John Locke Background Background 16321704 Early Years amp Education Public Life Revolution Works Two Treatises on Government 1690 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 1690 Letters Concerning Toleration ID: 694696
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Slide1
Metaphysics Part 4
Personal IdentitySlide2
John Locke: Background
Background (1632-1704)
Early Years & Education
Public Life
Revolution
WorksTwo Treatises on Government 1690An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 1690Letters Concerning Toleration 1689-1692Some Thoughts Concerning Education 1693The Reasonableness of Christianity 1695The End
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John Locke: PI & Substance
Substance
Idea of SubstanceQualities cannot subsist sine re substante.SubstantiaLocke’s Elephant Story
Asked about qualitiesThe elephantThe tortoise Something he knew not what. No distinct idea of substance.
Something he knows not what.Slide4
John Locke: PI & Substance
Ideas of Material Substance & Spiritual Substance
The physicalThe mentalLack of clear & distinct ideaIdentity of Living ThingsLiving CreaturesNot sameness of matter.
Changes in matter do not result in a change of identity.Oak exampleSame animalSlide5
John Locke: PI & Substance
Man
Identity of manOrganized living bodyIdentity of soulHog exampleSame substance, same soul, same personWhat is a man?
Animal of a certain form.Without reason but having the shape of manCat or parrot that reasoned.Man is particular shaped body.
Same body, same spirit, same man.Slide6
John Locke: PI & Substance
Consciousness & Personal Identity
PersonA thinking intelligent being.That has reason and reflection.Can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.Does so by consciousness.
ConsciousnessAlways accompanies thinking.Makes each to be what he calls self and distinguishes him from other thinking things.Sole basis of PI, the sameness of rational being.Identity reaches as far as the consciousness can be extended.Slide7
John Locke: PI & Substance
Consciousness Makes Personal Identity
ForgettingIf people did not forgetQuestions about same thinking substanceThis does not concern PI which is about sameness of person not substance.Consciousness
The same consciousness makes a man himself to himself.PI depends on that alone, regardless of substance(s).Changes of Time & Substance: Clothing analogy & hand argumentThe self extends as far as the consciousness.Clothing analogy.
Hand argumentSlide8
John Locke: PI & Substance
Personal Identity & Immaterial Substance
First QuestionIs it the same person through change of substance?Can only be resolved by those who knowWhat kind of thinking substance they are.If consciousness can be transferred.
If the same consciousness is not the same individual, we must know:Why one substance thinks it did something it did not.Why such a thought might be without reality.That this does not happen is best explained by God’s goodness.
If the same consciousness is transferable, two thinking substances might be one person.Slide9
John Locke: PI & Substance
Second Question
Can there be 2 distinct persons though the immaterial substance is the same?Loss of consciousnessPre-existence of the soul.Pre-existent spiritExample: Nestor
Soul of NestorNo consciousness of Nestor’s actions.Body analogy If conscious of Nestor’s actionsSlide10
John Locke: PI & Substance
Memory & PI
ResurrectionSame person, different body.Same consciousness.Prince & CobblerSoul of a prince enters the soulless body of a cobbler.Body goes into making the man.
Soul would not make another man.LanguageOrdinary way of speakingApply sounds
Determine what we mean.Slide11
John Locke: PI & Substance
Self Depends on Consciousness
ConsciousnessSelfConscious of pleasure & pain.Capable of happiness or misery.Concerned for itself.Matters not what substance.
Little FingerLittle fingerRemovedConsciousness makes the person.As far as the consciousness reaches. Slide12
John Locke: PI & Substance
Reward & Punishment
PI & JusticeFoundation of right & justice of reward & punishment.Happiness & misery.Little FingerFingerBody
Personal IdentityNot identity of substance, identity of consciousness. SocratesSocrates waking & sleeping
PunishmentSlide13
John Locke: PI & Substance
Problem of Punishment
Drunk, Asleep, & Judgment DayDrunk & soberWhy else punished for the act?Sleep walkingHuman laws punish both suitable to their knowledge.Ignorance is not admitted as a plea.
Punishment annexed to personality, personality to consciousness.Human law justly punishes.Fact is proved against him.Secrets laid open.Slide14
John Locke: PI & Substance
Objection & Reply
Loss of memorySame person?The word “I”Same man, same person.Same man, different consciousness, different persons.Opinions
Human laws do not punish the mad man for the sober man’s actions.Nor the sober for the mad.Two persons.Say that one is not his self.
