may also think oflovers,who endow each other with little shells or sto - PDF document

may also think oflovers,who endow each other with little shells or stones found onthe beach,symbolising their affection.Small children suck at pieces ofcloth,takingthem to their bed and cherishing them as ifthey were animated.They get attached totheir first teddy bears,sometimes developing such strong bonds that they still takethem to their bed as grown-ups.Objects may be worshippedÐthe grail,religiousitems like iconsÐor destroyedÐburning letters,smashing pottery,throwingjewellery awayÐactivities which show that strong emotions may be connected toIt is clear,then,that things may embody different kinds ofpersonalmeaning,varying between attachment and aggression.In this paper,I will focus on things asdepositories ofsocialcultural meaning.Things are a way to define who we are toourselves and to others (Carrier 1995).Things convey symbolic messages,referring tothe nature and (actual or desired) status ofthe relationship between human beings.Things are Ôtie-signsÕ:signs ofsocial bonds (Goffman 1971).There is no meaninginherent in things themselves;the meaning ofthings derives from human relation-Social historians as well as social and economical anthropologists have pointedto the ways in which people inscribe meaning in the forms,the uses and trajectoriesofthings.As Arjun Appadurai argues in his essay The Social Life ofThings(1986),it isnot merely things but things-in-motion that illuminate their human and socialcontext.Only the analysis ofthe trajectories ofthings enables us to interpret Ôthehuman transactions and calculations that enliven thingsÕ(1986:5).The main question ofthis paper is how things,in particular gifts,come toembody meaning within the context ofhuman relationships.Gifts are only onecategory ofthings;another important category is that ofgoods or commodities.There has been a longstanding scientific debate on the contrasts and similaritiesbetween gifts and commodities.As the supposedly different meanings ofgifts andcommodities are at the heart ofthis debate,it is also pertinent to the question howthe meaning ofthings comes into existence.The way gifts take on meaning cannot bestudied,therefore,without taking the broader category ofcommodities into accountas well.Three related areas ofscientific interest seem to be relevant here:thesociological and anthropological approaches to the giving ofgifts (for example,Caplow 1982;Cheal 1988;Weiner 1992;Komter 1996a;Frow 1997),the anthro-pological study ofmaterial culture (for example,Douglas and Isherwood 1979;Miller 1998),and the multidisciplinary study ofconsumption and consumerbehaviour (for example,McCracken 1990;Miller 1995a;Corrigan 1997).Far frompretending to review the relevant literature in all these areas,I will restrict myselftothose contributions that highlight the way things take on social meaning.First,I willgo into the nature ofgifts and commodities,and focus on the type ofsocial relation-ships that are supposed to belong to them.Then,I will discuss different explanationsemerging from the sociological and anthropological literature ofhow things become
 invested with meaning.In those explanations,surprisingly,an account ofthe waymeaning derives from the nature ofsocial relations seems to be lacking.I will presenta model ofthe basic forms ofhuman relations,derived from Alan Page FiskeÕs bookStructures ofSocial Life(1991);this model may be helpful in categorising themeanings ofthings as well.This model will then be applied to some empirical datafrom a study on the giving ofgifts in the Netherlands (Komter 1996a,1996b).Finally,I will present a briefsketch ofthe complications that may occur when the parties tothe transactions do not share the same frame ofmind with respect to each other andto the things that are being transferred.The meanings that things have for differentpeople may not harmonise:things may have different,even conflicting,social lives.In our century the dominant way ofthinking about patterns ofrelationshipsbetween persons has been through the opposition ofthe gift and the commodity.Anthropological approaches to ways ofexchange have often rested upon thedistinction between societies which are characterised by the Ôembedded nature ofeconomic acts,as against societies where the economy is relatively unfettered by thesocial consequences ofexchange.In some cases the two economies are juxtaposed asa contemporary dualism ÉÕ(Miller 1995a:272).In some ofthe older anthropological and sociological writings gift exchange andcommodity transactions are conceptualised as different Ômodes ofexchangeÕ.Thefirst example is MalinowskiÕs description ofthe Kulagift exchange ceremonials inwhich he distinguishes a whole range ofgifts,differing in the extent to whichsupposedly altruistic and solidary motives,or more profit-oriented drives areinvolved (1922).Malinowski assumes the different types ofgifts to go along withdifferent types ofsocial relationships.The same idea is reflected in GouldnerÕsdistinction between the norm ofreciprocity,based on expectations ofreturns,andthe norm ofbeneficence,a more altruistically inspired type ofgiving which mayoccur,for instance,between parents and their children (1973a and b).Also Sahlins(1972) argues that the spirit ofexchange swings from disinterested concern for theother party through mutuality to self-interest.According to Sahlins the nature ofsocial ties is related to the mode ofexchange that is preferred.The key variable in themovement from one extreme to the other is kinship distance.In terms ofgifts versus commodities:gift exchange tends to be the most commonamong people who are relatives,whereas commodity exchange emerges as thekinship distance becomes greater,with complete strangers at the other extreme ofthe scale.Although these authors analyse gift exchange and commodity transactionsas points on a continuum,the idea ofsome fundamental opposition between the twois at the root oftheir theories.The opposition returns in the work ofLewis Hyde (1979:60),for example,in hisHeirlooms,Nikes and Bribes61 statement that Ôa commodity has value and a gift does not.A gift has worthÉYoucanÕt put a price on it.