Typologyofarmedconflictsinhumanitarianlawlegalconceptsandactualsituati - PDF document

1 Typologyofarmedconflictsinhumanitarianla
Typologyofarmedconflictsinhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactualsituationsSylvainViteSylvainViteislegaladvisorintheLegalDivisionoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross.Althoughinternationalhumanitarianlawhasasitsaimthelimitationoftheeffectsofarmedconflict,itdoesnotincludeafulldefinitionofthosesituationswhichfallwithinitsmaterialfieldofapplication.Whileitistruethattherelevantconventionsrefertovarioustypesofarmedconflictandthereforeaffordaglimpseofthelegaloutlinesofthismultifacetedconcept,theseinstrumentsdonotproposecriteriathatarepreciseenoughtodeterminethecontentofthosecategoriesunequivocally.Acertainamountofclarityisnonethelessneeded.Infact,dependingonhowthesituationsarelegally Volume91Number873March2009 *Theviewsexpressedinthisarticlereflecttheauthor’sopinionsandnotnecessarilythoseoftheICRC.TheauthorwouldliketoexpresshissinceregratitudetohiscolleaguesintheICRC’sLegalDivisionwhocontributedtotheideasdevelopedinthisarticle,especiallytoLaurentColassis,TristanFerraro,Jean-MarieHenckaertsandKathleenLawand. Althoughinternationalhumanitarianlawhasasitsaimthelimitationoftheeffectsofarmedconflict,itdoesnotincludeafulldefinitionofthosesituationsthatfallwithinitsmaterialfieldofapplication.Whileitistruethattherelevantconventionsrefertovarioustypesofarmedconflictandthereforeaffordaglimpseofthelegaloutlinesofthismultifacetedconcept,theseinstrumentsdonotproposecriteriathatarepreciseenoughtodeterminethecontentofthosecategoriesunequivocally.Acertainamountofclarityisnonethelessneeded.Infact,dependingonhowthesituationsarelegallydefined,therulesthatapplyvaryfromonecasetothenext.Thelegalregimesthatneedtobetakenintoaccountarethusnotalwaysthesameanddependonwhetherthesituationsconstitute,forexample,aninternationaloranon-internationalarmedconflict.Similarly,someformsofviolence,referredtoas‘internaltensions’or‘internaldisturbances’,donotreachthethresholdofapplicabilityofinternationalhumanitarianlawandthereforefallwithinthescopeofothernormativeframeworks.Thisarticleproposesatypologyofarmedconflictsfromtheperspectiveofinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Itsetsout,first,toshowhowthedifferentcat-egoriesofarmedconflictanticipatedbythatlawcanbeinterpretedinthelightofrecentdevelopmentsininternationallegalpractice.Inthatrespect,itisappropriatetorefertotheconceptualizationeffortsrelatingfirstlytothelawofinternationalarmedconflictandsecondlytothelawofnon-internationalarmedconflict.Thisarticlethengoesontoexaminevariouscontroversialcasesofapplication.Therealityofarmedconflictisactuallymorecomplexthanthemodeldescribedininternationalhumanitarianlaw–totheextentthattodaysomeobserversquestiontheadequacyofthelegalcategories.ThelawofinternationalarmedconflictThehistoryofthelawofinternationalarmedconflictshowsthatthefieldofap-plicationofthislegalregimehasbeenprogressivelyextendedastreatylawdevel-oped.Whereasanarrowformalisticconceptofwarwaspredominantinitially,thereformofthesystemwiththerev

2 isionoftheGenevaConventionsin1949gavepre
isionoftheGenevaConventionsin1949gaveprecedencetoabroaderapproach,basedonthemoreobjectiveconceptofarmedconflict.Moreover,thatextensionwassubsequentlytakenupwiththeadoptionofAdditionalProtocolIin1977.Thatinstrumentaddedanothertypeofconflicttothefieldofthelawofinternationalarmedconflict,thatofwarsofnationalliber-ation.Thislegalregimealsocomprisesaspecificbodyofruleswhosefieldofap-plicationisdeterminedonthebasisofanautonomousconcept,thatofoccupation.WarandinternationalarmedconflictByvirtueofcommonArticle2(1),the1949GenevaConventionsapplyto‘allcasesofdeclaredwarorofanyotherarmedconflictwhichmayarisebetweentwoor S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual moreoftheHighContractingParties,evenifthestateofwarisnotrecognizedbyoneofthem’.ThesituationsreferredtohereareconflictsbetweenStates.The‘HighContractingParties’mentionedinthistextaresovereignentities.Dependingonthecaseinquestion,thesesituationsmaytaketheformofadirectconflictbetweenStatesorofinterventioninapreviouslyexistinginternalconflict.Inthelatterhypothesis,theconflictis‘internationalized’.ThatisthecaseifaforeignPowersendstroopsintoaterritorytosupportamovementopposingthelocalgovernment.InterventionmayalsotakeplacebyproxywhenthatPowermerelysupportsandguidestheuprisingfromadistance.Inthatcase,itisthenvitaltodeterminethelevelofcontrolthatmakesitpossibletoclassifythearmedconflictasinternational.Noteveryformofinfluencenecessarilyleadstotheconflictbecom-inginternationalized.Onthatpoint,theInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY)pointedoutthat‘controlbyaStateoversubordinatearmedforcesormilitiasorparamilitaryunitsmaybeofanoverallcharacter(andmustcomprisemorethanthemereprovisionoffinancialassistanceormilitaryequipmentortraining).Thisrequirement,however,doesnotgosofarastoincludetheissuingofspecificordersbytheState,oritsdirectionofeachindividualoper-Thecriterionof‘overallcontrol’isachievedwhentheforeignState‘hasaroleinorganising,co-ordinatingorplanningthemilitaryactionsofthemilitarygroup,inadditiontofinancing,trainingandequippingorprovidingoperationalsupporttothatgroup’(emphasisadded).Involvementmustthereforegobeyondmerelogisticalsupport,butthatinvolvementdoesnotimplythateverythingdonebythegroupconcernedisdirectedbytheStatetakingpartfromadistance.ThesituationsreferredtoinArticle2(1)commontothe1949GenevaConventionsareviewedfromthetwinviewpointsofformalismandeffectiveness.1Thesamefieldofapplicationwasalsoretainedforotherinstrumentsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,inparticularAdditionalProtocolI(seeArt.1(3)).2InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY),,CaseNo.IT-94-1-A,Judgment(AppealsChamber),15July1999,para84:‘ItisindisputablethatanarmedconflictisinternationalifittakesplacebetweentwoormoreStates.Inaddition,incaseofaninternalarmedconflictbreakingoutontheterritoryofaState,itmaybecomeinternational(or,dependinguponthecircumstances,beint

3 ernationalincharacteralongsideaninternal
ernationalincharacteralongsideaninternalarmedconflict)if(i)anotherStateintervenesinthatconflictthroughitstroops,oralternativelyif(ii)someoftheparticipantsintheinternalarmedconflictactonbehalfofthatotherState.’,para137.Onthispoint,seealsoInternationalCourtofJustice(ICJ),ApplicationoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide(BosniaandHerzegovinaSerbiaand,Judgment,ICJReports2007,26February2007,para404.Withoutadoptingadefinitivepositiononthematter,theCourtacceptedthatthecriterionofoverallcontrolmaybe‘applicableandsuitable’asameansofdeterminingwhetherornotanarmedconflictisinternational.Foradiscussionofthisissue,seeA.Cassese,‘TheTestsRevisitedinLightoftheICJJudgmentonGenocideinBosnia’,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,Vol.18,No.4,2007,pp.649–668.4ICTY,,Judgment(AppealsChamber),abovenote2,para137;seealsoparas120and131.SeealsoICTY,,CaseNo.IT-98-34-T,Judgment(TrialChamber),31March2003,para198.Forananalysisofthiscaselaw,seeJ.G.Stewart,‘TowardsaSingleDefinitionofArmedConflictinInternationalHumanitarianLaw:aCritiqueofInternationalizedArmedConflict’,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,Vol.85,No.850,pp.323ff.;A.Cullen,TheConceptofNon-InternationalArmedConflictinInternationalHumanitarianLaw:AStudyonThresholdsofApplicabilityThesis,UniversityCollege,Galway,2007,pp.229ff. Volume91Number873March2009 First,therearedeclaredwars,implyingthatthestateofwarisrecognizedofficiallybythepartiesconcerned.Second,thereareotherformsofinter-Statearmedcon-flict,whoseexistencedoesnotdependonhowthepartiesdefinethem.Whiletheconceptofwaralreadyexistsintheoldesttreatiesofinternationalhumanitarianthe1949Conventionsintroducedtheconceptofarmedconflictintothislegalregimeforthefirsttime.Throughthissemanticcontribution,thosewhodraftedthoseinstrumentswantedtoshowthattheapplicabilityofinternationalhumani-tarianlawwashenceforthtobeunrelatedtothewillofgovernments.Itwasnolongerbasedsolelyonthesubjectivityinherentintherecognitionofthestateofwar,butwastodependonverifiablefactsinaccordancewithobjectivecriteria.Thankstothatcontributionin1949,internationalarmedconflictthusbecameestablishedasaconceptgovernedbytheprincipleofeffectiveness.Therelevantrulesapplywhencertainspecificfactualconditionsaremet.Asforthenatureofthoseconditions,itisgenerallyacknowledgedthatitmustbeevaluatedfreely,asthelevelofintensityrequiredforaconflicttobesubjecttothelawofinternationalarmedconflictisverylow.Situationsenvisagedbytherelativeinstrumentsmerelyneedtoexist.Thus‘assoonasthearmedforcesofoneStatefindthemselveswithwoundedorsurrenderingmembersofthearmedforcesorciviliansofanotherStateontheirhands,assoonastheydetainprisonersorhaveactualcontroloverapartoftheterritoryoftheenemyState,thentheymustcomplywiththerelevantconvention’.Itis,however,notnecessaryfortheconflicttoextendovertimeorforittocreateacertainnumberofvictims.Inotherwords,aninternationalarmedconflictexists,asrecalledbytheICTY,‘wheneverthereisares

