ChenÉe Tracey Research Sponsored by Brookhaven National Laboratory introduction NonNuclear Weapon States NNWS that are signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty NPT agreed not to ID: 749593
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Slide1
Submarines & Safeguards
ChenÉe
Tracey
Research Sponsored
by Brookhaven National Laboratory Slide2
introduction
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that are signatory to the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT)
agreed not to
pursue nuclear explosives
and to
safeguard their civilian energy sectors
Nuclear propulsion is not a nuclear explosive and is used by the military
Brazil has demonstrated interest in pursuing naval nuclear propulsion for use in nuclear-powered submarines Slide3
Questions that Need answers
Which part of
nuclear-powered
submarines
are safeguarded
?
Is Brazil likely to proliferate? If not Brazil, then who?
What are options for the international
community
to protect
against proliferation with this technology? Slide4
introduction
In 2008, Brazil and France signed a contract to share submarine technology to help Brazil obtain diesel-electric attack submarines
Brazil plans to use this same technology to
build nuclear reactors indigenously for six nuclear-powered
submarines
Brazil
would be the first NNWS to have nuclear-powered submarines
Uranium used to power
the submarine is
not subject to safeguards while it is used in reactor
and can
be removed from safeguards verification
Brazil has agreed to maintain enrichment
below 20% Slide5
Why does brazil need a nuclear-powered submarine?
Protect
oil and natural gas off the coast
Technological development and national independence
Prestige and importance Slide6
Protect the “Blue Amazon”
Compartments: Sonar, Missile Room, Control Room, Crew Rooms, Reactor
PWR provide energy Slide7Slide8
why nuclear-powered Submarines?
Nuclear-powered submarines are powered by nuclear material.
They do not house nuclear weapons.
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)
Higher enriched nuclear material means more energy and time between refueling
PWRs have long core lives and require refueling every 30-40 years when used with HEU
The submarine hull will have a hatch to facilitate refueling in lieu of cutting the internal structure of the submarine Slide9
IAEA Safeguards regime loopholes
IAEA INFCIRC 153 details the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and NNWS
A
state can “exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement.”
Nuclear material is
not subject to safeguards while it is being used in the naval reactor Slide10
IAEA Safeguards regime loopholes
There are a series of steps to be taken before the material is withdrawn from safeguards
State must inform the IAEA of the activity and that the material
will be used in peaceful nuclear activity
State must inform the IAEA that the material will
not be used for production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices
IAEA and the state must
make an “arrangement
” that the material will not be safeguarded for a certain length of
time and where in the fuel cycle
Because nuclear-powered submarines are controlled by military, the IAEA does not have access to
classified information
and has difficulty pinpointing when fuel is removed from safeguards Slide11
Brazil and Nonproliferation
Brazil and Argentina signed the NPT in 1998 and are not signatories to the Additional Protocol
Brazilian officials believe it
created a divide between “haves” and “have nots”
Nuclear Weapon States have made little to no progress on disarmament
goals in the NPT
Former Brazilian
Foreign Minister
João
Augusto de
Araújo
Castro stated “The NPT drafts propose limitations only for those countries that do not possess nuclear weapons and they include restrictions which are not essential to the objectives of proliferation.” Slide12
Cooperation between The iaea
and abacc
Brazil is a member of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) created in 1991
ABACC enforces the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) in Brazil and Argentina
This agreement prohibits Brazil and Argentina from “carrying out, promoting, or authorizing directly or indirectly or from participating in the testing, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means of any nuclear weapon.” Slide13
IAEA Loopholes and
ABACC catchalls
Brazil’s
SCCC Quadripartite agreement accounts for nuclear-powered submarines
“none of the provisions of the…Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since
propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy
.”
Calls for Brazil and Argentina “to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in
all nuclear activities
.” Slide14
IAEA and ABACC Cooperation
ABACC has certain liberties that the IAEA does not
ABACC’s safeguards include military bases
For
example
, Brazil inspected Argentina’s
unfinished reprocessing plant, even though it is
not safeguarded
by ABACC
Both agencies conduct independent evaluations using same equipment, standards, and procedures for inspections
Miscommunications may occur due to
chain
of command Slide15
Policy recommendations
NWS should promote use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) in nuclear-powered submarines
U.S. uses 93%; Russia uses 45%
France and China are using caramel fuel (uranium dioxide composite)
Lasts for upwards of 33 years in reactor core with 20% enrichment
US should recommit itself to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program
DOE launched this program in 1978 Slide16
Long Term Options
Nuclear Weapon States recommitment to disarmament during the NPT Review Conference in 2020
Renewed commitment to promoting the Additional Protocol especially with Brazil and Argentina
Potential for Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and ABACC to negotiate a modified Additional Protocol with the
IAEA
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group acknowledges ABACC
Slide17
Thank You!
ChenÉe
Tracey
L
chtracey@gmail.com