ÕAlthough he recognises that gifts and commodities do notexist in any pure form,he thinks (pp.66Ð7) that they operate in fundamentallydifferent ways:ÔBecause ofthe bonding power ofgifts and the detached nature ofcommodity exchange,gifts have become associated with community and with beingobliged to others,while commodities are associated with alienation and freedom.ÕThe work ofGregory (1982;1983) is another example.In his view things as commo-dities and things as gifts cover quite different kinds ofrelations between objects aswell as persons (1983:104):Commodity exchange is an exchange between alienable objects between people who arein a state ofreciprocal independence that establishes a quantitative relationship betweenthe objects transacted,whereas gift exchange is an exchange ofinalienable objectsbetween people who are in a state ofreciprocal dependence that establishes a qualitativerelationship between the subjects transacting.According to the logic that opposes gifts and commodities,peopleÕs relationships tothings and to other people seem to fall in two broad categories,regarded as mutuallyexclusive:either as impersonal,economic or market relationships with strangers,oras personal gift relationships with intimates,friends or relatives.Recently,the dualistic tendency has been challenged (see,for example,Miller1995a,1995b;Davis 1996;Frow 1997).It has been suggested,for instance,that thedistinction between gifts and commodities is predominantly a matter ofdegree.Inalienability is not exclusively a gift characteristic,and goods are not necessarilyalienable objects,as Gregory assumes.Appadurai (1986) demonstrates that both inmonetarised and in less monetarised societies goods may pass in and out ofsituations ofalienability.Goods may acquire cultural meaning in the course oftime,they may have a Ôcultural biographyÕ.Commodities may become decommodified (apiece ofjewellery taking on personal significance and value) and non-commoditiesmay become commodified (selling oneÕs blood,selling information,cf.CorriganThere are other parallels in form between gift exchange and the circulation ofcommodities.By being stretched out in time,gift exchange disguises the fact that,inthe long run,every gift is ÔrepaidÕwith a countergift.According to Bourdieu (1990[1980]) the subjective experience ofthe freedom to give can go together withtheobjective necessity or obligation ofreturning a gift.In modern societies,theexchange ofgifts as well as commodities is characterised by ritual,social and sym-bolic aspects.Whereas this may be obvious for gift exchange (cf.Komter 1996a,1996b),the ritual elements in the consumption ofgoods and in market transactionsshould not be underplayed.One might think ofmodern consumption rituals (ritualoccasions ofcollective consumption offood and drinks;cf.Douglas and Isherwood1979),the ritual oftrying to outbid each other at auctions,forms ofmodernsuch as conspicuous consumption among the rich and the powerful
 (Veblen 1934 [1899]),or customs ofdoing big business in Ôdisguised settingsÕsuch asconcert halls or restaurants,where other,cultural and social aimsÐlistening tomusic,having a meal togetherÐare used to cover up economic transactions.The tendency to consider some things as commodities and others as gifts,is ahistorical as well as a cultural construction,as Carrier (1995) argues in his book and Commodities.On the one hand,the distinction between the two concepts relatesto the development ofindustrial and commercial capitalism and the correspondingchanges in forms ofproduction over the past three centuries.On the other hand,thegrowing impersonal alienation ofthe realm ofeconomy is also part ofour Westernculture,where people have come to construct a marked opposition between thesphere ofpersonal and family relationships,and the impersonal and utilitariandomain ofwork.From his review ofrecent anthropological contributions Frow (1997:124) con-cludes that Ôthere is no single form ofÒthe giftÓ,and no pure type either ofthe gifteconomy or ofthe commodity economyÉThere is nothing inherent in objects thatdesignates them as gifts;objects can almost always follow varying trajectories.Giftsare precisely not objectsat all,but transactions and social relations.ÕThe way things acquire meaningTraditionally the meaning ofgift exchange has been conceived in functionalterms:the mutual giving ofgifts serves to bring about social relationships which,intheir turn,are the cement ofa common culture (cf.Malinowski 1922;Mauss 1923).This view can be recognised in more recent contributions as well.For example,Titmuss (1970:81Ð2),in his study ofblood donation,describes the meaning ofgivingas follows:ÔThe forms and functions ofgivingÉmay reflect,sustain,strengthen orloosen the cultural bonds ofthe groupÉÕIn the same vein Cheal (1988:40) describesthe meaning ofgift exchange as being a moral economy in which Ôthe social signi-ficance ofindividuals is defined by their obligations to others,with whom theymaintain continuing relationships.It is the extended reproduction ofthese relation-ships that lies at the heart ofa gift economy,just as it is the extended reproduction offinancial capital which lies at the heart ofa market economy.