NATO Strategy Documents 1949 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 19 - PDF document

1 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO
NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969345 MC 14/3(Final)N O R T H A T L A N T I C M I L I T A R Y C O M M I T T E E C O M I T E M I L I T A I R E D E L Õ A T L A N T I Q U E D E N O R D M C 1 4 / 3 ( F i n a l ) 1 6 J a n u a r y 1 9 6 8 F I N A L D E C I S I O N O N M C 1 4 / 3 A REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEEto theDEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEEonOVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THEDEFENSE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AREA1. On 12 December 1967 the Defence Planning Committee inMinisterial Session adopted MC 14/3 as an overall strategic conceptfor the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area, while noting that,NOTE:This Final Decision sheet now becomes a part of andshall be attached as the top sheet of MC 14/3. PageMC 14/3(Final) - Pages i, iiMC 14/3(Mil Dec) - Pages 1-22(Page revised by Corrig. No. 1)- i - NATO Strategy Document

2 s 1949 - 1969346NATO Strategy Documents
s 1949 - 1969346NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 2. The attention of the Major NATO Commanders is drawn to thisreport, which now becomes operative.3. This document supersedes MC 14/2(Revised).FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:EZIO PISTOTTILieutenant General, Italian ArmyDirector International Military StaffCOPY TO:SECGENMILREPSMC 14/3(Final)(Page revised by Corrig. No. 1)- ii - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969347 N O R T H A T L A N T I C M I L I T A R Y C O M M I T T E E C O M I T E M I L I T A I R E D E L Õ A T L A N T I Q U E N O R D M C 1 4 / 3 ( M i l i t a r y D e c i s i o n ) 2 2 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 7 M I L I T A R Y D E C I S I O N O N M C 1 4 / 3 A REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEEto theDEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEEonOVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENSE OF THENORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AREA1. At their Informal Me

3 eting on 16 September 1967 in Oslo, theM
eting on 16 September 1967 in Oslo, theMilitary Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session approved MC 14/3.2. The attention of the Defense Planning Committee is invited tothe recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the report.FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:EZIO PISTOTTILieutenant General, Italian ArmyDirector, International Military Staff1 ENCLOSUREMC 14/3DISTRIBUTION:SECGENMILREPSMC 14/3(Military Decision)This document consistsof 22 pages- 1 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969348NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969349 MC 14/3- 2 -A REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEETO THEDEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEEONOVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THEDEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION AREAReferences :a. DPC/D(67)23, 11 May 67b. MC 14/2(Rev.)(Decision), 6 Apr 57I N T R O D U C T I O N 1. The decisions of the Defence Planning Committee in

4 MinisterialSession on 9 May 1967 (refere
MinisterialSession on 9 May 1967 (reference a) invited the Military Committee tocontinue its work upon a possible revision of the overall strategic2. The paper at enclosure represents the first stage of therevision. The second stage will be the submission of a revised paperon ÒMeasures to Implement the Strategic ConceptÓ (MC 48/3).3. These two papers together supersede the existing strategicguidance contained in MC 14/2(Revised) and MC 48/2.4. The Military Committee intends that the strategy paper reflectthe substance and intent of the Ministerial guidance even though thewording in the strategy paper varies in some respects from that in theR E C O M M E N D A T I O N 5. The Military Committee recommends that the Defence PlanningCommittee approve the document at enclosure. NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969350NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Docu

5 ments 1949 - 1969351 E N C L O S U R E
ments 1949 - 1969351 E N C L O S U R E 1 O V E R A L L S T R A T E G I C C O N C E P T F O R T H E D E F E N S E O F T H E N O R T H A T L A N T I C T R E A T Y O R G A N I S A T I O N A R E A ANNEX A - DEFINITIONSO B J E C T I V E 1. The overall defensive concept of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation is to preserve peace and to provide for the security ofthe North Atlantic Treaty area primarily by a credible deterrence,2. Should aggression occur, the military objective is to preserveor restore the integrity and security of the North Atlantic Treatyarea by employing such forces as may be necessary within the conceptA S S E S S M E N T O F T H E T H R E A T N a t u r e o f t h e T h r e a t 3. The Soviet leaders have not renounced as an ultimate aim theextension of Soviet Communist influence throughout the world.MC 14/3- 3 -Enclosure 1 NATO Strategy Documents 1949

