopositiveoutcomewasreached.Apartfromthat,forEastTimoresesocietyatlargetheelitereconciliation,whichstartedasfarbackasthepre-ballotperiodin1999,neverproducedanypositiveresults,thusgeneratingfurtherdistrustofthislevelofsociety.Thishasfurtherdeepenedfrustrationamongthepopulation,andreducedtrustinhigh-levelreconciliation,particularlyamongpeoplewhoareconcernedatseeingtheirrelativeslivingintheslumsofWestTimorrefugeecampsandafraidtoreturntoEastTimor.ThefailureofthepoliticalelitetoreconcileamongthemselveshassloweddownthereconciliationbetweenEastTimoresehome-stayersandrefugees,includingtherepatriationofthelatter.Thishasledtoagrowinginterestingrassrootsreconciliation,especiallyinviewofthewillingnessofthislevelofthesocietytodisassociateitselffromtheideologicalandsymbolicdifferencesinthecentreamongthepoliticalelite.Forexample,duringtheCNRTCongressinAugust2000,communityleadersfromvariouspartsofEastTimorspokeoutabouttheirTheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology disappointmentatthecentralisedre

6 conciliationinthecapital,Dili,andexpress
conciliationinthecapital,Dili,andexpressedfrustrationovertheexclusionofpeoplefromdirectinvolvementinasimilarprocessatthegrassrootslevel.Infact,theysaid,thepoliticaleliteunderstandsverylittleaboutthepoliticalfrictionwithinthesocietyatgrassrootslevel.Grassrootsreconciliationseemstobemorepromisinginachievingreconciliationthanhigh-leveltalksbetweenpro-andanti-Independenceelitegroups(see,13NovemberTypesofGrassrootsReconciliationTherearetwocategoriesofgrassrootsreconciliation(seeTable2).ThefirstisfamilyreconciliationcarriedoutthroughpersonalcontactfollowedbywelcomingceremoniesattheborderbetweenEastandWestTimor.InSeptember2000,intheareasofAinaro,ErmeraandalongtheborderwithWestTimor(BobonaroandSuai),peopleapproachedtheirfamilymembersinWestTimorandarrangedmeetingswiththem.Discussionsanddebateswereheldbyandamongthemandwereobservedonlybylocalcommunityleaders.Throughfamilyreunions,refugeeswerebroughtback.Ceremonieswereconductedintraditionalwaysforasymbolichandoverofthesepeople,undertheauspicesofcommunityleaders.Upontheirarrivalintheirdistrictsorvillages,anotherwelcomingceremonywasheldbeforetheywerereintegratedintotheircommunities.Suchwelcomingceremonieswereheldinawaythatallowedtherepresentativeoftherefugeestoaddressthepublic,usuallyinapublicsquare,confessingtheiractionsandofferingapologiesandtheiracceptanceofbeingbroughtbeforethecourtshouldtheybefoundguilty.Thesecondcategoryreferstowhatisknownaspeople’sreconciliation.Itissimilartofamilyreconciliationbutinvolveswidercommunityparticipation.Eachvillage,sub-districtordistrictindependentlyarrangesmeetingswiththeircounterpartsintherefugeecamps.Afteragreeingonthetermsandconditions,therefugeesarebroughtbacktotheirplaceoforiginandusuallythisprocesstakesplaceinthepresenceoflocalpoliticalauthorities.Alocalcustomaryceremonyisheldtoreceiveandacceptrefugees,inwhichbothsidesagreetomendtheirdifferencesandestablishpeaceandorder.Usually,suchaprocessisfinalisedwiththeceremonialexchangeofbetelnuttoshowsincerityandcommitment.Also,insomepartsofEastTimor,an‘OathofBlood’ceremony,asymbolicbondinwhichbothsidesdrinkeachother’sbloodandaresymbolicallyboundas(literally,elder/youngersiblings)isalsoheld. Table2TypesofgrassrootsreconciliationFormsFamilytofamilyPeopletopeopleerageFamilyVillageParticipantsFamilymembersCommunitymembersThird-partyinementLocalleadersLocalleadersandlocalNGOsMeansNahebitiNahebitiD.Babo-Soares The‘oath’bindstheparties,anditisbelievedthat,iftheyfailtoobserveandadheretothetermsandconditionsunderlyingthissymbolicgesture,thiswilldestabilisetheexistingsocialord

7 er.TheProcess:ThePhilosophyofLocalReconc
er.TheProcess:ThePhilosophyofLocalReconciliationTheMeaningofReconciliationtotheEastTimoreseTheword‘reconciliation’isnewtomanyEastTimorese.IntheCollinsCobuildEnglishDictionary,reconciliationisdefinedaswaysof‘reconcilingtwothingsthatseemtobeopposedtoeachother


