PHYSICALLYIt is common at least among philosophers to talk of causes b - PDF document

1 PHYSICALLYIt is common (at least among p
PHYSICALLYIt is common (at least among philosophers) to talk of causes being ÒconnectedÓ tocausal process involves an object that possesses a conserved quantity. Such processproblem for process theories in his chapter. Phil Dowe claims that negativemaintain a theoretical distinction. Schaffer, by contrast, argues that negativecausation gives us everything we could want from causation, and criticizes DoweÕs 9.1Introductionthe window not to break? According to some theories of causation I didnÕt. TheCQ1.A is a world-line of an object that possesses a conserved quantity.CQ2.A is an intersection of world-lines that involves exchange of a conserved quantity.For example, suppose I had thrown the rock through the window. Then

2 my throwingbreaking. And the windowÕs
my throwingbreaking. And the windowÕs breaking involves an exchange of momentum. But quiteing the rock and the window (see also the theories of Fair, Aronson, Ellis, Bigelowand Pargetter, and Ehring).rock the window would have broken (the it is causation because there is a regular pattern Ð a Òconstant conjunctionÓ Ð betweensays it is causation because not throwing the rock makes it more likely that theHowever, there are also versions of these latter accounts according to which suchcases are not causation. According to Lewis (1986), the most inßuential version ofthe counterfactual theory, any case that involves negative ÒeventsÓ exhibits no a relation that is required for causation. (Later, Lewis argues that such

3 cases count astaking the medication Òc
cases count astaking the medication ÒcausedÓ him not to die), and other cases in which some inter-medicine, thereby ÒcausingÓ his death). LetÕs call the range of theories that count negative-excludingstrictly speaking, cases of causation. However, more should be said about this classfor prevention, ÒcausationÓ by omission,to take the view that these cases either are or are not cases of causation.9.2Arguments from IntuitionArguments for and against the view that I am defending often appeal to Òclear intu-away, and had nothing whatsoever to do with them,Ó or ÒClearly your failure to reg-ularly clean your teeth is the cause of your tooth decay.ÓHowever, arguments that appeal simply to allegedly clear intuitions sh

4 ould beon, an account that explained why
ould beon, an account that explained why, loosely speaking Ð if not literally Ð it could be Phil Dowe190 taken as true to say the sun rises in the morning. (Sections 9.3 and 9.4 will do thistaken as sacrosanct.(A)I caused her death by holding her head under water for Þve minutes.(B)I can see the darkness outside.(C)I caused the terrorist attack in London by failing to report information that I had about(D)The hospital administration caused the death of an elderly patient by refusing to releasefunds to ship expensive equipment from the USA and thereby allowing her to die by(E)I caused the terrorist attack in London by failing to be in a pub on a certain night,(F)I caused the death of some penguins by failing to hire a pl

5 ane and travel to the (G)A man is engros
ane and travel to the (G)A man is engrossed in the view at a lookout, and doesnÕt see a small girl (who he doesnÕtknow) playing nearby. He sees her just as she is about to slip off the cliff, and runs ashave seen her earlier and been able to save her.(H)My not throwing the rock caused the window not to break.being causation. However, all the theories of causation mentioned above treat themuniformly. The negative-friendly theories say that these are while the negative-excluding theories say that none of them are.why our intuitions vary across cases that are theoretically similar. (I donÕt myself placetuitive cases of causation. On MillÕs theory, the scientiÞc ÒtotalÓ cause of an event is, and we could call partial ca

6 uses ÒcausesÓ if wewish. Two types of
uses ÒcausesÓ if wewish. Two types of counterintuitive cases then arise. Intuitively, some partial causesxygen is considered the cause of the explosion). And, intuitively, some very remote Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects191 sufÞcient or partial causes are also counterintuitive (the big bang is not, intuitively,and more or less proximate causes are of more interest to us than remote causes; forexample, in establishing legal responsibility.This approach can explain why, for example, we might have different intuitionsSo, in general terms, this solution takes all cases involving negatives as causationThere are two problems with this answer. First, at best it works for those negative-friendly theories of cau