6 - 1969352NATO Strategy Documents 1949
- 1969352NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 Enclosure 1Even though the policies by which the Soviets seek to realise theirends show signs of evolving in response both to political changes ina. Economic means;b. Political means;c. Propaganda;d. Subversion -including spreading of the Communist ideologyand the exportation of arms and material;e. Military power.4. Within Europe the Soviet leaders appear in recent years to havefollowed a more cautious line. Outside Europe, wherever they can doso without military risk to the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders5. The military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact constitute aformidable element in the threat. Although the Warsaw Pact leadersprobably believe that they now possess sufficient military power toMC 14/3- 4 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969353 a.The Soviets will continue to seek by every possible means,including re

7 search, development and production, to a
search, development and production, to acquire ab.The Soviets will continue to support their objectives from aposition of impressive military strength based on nuclear,W a r s a w P a c t C a p a b i l i t i e s 6. The Warsaw Pact is capable of initiating and conducting a widerange of actions against NATO. The principal possible options open tothe Pact are:a.Major nuclear aggression with the aim of destroying to aslarge an extent as possible NATOÕs military potential and, inb.Major aggression, possibly supported by tactical nuclear andchemical weapons, delivered simultaneously against thec.Major aggression against one or two land regions of NATO withor without tactical nuclear and chemical weapons.Enclosure 1MC 14/3- 5 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969354NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 d.Nuclear or non-nuclear operations, restricted to the seaareas of NATO, and directed against NATO forc

8 es, shipping ande.A limited aggression d
es, shipping ande.A limited aggression determined by a particular situation,against an individual NATO country. Such an attack could bef.A renewed harassment or blockade of West Berlin, or an attackon West Berlin.g.Covert actions, incursions or infiltrations (for definitionssee Annex ÒAÓ) anywhere in the NATO area.h.Politico-military pressures and threats against one or moremembers of the Alliance involving ultimatums, militaryO t h e r C o n t i n g e n c i e s 7. Other contingencies could arise which would not immediately anddirectly threaten the territories and populations of NATO but whichwould be of special importance and urgent concern to NATO, e.g:-a.Soviet actions in the peripheral areas outside the NATO area,e.g., Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, or on theb.Incidents, outside the NATO area, either on land or at sea,over which neither side could exercise immediate and fullP o s s

9 i b l e F o r m s o f A c t i o n
i b l e F o r m s o f A c t i o n A g a i n s t N A T O 8. G e n e r a l . The Warsaw Pact leaders will continue to exploitevery opportunity to undermine Alliance solidarity and, in general, toweaken NATO and secure the withdrawal and dispersion of its militaryEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 6 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969355 influenced both by NATOÕs military capabilities (particularly in termsof forces immediately available) and by their conclusions regarding9. C o v e r t A c t i o n s - Covert action ranging from subversion tooutright insurgency is most likely to be effective in countriescharacterised by political, economic and social instability. For this10. L i m i t e d A g g r e s s i o n - It is believed that the Warsaw Pactleaders are convinced that limited aggression initiated by them in theNATO area would engage vital Western interests and

10 commitments as inEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 7
commitments as inEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 7 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969356NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 a.Nevertheless, if NATO fails to maintain a credible capabilityto deal with the whole spectrum of aggression, the Warsawb.The Soviets might engage in such limited aggressions withSoviet forces, but more probably with other forces or with11. M a j o r A g g r e s s i o n - So long as the forces committed to NATO andthe external nuclear forces supporting the Alliance are able toinflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise12. D e l i b e r a t e A t t a c k - The risk of deliberate attack, which mayvary between regions, cannot be discounted; for example, if thepotential enemy, either from political evidence or by deduction from13. A c c i d e n t o r M i s c a l c u l a t i o n - The possibility of hostilitiesarising by accident, or from miscalculation, whi