[andto]findawayinwhichtheyareinagreement’(Sinclair2001).Thus,reconciliationissimilartorestorativejusticeinwhichthepartiesinvolvedinaconflictcometoresolveissuestogether.duringIndonesianruleinEastTimor,reconciliationwaspromotedamongtheeTheCatholicChurchsponsoredunsuccessfulmeetings,knownasDareIandII,betweenpro-andanti-Independenceleadersintheperiodleadinguptothe1999referendum,forexample.However,inthecustomarycontext,reconciliationisunderstooddifferently.Tothemajorityofthepopulation,reconciliationreferstoacompletesetofideasorconceptswhosemeaninggoesbeyondthesuccessfulcompletionofanadministrativeprocess.Traditionalleadersaretheoneswhohistoricallyconvenereconciliatoryeventsofthiskind.However,inthecontemporarypoliticalcontextsuchmeetingsareorganisedbybothtraditionalleadersandthosewhoareregardedashavingsomepoliticalinfluence.TheEastTimoreseusethetermnahebiti,whichcanbetranslatedliterallyasstretchingorlayingdownthematasameanstofacilitateconsensus,orreconciliation,amongthem.Conceptually,thistermfindsitsphilosophicalbasisinthewaythelocalsviewtheirworld.(NahebitiisunderstoodwidelyinEastTimor,notonlyasaprocessbutalsoasameanstoresolvedifferences.)Itistheusualwayofreferringtoagatheringinwhichpeopleareinvitedtositonamatprovidedspecificallyforthatoccasion.TheEastTimoresedistinguishbetweenbitibootmat)andbitikiik(smallmat).Apartfromtheirliteralmeanings,theformerreferstoavenueusedtosettlewiderkinship(lineage,kinandclan)mattersandthelatterreferstoavenuewheremorenarrowlydefinedfamilymattersarediscussedandsettled.Botharevenuestodiscussandsettleissuesamongtheinterestedpartiesthroughconsensus.However,thisisregardedonlyaspartofanall-inclusiveprocessandnotastheendoftheprocessitself.Mattersthatarediscussedandsettledonthemat()shouldnotbebroughtintothecommunityastheycouldleadtodisharmony.TheEastTimoreseusuallyquotethefollowingphraseattheendofmeetingsorateventswhereissuesarediscussedintheaboveterms:‘SaidamakladiakhaluhatihakamonuhelaihaneÕe,labelelouribaliur.Maibebuatnebemakdiakloribahodifohateneba,nohanourin,oansira.’Thetranslationis:‘Whatisbadshouldbeforgotten,andshouldnotbetakenhomewithyou.However,youmaytakethegoodTheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology thingstotell,andtoteach,yourchildren.’Thus,nahebitigoesbeyondshort-termreconciliationtowardsamuchgreateraim,whi

8 chiscontinuingharmonyandpeaceinthesociet
chiscontinuingharmonyandpeaceinthesociety.SuchaconceptiswellentrenchedinthewaytheEastTimoreseperceivetheworldtheylivein.Tounderstandthismoreprofoundly,letmeturntocustomaryviewsoftheworld.ThePhilosophicalBasisofLivingPhenomenaAnthropologistssuchasvanWouden(1968[1935])havecontendedthattheconceptoflifeinEasternIndonesiansocietiesderivesfrommythsandtheirinterpretationoflivingphenomena.Inmanyofthesesocietiestheconceptoflifeembracesthephysical,theliving/reallife,andthenon-physicalaspectsoflife,ritual,mythandhistory(1968,pp.23).Societiesrelyonlivingphenomenaasamodelfor‘all-embracing’classification(ibid.,p.2)intheirsociallife.AmongtheTimorese,thisreallife/non-physicallifeistranslatedintotheirviewoftheworld,theircosmologyandtheworldwheretheylive(Fox1989),wherebythesecularisinhabitedbylivingthingsandthecosmosbythespiritandtheancestors(Traube1986;Hicks1972).Forlifetoproceedthereshouldbeabalancebetweenthetwoworlds.Failuretoobserveappropriaterituals/exchangesleadstoanimbalance,whichmightresultinnegativeconsequencestothoselivinginthesecularworld.Incustomarythinking,thefailureoftheharvest,starvation,illness,floods,earthquakesandothernaturaldisastersarebelievedtobetheresultofthisdisequilibrium.Thisdualisticthinkingiswellrepresentedinthewaypeoplelookattheirworld.Lifephenomenaaretakentoportraytherelationshipbetweenlivingbeingsandthecosmos.Thus,fortheEastTimorese,nightcannotexistwithoutday,mancannotexistwithoutwoman,lifecannotexistwithoutdeath.Otherconfigurationssuchasright/left,top/bottom,water/earth,ascent/descentalsorepresentthedualisticviewoftheworld.Amongtheseistheconceptof‘roots’,‘origins’,‘past’,‘history’and,‘future’,‘end’,‘tips’.TheEastTimoreserefertoeventsofthepastastherootorthebasisofinterpretationandusethemtopredictorclassifypresentandfutureevents.Todayisseenasacontinuationofthepast,andthefuturemightlalaÕotuirlolos(nothappenasitissupposed)shouldonedisregardthepast.Asocietywithoutandwithoutdoesnothaveanidentityand,therefore,mourishanesanbalada-fuik(livesananimallife).Itisconsideredtobe,(wild)‘foreign’,andisnotthesubjectofdiscussionandcarriesnoweightinsociallife.Conversely,asocietywithoutpossessesno(seeFigure1).Thereisabalanceandequivalentqualitybetween,withoutwhichonecannotexist.Traditionally,bothsidesrepresentoriginsandends,showingsociety’slifespan.Asociety,eitheranindividualoracommunity,isrequiredtorecogniseits,itsforebears,itslineageanditsclan’sorigin,becausetheseelementsrepresentthe‘source’,thetrunkoflife.Onlybyrecognisingsuchoriginsdoesanindividualoracommunityknowits.Itisaconceptthatembraces