4 orttoarmedforcebetweenStates’.Tobemorepr
orttoarmedforcebetweenStates’.Tobemoreprecise,itmightbesaidthatthatisthecasewhenthecircumstancesarecharacterizedbyhostilitybetweentheparties.Theattackmustbemotivatedbytheintentiontoharmtheenemy,thus5See,forexample,Arts.4,5and6oftheConventionfortheAmeliorationoftheConditionoftheWoundedinArmiesintheFieldof22August1864.6SeeJ.Pictetetal.GenevaConventionIfortheAmeliorationoftheConditionoftheWoundedandSickinArmedForcesintheField:Commentary,Geneva,ICRC,1952,p.32;R.Kolb,Iusinbello,Ledroitinternationaldesconflitsarme,Basel/Brussels,HelbingandLichtenhahn/Bruylant,2003,pp.72ff.7J.Pictetetal.(eds),abovenote6,p.34;seealsoD.Schindler,‘TheDifferentTypesofArmedConflictsAccordingtotheGenevaConventionsandProtocols’,TheHagueAcademyCollectedCourses,Vol.63,1979-II,p.131;H.-P.Gasser,‘InternationalHumanitarianLaw:anIntroduction’,separateprintfromHumanityforAll:theInternationalRedCrossandRedCrescentMovement,HenriDunantInstitute,Geneva,1993,p.24;E.David,Principesdedroitdesconflitsarme,Bruylant,Brussels,2008,p.122;Kolb,abovenote6,p.73.8H.-P.Gasser,abovenote7,pp.22–23.9Someauthorsargue,however,thatadistinctionmustbeestablishedbetweeninternationalarmedcon-flict(reachingacertainlevelofintensity)andotherformsofhostileactionsamountingto‘incidents’,‘borderclashes’or‘skirmishes’only.SeeInternationalLawAssociation,DraftReport,InitialReportontheMeaningofArmedConflictinInternationalLaw,RiodeJaneiroConference,2008,pp.9–10and23–24.10ICTY,.Tadic,CaseNo.IT-94-1,DecisionontheDefenceMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction,2October1995,para70.SeealsoICTY,.Mucicetal.(CiCamp),CaseNo.IT-96-21,Judgment(TrialChamber),16November1998,para184:‘lerecoursalaforcearmeeentretatssuffitensoiaclencherl’applicationdudroitinternationalhumanitaire’.Thisdefinitionhassincebeentakenupbyotherinternationalbodies.Seeforexample:CommissionofInquiryonLebanon,ReportpursuanttoHumanRightsCouncilresolutionS-2/1,A/HRC/3/2,23November2006,para51. S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual rulingoutcasesinwhichtheuseofforceistheresultofanerror(involuntaryincursionintoforeignterritory,wronglyidentifyingthetarget,etc.).Similarly,aninternationalarmedconflictdoesnotexistwhenthetargetedStatehasgivenitsconsentforathirdStatetotakeactioninitsterritory(forexample,tofightanon-governmentalarmedgroup).SincetheadoptionofAdditionalProtocolIof1977,thefieldofapplicationofthelawofinternationalarmedconflicthasceasedtobelimitedtointer-Statestrictosensuandalsoencompassesconflictsbetweengovernmentforcesandsomenon-governmentalgroups,i.e.peoplesfightingintheexerciseoftheirrightofself-determination.TheProtocolstipulatesthatthesituationstargetedbyArticle2commontothe1949GenevaConventionsinclude‘armedconflictsinwhichpeoplesarefightingagainstcolonialdominationandalienoccupationandagainstracistregimesintheexerciseoftheirrightofself-determination,asen-shrinedintheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandtheDeclara

5 tiononPrinciplesofInternationalLawconcer
tiononPrinciplesofInternationalLawconcerningFriendlyRelationsandCo-operationamongStatesinaccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations’.Thescopeofthisprovisionraisesanumberofquestionsofinterpretation,beginningwiththeprecisedefinitionofthe‘peoples’concernedandthecriteriawhichmakeitpossibletodistinguishthosesituationsofarmedconflictfromthatcoveredbyArticle3commontothe1949GenevaConventionsandtheirAdditionalProtocolII.ThetwoinstrumentsreferredtoinArticle1(4)ofAdditionalProtocolIareactuallycouchedintermsthataretoogeneraltoallowfullysatisfactoryanswerstobederivedfromthem.Moreover,itisdifficulttofindadditionalclarificationinactualpracticebecausethescenarioreferredtointhatArticlehasneverbeenofficiallyrecognized,particularlyastheStatesthatmightbeconcerneddidnotratifyAdditionalProtocolI.Theinterestedreadercanmakeusefulreferencetothecommentariesalreadydevotedtothatparticulartypeofarmedconflict.Whenoneofthebelligerentssucceedsingainingtheupperhandoverhisadver-sary,aninternationalarmedconflictmaytaketheformofoccupation.InthewordsofArticle42ofthe1907HagueRegulations,‘territoryisconsideredoccupied11Fortheoppositeview,seeDavid,abovenote7,p.127.12AdditionalProtocolI,Art.1(4).13Seethesectiononthelawofnon-internationalarmedconflictsbelow.SeealsoM.Bothe,K.J.Partsch,W.A.Solf,NewRulesforVictimsofArmedConflicts,MartinusNijhoff,TheHague,1982,pp.45–52.14See,inparticular,D.Schindler,abovenote7,pp.133–144;Y.Sandozetal.(eds),CommentaryontheAdditionalProtocolsof8June1977totheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,ICRC/MartinusNijhoff,Geneva/TheHague,1987,paras66–118;E.David,abovenote7,pp.184–198.15Foramoredetailedstudyofthenotionandthelawofoccupation,seeY.Dinstein,TheInternationalLawofBelligerentOccupation,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2009;R.Kolb,S.ViteLedroitdel’occupationmilitaire:perspectiveshistoriquesetenjeuxjuridiquesactuels,Bruylant,Brussels,2009;Y.Arai-Takahashi,TheLawofOccupation:ContinuityandChangeofInternationalHumanitarianLaw,anditsInteractionwithInternationalHumanRightsLaw,MartinusNijhoff,TheHague,2009. Volume91Number873March2009 whenitisactuallyplacedundertheauthorityofthehostilearmy’(ouremphasis).Foroccupationinthemeaningofthisprovisiontoexist,twoconditionsmustbefulfilled:(a)theoccupierisabletoexerciseeffectivecontroloveraterritorythatdoesnotbelongtoit;(b)itsinterventionhasnotbeenapprovedbythelegitimateEffectiveterritorialcontrol,whichisattheheartoftheconceptofoccupation,impliesthatasubstitutionofpowersmaytakeeffect.Thatconditionisfulfilledwhen,first,theoverthrowngovernmentisunabletoexerciseitsauthorityand,second,theoccupyingPowerisinapositiontofillthatgapbyexertingitsownThisconditionimpliesinprinciplethatenemytroopsshouldbedeployedintheterritoryconcernedandsucceedinimposingtheminimumstabilitythatwillallowthemtoexercisetheirresponsibilitiesderivingfromthelawofoccupation.Asforthesecondcriterion,theabsenceofconsent,itmustbeunderstoodinfairlybroadterms.Inpartic

6 ular,itisnotlimitedtocasesinwhichpoweris
ular,itisnotlimitedtocasesinwhichpowerisseizedasaresultofhostilities.Article2(2)oftheFourthGenevaConventionof1949com-plementsthe1907definitionbyclarifyingthattherelevantrulesapplyeveniftheoccupation‘meetswithnoarmedresistance’.Insomecases,territorialcontrolisnotexerciseddirectlybytheoccu-pationforcesbutviaapuppetgovernmentoranotherformofsubordinatelocalHowever,itisdifficulttoevaluateonacase-by-casebasisthedegreeofinfluencerequiredforthisscenariotoactuallyconstituteoccupation,asanyin-terferenceintheaffairsofathirdStatedoesnotnecessarilymeanthatoccupationexists.Relationsbetweenthelocalauthoritiesandtheforeignforcesvaryinin-tensitydependingonthecircumstancesandalwaysrevealacertainreciprocalinfluence–orevenadegreeofconsultation–inthedecision-makingprocess.Toresolvethisquestion,theICTYretains–inthiscase,too–thecriterionof‘overallOccupationexistswhenaStatehas‘overallcontrol’ofthelocalagentsactuallyexercising‘effectivecontrol’overtheterritoryinquestion.Thisis,forexample,thepatternofthepresentsituationinNagorno-Karabakh.Azerbaijanhasnolongerbeenabletoexerciseitssovereigntyinthatareasincethewarwithits16See,inparticular:M.Bothe,‘BeginningandEndofOccupation’,CurrentChallengestotheLawofOccupation,ProceedingsoftheBrugesColloquium,20–21October2005,No.34,Autumn2004,pp.28–32.SeealsoE.Benvenisti,TheInternationalLawofOccupation,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,1993,p.4.Theauthordefinesoccupationas‘theeffectivecontrolofpower(beitoneormorestatesoraninternationalorganisation,suchastheUnitedNations)overaterritorytowhichthatpowerhasnosovereigntitle,withoutthevolitionofthesovereignofthatterritory’.17See,inparticular,UnitedKingdomMinistryofDefence,TheManualoftheLawofArmedConflictOxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2004,para11.3;ICJ,CaseconcerningArmedActivitiesontheTerritoryoftheCongo(DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Judgment,ICJReports2005,para173;ICTY,,abovenote4,para217;A.Roberts,‘WhatisMilitaryOccupation?’,YearbookofInternationalLaw,Vol.55,1984,pp.249and300.18SeeUnitedKingdomMinistryofDefence,abovenote17,para11.3.1.SeealsoICTY,.TadicCaseNo.IT-94-1-T,Judgment(TrialChamber),7May1997,para584:‘therelationshipofdefactoorgansoragentstotheforeignPowerincludesthosecircumstancesinwhichtheforeignPower“occu-pies”oroperatesincertainterritorythroughtheactsoflocaldefactoorgansoragents’(ouremphasis).19ICTY,,CaseNo.IT-95-14-T,Judgment(TrialChamber),3March2000,para149;,abovenote4,paras181–188,197–202. S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual secessionistforces(supportedbytheArmenianarmy)whichendedinitsdefeatin1994.Thatterritoryisgovernedinpractice(effectiveterritorialcontrol)bythegovernmentofthe‘Nagorno-KarabakhRepublic’,asitproclaimeditselfon6January1992followingalocallyheldreferendum.Todate,however,noStatehasrecognizedthesovereigntyofthenewauthority.Moreover,severalaspectsindicatethattherepublicisactuallyinarelationofsubordinationtoArmenia(

7 overallcontrol).Themilitarystructuresint
overallcontrol).Themilitarystructuresintheregioninclude,inparticular,asizeablenumberofconscriptsandofficersfromthatcountry.TheroleofArmeniaisnotthereforerestrictedtomerelogisticsupportbutimpliesthatithasahandintheorganization,co-ordinationandplanningofthepowerestablishedinNagorno-Karabakh.Itmaybethereforeconsideredthatthatterritoryisdefactoinasituationofoccupation.Therefore,thetestthatdetermineswhetherthesituationisoneofoccupationbyproxy,namelythatofoverallcontrol,isthesameasthetestthatneedstobecarriedouttodeterminewhetheraninternalconflictisinter-nationalized.Inbothsituations,itisacaseofevaluatingtheintensityofthecontrolexercisedbyaStateoveragrouporauthorityintheterritoryofanotherState.Thelawofnon-internationalarmedconflictTheconceptofnon-internationalarmedconflictinhumanitarianlawmustbeanalysedonthebasisoftwomaintreatytexts:Article3commontothe1949GenevaConventionsandArticle1ofAdditionalProtocolIIof1977.Thissectionwillshedlightonthecriteriaineachoftheseprovisionsandwillshowhowthesecriteriamaybeinterpretedinthelightofpractice.Moreover,theconceptofnon-internationalarmedconflictisdiscussedinconnectionwiththedeterminationofthejurisdictionoftheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC).ItisappropriatetoreferbrieflytothetermsofthatdiscussionbyexaminingtherelevantprovisionsoftheCourt’sStatute.Article3commontothe1949GenevaConventionsArticle3commontothe1949GenevaConventionsappliesinthecaseof‘armedconflictnotofaninternationalcharacteroccurringintheterritoryofoneoftheHighContractingParties’.Thisprovisionbeginswithanegativeexpression,dealingwitharmedconflict‘notofaninternationalcharacter’.ItthusrefersbackimplicitlytocommonArticle2,which,asstatedabove,dealswithconflictsbetweenStates.Armedcon-flictsthatarenotofaninternationalcharacterarethoseinwhichatleastoneofthepartiesinvolvedisnotgovernmental.Dependingonthecaseinquestion,hostilities20See,inparticular:UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,Res.884,12November1993;UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,Res.62/243,14March2008;CouncilofEuropeParliamentaryAssembly,Res.141621CommonArticle3(1). Volume91Number873March2009 takeplaceeitherbetweenone(ormore)armedgroup(s)andgovernmentforcesorsolelybetweenarmedgroups.CommonArticle3alsoassumesthatan‘armedconflict’exists,i.e.thatthesituationreachesalevelthatdistinguishesitfromotherformsofviolencetowhichinternationalhumanitarianlawdoesnotapply,namely‘situationsofinternaldis-turbancesandtensions,suchasriots,isolatedandsporadicactsofviolenceandotheractsofasimilarnature’.Thethresholdofintensityrequiredinthatcaseishigherthanforaninternationalarmedconflict.Actualpractice,inparticularthatoftheICTY,revealsthatthisthresholdisreachedeverytimethatthesituationcanbedefinedas‘protractedarmedviolence’.Thisconditionneedstobeassessedagainsttheyardstickoftwofundamentalcriteria:(a)theintensityoftheviolenceand(b)theorganizationoftheparties.Thesetwocomponentsoftheconceptofnon-internationalarmedconflictcannotbedescrib