11 ch could escalate togreater intensity, c
ch could escalate togreater intensity, cannot be ruled out.Enclosure 1MC 14/3- 8 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969357 P r o b a b i l i t y o f R e c e i v i n g W a r n i n g o f A t t a c k 14. The potential enemy has the capability to mount a surpriseattack on a considerable scale, and the concept of surprise remains afundamental principle of war; one of the bases for NATOÕs military15. If the Warsaw Pact was prepared to forego strategic surprisein order to increase the weight of its attack some militaryindications of the build-up should be expected. Although there can beS T R A T E G Y C O N S I D E R A T I O N S D e f e n c e P r i n c i p l e s 16. The deterrent concept of the Alliance is based on:Enclosure 1MC 14/3- 9 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969358NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 a.A m a n i f e s t d e t e r m i n a t i

12 o n to act jointly and defend the North
o n to act jointly and defend the NorthAtlantic Treaty area against all forms of aggression;b.A r e c o g n i s a b l e c a p a b i l i t y of the Alliance to respondeffectively, regardless of the level of aggression;c.A f l e x i b i l i t y which will prevent the potential aggressor frompredicting with confidence NATOÕs specific response toaggression, and which will lead him to conclude that an17. Should deterrence fail and aggression take place there arethree types of military response open to NATO, one or more of whichshould be used in any specific contingency:a.D i r e c t D e f e n c e . Direct defence seeks to defeat theaggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight.It rests upon physically preventing the enemy from takingb.D e l i b e r a t e E s c a l a t i o n . Deliberate escalation seeks to defendaggression by deliberately raising but where possiblecontrolling, t

13 he scope and intensity of combat, making
he scope and intensity of combat, making theEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 10 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969359 cost and the risk disproportionate to the aggressorÕsobjectives and the threat of nuclear response progressively(1)broadening or intensifying a non-nuclear engagement,possibly by opening another front or initiating action(2)use of nuclear defence and denial weapons;(3)demonstrative use of nuclear weapons;(4)selective nuclear strikes on interdiction targets;(5)selective nuclear strikes against other suitablemilitary targets.c.G e n e r a l N u c l e a r R e s p o n s e . General nuclear responsecontemplates massive nuclear strikes against the totalnuclear threat, other military targets, and urban-industrialE l e m e n t s o f S t r a t e g y 18. D e f e n c e C o n c e p t - To safeguard NATO territories andpopulations and to preserve the free use o

14 f sea and airspace, the NATOdefence conc
f sea and airspace, the NATOdefence concept should fulfil the following basic objectives:a.To maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent posture, with asecure retaliatory strike capability, and overall readinessEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 11 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969360NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 b.To make it credible to a potential aggressor that he willhave to contend with an immediate and effective response byc.To identify the scale of any aggression on land or at sea asquickly as possible.d.To prevent the aggressor from seizing and holding NATOterritory or interfering with the free use of sea and aire.To cope with a major aggression by bringing to bear suchconventional and nuclear capabilities as may be necessary to19. N A T O C o m m i t t e d F o r c e s - The forward defence concept requiressufficient ground, sea and air forces in a high state of readiness,committed to NATO for pro

15 mpt, integrated action in times of tensi
mpt, integrated action in times of tension orEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 12 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969361 To take account of the probability of a period of political tensionpreceding a possible aggression or to take advantage of forewarninga.The timely deployment of any active forces not located neartheir emergency defence positions.b.Supplementing effective local forces-in-being on the flanksthrough an improved NATO capability for rapid reinforcementc.The provision of trained, equipped, and readily mobilisablereserve forces which might be committed to NATO.d.The availability of adequate stocks of conventional andnuclear supplies.The requirement at c. above, which should take full account of themobilisation and force expansion capabilities of NATO countries,should provide a base for longer term force increases in a prolonged20. E x t e r n a l S t r a t e g i c

16 N u c l e a r F o r c e s - There m
N u c l e a r F o r c e s - There must be at all timesfull planning coordination between the nuclear strategic forces undernational control and the nuclear forces of NATO to ensure the most21. O t h e r N a t i o n a l F o r c e s f o r N A T O - Available national forcesthat are not committed to NATO should contribute to the defence of theNATO area by providing one or more of the following:a.Intelligence gathering and dissemination.b.Security forces to counter covert operations directed againstNATO countries.c.Reinforcement forces in support of the Forward DefenceConcept in limited aggression.d.A defence in depth in support of the Forward Defence Conceptin major aggression.Enclosure 1MC 14/3- 13 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969362NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 e.Rapidly intervening external reinforcement forces, for thedefence of the flanks in combination with resolute localf.