9 (elder-youngerD.Babo-Soares siblings),li
(elder-youngerD.Babo-Soares siblings),lineage,clan,kin;rai,thelandonestandson;,thehouseonelivesin;mouris(life),thefutureoneseekstoachieve;andrate,thegraveyardofone’skin.Thisconceptofisintersectedbythesequenceofeventsthatconstituteslifetheprocessduringalifetime.Thus,deathisnotanendoftheprocessthatiscommencedatbirthbutisabridgewhichfacilitatestheprocesstoeternallife,orlifeafterdeath.Timoreseexegesesdepictthesequenceofeventsinlifeinaconfigurationof(tree-trunk),or‘tree’,whichintheirminds,canbecalled‘tree’onlyifithas,‘roots’(origin)and,‘tip’(end),allofwhichserveastheconditionsforatreetoexist.Hunisalsoreferredtoas,and(tip).Inthisbotanicalconfiguration,lifemustbeseenasawholeconceptoforiginandendorrootsandtips(ofatree).Reconciliationornahebitiisplacedinthecontextofthetwoends().Itisseenasaprocessconductedtohealpastmistakes,thelatterbeingtheconflictandintra-Timoresedisputessincetempouluk(timeoflongago),andaimstobringthisto,livinginharmony.Pastmistakesconstitutethebeginningoftheprocess,andreconciliationisastandardprocedurethatmustbehighlightedinordertohealsuchmistakes.Togethertheyrepresentacontinuingprocess,butthisprocessdoesnotendwithreconciliation,forthelatterisonlyameanstoachieve,thatis,harmonyinlife.PhilosophyofNaheBitiWovenmats()aretraditionallymadetobeusedinTimoresehouseholds.Theirsizevaries,butlocalmatsaregenerallyrectangular,2metreslongand1metrewide.Theycanbefound(stretched)insidetraditionalhouses,usuallyinguestrooms,and,alongwiththeirconflictresolutionpurposes,areoftensleptonbyguests.EachsocietyorethnicgroupinEastTimorhasadifferentwayofinterpreting,butgenerallytheyincludecommoncharacteristics.Whiletraditionallynahebitiisareferencetoavenue,spaceorplacewherefamilyandwidersocialissuesarediscussed,debatedandsettled,itsmeaninghasbeenbroadenedtoencompassmendingdifferences,resolvingdisputesorsettlingpoliticalconflictsamongtheEastTimorese.Thetermwaspopularisedafterthecivilwarin1974andwasusedagainin1999withtheaimofbringingtogetherdividedEastTimoresefactionstosettletheirpoliticaldifferencesthroughthistypeofcustomaryconflictresolutionprocedure. Figure1HunandRohanideallyinbalanceTheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology AmongtheMambaipeopleofErmera,particularlyintheLetefohoarea,nahebiticanbeunderstoodthroughthewaythewordsarecompounded.Theconceptitselfgoesbeyonditsliteralmeaning.Tocomprehendthismoredeeply,elementsofhavebeenseparatedandtheirmeaningsindividuallyexplained(seeTable3).aremadefrom,aleafofapalm(Pandanustectorious)thatcanbefoundinpartsofTimor.TotheEastTimorese,differentsymbolisediverseideasandopinio

10 nsorconflictingviews,whicharebroughttoge
nsorconflictingviews,whicharebroughttogethertoconstituteaThissymbolicrepresentationemphasisesthepointthatbringingtogetherdifferentsetsofideas,orreconcilingthem,doesnotnecessarilymeanthatanagreementhasbeenachievedortheaimofareconciledagreementattained.Rather,bringingtogetherdifferentsetsofdiversethoughtsonlysuggeststhatdifferencescanbemended.Thephilosophybehindthisconceptisthatfordifferenttomatcheachotherandformamat,theyneedtobecheckedtoensure()thattheycanfitwithoutleavinganygaps(seeTable3).Likewise,fortheconflictingideastocometogetherthereshouldbeapriorconsensusamongtheconflictingpartiesthattheywillseektofindasolutionfortheirproblemandforthatpurposethenahebiticouldproceed.Withoutapriorcommitmentfromtheconflictingparties,therewouldbenoconsensusaboutwhattoexpectfromanyfuturemeeting,thustherewouldbegapsintheConceptually,areadysymbolisesconsensus.Bringingtogetherdifferentleavesintheformofamatsymbolisesthewillingnesstobringtogethertheconflictingpartiesandtofindacommonsettlement.‘Consensus’ispairedwith‘pastmistakes’,makingthemdifferentbutcomplementaryasameansdesignedtoachievesocialharmonyinsociety.Understandably,beinginsuchaposition,nahebiti(reconciliation)inlocalEastTimoreseperceptionimpliesacompletelydifferentobjectivefromtheonesoughtbyformalreconciliation,cynicallydubbedasbootsiranialian(thewordsofthoseinpower)or‘elitereconciliation’.Reconciliationamongtheeliteseekstomenddifferencesandaimstobringthedividedpoliticalfactionstogether;thusanagreementbetweenthetwosidesisregardedastheultimategoalofreconciliation.Thisisdifferentfromwhatisunderstoodatthelocallevelofnahebiti.Reconciliationinthelattersenseisperceivedasaprocessbetween‘pastmistakes’and‘futureharmony’.Thus,consensusormendingdifferencesismerelyaprocessthatmusttakeplaceinordertoachieve(tip,end),inharmonyinlife,peaceandsocialorder. Table3StagesinplaitingabitianditsinterpretationStagesWeaTranslation1Preparationtoplait2SelectionofAgreetomeeting3EnsurematcheseachotherSettheparameters4PlaitingCompromise/consensus5ThecompletionofAccomplishmentwithritualproceedingsD.Babo-Soares TranslatingPhilosophicalValuesintoConcreteTermsLetusnowmovetotheimplementationofnahebitiinsomepartsofEastTimorwithrespecttotheconflictofrecenttimes,inparticulartheviolencesurroundingSeptember1999andthe‘Independence’ballot.ThestagesaresetoutinTable4.TheWillingnesstoComeTogether:TheProcedureApproachestoreconciliationinthiscontexthave,forthemostpart,beendevotedtobringingtherefugeesinWestTimorbacktotheirowncommunities.Asdiscussed,forthispurpose,arrangementshavebeenconductedth

