xpagexID00Case 117cv00864 Document 47 Filed 080917 Page 8 of 21 P - PDF document

1 &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Docu
&#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 8 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 2 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 11 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 15 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID0

2 0;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Fil
0;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 3 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 10 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 7 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 13 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-c

3 v-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 P
v-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 16 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 1 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 17 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 14 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Docum

4 ent #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 18 of 21
ent #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 18 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 9 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 12 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 21 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Fil

5 ed: 08/09/17 Page 6 of 21 PageID #: &#xp
ed: 08/09/17 Page 6 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 19 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 4 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Page 5 of 21 PageID #: &#xpage;&#xID00;Case: 1:17-cv-00864 Document #: 47 Filed: 08/09/17 Pa

6 ge 20 of 21 PageID #: The complaints al
ge 20 of 21 PageID #: The complaints allege the following facts, which I take as drivers.” (These are the entities, vehicles, and providers of a drivers.” (These are the entities, vehicles, and providers of a exterior or in the interior of a transportation network vehicle.” Chi. Mun. Code § 9-115-130. Plaintiffs allege that Vugo is a technology company that “operates a so

7 ftware-only their vehicles.” Am. Cmplt.
ftware-only their vehicles.” Am. Cmplt. at ¶ 16. To use Vugo, rideshare . at ¶ 20. Passengers can interact ¶¶ 22-23. Vugo earns advertising revenue for displaying the ads, Vugo alleges that the ordinance prevents it from operating advertisements on or in their vehicles. One driver—plaintiff, Am. Cmplt. at ¶ 40. All plaintiffs complain that the advertising The City asser

8 ts two bases for dismissing plaintiffs’
ts two bases for dismissing plaintiffs’ The City’s standing argument focuses on prudential G & S but is not required to do so). has substantive merit. As The City posits that because none of the plaintiffs (except ordinance prohibits. In the City’s The City relies heavily on court’s analysis suggests that plaintiffs cannot assert their Although the City does not ch

9 allenge plaintiffs’ Article III At all
allenge plaintiffs’ Article III At all events, the City cites no authority for the Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. So while the City characterizes plaintiffs as mere here, the ordinance facially restricts the driver plaintiffs’ To be fair, objections to prudential standing can be waived, as or Clearing the standing hurdle is just a threshold ste

10 p, Constitutional protection for commer
p, Constitutional protection for commercial speech is of relatively recent vintage. Until 1976, the Court “adhered to the 54, 62 S.Ct. 920, 921, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942), that, while the Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995) (internal In the Court explained that while constitutional protection, it is entitled to a lesser degree of In the years since deciding

11 analysis and whether it should framewo
analysis and whether it should framework and to apply its framework); framework); the justification, the Court has not strayed from its commercial-speech jurisprudence despite calls for it to do so.”). Notwithstanding the Court’s ongoing adherence to content-based, and thus subject to the higher level of ., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 In In state of Vermont prohibiting t

12 he disclosure by certain the informatio
he disclosure by certain the information’s use by some speakers and for some purposes, the speech it seeks to suppress.” 564 U.S. at 580. The Court The ordinance at issue in this case cannot reasonably be or and content based and thus subject to strict scrutiny. No or so broadly, however, and the decisions themselves do not suggest that the Court intended that “fun

13 ction or purpose” distinctions are that
ction or purpose” distinctions are that “function or purpose” distinctions are subject matter for differential treatment.” 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (emphasis added). And while the Court applied “heightened” scrutiny to the , it is far from clear For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the ordinance framework and turn to It is true that Justice Breyer, in his concurring op

14 inion in for the observation that “the
inion in for the observation that “the Court has as requiring a higher standard than framework to explain that “[i]n commercial- at 2667-68); applies to commercial speech restrictions, citing and “Sorrell did not modify the standard.” test Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Foxthe government may invoke “common-sense judgment” as well as the Act

15 Now to Stop War As noted above, the f
Now to Stop War As noted above, the first prong of the test requires me to advertising. Accordingly, I consider whether passenger The City argues that passenger comfort is a substantial the City’s long-recognized interest in protecting the public, Where the City’s motion falls short, however, is on the analysis: whether In addition, while there is no dispute that

16 the exterior analysis, while its “commo
the exterior analysis, while its “commonsense” The City relies heavily on the Court’s analysis in In Count II of their complaints, plaintiffs assert that the The Seventh Circuit has explained that “the Constitution of the State of Illinois protects an individual’s right to free speech only to the same extent that situated vehicles – taxicabs.” Am. Cmplt. at 55. The

17 City F.C.C. v. Beach F.C.C. v. Beach c
City F.C.C. v. Beach F.C.C. v. Beach classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Plaintiffs do not dispute this proposition, but they argue that bec

18 ause the ordinance Plaintiffs cite West
ause the ordinance Plaintiffs cite West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. regulation of commercial speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny in a First Amendment challenge, it follows that equal protection claims involving commercial speech also are subject to the same level of review”) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992)); see also Am. Acad. of Imp

19 lant Dentistry v. Parker, No. A-14-CA-19
lant Dentistry v. Parker, No. A-14-CA-191-SS, 2014 WL 2808610 (W.D. Tex. Jun. 20, 2014) (observing a “significant overlap between the First Amendment claim based on commercial free speech and the equal protection claim also based on commercial free speech,” and finding “no compelling reason not to allow the equal protection claim to proceed alongside the First Amendment cla

20 im when they will likely involve litigat
im when they will likely involve litigation of the same issues.”) The City does not appear to dispute that heightened 21 interest at stake, the ordinance is subject only to rational 901 (N.D. Ill. 2005)), and that even if intermediate scrutiny applies, the ordinance survives for the same reasons it survives neither argument establishes the City’s entitlement to dismissal

21 For the foregoing reasons, the City’s
For the foregoing reasons, the City’s motion to dismiss is ENTER ORDER: Elaine E. Bucklo Plaintiffs, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) v. ) Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) In this action, plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor (to challenge the constitutionality of a City of Chicago The original plaintiff was Vugo, a technology company offering DN 15. In Order of 04/25/201