17 A threat to open another front.g.Forces
A threat to open another front.g.Forces for logistic support to NATO or national forces andfor safeguarding the lines of communication.22. T h e T h r e a t o f E s c a l a t i o n a.The main deterrence to aggression short of full nuclearattack is the threat of escalation which would lead theb.In peace and war nuclear power in being will weigh heavily inthe scales of negotiation and the keystone of NATO securityEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 14 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969363 so grave that the Alliance should engage in such action onlyafter the possibilities of preserving or restoring thec.NATO should retain the initiative to use nuclear weaponsunder conditions where it is militarily or politically23. D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g M a c h i n e r y - In view of the speed with whichthe Warsaw Pact could develop military operations, the political andmilitary con

18 trol arrangements of the Alliance must a
trol arrangements of the Alliance must allow for:a.A continuous assessment of the enemy capabilities andindications of attack.b.Decision-making machinery, capable of rapid decisionsespecially with regard to:(1)The declaration of alert measures, including theassignment of forces to the Major NATO Commanders.(2)The need for conventional military action whiledecisions are being made about mobilisation and(3)The release of nuclear weapons.24. Effect of NATO Force Build-Up - NATOÕs committed forces with acapability to respond rapidly to strategic warning would enhance thecredibility of NATO to deter any scale of aggression. National forcesT H E M I L I T A R Y P O S T U R E O F T H E A L L I A N C E G e n e r a l 25. In order to deter, and if necessary counter, aggression, thebasic military posture of the Alliance requires land, sea andEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 15 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969

19 364NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969
364NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 air forces with a full spectrum of capabilities, including:a.The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance. These shouldbe adequate to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet societyb.The tactical nuclear forces available to the Major NATOCommanders. These constitute an essential component of thec.The conventional forces of the Alliance, land, sea and air,many of which are organically supported by tactical nuclearThe broad requirements for these forces are outlined below.*C o v e r t A c t i o n s 26. The National armed forces and internal security forces of eachNATO country normally should be sufficient to meet covert actionsEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 16 - *Detailed requirements are contained in the revision of ÒMeasures to Implement theStrategic ConceptÓ. NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969365 Enclosure 1MC 14/3- 17 -in their res

20 pective countries. Certain covert actio
pective countries. Certain covert actions could directlyinvolve the forces of the Warsaw Pact. These potential sources ofL i m i t e d A g g r e s s i o n 27. The ground, sea and air forces of the Alliance should becapable of rapid, flexible and effective reaction against the variousforms of limited aggression. To provide the necessary flexibility anda.The provision of adequate local forces capable ofimplementing the forward defence.b.The provision of supporting reinforcement forces, land, navaland air, planned to intervene rapidly.M a j o r A g g r e s s i o n 28. To deal with major aggression NATO requires within theAlliance:a.As the ultimate response, strategic nuclear forces with asecure retaliatory capability.b.Ground, sea and air forces capable of conducting aconventional and nuclear defence against any form ofc.Maritime forces for the protection of shipping, to conductoffensive operations

21 against submarines and surface NATO Stra
against submarines and surface NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969366NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 forces, to counter amphibious operations, for support of the landbattle, to assist in the safe evacuation and dispersal of AlliedO p e r a t i o n s A f t e r a M a j o r N u c l e a r E x c h a n g e 29. Since the scale and nature of any nuclear exchange cannot becalculated with any assurance, the situation after a nuclear exchangeis difficult to foresee and to define. NATO should not plan toa. The implementation of survival measures.b. The maintenance of law and order.B a c t e r i o l o g i c a l a n d C h e m i c a l W a r f a r e 30. It is not evident to what extent BW or CW capabilities mightaffect deterrence. However, there is a danger that the Soviet leadersmight come to believe that their capabilities in these fields woulda. Lethal CW agents in retaliations, on a limited