Same man, different person.Slide15
John Locke: PI & Substance
Odd Cases
Two and OneOne body, day & night consciousnesses.PI determined by consciousness.Thinking substance.
Remembering and forgetting.Self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance.Identity of consciousness.Slide16
David Hume
Preliminaries
Other philosophers imagine
Self
Existence &continuance
Identity & SimplicityHumeEncounters a perceptionNever without perception, nothing but perceptions.Removal of perceptionsDeathThis Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SASlide17
David Hume
Disagreement
Different notionHume’s caseBundles & PersonsBundles & ChangePerson is a bundle of perceptions.Perceptions in perpetual flux.
No power to remain the same.The mind is a kind of theatre.Numerous perceptionsNo simplicity nor identity
Comparison to a theater.Slide18
David Hume
Identity & Relations
IdentityWhat leads us to ascribe identity?Distinct perceptionSuppose perceptions are united by identity.IdentityAttribution of identity.
RelationsResemblance, contiguity, and causation.Uniting principles.No connection
Identity depends on resemblance and causation.Easy transition of ideas.Slide19
David Hume
Resemblance & Memory
Memory Image resembles the objectResembling perceptionsSeems like one continuing objectMemory discovers and contributes to the production of identity.Causation & Analogy to a Commonwealth
Mind is a system of perceptions linked by cause & effect.Soul is like a republic.United by ties.The analogy.Slide20
David Hume
Concern, Memory, & Causation
ConcernIdentity & passionsDistant perceptionsConcernMemoryMemory acquaints
No memory, no notion of causationCausation & memorySlide21
David Hume
Criticism of Memory of the basis of identity
Remember few past actionsForgettingMemory discovers PIExtending identity beyond memoryConclusionQuestions about PI can never be decided.
Grammatical rather than philosophical.Identity depends on relation of ideas.DiminishAll disputes concerning PI are merely verbal.Slide22
Buddha’s No Self Doctrine
No Self
Names
Nagesena
A name
The king’s questionIf there is no self, whoFurnishes priestsUses themKeeps preceptsMeditatesCommits immoralityTells lies
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Buddha’s No Self Doctrine
Implications-if there is no self
No merit or demeritNo one who does deedsNo fruit or resultNo murdererNo teacherWho/what is
NagasenaNot hairNot nails, etc.Not sensations, etc.
Not something besides form, etc.King fails to discover any
NagasenaNagasena is a mere empty sound-there is no NagasenaSlide24
Buddha’s No Self Doctrine
Rebirth
RebirthHow does rebirth take place without anything transmigrating?Illustration 1: LightLight lit from another light.RebirthIllustration 2: poetry
Learning poetry from a teacherVerseRebirth without transmigratingSlide25
Digital Tears Fell from Her Virtual Eyes
Introduction
Robert Nozick’s experience machine argument’s 3 Assumptions
Metaphysical: there is a real world distinct from the virtual world of the machine.
Epistemic: a person can know the difference between the real and the virtual.
