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Starting observation (ex-post) Starting observation (ex-post)

Starting observation (ex-post) - PowerPoint Presentation

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Starting observation (ex-post) - PPT Presentation

Eggertsson and Krugman 2012 Distributional shocks matter expost in the presence of ZLB type of constraints Series of papers by Jorda Taylor and Schularik provide some fascinating historical evidence ID: 489672

post feedback credit inequality feedback post inequality credit policy debt tax macro mandating cycles financial demand employment aggregate ante

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Slide1

Starting observation (ex-post)

Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)

Distributional shocks matter ex-post in the presence of ZLB type of constraints.

Series of papers by

Jorda

, Taylor and

Schularik

provide some fascinating historical evidence

Caution: not clear in the empirical literature that the ZLB is “necessary”

Possible tension with theory.

Would be nice to explore other possible frictions

Other workSlide2
Slide3
Slide4

Can monetary policy solve this problem?

Not reallySlide5

Ex-ante decision making

Is ex-ante borrowing / lending decision going to incorporate the ex-post (stochastic) macro effects of debt?

No, there is an “aggregate demand externality”

d

vs.

D

Get inefficient outcome even with complete markets

Farhi and Werning,

Korinek

and SimsekSlide6

Credit cycles and inequality

The discussion has to involve income and wealth inequality as well

Lenders and borrowers differ systematically

The paper is agnostic about the “timing” of credit cycles

But evidence suggests that the “credit cycle” is related to rising inequality

Could credit cycle be a GE “response” to

disequilibriating

forces? Slide7
Slide8
Slide9
Slide10
Slide11
Slide12

Relevant forces outside of model

Non-standard preferences

What if a quarter to one-third of the population was myopic?

Fire sale externality

Equally important

Employment feedbackSlide13

Mandating change?

Mandating / subsidizing state-contingent financial contracts that automatically redistribute towards the more constrained agents ex-post

Getting rid of the bias induced by capital regulation

Getting rid of the bias induced by tax policy

Our financial regulation and tax policy makes no sense from a macro stability perspective.

This paper crystallizes some of the core issues in this debate.Slide14
Slide15

Buying

a $200K

HomeSlide16

House Prices Drop 40%Slide17

Debt concentrates risk on the debtor – the lender largely escapes unscathed

Who are lenders? Debt and inequality naturally connected

Concentration of LossesSlide18

The Rich Lend to the PoorSlide19

The Distribution of Losses Matters

!Slide20

The aggregate demand feedbackSlide21

The employment feedbackSlide22

The fire-sale feedback