International Conference on Nuclear Security - PowerPoint Presentation

1. International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS – 2020)Austria, Vienna, 10-14 February, 2020Alexander IzmaylovFederal Center of Science and High Technologies “Eleron” State Corporation “Rosatom”SIGNIFICANCE AND CHALLENGES OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION FOR NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR FACILITIES

2. OUTLINE Relevance of Physical Protection Systems (PPS) Effectiveness Evaluation PPS Effectiveness Evaluation problem reflected in IAEA documents International experience (IAEA) in this areaRussian Federation experience in this areaFuture perspectives2

3. GENERAL PROVISIONS PHYSICAL PROTECTION – a component of nuclear materials, radioactive substances and associated facilities nuclear securityDevelopment of physical protection systems (PPS) effectiveness evaluation methodology has to be the relevant task 3

4. PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION (1)Relevance It is necessary to evaluate reached protection level of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities as a consequences of spent human and financial resources in PPS development and upgrading processIn this respect an evaluation methodology should be developed and applied at all PPS lifetime stages 4

5. PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION (2)Definitions PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS (PPS) – PPS ability to resist advisory malicious actions against Nuclear Materials (NM) and Nuclear Facilities (NF) taking into account accepted Design Basis Threat (DBT) and intruder profile PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION – A systematic, performance-based process to evaluate availability of a physical protection system to meet performance requirements5

6. PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION (3)Definitions PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACH – Specification of PPS requirements list and formal evaluation of specific PPS to meet those requirementsPERFORMANCE BASED APPROACH – PPS assessment using quantitative effectiveness index6

7. PPS Effectiveness Evaluation issues in IAEA Publications (1)NSS 13 «Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)» 3.29. The operator should develop and implement means and procedures for evaluations, including performance testing, and maintenance of the physical protection system. 5.15. The operator should evaluate and the competent authority should validate the design of physical protection system effectiveness to verify that it complies with the required level of protection for the nuclear facility and nuclear material. 5.16. If the evaluation of the design of physical protection system indicates that it is ineffective, then the operator should redesign the physical protection system and re-evaluate its effectiveness.7

8. NSS 13 «Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)» 5.41. Evaluations, including performance testing, of the physical protection measures and of the physical protection system, including timely response of the guards and response forces, should be conducted regularly to determine reliability and effectiveness against the threat. These should be carried out with full cooperation between the operator and response forces. Performance testing of the physical protection system should include appropriate exercises, for example force-on-force exercises, to determine if the response forces can provide an effective and timely response to prevent sabotage. 8PPS Effectiveness Evaluation issues in IAEA Publications (2)

9. PPS LIFECYCLE (1) 9 According to the IAEA NSS 27-G “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5)”

10. PPS LIFECYCLE (2) 10Pre-design stageDesigningCommissioningPPS Operation PPS Effectiveness EvaluationSoWDetailed DesignCertific. of Accept.CorrectionsCorrectionsCorrectionsRedesignTask of Effectiveness Evaluation

11. 11PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (1)DefinitionsPPS Effectiveness Index (EI) – probability of adversary suppression by response forces acting by alarms of technical security means and systems Effectiveness Index should take into account:Design Basis Threat (DBT)Regulatory requirements and prescriptions Site configuration and specificity Technical security equipmentPhysical barriers layout Response forces characteristics (number, weapons, tactics etc)

12. AdversariesOutsidersInsidersSingle intruderSmall group (criminals)Numerous group(terrorists)GuardsSupport stuffKey stuffCollusion 12PPS Effectiveness Evaluation Methodology (2) Adversary classification

13. PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (3) ExamplePeff = Pdet * Pint * Pvictory Where:Pdet – probability of adversary detection by technical security means Pint – probability of adversary interception by response forces acting by alarmsPvictory – probability of response forces victory in engagement with adversary 13

14. 14 IAEA NSS 27-G “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)” 4.48 The physical protection system provides detection, delay and response functions through structural, technical and personnel elements. The interaction of these elements with the equipment and procedures makes the evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness a challenging task. 4.53 Several performance based approaches are available to evaluate the effectiveness of the physical protection system against insiders and external adversaries. Performance based evaluation methods include:Path analysisSimulations Exercises PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (4)

15. PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (5) IAEA NSS 27-G “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)”Simulations 4.53(в) This evaluation method includes computer based simulations of the physical protection system and tabletop exercises that allow consideration of the effectiveness of security and contingency plans as bases for response in the face of simulated decisions by the adversary and facility response forces Exercisies 4.53 (c) This evaluation method ranges from limited exercises of specific elements of the physical protection system, such as response to an alarm, to force-on-force exercises that address the effectiveness of the entire physical protection system against a simulated adversary attack. 15

16. PERFORMANCE TESTINGDefinition (NSS 13 «Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities») Testing of the physical protection measures and the physical protection system to determine whether or not they are implemented as designed; adequate for the proposed natural, industrial and threat environments; and in compliance with established performance requirements.16

17. PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION METHODS IMPLEMENTATIONThere are many possible scenarios of adversary attack and defend tactics PPS Effectiveness probabilistic evaluation requires presentable statistics on PPS elements characteristicsIt is connected with time consuming activityThat’s why appropriate computer programs were developed that allows to facilitate mentioned processes and to reduce time for PPS effectiveness evaluation17

18. Examples of PPS Effectiveness Evaluation computer programs*(Best practices)SAVI, ASSESS, AVERT (USA)Vega-2 (Russian Federation)ProEv (Czech Republic)* By IAEA«NUSAM» Coordinated Research Project final report (2016) 18