ÕGifts,like the larger category ofthings,however,are not merely or mainly to becomprehended by their functional meaning,as this is but one ofits multifariousmeanings.Neither is the Marxist terminology for analysing things in terms oftheiruse-value and exchange-value adequate when it comes to determine the complexsymbolicÐcultural,social,personalÐcharacter ofmeaning systems attached tothings.As Appadurai said,it is only things-in-motion,the trajectory ofthingsbetween human beings,that enable us to understand their meaning.For a betterunderstanding ofthe different meanings ofthings it is important to know thingsbecome invested with meaning:which economic,cultural,social and psychologicalHeirlooms,Nikes and Bribes63 processes are involved and how are these substantiated in things? To what extent isthe trajectory ofthingsÐtheir movements between human beingsÐdeterminingthe meaning ofthings?One possible answer is that the social order prevalent in a certain society isreflected in the classification ofthings.Barthes (1973),for instance,argues thatcommodities act as a kind ofÔmythsÕsupporting the existing ideology which favoursthose who are the most powerful in society.Similarly,Baudrillard (1988 [1970]) linksgoods and consumption to the overall economic order.Consumption is not tied toindividuals but to the larger system ofobjects.PeopleÕs needs are not so much locatedin the individual person but in the practices ofmarketing and advertising.Manu-facturers deliberately attempt to shape consumer behaviour through advertising.The sector ofproduction has Ôtotal dictatorshipÕover individual needs,according toBaudrillard.Whether the sector ofproduction alone has,in fact,such overwhelmingpower is doubtful;it is undeniable,however,that advertising,marketing and fashionare important instruments in assigning meaning to things.Corrigan (1997) describeshow patterns and ways ofconsumption have changed over the centuries,howpeopleÕs taste has been moulded through the spread ofadvertising and marketing,and how fashion has drawn more and more goods into its sphere ofinfluence.BourdieuÕs work (1984 [1979]) on the links between social class and the practicesofconsumption is another example ofexplaining the meaning ofthings by their rolein sustaining existing social and economic structures:people distinguish themselvesfrom each other by adopting a certain lifestyle in which certain things or goodsfunction as markers oftheir (aspired) status (such as paintings,books,objects dÕart).Acts ofconsumption,in his view,reproduce social difference because the con-sumption ofsome goods is considered a sign ofdistinction while the consumption ofothers signifies a lack ofdistinction.In a similar way McCracken analyses the meaning ofgoods in terms ofthecultural categories ofa certain society.Categories ofclass,gender,age and occu-pation may be represented in goods as many empirical studies have demonstrated:Ôthe order ofgoods is modelled on the order ofcultureÕ(McCracken 1990:75).But theprocess also works the other way around:goods not only substantiate culturalcategories,but goods so charged Ôhelp make up the culturally constituted wordÉInshort,goods are both the creations and the creators ofthe culturally constitutedworldÕ(p.77).While cultural categories act as the source ofmeaning to consumergoods (often using advertising and fashion as their medium),according toMcCracken there is another set ofinstruments that transfers meaning from theconsumer good to the consumer,namely rituals or forms ofsymbolic action.McCracken distinguishes four different types ofritual:exchange,possession,grooming and divestment rituals.Christmas and birthdays are the most commonexamples ofexchange rituals.Possession rituals become visible in people spendingtime cleaning,discussing,comparing,reflecting,showing offor photographing their
 new possessions.The purpose ofgrooming rituals is to insure that special andperishable properties resident in certain clothes,hair styles or looks,are made to livein the consumer;they allow the consumer to ÔfreshenÕthe properties he or she drawsfrom goods (for example,expressed in peopleÕs dressing up in their Ôgoing outÕrituals).Divestment rituals,finally,are used to erase goods ofmeaning,for example,meaning associated with the previous owner ofthe good,and to install personalmeaning (for example,cleaning and redecorating a newly purchased home).The explanations presented thus far refer to economic and social structures,advertising and marketing,the ideology cementing existing power hierarchies,cultural categories like class and gender,and the different types ofrituals people areusing when dealing with things.Interestingly,explanations in terms oftheembeddedness ofthings in trajectories between persons,are lacking.This is strikingin view ofthe idea explicitly adopted by many authors that it is the trajectory ofthings between human beings that installs their meaning (Appadurai 1986;Carrier1995;Frow 1997).The context ofhuman relations will therefore be my focus in whatfollows.Four different types of social relationshipDrawing on a broad range ofclassical and modern work in anthropology,sociology and psychology,Alan Page Fiske (1991) develops an encompassing theoryofthe basic psychological motivations underlying social life.Human activities asdiverse as arranging a marriage,performing religious rituals,making choices,judging what is morally good or wrong,or dealing with things,can be ordered in fourfundamental models:Ôcommunity sharingÕ,Ôauthority rankingÕ,Ôequality matchingÕand Ômarket pricingÕ.Integrating ethnographic,comparative and experimentalresearch with classical theory,Fiske demonstrates that people use different com-binations and permutations ofthese models to shape their own identity,theirmotives and their norms,to structure the way they relate to their environment,andto regulate their social roles and the way they participate in groups and institutions.These models also enable people to make sense ofthe way others behave towardsthem and to interpret their motives and intentions.The four relational models notonly orient people in different ways to other people,they also determine peopleÕsrelationships to natureÐplants,animalsÐand to material objects or things.Fiskestates (1991:51):ÔPeople can use each ofthe four fundamental models to organisetransfers ofmaterial and nonmaterial goods and services and to provide obligatoryor ideal standards for such transactions.