8 edinabstracttermsandmustbeevaluatedonaca
edinabstracttermsandmustbeevaluatedonacase-by-casebasisbyweighingupahostofindicativedata.regardtothecriterionofintensity,thesedatacanbe,forexample,thecollectivenatureofthefightingorthefactthattheStateisobligedtoresorttoitsarmyasitspoliceforcesarenolongerabletodealwiththesituationontheirown.Thedur-ationoftheconflict,thefrequencyoftheactsofviolenceandmilitaryoperations,thenatureoftheweaponsused,displacementofcivilians,territorialcontrolbyoppositionforces,thenumberofvictims(dead,wounded,displacedpersons,etc.)arealsopiecesofinformationthatmaybetakenintoaccount.However,theseare22SeeICTY,.Tadic,DecisionontheDefenceMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction,abovenote10,para70.23AdditionalProtocolII,Art.1(2).AlthoughthisquoteistakenfromAdditionalProtocolII,itisacceptedthatthethresholdestablishedisalsovalidforconflictscoveredbycommonArt.3.SeeICRC,Howistheterm‘ArmedConflict’definedininternationalhumanitarianlaw?,OpinionPaper,March2008,p.3.SeealsoICTY,,CaseNo.IT-03-66-T,Judgment(TrialChamber),30November2005,para84.24ICTY,,DecisionontheDefenceMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction,abovenote10,para70.25SeeICTY,,Judgment(TrialChamber),abovenote18,para561–568,especiallypara562.SeealsoICTY,,abovenote23,para84;ICTY,,CaseNo.IT-04-82,Judgment(TrialChamber),10July2008,para175.Thesecriteriahavesincebeentakenupbyotherinternationalbodies.See,inparticular,InternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda(ICTR),,CaseNo.ICTR-96-3,Judgment(TrialChamberI),6December1999,para93;InternationalCommissionofInquiryonDarfur,ReportPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution1564of18September2004,25January2005,para74–76.Inthecase,theICTYadoptedaslightlydifferentposition,statingthatthenotionof‘protractedarmedviolence’mustthereforebeunderstoodbroadly.Itdoesnotcoverthedurationoftheviolenceonly,butalsocoversallaspectsthatwouldenablethedegreeofintensitytobeevaluated.TheICTYalsoseemstoequatethisnotionwiththatofintensity.(ICTY,,CaseNo.IT-04-84-T,Judgment(TrialChamber),3April2008,para49.Foradoctrinalconsiderationofthispoint,seeA.Cullen,abovenote4,pp.179ff.26ICTY,,abovenote25,para49;ICTR,,abovenote25,para93.InhisCommentaryontheGenevaConventions,Pictetsuggests,bywayofindication,aseriesofcriteriathatmaybetakenintoaccountinthisevaluation(seePictet,abovenote6,pp.49–50).27SeeR.Pinto(rapporteur),‘ReportoftheCommissionofexpertsforthestudyofthequestionofaidtothevictimsofinternalconflicts’,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,February1963,especiallypp.82–83:‘Theexistenceofanarmedconflict,withinthemeaningofarticle3,cannotbedeniedifthehostileaction,directedagainstthelegalgovernment,isofacollectivecharacterandconsistsofaminimumamountoforganisation.Inthisrespectandwithoutthesecircumstancesbeingnecessarilycumulative, S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual assessmentfactorsthatmakeitpossibletostatewhetherthethresholdofintensityhasbeenreachedineachcase;theyarenotconditionstha

9 tneedtoexistcon-currently.Asforthesecond
tneedtoexistcon-currently.Asforthesecondcriterion,thoseinvolvedinthearmedviolencemusthaveaminimumleveloforganization.Withregardtogovernmentforces,itispresumedthattheymeetthatrequirementwithoutitbeingnecessarytocarryoutanevaluationineachcase.Asfornon-governmentalarmedgroups,theindicativeelementsthatneedtobetakenintoaccountinclude,forexample,theexistenceofanorganizationalchartindicatingacommandstructure,theauthoritytolaunchoperationsbringingtogetherdifferentunits,theabilitytorecruitandtrainnewcombatantsortheexistenceofinternalrules.Whenoneorotherofthesetwoconditionsisnotmet,asituationofviolencemaywellbedefinedasinternaldisturbancesorinternaltensions.Thesetwoconcepts,whichdesignatetypesofsocialinstabilitythatdonotpertaintoarmedconflict,haveneverbeendefinedinlaw,despitethefactthattheyarere-ferredtoexplicitlyinAdditionalProtocolII.Initsbackgrounddocumentsinpreparationforthedraftingofthatinstrument,theICRCconsideredthatinternaldisturbancesaresituationsinwhich‘thereisnonon-internationalarmedconflictassuch,butthereexistsaconfrontationwithinthecountry,whichischaracterizedbyacertainseriousnessordurationandwhichinvolvesactsofviolence.Theselattercanassumevariousforms,allthewayfromthespontaneousgenerationofactsofrevolttothestrugglebetweenmoreorlessorganizedgroupsandtheauthoritiesinpower.Inthesesituations,whichdonotnecessarilydegenerateintoopenstruggle,theauthoritiesinpowercalluponextensivepoliceforces,orevenarmedforces,torestoreinternalorder’.Asforinternaltensions,theycoverlessviolentcircumstancesinvolving,forexample,massarrests,alargenumberof‘political’detainees,tortureorotherkindsofill-treatment,forceddisappearanceand/orthesuspensionoffundamentaljudicialoneshouldtakeintoaccountsuchfactorsasthelengthoftheconflict,thenumberandframeworkoftherebelgroups,theirinstallationoractionapartoftheterritory,thedegreeofinsecurity,theexistenceofvictims,themethodsemployedbythelegalgovernmenttore-establishorder,etc.’ForareviewoftheindicativefactorstakenintoaccountbytheICTYinitscaselaw,seeICTY,,abovenote25,para177.SeealsoICTY,,abovenote23,para168;ICTY,,abovenote25,para49.28ICTY,,abovenote25,para60.29ForareviewoftheindicativefactorstakenintoaccountbytheICTYinitscaselaw,seeICTY,,abovenote25,paras199–203.SeealsoICTY,,abovenote23,paras94–134;ICTY,,abovenote25,para60.30AdditionalProtocolII,Art.1(2).31ICRC,ProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts,DocumentpresentedattheConferenceofgovernmentexpertsonthereaffirmationanddevelopmentofinternationalhumanitarianlawappli-cableinarmedconflicts,Vol.V,Geneva,24May–12June1971,p.79.ThisdefinitionwasalsotakenupintheCommentaryontheAdditionalProtocols:seeY.Sandozetal.(eds),abovenote14,para4475.32Y.Sandozetal.(eds),abovenote14,para4476.Forafurtherreviewofinternaldisturbancesandinternaltensions,seeespeciallyA.Eide,‘InternalDisturbancesandTensions’,InternationalDimensionsofHumanitarianLaw,UNESCO,Paris,1988,pp.279–295;H.-P.Gasser,‘Hu

10 manitarianStandardsforInternalStrife–ABr
manitarianStandardsforInternalStrife–ABriefReviewofNewDevelopments’,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,No.294,May–June1993,pp.221–226;F.NiAolain,‘TheRelationshipbetweenSituationsofEmergencyand Volume91Number873March2009 Lastly,commonArticle3appliestoarmedconflicts‘occurringintheter-ritoryofoneoftheHighContractingParties’.Themeaningofthiselementmaybecontroversial.Isittobeunderstoodasaconditionexcludingnon-internationalarmedconflictstakingplaceintwoorevenmoreStateterritories,orratherasasimplereminderofthefieldofapplicationofcommonArticle3?Accordingtothelatterhypothesis,itisarguedthatthisspecificpointwasincludedinordertomakeitclearthatcommonArticle3mayonlybeappliedinrelationtotheterritoryofStatesthathaveratifiedthe1949GenevaConventions.Weshallgoontoseethatitisprobablybesttotendtowardsthatinterpretation.Someobserversaddafurtherconditiontothenotionofnon-internationalarmedconflict.Theysuggestthataccountneedstobetakenofthemotivesofthenon-governmentalgroupsinvolved.Thistypeofconflictwouldthuscoveronlygroupsendeavouringtoachieveapoliticalobjective.‘Purelycriminal’organiza-tionssuchasmafiagroupsorterritorialgangswouldthusbeeliminatedfromthatcategoryandcouldinnowaythenbeconsideredaspartiestoanon-internationalarmedconflict.However,inthecurrentstateofhumanitarianlaw,thisadditionalconditionhasnolegalbasis.TheICTYhadoccasiontorecallthiswhenconsideringthenatureofthefightingthattookplacein1998betweenSerbianforcesandtheKosovoLiberationArmy(UCK).Inthecase,thedefencehadchallengedtheideathatthefightingcouldconstituteanarmedconflict,arguingthattheopera-tionscarriedoutbytheSerbianforceswerenotintendedtodefeattheenemyarmybuttocarryout‘ethniccleansing’inKosovo.TheTribunalrejectedthatargumentbypointingout,inparticular,that‘thedeterminationoftheexistenceofanarmedconflictisbasedsolelyontwocriteria:theintensityoftheconflictandorganizationoftheparties,thepurposeofthearmedforcestoengageinactsofviolenceoralsoachievesomefurtherobjectiveis,therefore,irrelevant’(ouremphasis).Thereversepositionwould,moreover,raiseproblemsthatitwouldbedifficulttoresolveinpractice.Themotivesofarmedgroupsareneveruniformandcannotalwaysbeclearlyidentified.Manyofthemoftencarryoutcriminalactivitiessuchasextortionordrug-trafficking,whileatthesametimepursuingapoliticalobjective.Conversely,onoccasioncriminalorganizationsalsoexerciseapowerpertainingtothepoliticalsphereorattheveryleasttothemanagementofLow-IntensityArmedConflict’,IsraelYearbookonHumanRights,Vol.28,1998,pp.97–106;R.Abi-Saab,‘Ledroithumanitaireetlestroublesinternes’,LiberAmicorumGeorgesAbi-Saab,MartinusNijhoff,TheHague,2001,pp.477–493.33Seethesubsectionon“‘Exported’non-internationalarmedconflicts”below.34Bruderleinretains,forexample,threemaincharacteristicsforthedefinitionofanarmedgroup,i.e.(a)abasiccommandstructure;(b)recoursetoviolenceforpoliticalends;(c)independencefromStatecontrol(C.Bruderlein,TheRoleofNon-stateActorsinBuildingHumanSecuri

