5 system thao the contents of a storage container Typically an IB would be used in a measurement system regime that any classified information to the inspectinS in am verification regimeS and IB syst ID: 900159
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1 5 A 505/667-3090 ABSTRACT system tha
5 A 505/667-3090 ABSTRACT system tha o the contents of a storage container. Typically, an IB would be used in a measurement system regime that any classified information to the inspectin S in am verification regime S and IB system system are perhaps the most stringent in nuclear material verification, there are a number of othe area s both con
2 cerns simultaneously while also l r prot
cerns simultaneously while also l r protection of sensitive data and a l potentially sensitive information is separated physically, electrically, and procedurally from the inspector w data can be displayed on a video monitor e being measured. The Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration in mind. The I ., each component of the I Previ
3 ous demonstrations of the IB and AMS con
ous demonstrations of the IB and AMS concepts, such a FMTTD made only superficial attempts at fostering inspector confidence in the r the next generation IB, w e other hardware and almost all of the software i l custom hardware as it easy to authenticate. The goal of the next-generation AMS design is to make all custom hardware ande as simple as
4 possible to further thes o information
possible to further thes o information path in an AMS. The security watchdog does not carr in custom extensiv l also be easy. Similarly, the functionality e most recently received messages from the analysis computer. the DB contains no intelligence one-way valve for directing information. Th ; all of the security system's sensors and cabling a
5 re physically separate e SW controls whe
re physically separate e SW controls whether s receive power. For this reason, the SW cannot affect the displayed output of the AMS, except by turn it off entirely. Thus, the S this hardware element that prevents someone from opening the enclosur n off. Like the DB, the SW contain g in a e in the presence of numerous technicians who were Each com
6 ponent of the AMS is designed around a p
ponent of the AMS is designed around a particula e to. CB can be developed so that a technician can rapidly verify the working condition of ar of CB boards. The design of the input/output system of the CB is specifically tailored to allow this simple doubly protected against damage from the environment or mechanical damage from rough handling. Se
7 curity Watchdog and Enclosure Reliabilit
curity Watchdog and Enclosure Reliabilit e doors. In order to ensure s that e expect components within the enclosure to be removed periodically for inspection and authentication, the internal wiring should be protected from possible mechanical damage.g the door-switch cabling e will protect it. Because the door-switch wiring i e reduce the time req
8 uired for inspectors and material owners
uired for inspectors and material owners to physically inspect e less time and money spent on activities that do not involve actually performing measurements. , and softwareÑwhether f an Information Barrier to Protectd Information," MacArthu . M. Puckett, D. . Gosnell, Z. Koenig, J Poplavko Igor Jarikhine, Alexande n o " to be presented at the 4