Moral— the beings of the virtual world lack moral status or have a moral status far below beings in the real world. GoalsExamine the 3 assumptions.Show that the experiences in the virtual world have value and that the inhabitants of this world either have or should be presumed to have moral status. Challenges2 Metaphysical.2 EpistemicSlide26
Digital Tears
Dogmeat & Kant
Saving DogmeatRepurposed Kantian Animal Argument: Principle of Analogous ServiceDogmeat is a virtual animal.Dogmeat is a program object.Rational beings have no direct moral obligations to animals.The principle of analogous service.Slide27
Digital Tears
Dogmeat & Kant
Repurposed Kantian Animal Argument: Principle of Emotional Impact:The ersatz status of animals is grounded in psychological consequences. Treating animals badly would have harmful consequences for rational beings. CPR analogy.Be kind to animals—because of impact on character.Application to DogmeatDogmeat lacks moral status.Dogmeat is morally on par with animals.By parity of reasoning, Dogmeat should has ersatz status.Slide28
Digital Tears
Dogmeat & Kant
Object ObjectionSticks and stones.So virtual beings like Dogmeat should be denied even an ersatz moral status. Responding requires showing virtual beings are more like dogs than sticks.Reply 1 to Object Objection: principle of serviceAnalogous behavior. Dogmeat example.Sticks and stones cannot do this.Objection: The virtual being does not earn this status.Reply: Kant’s argument does not require that the being earn the status through choice
. Slide29
Digital Tears
Dogmeat & Kant
Reply 2 to Object Objection: Principle of Emotional Impact
Impact
Isis (the husky) example
Dogmeat example
Argument neededSlide30
Digital Tears
Plato & Emotional Impact
FictionAnalogous to virtual realityPlato’s Argument in the RepublicArt appeals to the emotions and encourages people to give in to them, so it should be banned. Being ruled by such emotions is undesirable since it can cause shameful or even harmful behavior. Plato & Video GamesApplication of Plato’s argument to video games.Acting in bad ways towards virtual beings would have a corrupting impact on a person’s character. This supports the Kantian argument.Slide31
Digital Tears
Aristotle & Video Games
PolarityArt has two polarities: positive and negative. Influence on behavior.Supports the principle of emotional impact.Habituation, Halo & GTAHalo: one is playing a good person, acting in the right way towards the right persons for the right reasons. GTA: Acting in the wrong way towards the wrong people for the wrong reasons. Skill analogy argument: develop moral skills as one develops game skills.Slide32
Digital Tears
Aristotle & Video Games
ObjectionsPractice without improvementSports analogyRepliesMost improve from practice.Most athletes develop moral values from their experiences in sports. ImpactCurrent research is inconclusive because the “...evidence is all over the place.”If video games can impact players, the influence of the experience machine should be analogous to real life. The virtual beings would have an ersatz moral status even if they lacked a moral status of their own.
A person in the experience machine would have indirect duties to the virtual beings of the experience machine.Slide33
Digital Tears
Beings With Status
StatusPassing the TestsThe experience machine needs an incredibly sophisticated AI (and Artificial Emotion) system to create the NPCs. Virtual people would need to duplicate the behavior of actual people and thus pass the Turing Test.Even more difficult test: full interaction rather than just text.Passing this test shows a being qualifies as a human (or human enough).Grants a moral status comparable to humans.Slide34
Digital Tears
Beings With Status
Objection—no distinct beingsBeing in the virtual world are not distinct beings: they are part of the overall program. Analogous to Spinoza’s pantheism.Pancyberism: all the virtual beings are modes of the one virtual being. Reply-One Being with StatusThe one true virtual being would still have a moral status. One person play analogy Reply-IndividualsThe individual virtual beings are their own programs within the broader world.
Analogous to real beings. Side pointSlide35
Digital Tears
Beings With Status
Objection: Virtual Beings are FakesThey appear to think and feel, yet merely engage in programed behavior that simulates thinking and feeling. Reply: “Fake” Intelligence is Real A being that can “fake” intelligence flawlessly would be intelligent. Qualities needed to fake intelligence are the same as those involved in actually having intelligence. Slide36
Digital Tears
Emotions & The External World
Fake FeelingsFakingProblem of Other MindsProblem of the External World Real vs. VirtualOnly Difference: the real world is supposed to be metaphysically real. Experiences are indiscernible. The problem of the external world.Slide37
Digital Tears
Emotions & The External World
The Problem of the External WorldHow do I know that there is a really real world for real? Doubt of the difference.The usual suspects.Attempts at certainty.The allegedly real world might be the world of the experience machine. Need to solve the problem of the external world to claim the real world is superior. Slide38
Digital Tears
Emotions & The External World
Counter-Belief SufficesCertainty is not needed. The user’s belief grounds the superiority.Art AnalogyReplyBelief that the virtual world is real (or not different).Distinction is too tenuous.Slide39
Digital Tears
Emotions & the External World 2: Lockean Approach
Lockean ApproachWhat matters is understanding how the world seems to work in regard to causing pain and pleasure. Parity of WorldsThe world of the experience machine and the allegedly real world would be on par. Experientially and ontologically indistinguishable. City AnalogyAnalogous to entering and leaving a city, such as Las Vegas.