ÕAccording to Fiske homo economicusassumptions are predominant in manysocial science theories,from psychological learning theories,economically inspiredgame theories in political science,to sociological equity and anthropologicalexchange theories.As against this monolithic tendency,he offers illustrations fromHeirlooms,Nikes and Bribes65 Western and non-Western cultures as well as from everyday life,in which ÔsharingÕ,ÔrankingÕ,ÔmatchingÕand ÔpricingÕbehaviours come to the fore.His hypothesis,supported by abundant cross-cultural,ethnographic illustrations,is that thesebehaviours are universal,Ôbeing the basis for social relations among all people in allcultures and the essential foundation for cross-cultural understanding andintercultural engagementÕ(1991:25).Communal sharingis regarded as a relationship ofequivalence in which peopleattend to group membership,while the individuality and separate identity ofpersons is not very marked.Key words are identification,care,solidarity andfriendship.The experience ofbelonging to and identification with the collectivity isprimordial.The English terms ofÔkindÕ,ÔkindnessÕ,and ÔkinÕ,having a common Indo-European root,capture most ofthe features ofcommunal sharing:Ôit is a relationshipbased on duties and sentiments generating kindness and generosity among peopleconceived to be ofthe same kind,especially kinÕ(1991:14).In community sharing things are mainly exchanged on the basis offeelings ofconnectedness to other people,and ofan orientation to the maintenance and qualityofhuman relationships.What one gives is not dependent on what one has received,but springs from oneÕs perception ofother peopleÕs needs.In these cases,the thingsthat are given will often be food,care or services.Another category ofgiving withinthis model is not so much based on need,but on identification with other people.Animportant characteristic ofthings given in these cases is their sentimental value:whowore it or used it,to whom are you connected by means ofthese things? One maythink ofheirlooms,keepsakes and any other objects which symbolise preciousmemories.In all these examples,things are markers ofcommunity.In authority ranking,the social relationship is characterised by asymmetry andinequality.People construe each other as differing in social importance or status.Thehighest ranking people in a social relationship have often the prerogative ofbeingaccorded the initiative in social action,being the first who are allowed to makechoices or to utter a preference.Those in high rank are more salient by getting moreattention compared to their inferiors.Subordinates believe that their subordinationis legitimate (although they may come to resist their subordination at some time);purely coercive power in which people are dominated by force or threat is more oftenthe exception than the rule in authority ranking relationships.Within the authority ranking model exchange is motivated by a (conscious orunconscious) desire to emphasise oneÕs own position ofstatus or power within apower hierarchy.The perception ofother peopleÕs relative power is an importantfactor in the selection ofpersons with whom one decides to transact.Power,fame,prestige and merit are regarded as the most relevant criteria within social relation-ships.Valuable things are transacted with those high in the power hierarchy,whereassops are good enough for those in lower positions.In contrast to the communitymodel,the authority-ranking model promotes also showing and exposing valuable
 objects,in addition to transacting or giving such items to other people.Illustrationsare conspicuous consumption,the showing ofprestige items,or symbols ofrank andstatus.Clothes may function to symbolise status or group membership (think ofchildren forcing their parents to buy exclusively branded articles like Nike shoes,orLevi jeans for them).For adult men cars are often symbols ofstatus,power,virilityand sportsmanship.WomenÕs jewellery seems to perform similar functions.In thismodel,things possessed (and exposed) or transferred are markers ofsuperiority inpower relations.Equality matchingrefers to egalitarian relationships between peers.People havedistinct identities,but are,in other respects,each otherÕs equals.People share witheach other,contribute to each other,and influence each other equally.In relation-ships ofthis type people have reciprocal exchange patterns,in which quid pro quothe prevailing motivation.Rights,duties or actions are conceived as balancing eachother.People are interchangeable in the sense that it does not matter who gets orgives which share or who takes which turn,because everyone is equal and thingscome out even.The equality matching model orients exchange in such a way that nobodybenefits or loses disproportionally.Considerations in exchange are neitherinfluenced by need,nor by merit,status or power.The items exchanged can often bealigned,weighted or otherwise compared,which enables the participants to achieveequality by concrete operations ofmatching.Things exchanged in equality matchingrelationships are tokens ofbalance.In market pricingthe relationship is dominated by values derived from themarket.Rational choices and utility considerations determine how and when peoplewill interact with others.People give and get in proportion to a common standard,reflecting market-pricing values (money,time or utility).Market pricing andequality matching may be conflated or confused,when the profit-oriented elementquid pro quoreasoning gets too much emphasis.There is,however,a cleardifference:in market pricing,unlike commodities are exchanged in proportion totheir market value,whereas in equality matching,the same or equivalent things areexchanged.PeopleÕs main preoccupation in exchange within the market pricing model is:doI benefit from the transaction,do the costs involved outweigh the profits? PeopleÕsrelationships to others are instrumental and often characterised by competition andstruggle.One gives to those from whom one may expect some direct or futurebenefit.Things are tokens ofutility or material (monetary) value.It is important to bear in mind that the distinction between the models isanalytical in kind.Actual interpersonal relationships will in most cases be built out ofa combination ofthese four basic psychological models.People use these models inthe same way as they use grammatical rules,without necessarily being able todescribe them reflectively,or even being aware oftheir existence.According to FiskeHeirlooms,Nikes and Bribes67 (1991:25):ÔMy hypothesis is that these models are fundamental,in the sense that theyare the lowest or most basic-level ÒgrammarsÓfor social relations.