11 ty:ThecaseofArmedGroupsinIntra-stateWars
ty:ThecaseofArmedGroupsinIntra-stateWars,CentreforHumanitarianDialogue,Geneva,May2000).SeealsoD.Petrasek,EndsandMeans:HumanRightsApproachestoArmedGroups,InternationalCouncilonHumanRightsPolicy,Geneva,2000,p.5.35ICTY,,abovenote23,para170. S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual Article1ofAdditionalProtocolIIAdditionalProtocolIIappliestonon-internationalarmedconflicts‘whichtakeplaceintheterritoryofaHighContractingPartybetweenitsarmedforcesanddissidentarmedforcesorotherorganizedarmedgroupswhich,underresponsiblecommand,exercisesuchcontroloverapartofitsterritoryastoenablethemtocarryoutsustainedandconcertedmilitaryoperationsandtoimplementthisProtocol’.However,thisinstrumentdoesnotapplytowarsofnationalliberation,whichareequatedwithinternationalarmedconflictsbyvirtueofArticle1(4)ofAdditionalProtocolI.AsinthecaseofcommonArticle3,anon-internationalarmedconflictwithinthemeaningofAdditionalProtocolIIcanonlyexistifthesituationattainsadegreeofviolencethatsetsitapartfromcasesofinternaltensionsordisturbances.ThatinstrumentnonethelessdefinesamorelimitedfieldofapplicationthanthatofcommonArticle3.Itrequiresnon-governmentalforcestohaveaparticularlyhighleveloforganization,inthesensethattheymustbeplaced‘underresponsiblecommand’andexerciseterritorialcontrol,allowingthem‘tocarryoutsustainedandconcertedmilitaryoperationsandtoimplementthisProtocol’.commonArticle3alsopresumesthatarmedgroupsareabletodemonstrateadegreeoforganization,itdoesnotstipulatethatthesegroupsshouldbeabletocontrolpartofaterritory.Inpractice,aconflictmaythereforefallwithinthematerialfieldofapplicationofcommonArticle3withoutfulfillingtheconditionsdeterminedbyAdditionalProtocolII.Conversely,allthearmedconflictscoveredbyAdditionalProtocolIIarealsocoveredbycommonArticle3.Inpractice,itisoftendifficulttoidentifysituationsthatmeetthecriteriaofapplicationestablishedbyAdditionalProtocolII.Therequireddegreeofterri-torialcontrol,inparticular,maybeperceiveddifferentlyfromonecasetoanother.Ifabroadinterpretationisadopted,theconceptofnon-internationalarmedcon-flictwithinthemeaningofthatinstrumentcomesclosetothatofcommonArticle3.EventemporarycontrolthatisgeographicallylimitedwouldsufficeinthatcasetojustifytheapplicationofAdditionalProtocolII.Conversely,ifArticle1(1)isinterpretedstrictly,thesituationscoveredarerestrictedtothoseinwhichthenon-governmentalpartyexercisessimilarcontroltothatofaStateandthenatureoftheconflictissimilartothatofaninternationalarmedconflict.InitsCommentaryontheAdditionalProtocols,theICRCseemstoadoptanintermediatepositionon36AdditionalProtocolII,Art.1(2).37AdditionalProtocolII,Art.1(1).Onthispoint,seeM.Bothe,K.J.Partsch,W.A.Solf,abovenote13,pp.626ff.38MomtazconsidersthatitisnotnecessaryforthepartiesconcernedtosetupanadministrativestructuresimilartothatofaState.Headdsthatthecriterionofterritorialcontrolmustbeevaluatedinaccordancewiththenatureofthee

12 nvisagedobligations.Forsomeofthoseobliga
nvisagedobligations.Forsomeofthoseobligationsthatarerelatedtorespectforfundamentalrights,‘controlofpartoftheterritorycouldprovetobeunnecessary’(D.Momtaz,‘Ledroitinternationalhumanitaireapplicableauxconflitsarmesnoninternationaux’,TheHagueAcademyCollectedCourses,No.292,2002,p.50,ICRCtranslation).39L.Moir,TheLawofInternalArmedConflict,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2002,p.106. Volume91Number873March2009 thisissue,acceptingthatterritorialcontrolcansometimesbe‘relative,forexample,whenurbancentresremainingovernmenthandswhileruralareasescapetheirItnonethelessaddsthattheverynatureoftheobligationspresentedinProtocolIIimpliesthatthereis‘somedegreeofstabilityinthecontrolofevenamodestareaofland’.AdditionalProtocolIIalsorestrictsitsfieldofapplicationtoarmedcon-flictbetweengovernmentalforcesanddissidentarmedforcesorotherorganizedarmedgroups.Thatmeansthat–contrarytocommonArticle3,whichdoesnotprovideforthatrestriction–itdoesnotextendtoconflictssolelybetweennon-governmentalgroups.Lastly,AdditionalProtocolIIrepeatstherationelocicriterionalreadyformulatedincommonArticle3,i.e.thatitonlycoversnon-internationalarmedconflicts‘occurringintheterritoryofoneoftheHighContractingParties’.Thepreviouscommentsonthissubjectalsoapplyhere.TheProtocolalsostipulatesthattheconflictsconcernedarethosetakingplaceontheterritoryofaHighContractingPartybetween‘its’armedforcesandoppositionmovements.Anarrowreadingofthispassagewouldmakethisinstrumentinapplicabletothetroopsofagovernmentinterveningabroadinsupportofthelocalauthorities.TheforcesinvolvedinthatcasearenotthoseoftheStateinwhichtheconflictistakingplace.Aninterpretationinkeepingwiththespiritofhumanitarianlawindicates,how-ever,thattheexpression‘itsarmedforces’shouldinthiscasecovernotonlythetroopsoftheterritorialState,butalsothoseofanyotherStateinterveningonbehalfofthegovernment.AsforthescopeofthenewpointsintroducedinAdditionalProtocolII,itshouldberecalledthatthatinstrumentexpandsandsupplementscommonArticle3butthatitdoesnotchangeitsconditionsofapplication.Theadditionalre-strictionsprovidedforinArticle1(1)thereforeonlydefinethefieldofapplicationoftheProtocolanddonotextendtotheentirelawofnon-internationalarmedconflict.CommonArticle3thuspreservesitsautonomyandcoversalargernumberofsituations.TheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)TheRomeStatuteoftheICCdistinguishesbetweentwocategoriesofcrimesthatoccurduring‘armedconflictsnotofaninternationalcharacter’:(a)seriousviola-tionsofcommonArticle3,and(b)otherseriousviolationsofthelawsandcustomsofwarthatareapplicableinthosesituations.Inbothcases,theStatuteindicatesthelowestlevelofapplicabilityoftherelevantprovisionsbystipulatingthatthey40Y.Sandozetal.(eds),abovenote14,para4467.,para4461;Bothe,PartschandSolf,abovenote13,p.627.43AdditionalProtocolII,Art.1(1).44Y.Sandozetal.(eds),abovenote14,para4454;L.Moir,abovenote39,p.101.45RomeStatuteoftheICC,Art.8(2)(c)and(e),respectively. S.Vit

13 e´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternation
e´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual donotapplyto‘situationsofinternaldisturbancesandtensions,suchasriots,isolatedandsporadicactsofviolenceandotheractsofasimilarnature’.Moreover,whereasthisinstrumentdoesnotgiveamoreprecisedefinitionofthematerialfieldofapplicationoftherulespertainingto‘seriousviolationsofcommonArticle3’(Article8(2)(d)),itclarifiesthenotionofnon-internationalarmedconflictinthecaseof‘otherseriousviolations’.Article8(2)(f)stipulatesinthatcasethattherulesmustapply‘toarmedconflictsthattakeplaceintheterritoryofaStatewhenthereisprotractedarmedconflictbetweengovernmentalauthoritiesandorganizedarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroups’.Thequestionthatthenarisesiswhether,inreferringexplicitlytothecriterionofduration(‘protractedarmedconflict’),paragraph(2)(f)merelyclarifiesthetermsofpara-graph(2)(d),withoutcreatingaseparatecategoryofconflict,orwhetheritpro-posesadifferenttypeofnon-internationalarmedconflict,thusdefininganewfieldofapplication.Thatquestionisthesubjectofcontroversyandhasnotyetbeenfinallyresolved.Someobserversconsiderthatthetwoparagraphsdealwithoneandthesamesituation.Theyconsider,inparticular,thattheintentionofthosenego-tiatingtheStatutewasnottocreateaseparatecategoryofnon-internationalarmedconflict.Rather,thereferencetodurationinparagraph(2)(f)wasintendedtopreventtherestrictivenotioninAdditionalProtocolIIfrombeingincorporatedintotheStatute.Itwas,inaway,anefforttoachieveacompromisebetweentheoriginaldraft,whichmadenodistinctionbetweenparagraphs(2)(d)and(2)(f),andthedesireofsomeStatestoincludetherestrictionsofAdditionalProtocolIIinthatsecondparagraph.Moreover,thosewhomaintainthatpositionclaimthattheirinterpretationistheonlyonethatisinkeepingwiththeevolution46RomeStatuteoftheICC,Arts.8(2)(d)and(f),respectively.47ThisdefinitionisbasedonthecaselawoftheICTY,whichdeemedthat‘anarmedconflictexistswheneverthereisaresorttoarmedforcebetweenStatesorprotractedarmedviolencebetweengovern-mentalauthoritiesandorganizedarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroupswithinaState’(ICTY,,DecisionontheDefenceMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction,abovenote11,para70(ouremphasis)).48T.Meron,‘TheHumanizationofHumanitarianLaw’,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,Vol.94,2000,p.260;M.Bothe,‘WarCrimes’,inA.Casseseetal.TheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:ACommentary,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2002,p.423;A.Cullen,‘TheDefinitionofNon-internationalArmedConflictintheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:AnAnalysisoftheThresholdofApplicationContainedinArticle8(2)(f)’,JournalofConflictandSecurityLaw,Vol.12,No.3,2007,p.445.49Thewordingofparagraph(2)(f)istheoutcomeofaninitiativelaunchedbySierraLeone,theaimofwhichwastoreachacompromisebetweendelegationsinfavourofintroducingalistofwarcrimesapplicabletonon-internationalarmedconflictsandthoseagainstit.Aninitialproposalinthatdirection,submittedbythe‘BureauoftheCommitteeoftheWhole’,c