22 scale.b. Passive defensive measures agai
scale.b. Passive defensive measures against CW.O p e r a t i o n s O u t s i d e t h e N A T O A r e a 31. The forces of certain NATO nations may need to retain theflexibility required to permit action to meet limited militarysituations outside the NATO area especially in peripheral areas. ThisT H E S T R A T E G I C C O N C E P T 32. The overall military objective of the Alliance is toprevent war by creating an effective deterrent to all forms ofaggression. For this purpose the Alliance needs a full spectrum Enclosure 1MC 14/3- 18 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969367 of military capabilities ranging from conventional forces throughtactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear forces.33. To provide the minimum requirements for this deterrentstrategy the Alliance must act jointly and maintain at least:a.A credible capability for direct defence to det

23 er the lesseraggressions such as covert
er the lesseraggressions such as covert actions, incursions,b.A credible capability for deliberate escalation to deter moreambitious aggressions.c.A credible capability to conduct a general nuclear responseas the ultimate deterrent.34. Should aggression occur the military objective must be topreserve or restore the integrity and security of the North AtlanticTreaty Area by employing such force as may be necessary within thea.Meet initially any aggression short of a major nuclear attackwith the available direct defence.b.Conduct a deliberate escalation of the conflict if theaggression could not be held and the situation restored byc.Initiate the appropriate major nuclear response if theaggression were a major nuclear attack.35. The political and military control arrangements of theAlliance should permit timely political consultation required byindicators of attack, and consultation required for the use o

24 f nucleara.In the event of an unmistakab
f nucleara.In the event of an unmistakable attack with nuclear weaponsin the NATO area, the forces of the Alliance shouldEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 19 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969368NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to thecircumstances. The possibilities for consultation in thisb.In the event of a full-scale conventional aggression,indicating the opening of general hostilities on any sectorc.In the event of an attack not fulfilling the conditionsdescribed in a and b, above, but which threatened theEnclosure 1MC 14/3- 20 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969369 A N N E X A D E F I N I T I O N S 1. The definitions in the following paragraphs are intended onlyto define the spectrum of enemy aggression. They do not dictate orpre-judge the nature or scale or NATO response.2. C o v e r t A c t i o n s - are

25 defined as any non-nuclear operationswh
defined as any non-nuclear operationswhich are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, orpermit denial by, the sponsor. Such actions may be used to forment3. I n c u r s i o n s (Adapted from MC 78) - Small-scale raids, frontierviolations, or other harassments on land, at sea and in the aircarried out by Soviet, Satellite or other aggressive military or para-4. I n f i l t r a t i o n s (Adapted from MC 78) - Covert penetrations byindividuals or small groups of Soviet, or Satellite personnel or otherhostile groups for the purpose of executing various harassments. Such 5. H o s t i l e L o c a l A c t i o n s conducted in an atmosphere suggesting conscious restriction by theadversary on the objectives, nature and duration of operations and Enclosure 1MC 14/3- 21 - NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969370NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969 placed on the quick thrust and, if objecti

26 ves were quickly realised,on the assumed
ves were quickly realised,on the assumed reluctance of NATO to restore the situation by force6. L i m i t e d A g g r e s s i o n - is defined as any armed attack againstNATO forces or territory, or actions at sea or in the air, underconditions of self-imposed military restraint, in which it appears7. M a j o r A g g r e s s i o n - is defined as any nuclear or non-nucleararmed attack against NATO forces or territory, or actions at sea or inthe air, in which it has been clearly determined that the aim anda.One or more NATO countries, to the extent that survival asfree and independent nation(s) is immediately at stake, orb.The integrity of military forces, to the extent thatcapabilities essential to the effective accomplishment of8. C o n v e n t i o n a l F o r c e s - are defined as those forces employable ina non-nuclear role, although they may have a nuclear capability.Annexe A toEnclosure 1