ÕFiske emphasises that the four models are not in any intrinsic way related tospecific domains,as the work ofsome anthropologists had suggested.Whereas bothMalinowski and Sahlins presume that kinship distance is the primordial factor indetermining the mode ofexchange,Fiske argues that this is not necessarily the case:the same four patterns may emerge in anytype ofsocial relationship and in anydomain,whether it be work,decision making,the meaning oftime,social influence,the constitution ofgroups,the experience ofselfand identity,moral judgement ordealing with things.Communal sharing may be the most typical within-group formoftransaction,while exchanges between groups may often take the form ofequalitymatching.FiskeÕs theory allows for other possibilities,although he does not reflectexplicitly on these himself.For example,authority patterns,equality and marketconsiderations may creep into interpersonal relationships.We might think here ofsexually exploitative relationships,or ofmodern spouses or partners who,in thespirit ofequality,share rights and duties in work and leisure,or who,like participantsin market exchange,bargain meticulously about the division ofhousehold chores.Inversely,the community mode ofrelationship may penetrate the domain ofthemarket and ofinstitutional relationships,for example,when teachers or psychiatristshave love affairs with their pupils or patients,or when clients start having a personalrelationship with prostitutes.That community is not necessarily restricted to thesphere ofclose kin and intimate friends is also exhibited in public charity behaviour,in forms ofempathic involvement with strangers-in-need,in situations in whichpeople care disinterestedly for others than their own family or intimate friends,orwhen people offer hospitality to refugees.A final word on FiskeÕs models may be in order.Within and across cultures,socialrelations are enormously intricate and varied;how can such a general theory asFiskeÕs encompass all this? Fiske takes great pains to demonstrate Ôhow the set offoursimple models can generate complex social relationships,roles,groups,institutions,and societies.People produce complex social relations by applying the models at avariety oflevels (lower levels embeddedÐnestedÐwithin higher levels) and con-catenating the models together in various combinationsÕ(1991:139).He offerstheoretical as well as empirical answers to the question ofhow a few universal modelscan generate the great cultural diversity ofsocial systems that can be seen around theworld and throughout history.The bulk ofhis illustrations are not from Westernsociety but from ethnographic materials on the Moose ofBurkina Faso.In the next section I will apply FiskeÕs models to research data from a study on thegiving ofgifts in the Netherlands,originally conducted by Komter and Schuyt in 1992(Komter and Schuyt 1993).My aim is to illuminate how a certain category ofthings,namely gifts,comes to be invested with meaning within the context ofdifferent typesofhuman relationships.
 The four basic meanings of giftsThe main research question was:who gives what to whom,and why? A seriesofquestions derived from this main question were posed for several kinds ofgifts:presents,money gifts,hospitality (giving food to other persons or letting them stay inoneÕs house),giving care or help,and giving blood or organs.A questionnaire withboth precoded and open questions was sent to 3,000 households from all over thecountry and returned by 513 respondents.(For more details see Komter 1996b;Komter and Vollebergh 1997.) In addition to this questionnaire,ninety-ninerespondents from Amsterdam or its surrounding area were interviewed extensively,using in-depth interviews.The same set ofquestions as in the questionnaire wereposed,but more probing on subjective feelings surrounding the giving ofgifts wasdone.An equal number ofwomen and men participated,but there was a slightoverrepresentation ofthe higher educated levels and incomes.Interviews wererecorded and transcribed verbatim.The analysis below focuses upon that part ofthein-depth interviews,where open answers to the questions about motives and feelingssurrounding the giving ofgifts were given.Gifts reflecting communityare frequently mentioned.They symbolise theunique,highly valued,personal and durable character ofrelationships.These giftsare not intended to evoke return gifts and seem mainly to be given out ofsympathy,love or the need to support another person.A single mother living on social securityI gave to my parents my little sonÕs first shoe in silver as a Christmas present.It is apersonal present in a double way,I think.Because I know that they have a small table withonly silver objects on it,and on that table is also my own first shoe and my sisterÕs firstshoe silvered.So,I thought:I add my sonÕs little shoe to that.Because he is their firstgrandchild.A young woman mentions another example ofsuch a precious personal gift:I once asked my parents for my birthday to write in a booklet what had been importantfor them in their lives.I said that they were entirely free to decide what to write.And Iasked them to return the booklet full,a year later for my birthday.And so they did.Ivalued this present enormously.Within families money is sometimes given by (grand)parents to their grown-upchildren,just to offer some momentary reliefor to make up for some more structuralshortage ofmoney;these gifts are unidirectional:no returns are expected,and evenwhen the gift is given in the form ofa loan,the expectation ofreturn is very diffuseand not specified in time.A woman who had received £150 from her parentsreported:ÔThey said:donÕt worry,weÕll pay it for you.So I will return it at some time.IfI happen to have some money I may return it,but ifI donÕt for some time to come,well,okay,then I donÕt pay it back.ÕGifts reflecting community are not always material;also help offeredHeirlooms,Nikes and Bribes69 disinterestedly,without any felt obligation,may illustrate community.A femalerespondent said:My daughter has to work many hours.Sometimes she has a day off,and then she has thatenormous pile ofclothes to be ironed.And then I say:come on,I will help you.