The value of “real” experiences rests rest on the happiness or misery caused by these experiences. Since the “virtual” experiences can produce the same hedonic results, they are on par.Slide40
Digital Tears
VII External World 3: Assuming it Isn’t Real
Distinguish
Even if the real was known to be real, the experience machine experiences would still have value.
Video Games
A player knows the game is not real.
The enjoyment or disappointment is quite real.
This makes the virtual experience as valuable as other experiences in the real world.
Tabletop Games
The same point can be made using tabletop games.
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Digital Tears
External World 3: Assuming it Isn’t Real
SportsA similar point can be made about sports. An obvious counter is that the sports world is part of the real world.The experience is as much a part of the real world as sports and games are. Audience ExperienceIf value can be derived from the “unreal” experiences of games, sports and fiction, then the same applies to the experience machine. Objection
Objection: while games, sports and fiction are fine as amusements, their value is less than that of “real” activities. Reply: if there is value in games, sports and fiction, then there would be value in the experiences of the experience machine. Slide42
Digital Tears
Other Minds
Fake InhabitantsBecause these beings are not real, they lack moral status and what is done to and with them does not matter. The Problem of Other MindsHow do I know that other beings, real or virtual, have minds similar enough to my own to grant them an appropriate moral status?Critical claim: the inhabitants of the virtual world have either no moral status or a vastly inferior moral status, thus making the real-world superior. Issue: whether the experiences of a non-virtual person in the experience machine have less value if the virtual beings with whom she interacts lack the moral status of actual beings in the real world.
‘The problem of other moral statuses’—the epistemic question of knowing whether or not other beings have the moral qualities that I allegedly possess.Slide43
Digital Tears
Other Minds
Virtual MindsVirtual beings: uncertainty as to whether they possess minds.The problem of other minds shows their status is only marginally more in doubt than that of real beings. Simply assuming being virtual beings denies them status is a question-begging prejudice. The same presumption should be extended to the virtual beings of the experience machine. Slide44
Digital Tears
Other Minds
Justification of Presumption of StatusAnalogy to the presumption of innocence in American law: Objection: these are virtual beings and not real beings. Counter: It is not known the inhabitants of the real world have minds,.Status by analogyI could have relevantly similar moral obligations to beings in a virtual world as I do to those in real world. Grounds the value of experiences in the virtual world—they would have moral significance comparable to experiences of the real world.
Slide45
Digital Tears
Conclusion
ConclusionCompelling reasons for granting virtual beings moral status, if only an ersatz or presumed status, based on the problem of other minds. Compelling reasons to believe that life in an experience machine would have value. That it not known if there is a really real world for real makes accepting this appealing—otherwise the value of one’s existence rests on metaphysics that are forever uncertain. Counter: the value of existence rests on metaphysical hypotheses that are eternally uncertain. Reply: This still places the allegedly real world and the virtual world on the same uncertain footing.
Slide46
Digital Tears
Conclusion
In Sum The complexity of the experience machine entails it can create worlds and inhabitants on a par with the real world. They should be regarded as having comparable value and status. To hold otherwise would is a mere bias in favor of the real over the virtual. Slide47
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Introduction
Shortcut
A method of matching artificial beings with natural and assigning a corresponding moral status.
Matchup of morally important qualities.
Examples: Humans & Squirrels Practical Moral ChallengeMethods for matching of artificial beings with natural beings. Language-based tests for discerning the intelligenceProblem: Artificial beings that lack language capabilities. Non-language tests.This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BYSlide48
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Introduction
Two Approaches Reason-Kant’s metaphysics of morals is a paradigm. Feeling- utilitarians, such as J. S. Mill. Paper Map Tests Granting Moral Status 3 arguments in favor of a presumption of moral status.
Slide49
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Reason
Established Tests
Turing Test
Cartesian Test.
The Turing TestInvolves a machine and two humans. One human acts as the tester.The tester communicates with the subjects via text and endeavors to determine which is human. If the machine’s texting is indistinguishable from the human, it passes the test.The machine would have earned a status comparable to that of a human. This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SASlide50
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Reason
The Cartesian Test Discussion of whether animals have minds. The definitive indicator of having a mind (thinking) is the ability to use true language. If something really talks, then it is reasonable to regard it as a thinking being. Descartes distinguished between mere automated responses and actual talking. Objection There could be an intelligent being with a language unrecognizable by humans or no language. Such a being would not pass the Cartesian Test, though it would (by hypothesis) be intelligent.