14 onsistedoflimitingthefieldofapplicationo
onsistedoflimitingthefieldofapplicationofthecrimesinpara(2)(e)bytakingupthecriteriaelaboratedinArt.1(2)ofAdditionalProtocolII(A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59).Asagreementcouldnotbereachedonthatproposal,SierraLeonesuggestedthetextthatwasultimatelyretained.Theaimwastoappeasethedelegationsthatwereopposedtointroducingwarcrimesintothelawofnon-internationalarmedconflict,whileavoidingathresholdashighasthatinAdditionalProtocolII(A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35,para8).SeeA.Cullen,abovenote48,pp.419–445. Volume91Number873March2009 ofcustomarylaw,whichmakesnodistinctionbetweendifferenttypesofnon-internationalarmedconflict.Bycontrast,otherauthorsconsiderthatiftheconceptofnon-internationalarmedconflictinparagraph(2)(d)refersdirectlytothatofcommonArticle3,thenotioninparagraph(2)(f)addsatimecriterion.Anon-internationalarmedconflictwithinthemeaningofparagraph(2)(f)existswhenthatconflictis‘protracted’.Whereasfromthepointofviewofparagraph(2)(d),durationisafactorthatmayperhapsbetakenintoaccountwhenevaluatingthesituationbutdoesnotconstituteacompulsorycriterion,itisnonethelessanintegralpartoftheveryconceptofparagraph(2)(f).Thisnotiondoesnotthereforeseemtoconstituteanextensionofthefieldofapplicationofparagraph(2)(d)butcreatesaseparatecategoryofnon-internationalarmedconflictwithaviewtocriminalizing,withinthecontextoftheStatuteoftheICC,additionalviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,i.e.violationsofrulesinAdditionalProtocolII.Theneedtoachieveacompromisewhenpreparingthatprovisionseemstoindicatethattheintentionwastoreachagreementonadifferentcategoryfromthatreferredtoinparagraph(2)(d).Caselawtendstoprovidesupportforthesecondinterpretation.IntheLubangaDyilocase,theICCPre-TrialChamberreferredtoAdditionalProtocolIIinordertointerpretparagraph(2)(f)oftheStatute.Itthusapparentlywantedtoconferadistinctmeaningonthisprovision,definingaspecificthresholdofapplicability.TheChambermadeitclearthatthisthresholdischaracterizedbytwoconditions:(a)theviolencemustachieveacertainintensityandbeprotracted;(b)anarmedgroupwithadegreeoforganization,particularlythe‘abilitytoplanandcarryoutmilitaryoperationsforaprolongedperiodoftime’mustbein-Wordedlikethat,thisdefinitionthereforeseemstodefineafieldofap-plicationthatisstricterthanthatofcommonArticle3,asitrequiresthefightingtotakeplaceoveracertainperiodoftime.Itis,however,broaderthanthatofAdditionalProtocolIIasitdoesnotrequirethearmedgroup(s)concernedtoexerciseterritorialcontrol.ThecategoryofconflicttargetedhereisthereforehalfwaybetweenthecategoriesreferredtoincommonArticle3andinAdditionalProtocolII.50A.Bouvier,M.Sassoli(eds),HowDoesLawProtectinWar?,Vol.1,Geneva,ICRC,2006,p.110;R.Provost,InternationalHumanRightsandHumanitarianLaw,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2002,pp.268f.;W.A.Schabas,AnIntroductiontotheInternationalCriminalCourtCambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2007(3rdedn),p.116.SeealsothemorebalancedpositionofE.David,whoconsidersthat,strictlyspeaking,para(2

15 )(f)doesnotcreateathirdcategoryofnon-int
)(f)doesnotcreateathirdcategoryofnon-internationalarmedconflict,but‘thatbroaderconceptofarmedconflictreplacesthatofAdditionalProtocolIIbywayoflexposterior’(David,abovenote7,p.137,ICRCtranslation).51InternationalCriminalCourt,LubangaDyilo,CaseNo.ICC-01/04-01/06-803,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges(Pre-TrialChamberI),29January2007,paras229–237,especially234.52Thisnewcategoryalsoposescertainproblems.Thereisnoobjectivecriterionthatmakesitpossibletostatewhentherequiredminimumdurationisreached.Inaddition,thequestionisraisedofthelegalregimetobeappliedduringtheperiodinwhichthefightingmaynotyetbeconsidered‘sufficientlyprotracted’forittobeclassifiedasanon-internationalarmedconflictwithinthemeaningofthatdefinition.Mustaretroactiveapplicationofinternationalhumanitarianlawbeenvisagedinthatcase? S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual Insum,theRomeStatuteoftheICCseemstoidentifytwotypesofnon-internationalarmedconflict:firstly,conflictswithinthemeaningofcommonArticle3(paras(2)(c)–(d));andsecondly,‘protracted’non-internationalarmedconflicts(paras(2)(e)–(f)).ItshouldnonethelessberecalledthatthisinnovationintheStatutedoesnotcreateanewconceptofnon-internationalarmedconflictininternationalhumanitarianlaw,butsimplyaimsatdeterminingtheICC’sjurisdiction.Itthereforeappliesonlytotheexerciseofthatjurisdictionanddoesnotestablishacategorythatismoregenerallyapplicable.ControversialclassificationofcertainarmedconflictsArmedconflictsareinrealitynotasclearlydefinedasthelegalcategories.Someofthemmaynotexactlytallywithanyoftheconceptsenvisagedininternationalhumanitarianlaw.Thisraisesthequestionofwhetherthosecategoriesneedtobesupplementedoradaptedwithaviewtoensuringthatthesesituationsdonotendupinalegalvacuum.Withoutclaimingtobeexhaustive,thischapterwillexaminesomedilemmasencounteredinpracticebyreferringtothreetypesofsituationwhosequalificationsarecontroversial:controlofaterritorywithoutmilitarypresenceontheground;foreigninterventioninnon-internationalarmedconflict;andnon-internationalarmedconflictsontheterritoryofseveralStates.ControlofaterritorywithoutmilitarypresenceonthegroundDespitetheclarificationscontributedbythe1907HagueRegulationsandthe1949GenevaConventiontothenotionofoccupation,itisnotalwayseasyinpracticetoidentifythesituationsthatarecoveredbythatconcept.AsRobertspointsout,‘thecoremeaningofthetermisobviousenough;butasusuallyhappenswithabstractconcepts,itsfrontiersarelessclear’.TheexampleoftheGazaStripfollowingtheIsraeliwithdrawalillustratesthosedifficultieswithparticularacuity.On12September2005,thelastIsraelitroopsfinishedwithdrawingfromthatregioninwhichtheyhadmaintainedacontinuouspresencesincetheSix-DayWarin1967.Indoingso,theywerehelpingtoimplementa‘DisengagementPlan’adoptedbytheIsraeligovernmenton6June2004andendorsedbyparliamenton25Octoberofthatsameyear.Byvirtueofthatplan,theauthorities’intentionwastoputanendtotheirre

16 sponsibilitiesvis-avisthepeoplelivingint
sponsibilitiesvis-avisthepeoplelivinginthatterritory.Shoulditthereforebeconcludedthatthosemeasuresmarkedtheendoftheoccupationoftheregioninquestion?Inother53Roberts,abovenote17,p.249.54IsraeliPrimeMinister’sOffice,CabinetResolutionRegardingtheDisengagementPlan:AddendumRevisedDisengagementPlanMainPrinciples,6June2004,availableathttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/6-June-2004.htm#A(lastvisited9July2009). Volume91Number873March2009 words,wasthephysicalwithdrawaloftheIsraeliforcesenoughtoadmitthateffectiveterritorialcontrolcharacteristicofoccupationdidnotexistanylongeratthattime?Someobserversanswerthatquestioninthenegative.ItwasthusrecalledthatIsraelretainedsubstantialcontrolovertheGazaStrip,althoughitstroopswerenolongerphysicallydeployedinthatarea.TheDisengagementPlanclearlystatedthatIsraelwastocontinuetoexercisecontroloverthebordersofthatterritory,aswellasoveritsairspaceandcoastalregion.Moreover,IsraelhastheadvantageofbeingabletoenterPalestinianterritoryatanytimeinordertomaintainpublicThispowerismadegreaterbythesmallsizeoftheterritoryofGazaandthemilitarymeansavailable.ThatinterpretationwouldalsofindsomesupportinArticle42(2)ofthe1907HagueRegulations,whichmakesitclearthatoccupationexistswhentheauthorityofthehostilearmy‘hasbeenestablishedandcanbe’(ouremphasis).That‘ability’couldbeinterpretedasmeaningthatpotentialauthoritywouldsufficeasconfirmationoftherealityofoccupation.TheUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralthusconsideredthat‘theactionsofIDFinrespectofGazahaveclearlydemonstratedthatmoderntechnologyallowsanoc-cupyingPowertoeffectivelycontrolaterritoryevenwithoutamilitarypresence’.Accordingtothatposition,occupationoftheGazaStripwouldthereforenothaveceasedwiththewithdrawaloftroopsin2005,asIsraelcouldbesaidtocontinuetoexercisefromadistanceapowerequivalenttothe‘effectivecontrol’requiredunderthelawofoccupation.However,otherobserversconsiderthatacloserstudyofthetreatytextsshowsthattheabilityofanoccupiertoimposeitsauthoritycannotbeseparatedfromitsphysicalpresenceintheterritoryunderitscontrol.WhileArticle42of56SeetheNotebytheUnitedNationsSecretary-General:SituationofhumanrightsinthePalestinianterritoriesoccupiedsince1967,UNDoc.A/61/470,27September2006,para6.SeealsoReportonthesituationofhumanrightsinthePalestinianTerritoriesoccupiedbyIsraelsince1967,J.Dugard,SpecialRapporteur,E/CN.4/2006/29,17January2006,paras6ff.57IsraeliPrimeMinister’sOffice,abovenote54,Chapter1:Background–PoliticalandSecurity58ForamoredetailedanalysisofthepowersstillbeingexercisedbyIsraelfollowingitswithdrawalfromGaza,seeGisha–LegalCenterforFreedomofMovement,DisengagedOccupiers:TheLegalStatusof,January2007,pp.29ff,availableat:http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/Report%20for%20the%20website.pdf(lastvisited13July2009).SituationofhumanrightsinthePalestinianterritoriesoccupiedsince1967,UNDoc.A/61/470,27September2006,para7.SeealsotheReportoftheSpecialRapporteuroftheCommissiononHumanRightsonthesituationofhu