19. STATE OF AFFAIRS (1)Coordinated Research Project2014-2016 – IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) «Nuclear Security Evaluation Methodology for Regulated Facilities» («NUSAM») was conducted 2016 – NUSAM Project final report consist of: Effectiveness Evaluation Methodology Examples of the Methodology implementations for different types of nuclear facilities (nuclear power plant, radioactive materials storages etc.)2019 – IAEA TECDOC 1868 based on CRP NUSAM results was developed and published (after AdSec 33)19

20. STATE OF AFFAIRS (2)New Nuclear Security Series document2013 – 1st IAEA Working Group (WG) meeting on PPS Effectiveness Evaluation guideline (NST029) 2016 – WG meeting on NST029 working plan development 2018 – Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) meeting supported NST029 working plan2019 – Consultancy meeting on NST029 development was conducted 20

21. NST029 Development Schedule STEP 5: Preparing and completing the draft 2019STEP 6: Approval of draft by the Coordination CommitteeQ 1 2020STEP 7: Approval by NSGC for submission to Member States for comments June 2020STEP 8: Soliciting comments by Member StatesJuly 2020STEP 9: Addressing comments by Member StatesJanuary 2021STEP 10: Approval of the revised draft by the Coordination CommitteeApril 2021STEP 11: Approval by NSGCJune 2021STEP 12: Approval by DDG-NSAugust 2021STEP 13: Establishment by the Publication Committee October 2021STEP 14: Target publication date December 202221

22. TRAINING COURSES ON PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION (1) 2011 – IAEA Working Group (WG) developed a PPS Effectiveness Evaluation Training Course (TC) materials2011 – Pilot National Training Course (NTC) was conducted in South Africa 2013 – NTC was conducted in India 2015 – TC experience was generalized and TC materials were upgraded2015 – NTC was conducted in Pakistan using new training material 22

23. TRAINING COURSES ON PPS EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION (2) 2016 – TC experience was generalized and TC materials were upgraded once more2017 – Regional Training Course (RTC) was conducted in South Korea 2018 – NTC was conducted in Pakistan 2019 – International Training Course (ITC) was conducted in Pakistan23

24. Russian Federation experience in the area of PPS effectiveness evaluation development and application PPS effectiveness evaluation methodology has been developed taking into account Russian nuclear sites specificities Agency level regulatory documents (State Corporation “Rosatom”) were developed in this area “Vega-2” and “Polygon” computer programs for PPS effectiveness evaluation were developed Mentioned above computer programs were applied and still are using in PPS development and upgrading processes at dozens Russian nuclear sites 24

25. “VEGA-2” COMPUTER PROGRAM 25This program allows to perform PPS effectiveness evaluation index for specific nuclear site in accordance with defined DBT, PPS structure, response force tactics etc. Based on Monte-Carlo method. Received results are used to analyze that existing or designed PPS meets the requirements to find the way for further PPS upgrading.

26. “POLYGON” COMPUTER PROGRAM 26This program allows adversaries and response forces local engagement simulation (in a game mode) including for NM transportationReceived results allow to find PPS disadvantages and to develop upgrade proposals It also uses as a simulator in physical protection personnel education and professional training

27. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE AREA (1)№TaskHow to solve?Comments1PPS effectiveness evaluation methods expansion to Radioactive Material (RM) and associated facilities.Analysis of methods adequacy to IAEA documents concerning RM nuclear security. Initial data should be defined more precisely.Now only prescriptive approach is applied for RM protection.2Consideration of new threats (UAV, divers, special tools and software etc.).PPS effectiveness evaluation methods and computer programs have to be modified. Initial data should be defined more precisely.According to accepted new DBT.3Consideration of PPS connections with safety system and other protection systems.Analysis of the interconnections (interfaces) to provide “equal protection”.NSS-27G, paragraph «Safety-Security Interface» et al.4Human factor should be taken into account (guards, security operators, etc.) in PPS effectiveness evaluation methodology.Analysis how human factor influences to effectiveness evaluation is needed. Existing methods and computer programs should be modified.Now only “ideal” PPS is evaluated without human factor consideration.27

28. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE AREA (2)№TaskHow to solve?Comments5Optimization of PPS structure and composition using “cost-effectiveness” criteria.Optimization methods should be developed.Provision of rational resources usage for PPS development and operation.6Comprehensive use of different effectiveness evaluation approaches (analytical, experimental, simulations,).Labor costs optimization due to different effectiveness evaluation approaches could be used.Promotion of evaluation reliability, labor cost reduction.7Risk evaluation:R=PА* (1-Peff)*С, whereR – risk,РА–probability of attack,Peff – PPS effectiveness index,С – coefficient, reflecting consequences of adversary actions.Development of РА and С assessment methods.This topic is a subject for a special paper.28

29. CONCLUSIONS (1)Physical protection systems evaluation is very relevant topic as it allows to assess the level of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities protection and to justify financial and human resources have been spent Significance of this area is reflected in a number of IAEA documents (Nuclear Security Series) 29

30. CONCLUSIONS (2)Many events in this area has been performed and are performing now: IAEA CRP “NUSAM” (2016), training courses in IAEA Member States (South Africa, India, South Korea, Pakistan), start of development of special IAEA NSS document on PPS effectiveness evaluation (NST029)Russian Federation has big theoretical and practical experience in this area. An appropriative methodology, regulatory documents and computer programs have been developed. All these “tools” are put into practice at dozens nuclear facilities in the State Corporation “Rosatom”Perspective areas for further development are presented 30

31. Thank you for your attention!31