[Int.:Doyou feel it as your obligation to help her,orÉ?] No.IfI would feel it as an obligation,thenI wouldnÕt do it anymore.I simply do it because itÕs normal.Authority,power and dependency are very common aspects ofrelationships.However,people are not inclined to interpret gifts in these terms.Nevertheless,theinterviews reflect those aspects in different ways.One way to emphasise oneÕssuperior position towards another person and the rights and privileges going with it,is to give gifts that symbolise the subordinate position ofthe other person in arelationship,for example by pointing to the role and tasks to be expected ofthisperson:ÔWhen we were a starting family,I received some aprons from my husband.IwasnÕt happy with them at all.I was used to something more spiritualÉÕAnotherfemale respondent told us:ÔMy mother-in-law gave me some tea towels for mybirthday,as ifshe were saying:your place is in the kitchen.ÕThese answers may beinterpreted as reflecting Ôdisplaced meaningÕin McCrackenÕs terms (1990).TheÔdisplaced meaningÕofgoods is that they tell us Ônot who we are,but who we wish wewereÕ(McCracken 1990:117).In a similar way our gifts may indicate whom we wishthe other person to be.Another illustration ofauthority and power is related to the phenomenon oftheThis ceremonial illustrates how the abundant and excessive giving ofgiftsserves to confer status and prestige on the giver,thereby putting the recipient in aposition ofalmost impossible indebtedness.Marcel Mauss describes how the North-American Indians (among others) went so far as to publicly destroy their wealthinstead ofgiving it away:wasting oneÕs riches as a sign ofoneÕs ultimate superiorityand power.Apart from the more caricatural examples in our own cultureÐtheswimming pool filled with champagne,the bank manager lighting his cigar with athousand dollar noteÐexcessive giving as a sign ofpower is a common practice inWestern society.Our interviews revealed many examples ofgifts too many,too largeor too expensive,putting the recipient in a position ofundesired dependency.A malerespondent said:ÔI gave an expensive present to a woman ofwhom I expectedsomewhat more than mere friendship in return,but she didnÕt feel like thatÕ.A final example ofgiving causing dependency in the recipient is givingabundantly to a person who,for some reason,is not able to reciprocate at somefuture time.A divorced woman living on social security and being severely ill told ushow difficult it was for her to accept the lack ofbalance between gifts given andreceived by her:ÔI think that it is more difficult to receive than to give.It is,uh,yes,it issometimes a bit ofa burden.Then I think:gee,how can I ever make up for that,for allthe help that is given to me.Õ
 Equalityis reflected in the expectations ofreciprocity common to giving ofmostgifts.Although the expectation ofa return gift is very often not consciously realised,research results show that the empirical pattern is that ofreciprocal giving:most giftsappear to be followed by a return gift at some point in time;moreover,those who givemany gifts receive many in return,and those who do not give much,are also thepoorest receivers (see Komter 1996b).The underlying motivation is quid pro quo,titfor tat,inviting others because they invited us,helping oneÕs neighbour because hehelped us,doing odd jobs for friends because you are expected to do these things forfriends.A male respondent said:I repaired the hallstand for her.She is old and,you know,a lamp was out oforder,Irepaired a plug,that sort ofthing.And then the old woman said:here,take this;itbelonged to my husband.ItÕs Beethoven;he loved Beethoven,and now this completeBeethoven collection is yours,because you did all those jobs for me É I appreciated thatso much,that she gave her husbandÕs favourite music to me.Between parents and children reciprocity is often experienced in a special way:adult children often feel obliged to give their parents attention by visiting them orinviting them to dinner,because ofwhat their parents have done for them when theywere small children.A young man said:I regularly visit my mother,every two weeks one afternoon.Then we talk together.Sheneeds attention,she has just left the hospital.I find that okay:she has also given attention,extra attention to me when I needed it.Now she needs it.It is quite normal that I go to visither.A Moroccan respondent emphasised the social and cultural necessity oftheprinciple ofreciprocity in a more general way:ÔGiving and receiving.In our societypeople have to give and receive.ThatÕs how it is.We ourselves receive as well as give.Otherwise life cannot continue,when one is giving and receiving.ÕMarket pricingis shown,for example,in gifts that function as bribes.These giftsare more characteristic ofthe public sphere than ofthe sphere ofpersonal relation-ships,although they are not totally absent there.Examples are gifts given to generalpractitioners by the pharmaceutical industry,gifts to political parties or politicians,or gifts meant as more or less subtle blackmail.But also in the interaction betweenfriends,lovers,partners and family members instrumentality and calculation,anorientation towards personal benefit may be reflected.A female respondent said:ÔMyparents-in-law give us always very expensive gifts,as a kind ofblackmail to visit themmore often,by forcing us to be grateful.