Slide51
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Reason
Replies Human-constructed beings would use human languages or languages humans would recognize. It does not invalidate the test; at worst an additional behavioral test would be needed. Such a being would not be possible.MoralityIf an artificial being can match the human capacity to use true language, then this indicates it possesses reason comparable to that of a human. Entitlement to a moral status analogous to that of a human. MetaphysicsDescartes regarded his test as indicating the presence or absence of an immaterial mind.
Addressing moral status as a practical matter does not require deciding the metaphysical question of the nature of the mind. Otherwise the moral status of humans would also be forever hostage to metaphysics. Slide52
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Reason
LimitationLanguage-based tests would be failed by entities that lack the intelligence to use language. Consistent with some reason-based approaches to ethics, such Kant’s. Possible to deny moral status to entities that lack rationality.If non-rational natural beings are afforded moral status on the basis of their intelligence, the same should apply to non-rational artificial beings. Slide53
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Reason
Argument Against Behavioral TestsA being could pass such a test without really being intelligent. John Searle: believing a computational model of consciousness to be conscious is analogous to believing that a computational model of rain would make people wet. Artificial beings could be granted the same moral status as human beings when they are “faking” intelligence and not entitled to that status.Reply Perfectly “faking” intelligence would suffice as proof of intelligence. Intelligence would be required to “fake” intelligence, thus providing an ironic proof of intelligence.
Analogy: Faking a skill perfectly Slide54
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Reason
ObjectionAn entity could be indistinguishable from an intelligent being in regard to all possible empirical tests, yet lack intelligence.Challenge: present an adequate account of how this is possible.Without philosophical fiat.This is a version of the problem of other minds. Slide55
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Feeling
FeelingScience Fiction beings that are rational but lack feeling,PainSince artificial beings could be thinking yet unfeeling, this would be relevant to their moral status. An approach to the moral status of animals is to base it not on their intelligence but on their capacity to feel and suffer. Need for tests.Testing for FeelingVariations on the language tests. Determine the presence or absence of artificial feeling (AF) rather than artificial intelligence (AI).
Voight-Kampff Test used in Blade Runner to distinguish replicants from humans.Slide56
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Feeling
Problem with language based tests for feelingDetermining whether the subject only knows how to use the words properly or if it really feels. An artificial being could be like a human actor reading emotional lines.ExamplesA being with artificial emotions might merely have language skills and lack feelings grounding moral status. Faking FeelingsFeelings are trickier than intelligence in regards to testing. A being could fake having a feeling. Slide57
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Feeling
Reliable Test NeededA test is needed that even a human could not reliably fake.Fictional Example: Voight-Kampff Test in Phillip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? These tests provide an interesting theoretical starting point.To determine if an artificial being has the appropriate sort of feelings and assign it a moral status comparable to that of a similar natural being.Psychological Tests A multitude of psychological tests relating to emotions.
Test for what some psychologists call emotional intelligence. Slide58
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Feeling
Problem of Other (Hearts) & MindsThe problem of other mindsA being with knowledge could act appropriately or manipulate effectively without feeling.Spinoza believed that he could work out human emotions with geometric exactness.An unfeeling artificial being could think its way through feelings. Would still have the moral status conferred by its intelligence. Slide59
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Tests of Feeling
DoubtAlways be room for doubt. Practical doubt about the effectiveness of the tests analogous to doubts about medical tests. The problem of other mindsThe moral question of status is distinct from the metaphysical question of status. Slide60
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status
Presumption of Status A principle of presumption of status. Analogous to the presumption of innocence in the U.S. legal system.The Precautionary PrincipleUsed in moral debates about abortion.Despite the uncertainty of the moral status of a fetus, it is preferable to err on the side of caution and treat it as if it had the status of a person. A person should endure some negative consequences to avoid killing what might be a person.Slide61
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: Utilitarian Argument
The argumentThere should be a presumption of status because erring on the side of the higher status would tend to avoid more harm than it would create.Example: being polite to a human-like android.Example: putting up an unwanted artificial dog for adoption rather than throwing it in the trash.Objection-Presumption could do more harm than good.Accepting a presumption of status could lead to greater harm than its rejection. Example: a firefighter must choose between a human and an android.Slide62
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: Utilitarian Argument
Reply-Presumption does more good than harm.Specific cases can occur in which the presumption of status creates more harm than good.The general impact of the principle will be positive. Analogy to the problem for the presumption of innocence. The general principle should be accepted while acknowledging it is not a perfect principle.Reply-Context relativeThe resumption of status could be relative to the context.If a being with established status is in conflict with a being of presumed status, then the being with established status should be given moral priority.