11 roughfamily-to-family,district-to-distri
roughfamily-to-family,district-to-districtandUNTAET/national-levelcross-bordercontacts.Afterinitialcontact,asecondmeeting,whichinvolvescommunitiesofadesignatedvillageordistrict,usuallytakesplacealongtheborderbetweenEastTimorandWestTimor.Politicalleaders,bothfromIndonesiaandEastTimor,areinvitedtoattendtowitnessandgiveassurances.Suchanoccasionwillcertainlyattractmediaattention,andpublicityiswhatthepartieswouldnormallyhopetoreceive.Aftersuchencountersperhapsrepeatedseveraltimesarrangementsforaformal‘return’wouldbepreparedbothalongtheborderandinthevillages/districtsinEastTimorfromwhererefugeesoriginated.VoluntaryAcceptanceofCulpabilityThereseemstobeanacceptancebybothpro-andanti-Independencesupportersthatrefugees(anti-Independence)arestigmatised,indeedagreetobeidentified,asthe‘guiltyparty’fortheirassociationwiththe1999violenceinEastTimor.WhileagreeingthatthissymbolicgesturedoesnotapplytoeveryindividualwhowilleventuallyreturntoandresideinEastTimor,inencountersbetweenthetwosidestheanti-Independencesupporterswhoarerefugeesthemselvesusuallyaccepttheblame.InthereconciliationmeetingbetweenthepartiesfromAinaroinMetamasin(arefugeecamplocated85kilometressouthofAtambua,districtofBelu,intheIndonesianprovinceofNusaTenggaraTimur)NemecioLopezdeCarvalho,a Table4StagesingrassrootsreconciliationStagesGrassrootsreconciliation1Enoyssenttoestablishcontacts(cross-bordercontact)2Meetingattheborder3Agreementtoconductfurthermeetings(topicsofdiscussiontosetparametersincludingpossiblelegalprosecution)4All-inclusiemeetingattheborder5Returntodistrict/sub-district/6Returnofrefugees(nahebitiprocess)7CeremoniesandhandoerofrefugeesTheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology communityleaderandformermilitialeader,isquotedassaying:‘‘‘Ourstrugglehasfinished’’


thenhehandedoverasetofarmyfatiguesandaredberet,theuniformofpro-IndonesianmilitiafromAinaroto(thepro-Independenceleader)XananaGusma˜o’asacommitmenttodisavowingviolence.Thisalsosignalledtheiracceptanceofthepoliticalprocessandreadinesstoreturntotheirhomeland,13November2001).Ataceremonialhandover,whichusuallytakesplacealongtheborder,refugeesareexpectedtofacetheirowncommunities,andapublicencounterisoftenstagedtoheartheirconfessions.Usually,suchconfessionsincludeacceptanceofthepoliticalprocessanddeclarationsabouttheirinvolvementinthepost-1999referendummayhem(includingnamesofthosekilled,ifany)andotheratrocitiesinwhichtheymighthavebeeninvolved.Thisimpliesaccepting,amongotherthings,theresultsoftheAugust1999referendum,renunciationoftheirassociationwithIndonesiaandagreeingtodeclareanything

12 theyknowabouttheSeptember1999violence.At
theyknowabouttheSeptember1999violence.Ateamissetuptoscrutinisesuchtestimoniesandverifythemwiththeavailablewitnesses.Sinceeverythingisarrangedandpreparedwellbeforehand,suchaprocessisguaranteedtobefairandtransparent.OftenthelocalCatholicpriestisinvitedtoofficiateattheceremonytoencouragetheparticipantstospeakthetruthandalsotoactasawitnesstotheprocess.Usually,anelectedrepresentative(s)orelderofthereturneesconfessesonbehalfofthegroup.Therepresentativeoftenusesmodestwordsandpresentshimself/herselfveryhumblysoastoappeasethehome-stayers.Forexample,inareconciliationmeetingfollowedbyreintegrationofrefugeesinavillageinBobonarodistrict,thefollowingwordswereusedbytherefugees’representative:AmiatasiraWe,thesubservientNebeulukThose[who]onceHaloaÕatDestroyedSunuhelaumaPutfireonhousesHaloaÕatraiScorchedtheearthAmimakaneÕeWearehereAmifilahikasmaiWecomebackHolaranmorasWefeltsadness[forwhatwehadcommitted]MaibehaksolokYet[with]joyTambahasourufamiliaBecause[we]meet[our]familyKetaamisalakarikWeperhapsmademistakesKetaamihaloaÕatkarikWeperhaps[caused]destructionKetaamiliasalakarikWemighthave[expressed]wrongwordsAmihusudesculpaWearesorryInansiraMothersAmansiraFathersD.Babo-Soares Maun-alin,Bin-fetonOld-youngbrothers,Old-youngsistersHareba,tetubaLookat[us],weigh[oursins]AmisalakarikdehanmaiIfwehavemademistakesAmihaloaÕatkarikIfwehavedestroyed[you]KatakmaiSpeakoutAmisimuhotuamisalaWeacceptalloursinsHolimanruaWithbothhands.Aftersuchaconfession,thepublicareaskedtopresenttheircomplaintsandoftenthecomplaintsareaddressedtoparticularindividuals,followedbydiscussionsandassessmentbythosepresent.Theguiltysideisusuallyrepresentedbyprominentfiguresorleadersoftherefugeeswhoaredeemedtohavebeenassociatedwiththearmedmilitiain1999.Theyareaskedtoconfesstheirwrongdoinginpublicandtheelders,includinglocalgovernmentauthorities,arebroughtintohearandgivetheirassessmentsoftheprocess.Thelatteralsohavethepowertodecidewhethersomeoneis(literally,clean)ornot,fortheirjudgmentdeterminesthenextstep.Sanctionsforaguiltypersonrangefroma‘fine’(payingacertainamountofmoneyequivalenttowhathe/shedestroyed)toundertakingvoluntaryworkinthecommunity.Incaseswheresomeoneisknowntohavecommittedseriouscrimes(murderorrazingproperties),he/sheishandedovertotheUnitedNationsCivilianPolice(CivPol)forlegalinquiries.Thosewhoarefoundtohavecommittedanyviolentactioninthepastwillbedetainedandwaitforthedueprocess.Forpeaceandharmonytobeachieved,bothsidesshouldagreethatthemeetingisnotonlyaprocessofmendingtheirdifferencesbutatimetobringthepartiestogetherasdiscussedabove.Thisproc