ÕAlthough an element ofauthority is clearlypresent in this quotationÐthe giver bringing the recipient in a dependent positionby giving excessivelyÐthe market pricing aspect is revealed in the parentsÕattempt toÔblackmailÕtheir children.Professional relationships are based on a market model:services are offered inexchange for money.When an employer gives standard Christmas presents to hisHeirlooms,Nikes and Bribes71 employees,this is not only an expression ofhis gratitude for performed services butalso an attempt to strengthen the employeesÕcommitment to the company.TheemployerÕs motives to give this gift remain within the confines ofthe market model.However,professional relationships may take on other connotations,for instancederiving from the communitymodel:university professors giving more than normalattention to their students,barristers receiving more than financial compensationfor their services.A quote from a barrister illustrates the difference betweenÔeconomicÕand ÔpersonalÕrecompense:ÔYes,giving a present has a differentconnotation,because people have to pay a bill as well,so ifthey give something extra,then it has often a personal tinge.It has a different content.The economic valuedoesnÕt interest me at all,but it special.ÕThe potential use ofFiskeÕs typology may be further demonstrated by anattempt to explain the conflicts that may occur in the social life ofthings.Ininterpersonal relationships peopleÕs interpretations and valuations ofthings maynot correspond with each other.Things may lead conflicting social lives,in that themeanings people attach to them,may not harmonise with each other.Differencesbetween peopleÕs attitudes towards things may be the source ofdisagreeablemisunderstandings and serious disputes between them.Conflicts may arise betweenpeople when things represent a different value to them or embody differing sets ofexpectations and different courses ofaction to be undertaken.For example,things experienced by one party as markers ofcommunity,may beconsidered by another party as mainly interesting because oftheir marketvalue.Examples may be found in (often fierce and long-lasting) family disputes aboutlegacies.We may think ofa heirloom which is cherished by one inheritor because ofthe inalienable and unique memories it embodies for him or her,while anotherrelative emphasises its monetary value and wants to sell it on the market.In fact,whatthe surviving relatives are quarrelling about,is the symbolic value ofthe object asexperienced by each ofthem.The inheritor who succeeds in imposing his will to sellthe object,is in fact denying and even annihilating the special and personal value theobject had for the other relative.Many other examples present themselves.A thing given out oflove or communitysharing,may be received with indifference and in the long run be reciprocated with areturn gift in the spirit ofequalitymatching.Humiliating gifts may degrade therecipient and destroy his or her expectations ofcommunityequality.Ourrespondents offered abundant examples ofsuch gifts (Ôaftershave,while I have [had]a beard for twenty-five yearsÕ,Ôa bottle ofwine,but I donÕt drinkÕ,Ôa dress that was toosmallÕ,Ôperished flowersÕ,Ôsour wineÕ,all sorts ofmonstrous objects,gifts received andpassed on,etc.).Gifts given to mark the authorityofthe giver over the recipient,for
 example gifts consciously or unconsciously meant to make the recipient somehowdependent upon the giverÐa money gift to someone who is less wealthy,or a learnedbook to someone with only rudimentary educationÐmay be misjudged as signs oflove and real personal interest:communityin FiskeÕs terms.Even merely marketinspired attempts to manipulate or bribe someone,or to induce him or her to do areturn favour or service by means ofgiving a gift,may be misinterpreted as a token ofcommunity:a sign ofpersonal attention and love.Behind the cheerfully colouredwrapping ofthe gift,various types ofintentions ofthe giver may be hidden.Thesemay not in the least correspond with the recipientÕs relational wishes and desires andhis or her frame ofmind towards the giver.The transfer ofthings may be regarded,in the terms ofAppadurai (1986:21),tournaments ofvalue:complex social processes in which the value ofthings isdetermined by developing Ôa broad set ofagreements concerning what is desirable,what a reasonable Òexchange ofsacrificesÓcomprises,and who is permitted toexercise what kind ofeffective demand in what circumstancesÕ(1986:57).Thesetournaments not only determine the economic value ofthings,but form also thecontext in which other symbolic and social meanings ofthings are developed.The(economic) scarcity ofthings is only one ofthe relevant dimensions within exchangerelationships.Things may come to embody the values ofcommunity,be used toemphasise authority,underscore equality between exchange partners,or expresseconomic or market values.Things do not represent these values in any inherent way.Neither is it merely the form or ceremony ofthe transaction that renders meaning toa thing.As Carrier states,it is,instead,Ôthe relationship that exists between thetransactors and the relationship between them and what is transactedÕ(1995:19).Things,then,far from being static,inert and mute,may be compared with othermore current vehicles ofmeaning such as words.Like words,things are part ofaninformational system,the meaning ofwhich is created within the context ofsocialinteraction and mutual communication between people.Due to the variousemotions they invoke in people,and to the contest ofvalues to which these emotionsare exposed,things come to embody differential meaning.Like words,things play adynamic and active role in creating,maintaining,disturbing or destroying humanrelationships (think ofthe fatal,poisoned chalice).As Douglas and Isherwood have observed in their anthropological theory oftheconsumption ofgoods (1979:74),things work as markers or classifiers:ÔTreat thegoods then as markers,the visible bit ofthe iceberg,which is the whole social process.Goods are used for marking in the sense ofclassifying categories.ÕBut goods are notonly Ôused for markingÕ,the coin has another side as well.In McCrackenÕs view goodsare both the creators and the creations ofthe culturally constituted world.Similarly,Heirlooms,Nikes and Bribes73 one might argue that relationships not only get meaning by means ofthe trajectoryofthings,but,inversely,that things derive their meaning from their place and rolewithin relationships.Things are markers as well as marks ofrelationship.   Appadurai,A.(ed.).1986.The Social Life ofThings: Commodities in Cultural Perspective.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Barthes,R.1973.Mythologies.London:Paladin.Baudrillard,J.1988 [1970].