Fire exampleAnalogous to other situations involving knowledge and doubt.Slide63
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: Probability
ProbabilityAnalogous to assessing a risk.When acting toward an artificial being, the probability that it has moral status has to be considered. The moral risk of acting in harmful ways toward an artificial being increases according to the likelihood that the being has a moral status. A practical estimate is possible.The possibility they possess their apparent status warrants treating them in accord with that status.Slide64
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: Probability
Problem: ConflictCases in which artificial and natural beings come into conflict.Nuclear plant example.Reply-Risk CalculationsThe android should be sent.Sending the human would yield a certainty that a being with human status will die. Sending the android means it is only likely that a being with human status will be destroyed. Choice between 2 humans: send the one most likely to survive.The risk calculation is analogous.Slide65
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: Probability
Objection: Second-Class status Condemns artificial beings to 2nd class moral status due to epistemic concerns about actual status. Humans routinely treat other humans as second-class beings and this always turns out horribly. Avoid making the same horrific moral mistakes again by deciding that it is better to err on the side of a higher moral status than intuitions might indicate. Slide66
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: The Ersatz Option
Ersatz OptionWhile some artificial beings probably lack status, they should still be granted an ersatz status. The argument for this is a repurposed version of Kant’s argument for treating animals well.Kant’s ArgumentKant bases moral status on rationality and denies animals are rational.For Kant animals lack moral status-they are “objects of the inclination.”So we have no direct duties to animals. He endeavors to sneak in indirect duties to animals.
If a rational being doing X would create a moral obligation to that being, then an animal doing X would create an ersatz moral obligation. Kant uses philosophical prestidigitation to avoid granting the dog moral status.The dog’s lack of rationality results in a lack of moral status, so it cannot be wronged.Slide67
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: The Ersatz Option
Kant’s Argument ContinuedIf a person abandoned her loyal old dog, her humanity would be damaged by this callous action. Acting in inhumane ways toward animals would have harmful consequences—not to the animals (which have no moral status) but toward other humans. Treating animals with cruelty would make it more likely for a person to fail in her duties to other humans, and this would be wrong.The treatment of animals as moral practice for humans. Analogy to shoot/don’t shoot police training.Kant enjoins us to be kind-because kindness to animals will develop our kindness to humans.
Animals are objects of practice for the real thing—humans. This grants animals an ersatz moral status.Kant’s argument can justify an ersatz moral status for artificial beings. Slide68
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: The Ersatz Option
Kant & hitchBOT-the story of hitchBOTFrauke Zeller and David Smith created hitchBOT in 2015.A solar-powered iPhone in a cute anthropomorphic plastic shell. An experiment to determine how people would interact with the bot as it “hitchhiked” around.
The bot made it safely across Canada and Germany, but lasted only two weeks in the United States Destroyed in Philadelphia.Kant & hitchBOT:Objects & AnimalsThere is no doubt about hitchBOT’s moral status-it was an object.What makes hitchBOT relevant is that people had positive feelings toward it.The illusion of a person—a mechanical Turk hitching its way around the world.
Given Kant regards animals as objects and hitchBOT is also an object, it could be taken as morally equivalent to an animal. Problem: this line of reasoning would make all objects, such as rocks, on par with animals.Slide69
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: The Ersatz Option
Kant ContinuedKant did not grant even ersatz moral status to rocks or clocks, there must be something that distinguishes animals from other objects. Kant has a simple dichotomy between rational beings and everything else. Kant grants animals an ersatz moral status, and this has to be grounded in something.Ground: the way humans treat animals has a psychological impact that influences how humans treat each other. Animals are more like humans than they are like rocks, and the similarity provides the foundation for their influence.