17 manrightsinthePalestinianTerritoriesoccu
manrightsinthePalestinianTerritoriesoccupiedbyIsraelsince19672006/29,17January2006).SeealsoC.Bruderlein,‘LegalAspectsofIsrael’sDisengagementPlanUnderInternationalHumanitarianLaw’,LegalandPolicyBrief,HarvardUniversityProgramonHumanitarianPolicyandConflictResearch,November2004,pp.10–11;A.Bockel,‘LeretraitisraeliendeGazaetsesquencessurledroitinternational’AnnuaireFranc¸aisdeDroitInternational,Vol.50,2005,p.23;I.Scobbie,‘IsGazaStillOccupiedTerritory?’,ForcedMigrationReview,Vol.26,2006,p.18.60SeeY.Shany,Faraway,soClose:TheLegalStatusofGazaafterIsrael’sDisengagement,TheHebrewUniversityofJerusalemInternationalLawForum,ResearchPaperNo.12-06,August2006,p.19.SeealsoRoberts,abovenote17,p.300;H.-P.Gasser,‘BelligerentOccupation’,inTheHandbookofHumanitarianLawinArmedConflicts,D.Fleck(ed),OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1995,p.243;M.Bothe,‘Occupation,Belligerent’,EncyclopediaofPublicInternationalLaw,Vol.3,Elsevier,Amsterdam,1997,p.764. S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual the1907HagueRegulationsacceptsthatoccupationexistswhentheadversary’sauthority‘canbeexercised’,itmakesitclearthatthatauthoritymustfirstbe‘established’.Itthusforgesanindissociablelinkbetweentheestablishmentofauthority,implyingthedeploymentofapresenceintheterritoryinquestion,andtheabilitytoextendthatauthoritytotheentireterritory.AswasrecalledbytheInternationalCourtofJustice,effectivecontrolbecomesapparentasaresultofasubstitutionofpowers.Obviously,asimilarthresholdofapplicationcannotbeachievediftheforeignforcesarelocatedoutsidetheregioninquestion.Moreover,itisimpossibletoconceiveoftheimplementationofmostoftherulesofoccupationunlessthereisapresenceintheterritory.Itisactuallyimpossibletoensurepublicorderandlifeinaterritory,asrequiredbyArticle43ofthe1907HagueRegulations,fromoutside.ItwouldthusbeparadoxicaltorequireaStatetofulfilitsinternationalobligationsifitisunabletodosobecauseitisnotpresentintheareaconcerned.Asimilarinterpretationwouldruncountertothebasictenetsofthelawofoccupation.TheexampleofGazashowstowhatextenttheconceptofoccupationposesdifficultiesofinterpretationwhenitcomestoapplyingitinpractice.Itwouldbeimpossiblewithinthelimitedframeworkofthisarticletodealwithalltheissuesassociatedwiththatconcept.TheICRCiscurrentlycarryingoutaconsultationprocessthatwillhelptoclarifyanumberofstillcontroversialpoints.Foreigninterventioninnon-internationalarmedconflictTwodifferentformsofinterventionmaybedistinguishedhere:(a)whenone(ormore)thirdState(s)becomeinvolvedinanon-internationalarmedconflictinsupportofoneorotherofthepartiestotheconflict;(b)whenmultinationalforcesbecomeinvolvedinanon-internationalarmedconflictinthecourseofapeace-keepingoperation.TheinterventionofoneormorethirdStatesinanon-internationalarmedThisscenario,whichissometimesreferredtoasa‘mixedconflict’,combinescharacteristicswhichmayderivefrombothinternationalarmedconflictsandnon-internationa

18 larmedconflicts.Dependingontheconfigurat
larmedconflicts.Dependingontheconfigurationofthepartiesin-volved,fightinginthefieldmaybebetweentheforcesoftheterritorialStateandthoseofaninterveningState,betweeninterveningStatestakingactiononbothsidesofthefrontline,betweengovernmentforces(oftheterritorialStateorofathirdState)andnon-governmentalarmedgroupsorbetweenarmedgroups61ICJ,CaseconcerningArmedActivitiesontheTerritoryoftheCongo,abovenote17,para173.62Bywayofexample,seeArt.43ofthe1907HagueRegulationsandArts.55,56and59oftheFourthGenevaConvention. Volume91Number873March2009 only.ThisraisestheissueofthelegaldefinitionofthosesituationsthatdonotfitintothestandardcategoriesofconflictsestablishedbyinternationalhumanitarianInitswork,theICRCconsidersthat,dependingonthewarringparties,thelawthatappliesinsuchsituationsvariesfromonecasetothenext.Inter-Staterelationsaregovernedbythelawofinternationalarmedconflict,whereasotherscenariosaresubjecttothelawofnon-internationalarmedconflict.Thusinter-ventionbyathirdStateinsupportofanon-governmentalarmedgroupopposedtoStateforcesresultsinthe‘internationalization’oftheexistinginternalconflict.ThisfragmentedapplicationofinternationalhumanitarianlawwasimplicitlyfavouredbytheInternationalCourtofJusticeintheCaseconcerningMilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua:initsanalysisoftheconflict,theCourtdifferentiatedbetween,ontheonehand,theconflictbetweentheNicaraguangovernmentandthecontras,and,ontheother,theconflictbetweenthatsamegovernmentandthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates.However,thisdifferentiatedapproachalsoraisescertainpracticalproblems.Inmanycases,thedistinctionbetweenconflictsderivingfromoneorotherofthetwotypesofarmedconflictisartificialorleadstoresultsthataredifficulttoaccept.Whenthereisanallianceofforeigngovernmentforcesandrebeltroops,thefollowingquestionsareraised,forexample:Whatstatusneedstobegiventocivilianstakencaptivebyforeignforcesandthenhandedovertothelocalgroup?AretherelevantrulesoftheFourthGenevaConventiontobeappliedtothem(totheextentthatthereisanarmedconflictbetweentheinterveningStateandtheterritorialState)ortherulesstemmingfromthelawofnon-internationalarmedconflict(sincetheyareheldbyanon-governmentalarmedgroup)?Inotherwords,doesadifferentsetofrulesneedtobeapplieddependingonwhetherthosepersonswerearrestedbytheforeignforcesordirectlybythelocalgroup?Inthelightofthesedifficulties,thequestionisthenraisedofwhetheritisdesirabletoenvisageanadaptationofinternationalhumanitarianlawasapplicabletonon-internationalarmedconflictscharacterizedbyforeignmilitaryinter-vention.Someobserverssuggestasmuch,requiringthelawofinternationalarmedconflicttobeapplicableineverycaseinwhichaforeignPowertakesactiononbehalfofoneorotheroftheparties.Thiswasthenature,inparticular,ofoneoftheproposalsmadebytheICRCinits1971ReportontheProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts.ThatproposalwasnonethelessrejectedbytheexpertswhostudiedtheICRC’sdraft.Itwassuggestedthatitw

19 ouldtendtomaketheseconflictsworse,asthen
ouldtendtomaketheseconflictsworse,asthenon-governmentalgroupswouldtrytoattract63SeeD.Schindler,‘InternationalHumanitarianLawandInternationalizedInternalArmedConflicts’,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,No.230,1982,pp.255–264.64ICJ,MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(NicaraguaUnitedStatesofAmerica)Judgment,ICJReports1986,para219.65I.Detter,TheLawofWar,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2000,p.49;E.David,abovenote8,p.175.66ICRC,ProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts,abovenote31,pp.17ff. S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual thirdStatesinordertobenefitfromapplicationofthelawofinternationalarmedTheinterventionofmultinationalforcesinanon-internationalarmedWeneedtobeginbyrecallingthatthepresenceofmultinationalforcesinthiscontextdoesnotnecessarilytransformthemintopartiestotheconflict.Usually,thesetroopsarenottheretotakepartinthefighting,butaredeployedwiththeaimofconventionalpeace-keeping.Theirmandatedoesnotauthorizetheminthatcasetoprovidesupportforoneorotheroftheadversaries,butislimitedtointerpositionorobservation.Moreover,theymayonlyresorttousingarmedforceinthecaseofself-defence.Multinationalforcesmust,however,beconsideredpartiestotheconflictintwohypotheses.First,itmaysohappenthattheytakepartdirectlyintheongoinghostilitiesbysupportingoneofthewarringentities.TheUnitedNationsOrganizationMissionintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(MONUC),forex-ample,providedmilitarysupportforthegovernmentoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoinordertorepeltheoffensiveslaunchedbythearmedopposition.Secondly,wheninternationaltroopsaredeployedwithoutsupportingoneofthewarringcamps,theirstatuswillbedeterminedinaccordancewiththecriterianormallyusedtoevaluatetheexistenceofanon-internationalarmedconflict.Thosetroopsmustbeconsideredasapartytotheconflictiftheirlevelofin-volvementreachestherequireddegreeofintensity.Thisisnotthecaseifrecoursetoforceislimitedtothecontextofself-defence.Thenatureofthearmedconflictsconsideredhereiscontroversial.Formostauthors,thesesituationsaretobeequatedwithinternationalarmedcon-flicts.Totheextentthattheoperationsconcernedaredecided,definedandcarriedoutbyinternationalorganizations,theyarebynatureincludedinthatcategory.ItisoflittlerelevanceinthatcasewhethertheopposingpartyisaStateora67ICRC,ReportontheWorkoftheConferenceofGovernmentExpertsontheReaffirmationandDevelopmentofInternationalHumanitarianLawApplicableinArmedConflicts,ICRC,Geneva,August1971,pp.50ff.,especiallyparas301ff.68See,forexample:UnitedNationsSecretary-General,FourthspecialreportoftheSecretary-GeneralontheUnitedNationsOrganizationMissionintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,S/2008/728,21November2008,paras13and25.69Seethesubsectionon‘Warandinternationalarmedconflict’above.70See,inparticular,D.Shraga,‘TheUNasanActorBoundbyInternationalHumanitarianLaw’,inL.Condorellietal.TheUnitedNationsandInternationalHumanitarianLaw,Pedone

20 ,Paris,1996,p.333;P.Benvenuti,‘TheImplem
,Paris,1996,p.333;P.Benvenuti,‘TheImplementationofInternationalHumanitarianLawintheFrameworkofUNPeace-Keeping’,inEuropeanCommissionHumanitarianOffice,LawinHumanitarianCrises:HowCanInternationalHumanitarianLawBeMadeEffectiveinArmedConflicts?,OfficefortheOfficialPublicationsoftheEuropeanCommunities,Luxembourg,1995,pp.96f.;C.Emanuelli,‘UnitedNationsforcesandhumanitarianlaw’,inL.Condorellietal.TheUnitedNationsandinternationalhu-manitarianlaw,Paris,Pedone,1996,pp.357ff.;R.Kolb,Droithumanitaireetoperationsdepaix,Bruylant,Brussels,2006,pp.57ff. Volume91Number873March2009 non-governmentalgroup.Inaccordancewiththatdoctrinalposition,thehypothesisenvisagedconstitutesaninternationalarmedconflictsuigeneris,theparticularstatusoftheorganizationinvolvedbeingenoughtoqualifyitassuch.Nonetheless,theapplicationofthelawofinternationalarmedconflictinthiscasedoesposecertainproblems.Inthehypothesisinwhichtheconflictisbetweenmultinationalforcesandunstructuredarmedgroups,itseems,inpar-ticular,difficulttorequirethepartiestocomplywiththeThirdGenevaConventionof1949.Takinganotherapproach,whichisthatfollowedbytheICRC,adiffer-entiatedapplicationofinternationalhumanitarianlawmustbefollowedinthatcase,dependingonthepartiestotheconflictineachindividualcaseinthefield.Thelawofinternationalarmedconflictmustthereforebeapplicablewheninternationaltroopsclashwithgovernmentforces.Bycontrast,iffightingisbetweenthosetroopsandnon-governmentalgroups,itisthelawofnon-internationalarmedconflictwhichmustprevail.ThelegalregimeapplicableinthesameconflictthusvariesdependingontheadversariespresentineachNon-internationalarmedconflictstakingplaceontheterritoryofseveralBothArticle3commontotheGenevaConventionsandAdditionalProtocolIIspecifytheirrespectivefieldsofapplicationbyclearlystatingthattheconflictinquestiontakesplaceontheterritoryofaStatepartytothoseinstruments.However,manyconflictsbetweenagovernmentandanarmedgroupareinprac-ticecarriedoutontheterritoryoftwoorevenofseveralStates.Someauthorsconsiderthatthisisanewtypeofconflictthatisnottakenintoaccountinthetextscurrentlyinforce.Theyrefertosuchconflictsas‘transnationalarmedconflicts’or‘extra-Stateconflicts’andconsiderthataspecifictypeofinternationalhumani-tarianlawmustapplytothem.Itisusefulinthisrespecttodifferentiatebetweenvariousscenarios.71H.McCoubrey,N.D.White,TheBlueHelmets:LegalRegulationofUnitedNationsMilitaryOperationsDartmouth,Aldershot,1996,p.172;L.Condorelli,‘LestatutdesforcesdesNationsUniesetledroitinternationalhumanitaire’,inLescasquesbleus:policiersoucombattants?,C.Emanuelli(ed),WilsonetLafleurItee,Montreal,1997,p.110;B.Tittemore,‘BelligerentsinBlueHelmets:ApplyingInternationalHumanitarianLawtoUnitedNationsPeaceOperations’,StanfordJournalofInternationalLaw,Vol.33,1997,p.110;J.Pejic,‘StatusofArmedConflicts’,inE.WilmshurstandS.Breau(eds),PerspectivesontheICRCStudyonCustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridg

