causes yet to be uncovered. It is widely held that quantum mechanicalp - PDF document

causes yet to be uncovered. It is widely
causes yet to be uncovered. It is widely held that quantum mechanicalprobabilities are objective single case chances. So, for example, if aparticular atom has a 50:50 chance of decaying in the next 60 seconds,then that is an objective chance, because there are no underlying factorsabout that atom that determine exactly when it will decay. If it decays after30 seconds, then there is no reason why it decayed then rather than a bitearlier, or rather than a bit later. The probability is the full story; there areno further factors underlying it, according to the standard view of quantumphysics. Therefore chance is inherent in the basic nature of microscopic3How does a Christian respond to this kind of development? ArthurKoestler, not a Christian, said, ÔAs long as chance rules, God is ananachronism.Õ4And R. C. Sproul, in his 1994 book Not a Chance, writes,The mere existence of chance is enough to rip God from his cosmicthrone. ... If chance existed, it would destroy GodÕs sovereignty. If Godis not sovereign, he is not God. If he is not God, he simply is not. Ifchance is, God is not. If God is, chance is not. The two cannot coexistby reason of the impossibility of the contrary.5Clearly what is at issue here is GodÕs sovereignty and, in particular, GodÕswork of providence. If Sproul is right and quantum mechanics is true, thenmodern science refutes

the providence of God. Then providence a
the providence of God. Then providence andchance are mutually exclusive. So we now turn to the issue of provi-ProvidenceProvidence is a theological doctrine distinct from creation. Providence isGodÕs continuing action whereby he preserves creation and directs itaccording to his purposes. At least since John Calvin it is common underthe heading of providence to distinguish GodÕs preservation of the world,whereby he upholds all things by his powerful word, from his government,whereby he directs and rules over creation. Government is not just astatement of GodÕs power and the fact that there is no-one to rival him orusurp his power. Rather it refers to the actual exercising of GodÕs controlover all areas of creationÑover the forces of nature, over the animal world,over the destiny of nations and of kings, over the circumstances of ourlives, and even over our inner thoughts, beliefs and desires.Absolute providence is a particular version of providence that I wish tofocus on. According to Calvin, providence is absolute in the sense that itextends to every single detail of the universe. In the InstitutesCalvinwrites, ÔSingle events are so regulated by God and all events so proceed3Dowe, P. Chance, Coincidence and Chaos. Book manuscript, Submitted.4In Sproul, R. C. Not A ChanceÑthe Myth of Chance in Modern Science and Cosmology.Grand Rapids: Baker

House (1994).5Sproul, R. C. Not A Chanc
House (1994).5Sproul, R. C. Not A ChanceÑthe Myth of Chance in Modern Science and Cosmology.Grand Rapids: Baker House (1994), p. 3.Chance and ProvidenceScience & Christian Belief, Vol 9, No. 1c5does in the beginning and gives it the laws of nature that he gives it, thenthat ensures that it evolves in a certain way. But when God created it hedid not especially care what was going to happen later on. He may havehad some purposes when he created the world, but according to uncaringDeism, God did not have a particular interest in some of the things that aregoing to happen later on, for example, the events and circumstances in ourlives. So, it is not true, according to uncaring Deism, that there is acomplete reason for everything that happens.This view can be contrasted with what could be called Ôcaring DeismÕ.Like uncaring Deism, caring Deism holds that God is (in a deterministicuniverse) the sufÞcient cause of everything that happens but is not thenecessary cause because the universe has its own power to continue toexist by itself. But caring Deism holds that God does actually have acomplete reason for everything. So in creating the world God lookedforward to see what was going to happen, and created it so as to ensurethat it came out the way he wanted. But having set it up like that, with thatconcern for what was going to happen in the futur

e, he is able just to let itgo and it wi
e, he is able just to let itgo and it will run on its own. This is caring Deism because God has aconcern about what is going to happen, but it is still Deism because he isable to withdraw and does not have to sustain the world.I mention both versions to bring out the point that whatÕs at issue inDeism is whether or not God has to sustain the world, ie whether it canexist and have its being independently of God. The theologian Ericksongives the analogy of a power tool.8Some power tools are such that whenyou let go of the trigger and put them down, they continue to run; butothers are such that when you let go of the trigger, they stop so that youcannot put them down and walk away while the tool continues to operate.The tool that keeps going is like the universe according to Deism; and thetool that stops when you leave it is like the universe, according toThree Models of ProvidenceIn philosophy there are at least three models of absolute providence, ordivine determinism: occasionalism, concurrence and one due to Leibniz.These are models of the relation between divine and human action, andare all rivals to Deism. One of the key issues depends on the differencebetween a direct and indirect cause. An indirect cause is where there is anintermediate link between the cause and the effect. If I tread on TimÕs toeand he yells out, and Derek drops his glass