Descartes, while denying animals have minds, does not deny that they have life or feelings .Slide70
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: The Ersatz Option
Kant ContinuedDescartes: humans (wrongly) think animals have minds because of analogical reasoning.Animals seem like humans in appearance and actions.Humans have minds.So, animals have minds.Bertrand Russell’s proposed solution to the problem of other minds is an argument by analogy. The more an animal is like a human, the more a person becomes habituated to a particular way of treating such a being.
Aristotle makes an excellent case for people becoming what they repeatedly do. Plato claims people can be strongly influenced even by exposure to the emotions of fictional characters .The same influence holds for artificial beings that are similar to animals that are like humans.Slide71
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: The Ersatz Option
Kant & hitchBOT: Illusory Person hitchBOT was an object that became an illusory person through social media and anthropomorphizing. Shown by the emotional response to its “murder”hitchBOT was entitled to an ersatz moral status because of its power to influence people emotionally.This also applies to artificial beings possessing deeper similarities to animals or humans.
Being more like animals and humans in relevant ways would yield an even greater psychological impact on humans, thus providing a stronger foundation for ersatz moral status. Advanced artificial beings could engage in activities analogous to those humans engage in.If these activities were to create an obligation if performed by a human, then they would create an indirect obligation to the artificial beings. Slide72
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Presumption of Status: The Ersatz Option
Kant & hitchBOT: Illusory PersonDog and robot dog example.Human-like artificial beings, even if their status is in doubt, would be entitled to ersatz moral status.Their ersatz moral status would make it wrong to harm them without adequate justification. Having only ersatz moral status, they would be less morally protected than natural beings.The needs of natural beings would trump such beings.
Artificial beings could be justifiably harmed if doing so was necessary to promote the ends of natural beings. Nuclear plant example: the android should be sent. Slide73
Testing the Moral Status of Artificial Beings
Conclusion
ConclusionWorking out the moral status of artificial beings will be challenging but can be done with proper guidance and reflection. Even if people are unwilling to grant such beings full moral status, they would be at least entitled to an ersatz moral status. Ersatz, as no old saying goes, is better than no moral status.Slide74
Who Do You Love?
Introduction
Love
When Jane loves Dick what is it exactly that she loves?
Easy and obvious answer-Dick.
Raises questions about who Dick is and what it is about him that she loves.Ideal Romantic LoveJane loves Dick himself and not his qualities or possessions. Qualities and possessions change and can be possessed by others.Ideal romantic love is not something that can fade or be transferred to another person with similar qualities. Interchangeable love.What is neededSomething that lies beneath all the qualities and possessions. What makes the person the person he is and separates him from all others.Slide75
Who Do You Love?
Bare Particularity
The Bare ParticularA bare particular is bare because it does not have any qualities of its own beneath all the qualities that it supports. It is a particular because there is only one of each (and each one can only be in one location at a time). It distinguishes each individual thing for all other things. In ideal love one person simply loves the bare particularity of another as opposed to qualities or possessions that can change or be duplicated by another. A Problem with Naked LoveWhen we interact with the world we interact with various qualities and properties.
It seems impossible for Jane to be aware of Dick’s bare particularity. Since it has no qualities there would seem to be nothing to experience. Impossible for Jane to be aware of Dick’s bare particularity to be in love with him. Takes love back to being about detectable qualities.Slide76
Who Do You Love?
Bare Particularity
Detectable QualitiesHaving love rest on detectible qualities is more realistic and intuitive than an ideal metaphysically based concept of love. People talk about qualities.Dating services test people for qualities and use them to find compatibility and love. Scientists talk about love as driven by genes in search of suitable genes to combine withReasonable to conclude that when Jane loves Dick, she loves his qualities.Slide77
Who Do You Love?
Ideas
PerceptionWe do not perceive the world directly. Neurological responses to objects that initiate sensory experiences in the mind/brain about such experiences. We do not experience things-we have ideas in our mind about things. Jane does not love Dick directly. She has never directly experienced Dick-just various perceptions she takes to be of Dick.InterpretationPerceptions are interpreted by the person.
Analogy to reading text.When Jane says she loves Dick, she is saying that she is in love with her ideas of Dick.These ideas might or might not correspond to the real Dick. Because of skeptical worries about the existence of other minds or external world, there might not be any Dick. Slide78
Who Do You Love?