13 essparallelsthespiritofmat-making.Whendi
essparallelsthespiritofmat-making.Whendifferent(driedleaves)arebroughttogetherreadyfor(weaving,plaiting)intoamat,itshouldbeensuredthattheyarethebestleaveswhichcanfittogether.Thus,partiesinanahebitimeetandseektoweaveorplaitacompromise.Inmakingitofficial,communityleaders,victimsofpreviousconflictsandpoliticalauthoritiesareoftenbroughtintowitnesstheprocess.Whiledisagreementispossibleduringsuchmeetings,partieswillusuallyworktoavoidit.TheUltimateGoal:AStableSocialOrderTheultimategoalofnahebitiistobringpeace()andstability()tothesociety.istranslatedas‘peace’oratimewhentranquillityprevails,atimewhenpeoplegoabouttheirownliveswithoutinterferencefromothers.Hakmatektranslatedas‘quiet’andreferstoasituationwhereconflictanddisorderareabsent.nahebitiaimstofacilitatetheprocessthatgoesonbetweenBearingthisinmind,nahebitiembracesaprocessthatcommenceswithacause(conflictormistakes),strivesforconsensus(reconciliation)andendsupinastateofTheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology peaceandtranquillity(stablesocialorder).Thus,consensusisnottheresultofthisprocess;rather,itservesasamediumtofacilitateopposingfactionstoreachtheultimategoal.Nahebitiisthuscomprehendedasawholeconcept;failureofanyonestepwoulddisableandjeopardisetheaimandspiritofit.Itisperceivedthatnostablesocialorderisachievableifasinglestageintheprocessisnotobserved.Suchasituationwouldinevitablyleadtoimbalanceinthesecularworld,thusdeepeningfurtherimbalancebetweentheworldandthecosmos.Theinterventionoftheancestor’sspiritissoimportantherethatitisseenasaprerequisitefortobereached.Consequently,wheneveraconsensushasbeenachieved,aritualceremonyoftenintheformofabloodoathoroathofloyaltybeforethelineage’sumalulik(literally,sacredhouse)isheldtoboth‘officialise’andlegitimisetheprocess.Thisritualeventvariesfromoneplacetoanotherandnotallparticipantspledgeloyaltytoanumalulik.Nevertheless,aritualprocessincludinganoathofloyaltyisconducted.Itiswidelybelievedthatfailuretoconductthisritualrisksinvalidatingthewholeprocessandbringingtheattendantpartiesbackintoconflict.Hencetheoathdemonstratesthatsocialstabilityhasbeenrecoveredandthestatusofthepreviouslydeemedsocialmalefactorhasbeenre-established;likewise,thebalancebetweenthecosmosandthesecularworld.Theoaththereforeprovidesprotectionandclosesdownthechapterofthatspecificconflict.Socialorder,indeedsociallife,isrestored.LocalReconciliationandStateJusticeHavingunderstoodtheessenceandthephilosophicalvalueofnahebiti,thequestionis:canthisbefittedintotheformaljusticesystem?Doestheimplementationofconflictwiththeapplicationofofficialjustice?To

14 understandthisissue,letmedrawattentionto
understandthisissue,letmedrawattentiontotheexistinglegaldocumentsandthepolicieswhichhavebeenadoptedandtheirrelationtonahebitiExistingDocumentsThebasisonwhichthelawinEastTimorisimplementedisUNTAETRegulationNo.1/1999.Section3oftheregulationstatesthatthelawsappliedinEastTimorpriorto25October1999shallapplyinthecountryprovidedthattheydonotconflictwithSection3.1oftheregulation.Thelatterincludes(a)theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1272/1999,whichempowersUNTAETtotakethenecessarymeasurestoensurestabilityandrebuildingofthecountry,and(b)theregulationsanddirectivesissuedbytheTransitionalAdministratorinexecutingitstask.ThismeansthatmanyaspectsofIndonesianlawthePenalCodeandCriminalProcedureCodeandlegallybindingdecisionsunderbothPortugueseandIndonesianlegalregimesarehonouredbyUNTAET’sRegulationNo.1/1999.Inaddition,theIndonesianCivilCodeandCivilProcedureCode,bothofwhichareD.Babo-Soares Dutch-basedlaws,arealsousedincourtsinEastTimor.However,RegulationNo.1/1999doesputanendtoanumberofIndonesianlaws(Section3.2),including,forexample,thatofcapitalpunishment(Section3.3).Section2ofthesameregulationrequiresstrictadherencetointernationalconventionsandfullcompliancewithuniversalhumanrightsstandards.Thus,onlystatelaw,inparticulartheCodeofCriminalProcedure,isrequiredtodealwithcriminalcases,includingthecrimeswhichfallunderthejurisdictionofinternationalcriminallaw.Thelatterarecrimessuchasmurder,killingsandthoseconsideredascrimesagainsthumanityandwarIn1999,UNTAETmadecriminalcasesitsprimarytargetinupholdingtheruleoflawinEastTimor.Apartfromestablishingcourtsitalsopromulgatedtransitionalrulesofcriminalprocedure(Regulation30/2000)andestablishedseparatepanelstodealwithbothordinarycrimesandcrimesconsideredtobeseriousoragainsthumanity(Regulation15/2000).ThenewConstitutionofEastTimorstatesthat‘Actscommittedbetweenthe25thofApril1974andthe31stofDecember1999thatcanbeconsideredcrimesagainsthumanityshallbeliabletocriminalproceedingswiththenationalandinternationalcourts’.TheCRTRhasalsohintedthat,whilecontinuingto‘reportonitsfindingsandmakerecommendationstothegovernmentforfurtheractiononreconciliationandthepromotionofhumanrights’,itwillpromotereconciliationandtruth-telling.ThisimpliesthattheCRTRwillinvestigatemainlymajorcrimes,whereaslessercrimessuchaslooting,burningandminorassaultsinthepastwillbedealtwiththroughcommunity-basedreconciliation,thusemphasis-ingthat(serious)criminalcasesfallunderthejurisdictionofthestatelaw.Inotherwords,thisunderlinestherecognitionofstatelawintheroleplayedbynahebiti,thushelpingtoovercomethedifficu