7 sation that take negatives to be causes
sation that take negatives to be causes or effects, but it wonÕtwork for negative-excluding theories. Secondly, itÕs not clear how this solution worksin detail. Take (H), the case of my not throwing the rock causing the window to notitions, that account would therefore have to be the preferred answer. We now turn to9.3The Counterfactual Theory of Quasi-CausationThe general outline of this account is to assert that negatives cannot be linked by(2000, ch. 6) and Dowe (2001), which the following summarizes.)(1) if A had occurred, A would have caused B. Phil Dowe192 would have caused B.of preventions (see Dowe, 2001).up the terroristsÕ van, the attack didnÕt occur, and there was a genuine causal processrelation between A a

8 nd B, nor A and not-B.quasi-causes B, wh
nd B, nor A and not-B.quasi-causes B, where A and B are positive events or facts, and not-A is an Òact ofthe fact that I didnÕt blow up the terroristsÕ van, the attack did occur, and there was Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects193 . This will work even for the counterfactual theory: moreover,about cases of quasi-causation. It takes all our cases to be cases of quasi-causation,not causation. We now turn to this question.9.4Epistemic Blur and Practical Equivalencenatively, apparently positive events may turn out to be negative events and, conse-quently, cases of apparently genuine causation may turn out to be omissions orpreventions. The latter is especially convincing. Take the case of ÒcausingÓ drowning.

9 ctually, this is quasi-causation, since
ctually, this is quasi-causation, since holding her head under water prevents herfrom getting oxygen. Thus there is an epistemic blur between quasi-causation andof smoke is to prevent normal processes from impacting certain cells in a certain way, so that, in the absence of those processes, diseased cells prosper (causation byThese considerations are of merely epistemic concern. We may not know whetherSecondly, causation and quasi-causation play very similar practical roles. Nega-also feature in explanation. Arguably, quasi-causation may also, subject to Òprag-theoretically, in metaphysics. Phil Dowe194 9.5Explaining Intuitionsnegative-excludingnegative-excludingSecondly, the two facts outlined in the previous section Ð

10 the epistemic blur andproblem and the pr
the epistemic blur andproblem and the practical equivalence together suggest that we take our undoubtedThirdly, there is a straightforward explanation for the difÞcult case of negative-excludingprocess between the two Òevents.Ó I submit that these factors place the excludingA World of States of Affairs1999: The open door. In H. Sankey (ed.), . Dordrecht: Kluwer,Aronson, J. 1971: On the grammar of Òcause.Ó , 22, 414Ð30.The Act Itself. New York: The Clarendon Press.Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R. 1990: Collingwood, R. 1974: Three senses of the word Òcause.Ó In T. Beauchamp (ed.), . Encino, CA: Dickenson, 118Ð26.Dowe, P. 2000: . New York: Cambridge University Press.2001: A counterfactual theory of prevention and Òcaus

11 ationÓ by omission. 79(2), 216Ð26.Caus
ationÓ by omission. 79(2), 216Ð26.Causation and Persistence Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects195 Fair, D. 1979: Causation and the ßow of energy. Erkenntnis, 14, 219Ð50.Glover, J. 1977: . Harmondsworth: Penguin.Hart, H. and HonorŽ, T. 1985: . New York: Cambridge University Press.Philosophical Papers, vol. II. New York: Oxford University Press.forthcoming: Void and object. In J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul (eds.), Mellor, D. 1995: Salmon, W. 1997: Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques. 64, 461Ð77.. New York: Oxford University Press.Suppes, P. 1970: von Wright, G. 1971: . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Dowe, P., Causal processes. In E. Zalta (ed.), Hart, H. and HonorŽ, T.

12 1985: Salmon, W. 1998: . New York: Oxfo
1985: Salmon, W. 1998: . New York: Oxford University Press. Phil Dowe196 CONTEMPORARYDEBATES IN 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA08 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UKthis Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Actrecording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.p.cm. Ñ (Contemporary debates in philosophy ; 2)ISBN 1-4051-0151-2 (alk. paper) Ñ ISBN 1-4051-0152-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)1.ScienceÑPhilosophy.I.Hitchcock, Christopher, 1964ÐII.Series.Q175.C6917 2004501Ñdc222003016800A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.Set in 10/12http://www.blackwellpubl