Ideas
Loving Ideas Explains a LotSituation in which Jane loves Dick but when she tells her friends why she loves him, her friends do not see Dick as having all (or even any) of those qualities. A reasonable explanation is that Jane’s idea of Dick includes those qualities the actual Dick lacks.Situation in which Jane initially loves Dick and then says that Dick’s sudden change put an end to her love; but no one else notices that change in Dick. Jane’s ideas about Dick changed and she has fallen out of love with her ideas and not Dick.She never loved Dick to begin with-only her idea of Dick.
While you are not loved, there is a chance that someone does love the ideas they have of you. Slide79
Transcendent Argument for True Love
Introduction
Challenge to True Love
Classic Obstacles
Today: Science and philosophy pose the main intellectual challenges to true love.
Good arguments in both fields point towards a denial of true love. True LoveTrue love is such that one person (Jane) loves another (Dick) himself and not his qualities or possessions. Qualities and possessions change and can be possessed by others. True love will not fade with change or be transferred to another who has similar qualities. What is needed is something that lies beneath all the qualities and possessions. What makes the person the person she is and separates her from all others. This is something contemporary scientists and philosophers tend to deny. Slide80
Transcendent Argument for True Love
Introduction
Scientific View of LoveLove is a brain state that is ultimately driven by genes in search of suitable genes with which to combine. This drive is aimed at empirical qualities and not a mysterious metaphysical entity.Romantic love is an evolutionary result that has been selected for because it has enabled propagation of the species. 4. Dick loves Jane: the organism that is Dick is reacting to the organism that is Jane in a way that would incline Dick to mate with Jane. Whether Jane reciprocates depends on the way her brain states respond to Dick’s qualities. True love is absent.
The SelfWhat would be needed for true love is an underlying metaphysical self-the true self. This self would be the object of true love. There are serious problems with this approach. True love would seem to be as much a fantasy as fire breathing dragons and honest politicians. Slide81
Transcendent Argument for True Love
Introduction
True LovePeople still want to believe in true love. Most human beings need to believe in the possibility of true love. People want to believe they love and are loved-and love is more than an evolutionary device for the propagation of the species.Slide82
Transcendent Argument for True Love
Kant
Kant’s phenomena and noumenaArgue for the foundation of true love-the true, metaphysical self.Kant divided the world into noumena and phenomena. The phenomena are the things as they appear to us. The noumena are the things in themselves. The noumena cannot be known because they are beyond our experience. The noumena cannot be the subject of science-they are beyond its legitimate bounds. Transcendent Illusions of Metaphysics
We should just stick with the phenomena and withhold any speculation about the noumena. Kant claims we cannot help but try to extend our reason beyond the phenomena and into the realm of noumena. We are drawn to accept transcendent illusions of metaphysics. Slide83
Transcendent Argument for True Love
Kant
The SelfA transcendent illusion, crucial for true love, is the metaphysical self. Like Hume, Kant agrees we can have no impression of the metaphysical self. We have impressions, via introspection, of the empirical self.When one looks inside her ‘mind’ a person never encounters a metaphysical self. What she encounters is various sensations, thoughts and feelings. Kant argues we have to think of our experiences as if they occur within a unified self.
This provides a frame of reference for thought and it is useful to accept a metaphysical self. Since it is useful and we need the metaphysical self, Kant concludes we should accept it.Debate: whether we should treat it is a useful fiction or accept its existence based on his transcendent argument. Slide84
Transcendent Argument for True Love
Kant
LoveKant’s argument can be employed to argue for the self of true love. The self that is loved for what it truly is and loves others for what they truly are. The metaphysical self. Slide85
Transcendent Argument for True Love
Kant
God, Freedom & ImmortalityArgument modeled on Kant’s case for God, freedom and immortality. Kant contends these three cannot be proven and hence cannot be known. He claims they are irresistible because they are necessary conditions for morality, hence we must accept them. Applying this method to true love.As has been argued, true love would be impossible without the metaphysical self. It is a necessary condition for true love.
The metaphysical self is beyond the realm of scientific proof. True love is irresistible because it is critical belief for our happiness and for our conception of ourselves.True love compels us to accept the existence of the metaphysical self.Thanks to Kant, the world is now a safer place for true love. Slide86
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