15 ltiesofthejudicialsysteminthisnewsociety
ltiesofthejudicialsysteminthisnewsociety.GrassrootsReconciliationandJusticeTheformaldefinitionofoffences(seriousandminor)correspondswellwiththespiritofgrassrootsreconciliationconductedsofar(seeTable5).Thepurposeofinvitingcommunityleadersandpoliticalauthoritiestoassessthesubstanceoftheconfessionoftheperpetratorsandanyobjectionbythevictimsduringtherepatriationprocessistohelpidentifythenatureoftheoffence.Incommunityreconciliations,casesthatarecategorisedasseriousareseparatedfromtheothers.Asfaraslegalsanctionsare Table5ReconciliationandjusticeReconciliationElitereconciliationGrassrootsreconciliationFamilyCommunityPoliticaleliteStablesocialorderConsensusPeaceandstabilityPoliticalstabilityLessercrimesJusticeJusticeisoptionalTheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology concerned,CivPolwillbecontactedaboutthepersonaccusedofbeingimplicatedinseriouscrimes,andanarrestwarrantissuedinaccordancewiththeexistinglaw.Finaldeterminationsareconsideredandanalysedcarefullyonacase-by-casebasis.Thisapproachensuresrefugeesunderstandthatreconciliationdoesnotmeanthattheperpetratorsofmoreseriousviolencewilleasilyescapestateprosecution.ThisapproachalsosendsasignaltotheremainingrefugeesinWestTimorinvolvedinthemoreseriousoffencesthattheycanreturnwithouthavingtofacestateprosecution.Finallyandmostimportantly,theoptionofstatejusticeforseriouscrimesensuresthesatisfactionofhome-stayers,the‘victims’,someofwhomhaveremainedhithertodissatisfiedwithelitereconciliation,whichisoftenperceivedtohavecompromisedonjusticeinthepastforthesakeofpoliticalstability.Afterthepromulgationofstatelawswhichdealwithseriouscrimes,grassrootsreconciliationswereconductedwithoutviolatingtheexistingstatelaw.Clearparameterswereusuallysetintheearlystagesofpreliminarytalksbetweentheparties,evenbeforestateauthoritiesorpoliticalleadersareinvitedtoattend.ThemeetinginthevillageofCassainAinaroinlate2001,involvinglocalsandvillagerswhowereformermilitiamembers,wasco-ordinatedcarefully,andreturneesagreedtobeprosecutediftheywerefoundtobeimplicatedintheSeptember1999violence,13November2001)forexample.ClosingRemarksNahebitiisverymuchingrainedinthecultureoftheEastTimorese.Ithasbeenpartoftheprevailingsocialvaluessincetimeimmemorial.Suchvaluesareoftenrecitedinritualchants,(folkstories)andsayings.Whiletheword‘reconciliation’itselfisanewtermtomanyEastTimorese,itsspiritisclearlyreflectedinnahebitilocalprocessusedtraditionallyasthemeanstosettlemattersanddifferencesthatinvolvefamily,clanandsocietymembers.Forthatveryreason,frustratedbyreconciliationattheelitelevel,withitscomplexbureauc