ÔConsumer SocietyÕ,in Selected Writings,edited by M.Poster.Cambridge:Polity Press.Bourdieu,P.1990 [1980].Le sens pratique.Eng.transl.:The Logic ofPractice.Oxford:Polity Press.Bourdieu,P.1984 [1979].Distinction: A Social Critique ofthe Judgement ofTaste,transl.by R.Nice.London:Routledge & Kegan Paul.Caplow,T.H.1982.Middletown Families.Minneapolis:University ofMinnesota Press.Carrier,J.G.1995.Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700.London:Routledge.Cheal,D.1988.The Gift Economy.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Corrigan,P.1997.The Sociology ofConsumption.London:Sage.Davis,J.1996.ÔAn AnthropologistÕs View ofExchangeÕ.Social AnthropologyDouglas,M.and Isherwood,B.1979.The World ofGoods: Toward an Anthropology ofConsumptionLondon:Allen Lane.Fiske,A.P.1991.Structures ofSocial Life: The Four Elementary Forms ofHuman Relations.New York:The Free Press.Frow,J.1997.Time and Commodity Culture: Essays in Cultural Theory and Postmodernity.Oxford:Clarendon.Goffman,E.1971.Relations in Public: Micro Studies ofthe Public Order.London:Allen Lane.Gouldner,A.W.1973a.ÔThe Norm ofReciprocity:A Preliminary StatementÕ,pp.226Ð60 in A.W.For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today.London:Allen Lane.Gouldner,A.W.1973b.ÔThe Importance ofSomething for NothingÕ,pp.260Ð90 in Alvin W.For Sociology.Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today.London:Allen Lane.Gregory,C.A.1982.Gifts and Commodities.London:Academic Press.Gregory,C.A.1983.ÔKula Gift Exchange and Capitalist Commodity Exchange:A ComparisonÕ,inJ.W.Leach and E.Leach (eds.),The Kula: New Perspectives on Massim Exchange.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Hyde,L.1979.The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life ofProperty.New York:Random House.Komter,A.E.(ed.).1996a.The Gift: An Interdisciplinary Perspective.Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversity Press.Komter,A.E.1996b.ÔReciprocity as a Principle ofExclusionÕ.SociologyKomter,A.E.and Schuyt,C.J.M.1993.Geven in Nederland.[Gift Giving in the Netherlands].Amsterdam:Dagblad Trouw.Komter,A.E.and Vollebergh,W.1997.ÔGift Giving and the Emotional Significance ofFamily andFriendsÕ.Journal ofMarriage and the FamilyMalinowski,B.1950 [1922].Argonauts ofthe Western Pacific.London:Routledge and Kegan Paul.Mauss,M.1990 [1923]..Eng.trans.:The Gift.The Form and Reason for Exchange inArchaic Societies.London:Routledge.McCracken,G.1990.Culture and Consumption.Bloomington and Indianapolis:Indiana UniversityPress.
 Miller,D.(ed.).1995a.Acknowledging Consumption: A Review ofNew Studies.London and New York:Routledge.Miller,D.1995b.ÔConsumption and CommoditiesÕ.Annual Review ofAnthropologyMiller,D.(ed.).1998.Material Cultures: Why Some Things Matter.London:UCL Press.Sahlins,M.1972.Stone Age Economics.London:Tavistock.Titmuss,R.M.1970.The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy.Harmondsworth:Penguin.Veblen,T.1934 [1899].The Theory ofthe Leisure Class.New York:Vanguard Press.Weiner,A.1992.Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox ofKeeping-While-Giving.Berkeley:UniversityofCalifornia Press.Biographical note:AAFKE E.KOMTER is Associate Professor,Department ofGeneral SocialScience,Utrecht University,the Netherlands.In 1986 she was an Associate Member ofBalliolCollege,Oxford.During 1991Ð92 she was a Visiting Professor at the Graduate School ofSocialScience,University ofAmsterdam.She has published books and articles on power,morality andgender,informal giving,reciprocity and solidarity.Address:Department ofGeneral Science,Utrecht University,POBox 80140,3508 TC Utrecht,TheNetherlands.Heirlooms,Nikes and Bribes75 Heirlooms, Nikes and Bribes: Towards a Sociologyof ThingsAafke KomterDepartment of General ScienceUtrecht UniversityABSTRACTHow do things come to embody meaning? In much anthropological andsociological writings,things have mainly been considered in two ways:either ascommodities or as gifts.Correspondingly,peopleÕs relationships to things and to otherpeople seem to fall in two broad categories,often regarded as mutually exclusive:either asimpersonal,economic or market relationships with strangers,or as personal giftrelationships with intimates,friends or relatives.The Ôsocial life ofthingsÕ,however,is morevaried.Drawing on Alan Page FiskeÕs theory ofthe four fundamental models ofhumanrelationship,four ways in which people may relate to each other and to things aredistinguished;these models are applied to empirical data from a study on the giving ofgiftsin the Netherlands.Complications may occur when the parties to the transaction do notshare the same frame ofmind with respect to each other and to the things that are beingtransferred.Things may have conflicting social lives.KEYWORDScommodities,consumption,exchange,gifts,material culture,things Things are things,and people are people.Things are mute and inert,peopleare speaking and acting with each other,and are involved in the construction ofshared meanings.This is a common way to conceive ofthe distinction betweenpeople and things in Western society.This view is often contrasted with non-Westernsocieties,where things are supposed to possess a life oftheir own (cf.Appadurai1986).In some tribal societies described by Marcel Mauss in his things were considered as animated,or having a spirit (ÔÕ),communicatingmessages from the person originally in possession ofthe thing,to its recipient.Thespirit ofthe thing would not come to rest until it was returned to the place where itsgiver was born.In this message MaussÕs famous threefold obligationÐto give,toreceive,and to give in returnÐwas succinctly symbolised.The opposition between Western and non-Western conceptions ofthings isclearly too simplistic.Many people will recognise that things may have a personal,often highly idiosyncratic meaning to them.For example,it is impossible for somepeople to throw anything away:for them the things with which they havesurrounded themselves,represent inalienable and highly cherished memories.WeSociologyVol.35,No.1,pp.59Ð75.Printed in the United Kingdom © 2001 BSA Publications Limited