because he is startled, thenwhen I trod
because he is startled, thenwhen I trod on TimÕs toe I actually was to blame for DerekÕs dropping theglass and breaking it. I am not the direct cause, because there are a numberof links in between, but I am an indirect cause of DerekÕs dropping the8Erickson, M. J. Christian Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker House Book Company(1983).Chance and ProvidenceScience & Christian Belief, Vol 9, No. 1c7did for speciÞc reasons. In this way God has an intimate interest ineverything that happens in the universe right through its entire history.Yet some people harbour concerns that this is just a veiled form ofDeism.12One problem that people might have is that there is a kind oftemporal distanceÑGod is supposed to be involved in my life at everystep, but he seems on this model to be too distant temporally. But onLeibnizÕ theory God isinvolved in peopleÕs lives, because he has thoughtabout every little bitÑfor example this sparrow falling at this particulartimeÑand has set it up because he is concerned about exactly whathappens. Leibniz is not a Deist.As an analogy, suppose God did something from a spatial distance.Imagine, for example, that you are lying in the bush just having a snoozeand a tiger snake slithers up and is going to bite you, and then a neutrinoarrives from outer space, just at the right time, into the brain of the snakeand zaps somethi

ng in the brain that makes the snake tur
ng in the brain that makes the snake turn away and go off., all conventional theists will agree that this is an example of GodÕsabsolute and special providence, where he organised something to arrivefrom a star that is right across the other side of the universe.But if God can organise things from a spatial distance then he canorganise things from a temporal distance (as indeed he did in the case ofthe neutrino). The key thing is that he is interested in what is happening toyou, and he has arranged things so that it will happen in the way that hewants them to happen for you, right now.13The subsequent argument about chance is not going to depend onwhich of these three views is right: the argument should work for any ofthem. However, I am actually going to draw on the Leibnizian story lateron, but I could have used any of them, so if you prefer one of the otherones, then just translate the argument into the terms of that other ac-Quantum ChanceÔChanceÕ, as it is used here, means single case objective chance, forexample the probability of an atom decaying in the next minute. If there isa genuine chance, then the state of the system right now does not Þx whatit will be in a minuteÕs time. It could either have decayed or not decayed,and all the facts about it right now, together with all the laws of nature, donot Þx which of those two states it

will be in.12van Inwagen, P. ÔThe Place
will be in.12van Inwagen, P. ÔThe Place of Chance in a World Sustained by GodÕ. In Morris, T. (ed)Divine and Human Action. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, (1988), pp. 215, n. 4.13And if you think about God as outside time, which is the classical way to think thatgoes back to Augustine, then it does not really seem to be relevant. We do not think Godis over there at that side of the universe just because he sent that neutrino, any more thanto believe in providence you have to think that God is located right here. He is everywhere,he is not in space really, he is outside of space, and if you think about time like that, thatGod is outside of time and time is just part of his creation, then it does not really seem tomatter much at what point God came into it.Chance and ProvidenceScience & Christian Belief, Vol 9, No. 1c9hidden variable theories are wrong. Thus it is argued that determinism hasbeen proved to be false.It may be a little difÞcult at Þrst to conceive just how it could be provedthat a certain description is the full story, and that there are no furtherfactors to account for. This brings us to the central puzzle in the inter-pretation of quantum mechanics, which lies at the heart of the so-calledBell phenomena. Instead of discussing the physics of this remarkablephenomenon, I propose to illustrate the central puzzle by giving anana

logy concerning identical twins. This an
logy concerning identical twins. This analogy is an imperfect analogy;I have deliberately simpliÞed things in order to focus on the centralpuzzle, and I hope to show that one does not need to know anything aboutphysics in order to understand the really puzzling feature of the Bellphenomenon.Suppose there are identical twins from Sydney, Steve and Mark. One ofthese twins, Steve, moves to Hobart, where he falls foul of a mysteriousdisease and dies. It is reported that this disease is triggered by excessivelycold weather, and a person with the condition will almost certainly die ifhe is subjected to, say, about 2 or 3 days of continuous cold. This exoticdisease has become known as ÔfreezerphobiaÕ. The other twin, Mark, staysin Sydney, where he is hit by a bus and dies.Let us call putting a person in Hobart Ôthe cold testÕ, or measurement.Now, we have heard rumours from scientists that when a pair of twins goto Hobart then often they both die. In fact, it is reported that there is a oneto one correlation, namely, that if two identical twins are both cold testedthen one dies if and only if the other dies. On this evidence it is reasonableto think that this disease is genetic, and that is why we observe thiscorrelation between identical twins. This means, for any pair of identicaltwins, if we subject both twins to the cold test, eg take them both t