16 raticprocedures,localcommunityleadersinE
raticprocedures,localcommunityleadersinEastTimorhaveinitiatedtheirownversionofreconciliationthroughnahebitiBasedonbothcosmologicalandsecularvalues,nahebitiisseenasthemeanstoachieveastablesocialorder.Likewise,thosewhoareparticipatinginorhaveparticipatedinnahebitiaredutyboundtocomplywithit,fornahebitidoesnotmerelyseektoreachconsensusamongthepeoplebut,morethanthat,itseekstorecoverthedisruptedpeace.OneofthereasonswhythetransitionalgovernmentandlocalpoliticalleaderswereslowtodealwithreconciliationatthegrassrootslevelinEastTimorwastheir‘waitandsee’approachandalackofunderstandingofthelocalcultureintheearlydaysoftheUNmission.Issuessuchasbureaucraticproceduresandconfusionoverwhoshouldbeinchargeofthisnewprocessofgrassrootsreconciliation,howitshouldbeconductedanditsrelationtothenewlyestablishedjusticesystemarereasonsfortheearly,underlyingreluctancetopushaheadwithit.Thisreluctance,however,D.Babo-Soares changedattheendoftheUNmissionandwhenithadbecomeobviousthatgrassrootsreconciliationwaseffectiveinsomeareasandprovidedastrongbasistorecultivateandcementemotionallinksamongthepopulation.Indeed,thetransitionalgovernmentandlocalpoliticalleadershavequicklyrespondedtothistypeofreconciliation.Inthelastsixmonthsbeforetheendofitsmission(20May2002),UNTAETencouragedcommunityleaderstopushaheadwithgrassrootsreconciliation,thusensuringasmoothandquickrepatriationofrefugeesfromWesttoEastTimor.Itisacknowledgedthatvariationintheimplementationofnahebitiamongdifferentethno-linguistgroupsinEastTimorcannotbeavoided.Nevertheless,theemphasishereisthatdirectinvolvementofthepeopleinthisprocess,withallitsphilosophicalreasons,guaranteesthatalongandlastingpeacecanbeachievedwithoutunderminingthevalueofjustice.Furthermore,apartfrombeingeffective,thisapproachislesscostlyandlesstimeconsuming.Mostimportantly,forthelocalpeople,itdoespresentacompromiseandawaytorecover,indeedre-establish,thepreviouslydevastatedsocialorder.Notes[1]Theconceptnahebiti(literally,stretching,lyingorrollingthemat)canbefoundinalmostallethnoa-linguistgroupsinEastTimor.Denitionandapproachesinitsapplicationalsovaryfromoneplacetoanother.Nevertheless,therearecommonwaysofdeningthisinstitutionwhenitcomestoimplementationparticularlyontheeveofcontemporarygrassrootsreconciliationinEastTimor.Forreasonsofsimplication,IusethetermnahebitiinTetum,thelinguafrancaofEastTimor,anditexplainsthewayitiswidelyappliedinreconciliationsthathavebeentakingplacesofarinthenewcountry.[2]ThisviolencesawthousandsofpeopleeeeitherevictedbytheIndonesianmilitaryanditscreatedmilitiaorleavingvolun

17 tarilyforsafetyreasonstotheIndonesianpro
tarilyforsafetyreasonstotheIndonesianprovinceofWestTimor.[3]SeeDiliandJakartaagreetopromoterefugeesrepatriation,inReliefWeb,original:UNTransitionalAdministrationinEastTimor(UNTAET),25March2002.Source:http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/9b02e2c57b2b1b8585256b87005d5868?OpenDocument(accessed3April2002).[4]AccordingtotheIndonesiannewspaperSinarHarapandated26March2002,thedataprovidedbythemilitaryheadquarters(KomandoResorMiliter[Korem]161/Wirasakti)inKupangsuggestthat,untillateJanuary2001,therewere70,000peopleor9percentoftheapproximately800,000populationofEastTimor..Kompas(26November2001).Seealso,theSydneyMorningHeraldandtheAgeNovember2001).[6]Thisregulationcameintoforceon13July2001.[7]Bydenition,grassrootsinthispaperreferstotheordinarypeoplewholivemostlyinthevillagesandwerenotinvolveddirectlyatthereconciliationbetweenpro-andanti-Independence.ThisgroupalsoincludesNGOsandvoluntaryorganisationswhowerenotpartofthepoliticaldecision-makingprocess.[8]AroundFebruary2000,anoldmanfromViquequewhohadjustreturnedfromWestTimorwasbeatenandremainedunconsciousforseveraldaysbeforedyinginDilihospital.Whileconductingeldwork,Ihadtheopportunitytospeaktohimthreedaysbeforetheincident.TheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology [9]CNRTwasdissolvedinJune2001.MostofitsactivistshavenowbecomemembersofVeteransofResistance,aneworganisationledbyJoseAlexandreXananaGusma˜o.[10]FamiliesalongtheborderbetweenEastandWestTimorinthedistrictofBobonaro(EastTimor)andAtambua(WestTimor)tooktheinitiativetobeginsuchreconciliationmeetings.TheysuccessfullybroughtbacktheircountrymenfromWestTimorwithouthavingtogothroughtheformalproceduresatahighlevel(interviewwithLazaruofYayasanHAK(alocalNGO)inDili,February2000).[11]IncludingtheInternationalOrganisationforMigration(IOM),theUnitedNationsChildren’sFund(UNICEF)andtheUnitedNationsHighCommissionforRefugees(UNHCR).[12]Forfurtherinformationvisithttp://www.jesref.org/alerts/tmp00/tp00907e.htm(accessed3April2002).[13]Seethewrittenjudgmentonlineathttp://www.jsmp.minihub.org(accessed15April2002).[14]IwasworkingasatranslatorthroughouttheCongressfrom20to31August2000.SuchremarksweremadebyvariousdelegationsfromdistrictsinEastTimorexpressingtheirdiscontentwiththereconciliationprocessbeingundertakenattheelitelevel.[15]EvenuntilMarch2002,whenthispaperwaswritten,manypeopleinEastTimorstilldidnotconsiderreconciliationamongthepoliticaleliteattractivebecauseitwasseentoreecttheoperationofpoliticalinterests.SuaraPembaruan,anIndonesiannewspaper,quotedthewordsoftwoprominentEastTimorese,Anice