21 e,2007,p.94.Someauthorsalsosuggestthatin
e,2007,p.94.Someauthorsalsosuggestthatinternationalhumanitarianlawberevisitedwithaviewtoadaptingittothedistinctivecharacteristicsofmultinationalforces.Foranattempttodoso,seeR.Kolb,abovenote70,pp.65ff.72See,inparticular,R.S.Schondorf,‘Extra-StateArmedConflicts:IsthereaNeedforaNewLegalNewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolitics,Vol.37,No.1,2004,pp.61–75;G.S.Corn,‘Hamdan,Lebanon,andtheRegulationofArmedConflict:TheNeedtoRecognizeaHybridCategoryofArmedConflict’,VanderbiltJournalofTransnationalLaw,Vol.40,No.2,March2007. S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual ‘Exported’non-internationalarmedconflictsThepartiestoaclassicnon-internationalarmedconflict(withinthemeaningofcommonArticle3orofAdditionalProtocolII)maywellcontinuetheirfightingontheterritoryofoneormorethirdStateswiththeexplicitortacitconsentofthegovernment(s)concerned(Theseareknownas‘exported’or‘delocalized’conflicts,or‘extraterritorial’non-internationalarmedconflicts.)Inprinciple,thegovern-mentforcesinvolvedarepursuingthearmedgroupseekingrefugeintheterritoryofaneighbouringState.Inthatkindofsituation,aninternationalarmedconflictdoesnotexistsincethereisnoconflictbetweentwoormoreStates(asrequiredbyArticle2commontotheGenevaConventions),giventhattheinterveningStateactswiththeconsentoftheterritorialsovereign.Thelawapplicableinthiscasegivesrisetocontroversy.Someauthorsconsiderthatwhatisbeingdealtwithhereisadifferentformofconflictandrecommendworkingoutanewformofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,whichwouldconstituteathirdlegalsystemalongsidethelawofinternationalarmedconflictandthelawofnon-internationalarmedconflict.Theyconsiderthat,fromtheperspectiveofthepartiesinvolved,thesearmedconflictsareverysimilartonon-internationalarmedconflicts,astheyinvolvegovernmentforcesinconflictwitharmedgroups.However,fromtheterritorialpointofview,theseconflictsarecharacterizedby‘internationalization’,astheyarenotconfinedwithinthebordersofasingleStatebutconcerntwoormoreStates.Anewlegalregimespeciallyadaptedtothatthirdcategorymightlead,forexample,asSchondorfsuggests,toacombinationof,ontheonehand,the‘lawofnon-combatantsofinter-Statearmedconflicts’(treatmentofciviliansinenemyhands,principleofdistinction)with,ontheother,the‘lawofcombatantsofintra-Statearmedconflicts’(protectionandtreatmentofthewounded,sickandshipwrecked,nostatusforadversariestakencaptive,etc.).Theauthorthusconsidersthatthereisnothingtojustifyadifferentkindofprotectionfornon-combatants(inthesenseofciviliansnottakingpartdirectlyinhostilities)dependingonwhethertheconflictisinter-Stateorintra-State.However,thiskindofdistinctionwouldbeacceptableforcombatantsas,inthecaseofanintra-Stateconflict,themembersofarmedgroupsdonotbenefitfromtheprivilegegrantedtosoldierstakingpartininternationalarmedconflicts.Thissolutionwouldallowaccounttobetakenofboththeinternal(natureofthepartiestotheconflict)andinternational(extraterr

22 itoriality)aspectsofthosearmedItisnoneth
itoriality)aspectsofthosearmedItisnonethelessnotcertainwhethertheterritorialaspectisindeedaconstitutivefactorofnon-internationalarmedconflict.Itmayactuallybemain-tainedthatthereferencetotheterritoryofaHighContractingPartyincommonArticle3andinAdditionalProtocolIIwassimplyintendedtoensurethattheapplicationoftherelevantrulesislinkedtothejurisdictionofaStatethathas73See,inparticular,Schondorf,abovenote72,pp.41ff.,pp.45ff. Volume91Number873March2009 ratifiedthetreatiesinquestion.Theaimofthisreferencewouldthereforenotbetoremove‘exportedconflicts’fromthefieldofapplicationofinternationalhumani-tarianlaw.Rather,itcanbeseenasareminder–inthecontextofthelawofnon-internationalarmedconflict–oftheprincipleaccordingtowhichtheinternationalconventionsareonlybindinguponthoseStatesthathavesubmittedtothem.Thereisthennothingtostopthislegalregimebeingapplied,evenifhostilitiesextendbeyondthebordersofasingleState.Moreover,giventhatthefourGenevaConventionshavenowbeenratifieduniversally,theICRCaddsthat,inpractice,theterritorialcriterioninArticle3haslostitsimportance.Indeed,asthatorgan-izationpointsout,‘anyarmedconflictbetweengovernmentalarmedforcesandarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroupscannotbuttakeplaceontheterritoryofoneofthePartiestotheConvention’.Cross-bordernon-internationalarmedconflictsAnotherpossibilityisthatStateforcesenterintoconflictwithanon-governmentalarmedgrouplocatedintheterritoryofaneighbouringState.Inthatcase,thereisthusnospilloverorexportationofapre-existingconflict.Thehostilitiestakeplaceonacross-borderbasis.IfthearmedgroupactsunderthecontrolofitsStateofresidence,thefightingfallswithinthedefinitionofaninternationalarmedconflictbetweenthetwoStatesconcerned.If,however,thisgroupactsonitsowninitiative,withoutbeingattheserviceofagovernmentparty,itbecomesmoredifficulttocategorizethesituation.Doesaninternationalarmedconflictnecessarilyexistbe-causeaStateusesarmedforceontheterritoryofanotherState?Ifthatisso,shouldmembersofthearmedgroupbeconsideredtobecivilianstakingpartdirectlyinthehostilities?Isitmoreappropriatetoconsiderthatsituationtobeacross-bordernon-internationalarmedconflictevenifaparallelinternationalarmedconflictbetweenthetwoStatesmayalsobetakingplace?Bycontrast,mustanon-inter-nationalarmedconflictbedeemedtoexistsolelyinthehypothesisaccordingtowhichtheStateofresidenceofthearmedgroupacceptsortoleratesinterventionbyitsneighbouringState,theabsenceofconsentleadingittobeclassifiedasaninternationalarmedconflict?Lastly,shouldthisbeconsideredanewtypeofconflict,requiringaspecificlegalregimethathasyettobedefined?75SeeD.Jinks,‘September11andtheLawsofWar’,YaleJournalofInternationalLaw,Vol.28,2003,pp.36f.;M.Sassoli,‘TransnationalArmedGroupsandInternationalHumanitarianLaw’,OccasionalPaper,HarvardUniversity,Winter2006,Number6,p.9;J.Cerone,‘JurisdictionandPower:TheIntersectionofHumanRightsLawandtheLawofNon-InternationalArmedConflictinanExtraterritorialContext’,IsraelLa

23 wReview,Vol.40,No.2,2007.76ICRC,Howisthe
wReview,Vol.40,No.2,2007.76ICRC,Howistheterm‘ArmedConflict’definedininternationalhumanitarianlaw?,abovenote23,p.3.SeealsoMoir,abovenote39,p.31.77DavidconsidersthataninternationalarmedconflictexistswhenthearmedgroupclaimstorepresenttheStateandhasthesupportofasectionofthepopulation(David,abovenote7,p.127).78Cornreferstothesesituationsas‘transnationalarmedconflicts’andsuggeststhatthe‘foundationalprinciplesofthelawofarmedconflict’beappliedtothem,i.e.essentially,commonArticle3andsomeprinciplesgoverningtheconductofhostilities(Corn,abovenote72). S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual OnerecentexampleisthatofLebanoninthesummerof2006.Itmayberecalledthatahigh-intensityarmedconflicthadbegunon12Julyfollowingvari-ousattacksbyHezbollah’smilitarycomponentonpositionsandvillagesinIsraeliterritory.Forinstance,eightIsraelisoldiershadbeenkilledinthecourseofthoseoperationsandtwootherstakencaptive.TheIsraeliauthoritiesretaliatedbylaunchingaground,airandseaoffensiveonLebanon.Thehostilitiescontinueduntil14August,whenaceasefirethathadbeenagreedbythetwogovernmentsconcernedenteredintoeffect.TheCommissionofInquirysetupbytheUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncilconsideredthataninternationalarmedconflicthadtakenplace,although,initsview,theLebanesearmedforceshadnevertakenpartinthefighting.InitsreportdatedNovember2006,itconsideredthatHezbollahshouldbeconsideredamilitia‘belongingtoaPartytotheconflict’,withinthemeaningofArticle4A(2)oftheThirdGenevaConventionof1949.Insupportofthatposition,itstressedthatHezbollah,asalegallyestablishedpoliticalparty,wasrepresentedinparliamentandintheLebanesegovernment.Inaddition,forseveralyearsHezbollahhadassumedtheroleofananti-IsraeliresistancemovementinsouthernLebanon,afactacknowledgedbythePresidentofLebanonhimself,whohadcalledthearmedbranchesofthatgroup‘nationalresistancefighters’.AccordingtotheCommission,thewarin2006thusassumedaninternationalcharacterbyvirtueoftheorganiclinkexistingbetweenHezbollahandtheStateofLebanonatthattime.Thereisnonethelesssomedoubtaboutwhethertheargumentsputfor-wardbytheCommissionreallydoallowtheconclusiontobereachedthatthehypothesisofArticle4A(2)oftheThirdGenevaConventionhadbeenrealizedinthecaseinpoint.Actually,thoseargumentsarenotenoughtoshowasufficientlynarrowlinkbetweentheHezbollahcombatantsandtheLebanesegovernment.Forthatlinktoexist,thosecombatantsneedtohavebeenacting‘onbehalfof’theExpresseddifferently,‘[i]norderforirregularstoqualifyaslawfulcom-batants,itappearsthatinternationalrulesandStatepractice[…]requirecontroloverthembyaPartytoaninternationalarmedconflictand,bythesametoken,arelationshipofdependenceandallegianceoftheseirregularsthatPartytotheconflict’.Thisishowtheexpression‘belongingtoaPartytotheconflict’mustbeunderstoodinArticle4A(2)oftheThirdGenevaConvention.Inthecaseinquestion,itseemsthattherequireddegreeofcontrolwasnotachieved.Onthecontrary,theLebaneseauthoritie

