signed the Agreed Framework in which Pyongyang promised to abandon its - PDF document

1 &'()&*+,-.,/-01/,&2((301/-.(4&50,306&/4&
&'()&*+,-.,/-01/,&2((301/-.(4&50,306&/4&+431020604-06&&7(1-5&!(10/4&31(802-&&9:&7/(;(&(;.&!"#$$%!&'()*+,!-./0(!!$0/10230(!4567!! signed the Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang promised to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid and improvement of relations with Washington. An international consortium led by the United States was created to aphite-moderate U.S. negotiators, however, immediately realized that the cost of the reactors, estimated at over $4.6 billion, was more than the United States was willing to shoulder alone. KEDO was founded partly as a solution to these financing concerns as Moscow was unwilling to provide s

2 ignificant funds for the project.11 In c
ignificant funds for the project.11 In contrast, China was generally supportive of the Agreed Frameworkut Beijing did not play an active role in KEDO, saying that it could be more useful by staying outside of the organization.12 KEDO faced unique challenges. While multinational projects are common for commercial nuclear projects, the complexities involved were unusual because KEDOÕs founding members had historically hostile relations with North Korea.13 Neither Japan, South Korea, nor the United States had diplomatic relations with the North. This meant that in addition to the normalconstraints that such a project may face, KEDO had additional conce

3 rns, ranging from the security of its em
rns, ranging from the security of its employees working on North Korean soil to the larger political landscape impacting its operations. The LWR project was also different from normal civilian nuclear cooperation projects, as the reactors were to be constructed in exchange for North Korean nonproliferation commitments. While a few countries had given up their nuclear weapons programs in exchange for economic assistance and improved relations with the West, this was a rare case that involved an exchange of a set of proliferation-prone reactors for more proliferation-resistant ones.14 North Korea also lacked the technical experience, skill Based on t

4 his agreement, KEDO and North Korea also
his agreement, KEDO and North Korea also negotiated eight protocols that were needed for implementing the project.18 The lack of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the original KEDO founders complicated this process. For example, in order to allow KEDO personnelmainly Americans, Japanese and South KoreansÑto visit the North Korean construction site, the parties agreed that the employees should use KEDO identification cards that served the same function as passports.19 The protocol on transportation allowed goods to be shipped from South Korea to North Korea by designated points on land, sea and air, but not through the demilitarized zone bet

5 ween the two Koreas.20 According to the
ween the two Koreas.20 According to the Supply Agreement, KEDO was in charge of preparing the construction site in Kumho, on North KoreaÕs northeast coast. The rural site had originally been chosen for LWRs that the Soviet Union promised North Korea in the mid 1980s but were never built. It still lacked the necessary infrastructure, etc.21 KEDO put in the infrastructure needed to support October 1994 signing of the Agreed Framework. While largely symbolic, the IAEA also resumed in March 1996 ad hoc and routine inspections at small nuclear facilities that were not subject to the freeze.24 Had the project moved forward, North Korea would have had to co

6 me into full compliance with its safegua
me into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and solved the issue of its past plutonium production before the LWRs were completed. 25 How multilateral cooperation helped the project The largest benefit of the multinational approach embodied in KEDO was that it made the project financially feasible. With the United States unwilling to pay for the KEDO members thought that repayment was unlikely.28 for the HFO still fell short.30 As such, HFO delivery to North Korea was often late. To prevent further delays, Japan provided funds for an account that could be used to finance the HFO delivery, under the condition that the money

7 be replenished at the earliest possibil
be replenished at the earliest possibility. 31 Yet even then, HFO shipments lagged. Another benefit of the multinational approach was that it helped some member countries win the domestic support necessary to secure their contributions to the LWR construction and HFO shipments. In selling the deal to members of the U.S. Congress, Clinton administration officials argued that Japan and South Korea were contributing the lionÕs share of the cost of the project and that the two allies were sufficiently committed to the agreement North Korea initially rejected accepting South Korean origin reactors for the project. Once the North agreed to have the react

8 ors supplied by the South, they insisted
ors supplied by the South, they insisted on calling the reactors ÒAmerican giving the demanding, some KEDO members thought it was an important opportunity to show the North Koreans that they were not going to give in to what they viewed as unreasonable North Korean demands.41 More generally, interaction between KEDO members and their North Korean counterparts reduced potential misperceptions and at times prevented disruptive problems from exacerbating. A South Korean KEDO member, for example, recalls a time when negotiations were deadlocked due to North KoreaÕs demand that KEDOÕs ships turn off their communication and navigation systems when enteri

9 ng a North Korean port. A North Korean d
ng a North Korean port. A North Korean delegate explained to him on the side that work was underway to overcome strong military objections, and asked for some time. The issue was resolved in a following meeting as the North Korean indicated.42 What did not work well Despite the benefits of the multinational approach embodied by KEDO, it also raised some challenges that hindered the projectÕs success. One was the impact of historical enmity and Differing technical standards among KEDO countries also sometimes held up progress. For instance, Japan hesitated to approve additional funding for the LWR construction when an American industrial organizati

10 on asked for the the United States conf
on asked for the the United States confronted North Korea about its pursuit of a covert highly enriched uranium program in 2002. KEDO formally ended its operations in 2006. Even had the project moved forward, it would have faced numerous Another sizeable challenge was negotiating a U.S.-North Korean nuclear cooperation agreementThe North needed such an agreement Would KEDO have worked better had it included more countries, particularly regional powers China and Russia? KEDO would certainly have welcomed more financial contributions, and there would likely have been benefits to including countries that have diplomat The reactors are due for completi

11 on in 2020. World Nuclaer Association. Ò
on in 2020. World Nuclaer Association. ÒNuclear Power in the United Arab Emirates.Ó (Updated May 2017). http://world 27 KEDO. ÒAgreed Framework.Ó 28 Comments by Japanese Ambassador Terusuka Terada in Kartman, Carlin and Wit, ÒA History of KEDO,Ó 67. 29 United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. North Korea Nuclear Agreement!: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, January 24 and 25, 1995. S. Hrg.!; 104-125; United States. 104-125. Congress. Senate. S. Hrg.!; Washington!: U.S. G.P.O.!:, 1995. http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.law/llconghear.00034039914, 37, 30 Ibi