18 toGuterresLopes,thedirectorofYayasanHAK,
toGuterresLopes,thedirectorofYayasanHAK,awell-knownEastTimorhumanrightsNGO,andheadofEastTimorTruthandReconciliationCommission,and(whilehewastravellingtoKupanginWestTimor)RicardodaCostaRibeiro,leaderofEastTimorYouth,sayingthatelitereconciliationhadbeeninvain.Therefore,peopleatthegrassrootslevelneedtobeinvolvedandshouldsortoutdifferencesthemselves(SuaraPembaruan,25February2002)foritislesscostly,moreeffectiveandyieldsconcreteresults.[16]Foranoverview,seeGordon(2001).ForabriefoverviewseealsoGorja˜o(2001).SeealsoVilla-Vicencio(2000).[17]Forthispoint,IamindebtedtodiscussionwiththelateJoa˜oNunes(formerteacherandsonofthe(king)ofManu-Tasi,Ainaro)andAntonioAitahanMatak(aleaderofCPD-RDTL(People’sDefenceCouncilDemocraticRepublicofEastTimor)).AgooddiscussiononthistopiccanbefoundinJoa˜oMartins(yearunknown)‘KuncipembangunanmanusiaTimorense’(KeytodevelopmentoftheTimorese),privatelibrary.[18]Thisisadistrictinwhichreconciliationwithinitspopulationatthegrassrootslevelhastakenplace.NumbersofrefugeeshavereturnedtothisdistrictsinceAugust2001,thankstothedirectparticipationofthecommunityleadersofbothsides(KupangPos,September2001).[19]Pers.comm.,DomingosMaia,March2000.[20]AmongtheMambai,theprocessofensuringgoodisknownas.Literally,referstotheprocessofselectionorcompilationofgood,allofwhichareplaitedintoamat.[21]Interestingly,thereisacommonperceptionthatthedestructionofEastTimorfollowingtheAugust1999referendumshouldbeblamedonrefugeeswhoareidentiedorassociatedwiththearmedmilitiainWestTimor.Therefugeesareassumedtobemorally‘guilty’fortheSeptember1999violenceandarerequiredtoconfesstheirwrongdoings,somethingthattheyare‘forced’toaccept.[22]InterviewwithLazaru,February2000.[23]SeeRegulation1/1999,27November1999.Source:http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/r-1999.htm(accessed3April2002).[24]Otherlawsaffectedincludethoseonanti-subversion;socialorganisations;nationalsecurity;nationalprotectionanddefence;mobilisationanddemobilisation;anddefenceandsecurity.[25]TheseincludetheUniversalDeclarationonHumanRightsof10December1948;theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsof16December1966anditsProtocols;theInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsof16December1966;D.Babo-Soares theConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationof21December1965;theConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomenof17December1979;theConventionagainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumaneorDegradingTreatmentorPunishmentof17December1984;theInternationalConventionontheRightsoftheChildof20November1989.[26]Itisinteres

19 tingtoseethatthenewlyestablishedTruthand
tingtoseethatthenewlyestablishedTruthandReconciliationCommission(TRC)inEastTimoralsolimitsitselftodealingonlywith‘crimes’inthepast.Thus,itrecommendscommunityleadersdealwithissuessuchaslooting,burningandminorassaults:‘ApanelcomprisedofaRegionalcommissionerandlocalcommunityleaderswillmediatebetweenvictimsandperpetratorstoreachagreementonanactofreconciliationtobecarriedoutbytheperpetrator’.Source:http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/(accessed15April2002).[27]ExamplesofthiscanbefoundinmanypartsofEastTimor.Peoplearefedupwiththefactthatpoliticalleadersarereluctanttopromotejusticebybringingtheperpetratorsofviolencein1999tothecourtsforthesakeofstability.VariousNGOsinEastTimor,includingmostprominentlythelocalYayasanHAK,areworkinghardwithvictimsofpastviolencetoresolvesomeoftheseissuesatthelocallevel,throughthemediumofnahebiti.[28]IhavediscussedelsewheresomeoftheconfusionintheTransitionalAdministration(UNTAET)inEastTimorintheearlyyearsofitsmission.SeeBabo-Soares(2001).ReferencesBabo-Soares,D.(2001)‘Successes,weaknessesandchallenges:acriticaloverviewofthepoliticaltransitioninEastTimor’,apaperpresentedattheConferenceonComparingExperienceswithPost-ConictStateBuildinginAsiaandEurope:TheCasesofEastTimor,BosniaandKosovo.Bali,October2001.Availableat:http://www.caec-asiaeurope.org/conference/index.html(accessed5January2002).Fox,J.J.(1989)‘Categoryandcomplement:binaryideologiesandtheorganizationofdualisminEasternIndonesia’,inTheAttractionofOpposites:ThoughtandSocietyintheDualisticModeedsD.Maybury-LewisandU.Almagor,TheUniversityofMichiganPress,AnnArbor,MI.Gordon,M.(2001)Reconciliation:AJourney,UniversityofNewSouthWalesPress,Sydney.˜o,P.(2001)‘TheEastTimoreseCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation:chronicleofaforetoldfailure?’,CivilWars,vol.4,no.2,pp.142Hicks,D.(1972)‘Easterntetum’,inEthnicGroupsinInsularSoutheastAsia,Vol.1,ed.F.LeBar,HumanRelationsAreaFilePress,NewHaven,CT.Sinclair,J.(2001)CollinsCobuildEnglishDictionaryforAdvancedLearners,Collins/BirminghamUniversityInternationalLanguageDatabase,LondonandGlasgow.Traube,E.(1986)CosmologyandSocialLife,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,IL.vanWouden,F.A.E.(1968[1935])TypesofSocialStructureinEasternIndonesia(SocialestructuurtypenindeGrooteOost),trans.R.Needham,MartinusNijhoff,TheHague.Villa-Vicencio,C.(2000)‘Restorativejustice:dealingwiththepast’,inLookingBack,ReachingForward:ReßectionsontheTruthandReconciliationCommissionofSouthAfrica,edsC.Villa-Vicencio&W.Verwoerd,UniversityofCapeTownPress,CapeTown;ZedBooks,London,p.TheAsiaPacificJournalofAnthropology