24 sstatedonseveraloccasionsthattheyhadnotb
sstatedonseveraloccasionsthattheyhadnotbeenawareoftheattacksthatwereattheoriginoftheconflictandthattheydidnotapproveofthem.Theymadethisstatementofficiallyinaletteraddressedtothe79Formoredetailsofthecircumstancesandthecourseofthisconflict,seeCommissionofInquiryonReportpursuanttoHumanRightsCouncilresolutionS-2/1,A/HRC/3/2,23November2006..,paras50–62.81J.Pictetetal.GenevaConventionIIIRelativetotheTreatmentofthePrisonersofWar:CommentaryICRC,Geneva,1960,p.57.82ICTY,,Judgment(AppealsChamber),abovenote2,para94. Volume91Number873March2009 SecretaryGeneralandtheSecurityCounciloftheUnitedNations.inthiscaseadoublelegalclassificationprobablyneedstoberetained.AlongsideaninternationalarmedconflictbetweenIsraelandLebanon,thewarin2006con-stitutedanon-internationalarmedconflictbetweenIsraelandHezbollah,whosedistinctivefeaturewasthatittookplaceacrossaborder.Itisthereforethenatureofthebelligerentsratherthanthetransbordercharacterofthesituationwhichinthiscaseconstitutesthedecisivecriterionforclassifyingtheconflict.Thatpositionnonethelessraisescertainquestionsabouttheapplicationofthelaw,particularlyinconnectionwithcombatantswhoaretakencaptive.Itim-pliesthattheFourthGenevaConventionwouldhavetoapplytodetainedmembersofHezbollahtotheextentthattheywerenationalsofLebanonorofaStatenotentertainingdiplomaticrelationswithIsrael.However,theIsraelisoldiersde-tainedbythearmedgroupwouldbenefitonlyfromtheprotectiongrantedbythelawofnon-internationalarmedconflicts.Thatpositionthereforeraisesaproblemwithregardtotheequalityofthebelligerents.If,however,oneconsidersthatthelawofnon-internationalarmedconflictalsoappliestothosedetainedinIsraelihands,equalityhasbeenupheld,butatthecostofaweakeningoftheapplicableOtherobserversproposefurtherdifferentreadingsoftheLebanesecon-flict.Someofthemconsider,forinstance,thatthisexampleisillustrativeofanewtypeofarmedconflict,whichcannotbeclassifiedasaninternationalarmedcon-flictorasanon-internationalarmedconflict,andwhich,hence,impliestheapplicationofaspecificinternationalhumanitarianlaw.ThequestionoftheinternationalfightagainstterrorismThedebateaboutthenatureofcross-borderarmedconflictspromptsquestionsaboutthecurrentclashbetweensomeStatesandAlQaeda.Inthecaseinpoint,thisconflicttakestheformofaseriesofterroristattacksandanti-terroristoperationsinseveralcountries.Canthesumtotaloftheseeventsthenbeconsideredasa(cross-borderglobal)armedconflicttowhichinternationalhumanitarianlawwouldDoesitconstituteanewtypeofarmedconflictgivingrisetothe84See,inparticular,Identicallettersdated13July2006fromtheCharged’affairesa.i.ofthePermanentMissionofLebanontotheUnitedNationsaddressedtotheSecretary-GeneralandthePresidentoftheSecurityCouncil,A/60/938-S/2006/518,13July2006.85SeeDavid,abovenote7,p.156.86L.Zegveld,AccountabilityofArmedOppositionGroupsinInternationalLaw,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2002,p.136.87FourthGenevaConvention,Art.4(1)and(2).88Seenote78above.89Se

25 eJ.C.Yoo,J.C.Ho,‘TheStatusofTerrorists’,
eJ.C.Yoo,J.C.Ho,‘TheStatusofTerrorists’,UCBerkeleySchoolofLaw,PublicLawandLegalTheoryResearchPaperNo.136,2003.Jinksalsoconsidersthattheattacksof11September2001constituteanon-internationalarmedconflictbetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandAlQaedaandthatcommonArticle3isthereforeapplicableinthiscase(Jinks,abovenote75,pp.11f.and30ff.). S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw:legalconceptsandactual applicationofalegalregimethathasyettobeestablished?Orisitaphenomenonthatisnotrelatedtoarmedconflict?Thesamequestioncouldalsobeaskedwithregardtotransnationalcriminalgroups.Someobserversdonothesitatetorefer,forexample,totheexistenceofa‘globalwarondrugs’.Thekeyissuesinthematterhavealreadybeendiscussedatlength.Itisenoughtorecallatthisjuncturethattheanswerneedstobeflexibleenoughtotakeaccountofthedifferenttypesofarmedconflictprovidedforunderinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Basically,AlQaeda’swayofoperatingprobablyexcludesitfrombeingdefinedasanarmedgroupthatcouldbeclassifiedasapartytoaglobalnon-internationalarmedconflict.Inaccordancewiththecurrentstateofintelligence,itappears,rather,tobealooselyconnected,clandestinenetworkofcells.Thesecellsdonotmeettheorganizationcriterionfortheexistenceofanon-internationalarmedconflictwithinthemeaningofhumanitarianlaw.SomeexpertsnonethelessthinkthatitisnotimpossibleforaconflictbetweenoneormoreStatesandatransnationalarmedgrouptoreachthatleveloneday.Inthecase,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtseemstotakethatview,consideringthatArticle3commontothe1949GenevaConventionsisapplicabletothemembersofAlQaeda,andtothepersonsassociatedwiththatorganization,whoweretakencaptiveduringthefightagainstterrorism.Apartfromthatparticularproblem,incertaincontextsthefightagainstterrorismmayalsotaketheformofanarmedconflict.ThatisthecasewhenitresultsinaclashbetweenStates,aswasthecasewhentheUnitedStatesofAmericaattackedAfghanistaninOctober2001.Thatfightmayalsobetheequivalentofaclassic(internationalized)non-internationalarmedconflict,aswasthecaseinAfghanistanfrom19June2002onwards,onwhichdateatransitiongovernmentwasestablished.Withthesupportoftheinternationalcoalition,thenewlyestab-lishedauthoritiesweretodealwithhigh-intensityfightingagainstorganizednon-governmenttroops,i.e.thoseoftheTaliban.90SeeSchondorf,abovenote72;Corn,abovenote72;R.D.Sloane,‘ProloguetoaVoluntaristWarBostonUniversitySchoolofLaw,WorkingPaperNo.07-09.Balendraseemstosuggestanadditionaloptionthatwouldconsistofhavingrecoursetoavariabledefinitionofarmedconflict:thatdefinitionwouldbenarrowwheninternationalhumanitarianlawandtheinternationalhumanrightslawdonotconcurandbroadwhentheydo(N.Balendra,‘DefiningArmedConflict’,CardozoLaw,Vol.29,No.6,2008).91M.Kenney,‘TheChallengeofEradicatingTransnationalCriminalNetworks:LessonsfromtheWaronDrugs’,Paperpreparedfordeliveryatthe2002annualmeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation;D.M.Luna,‘Narco-Trafficking:WhatIstheNexusWiththeWaronTerror?

26 ’,8October2008,availableathttp://merln.n
’,8October2008,availableathttp://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/terrorism/state/110828.pdf(lastvisited9July2009).92SeeJ.Pejic,‘TerroristActsandGroups:aRoleforInternationalLaw?’,BritishYearbookofInternational,2004,pp.85ff.93See,inparticular,ICRC,Internationalhumanitarianlawandthechallengesofcontemporaryarmedcon-,ExcerptoftheReportpreparedbytheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossforthe28thInternationalConferenceoftheRedCrossandRedCrescentGeneva,December2003,pp.232ff.SeealsoPejic,abovenote92,pp.85ff.;Sassoli,abovenote75,pp.10–11.94Sassoli,abovenote75,p.9.95SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,.Rumsfeld,548US557(2006),pp.65–69. Volume91Number873March2009 Thisreviewofthedifferentformsofarmedconflictininternationalhumanitarianlawhasshownjusthowdifficultitcanbetoclassifysituationsofviolenceandhencetodeterminetherulesthatapply.Thesedifficultiesarepartlyrelatedtothelegalcategoriesthemselves,whosecontentisoftenimpreciseinthetreatytextsestablishingthem.Inthatrespect,thedevelopmentofinternationalpracticeisessentialasitenablesthosecategoriestobegraduallyexpressedinconcretetermsbyassessingtheminthelightofrealsituations.ThemostoutstandingcontributioninthisregardisprobablythatoftheICTYwithregardtotheconceptofnon-internationalarmedconflict.TheICTY’scaselawhasnotonlyidentifiedthetwoconstitutiveelementsofthatconcept,buthasalsoputforwardawiderangeofindicativecriteriamakingitpossibletoverify,onacase-by-casebasis,whethereachofthesecomponentshasbeenachieved.Otherelementsderivingfromthetypologyofarmedconflictswould,however,deserveadditionalclarification.ThecaseoftheGazaStripisjustoneexampleofthedifficultyoftakingaccountofallthedimensionsoftheconceptofoccupation.Otheruncertaintiespersist,inparticular,aboutthecriteriaenablingthebeginningortheendofanoccupationtobeTheclassificationofsituationsofarmedviolenceisalsooftenlinkedtopoliticalconsiderations,asthepartiesinvolvedendeavourtointerpretthefactsinaccordancewiththeirinterests.Onthebasisofthemarginofdiscretionallowedbythegeneraltermsofthelegalcategories,itisnotunusual,forinstance,forStatestorefusetoadmitthattheyareinvolvedinanarmedconflict.Theyprefertoplaydowntheintensityofthesituationbyclaimingtocarryoutanoperationtomaintainpublicorder.Insodoing,theydenytheapplicabilityofhumanitarianlaw.Thistendencyisencouragedbythefactthatthereisnoindependentinter-nationalbodyauthorizedtodecidesystematicallyoncasesthatarelikelytorelatetooneorotherformofarmedconflict.ItistruethattheICRC,whoseworkisbasedprimarilyoninternationalhumanitarianlaw,informsthepartiesconcernedofitsassessmentofsituations,unlessitwouldnotbeintheinterestofthevictimstodoso.However,thosewhoreceivethatassessmentarenotboundbytheICRC’sview.Underthoseconditions,itseemsevenmoreimportanttoclarifytherelevantconcepts,withaviewtoreducingthescopeforinterpretation,thusreinforcingthepredictabilityofinternationalhumanitarianlaw. S.Vite´–Typologyofarmedconflictsininternationalhumanitarianlaw