o Hobart,then if one dies from freezerph
o Hobart,then if one dies from freezerphobia then the other will too; simply becausethe disease is genetic, and identical twins share the same genetic makeup.Therefore, we might reason, given what we know about Steve, we can inferthat Mark also had freezerphobia, even though we cannot actually test that,since he is dead, having been hit by a bus.So we have formed a kind of theory, a mechanistic theory. We think thecorrelation is due to an underlying mechanismÑgenetic, probablyÑwhichcan be traced back to a condition of the unsplit egg from which both twinswere produced. That is, we suppose that the correlation has what philo-sophers call a common cause explanation.18It is a reasonable hypothesis,and the reasoning seems to be common sense.Let us move now from this particular case of our friends Steve andMark, and look instead at what the scientists are doing about this. In factwe Þnd, already established at St Vincents Hospital in Sydney, the so-called ÔFreezerphobia Register Of ScientiÞc TerminationsÕ or ÔFROSTÕ for18See Salmon, W. Scientific Explanation and The Causal Structure of the World. Prince-ton, Princeton University Press (1984).Chance and ProvidenceScience & Christian Belief, Vol 9, No. 1c11your twin is coldtested. These results are very puzzling, and this feature isparallel to the central puzzle in Bell phenomena.So let us tur

n to the scientiÞc interpretation of th
n to the scientiÞc interpretation of these freezerphobiaresults. Firstly, letÕs look again at the Genetic Mechanism Theory. Thistheory is a deterministic, hidden variable theory. It says that there is afactor l which, if one identical twins has it, then the other does as well;and if a twin has factor l then if he is subjected to the cold test, he willcertainly die. Thus the condition of the twins back at the time of concep-tion sets the results of the measurement, were it to be performed, and thiscondition is ÔhiddenÕ in the sense that it does not manifest itself directly inthe measurements. But the experimental results are a major setback for theGenetic Mechanism Theory, at least in its present form. In fact, thescientists all agreed that the Genetic Mechanism Theory in its present formis refuted by these data, and being good Popperians, they abandon that. But with what can it be replaced?Well, when the dust settled there were numerous differing viewsamongst the scientists. But the dominant group, called the Copenhagenschool, focussed on the mathematical description of the results of thevarious measurements. They held that we should simply Þgure out themathematical formula, called the state function, that describes all theresults of all the measurements, both actual and possible. But we shouldnot ask how to explain it. The state function sho

uld be regarded as amathematical tool fo
uld be regarded as amathematical tool for making predictions about the results of measure-ments, and not as a pointer to underlying mechanisms. ÔThe state functionis completeÕ, was their slogan. Actually, they had not been pleased withthe way most scientists had interpreted the Þrst part of the experiment,and were feeling pretty smug about the way the second part had gone. Infact they now claim that the results prove that the state function iscomplete.The situation in quantum mechanics is analogous to this parable in anumber of important ways. In particular, the situation in Bell set-upsseems to be such that the predictions of Ôlocal realistÕ theories19run intoconßict with the predictions of the quantum mechanical state function.Experiments conclusively support quantum mechanics over the localrealist theories. But the local realist theories can be derived from veryplausible assumptions. This difÞculty, Þrst articulated by Bell in 1964, isperhaps one of the most startling conceptual problems in twentieth cen-tury science. As one prominent scientist has said, ÔAnyone whoÕs notbothered by BellÕs theorem has to have rocks in his head.Õ2019See the influential presentation in dÕEspagnat, B. ÔThe Quantum Theory and RealityÕ,Scientific American(1979) 241, 128Ð140.20Cited in Mermin, N. ÔIs the Moon There When Nobody Looks? Reality and the

Quan-tum TheoryÕ, In R. Boyd, P. Gasper
Quan-tum TheoryÕ, In R. Boyd, P. Gasper and J. D. Trout, (eds) Philosophy of Science. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press (1991), p. 504.Chance and ProvidenceScience & Christian Belief, Vol 9, No. 1c13have proved that it is not the case that God has made it that the atom willdecay now rather than at another time. Then chance refutes providence.If the former is true, then we are allowing that God produces what,physically speaking, we call chance. On this alternative, the atom decaysafter 20 seconds and there is no physical reason, but it is possible that Godbrought it about that it would decay just at that time rather than at someother time. A further question then arises: does God in fact bring about theresults of chance events? Donald Mackay for example, took the view thatnot only is it possible that God causes chance events, but that this alwayshappens. He held that God is sovereign and directs all things, and is thesufÞcient cause over all natural things including chance events.25Physical Chance, Divine CauseAccording to John Polkinghorne, the fact that the chancy universe is whathe calls ÔopenÕ is theologically signiÞcant, because it shows that (contraLeibniz) God allows the universe to have a degree of independence andmaturity in itself.26Like small children, who, in order to grow up, must beallowed to make their own decisions, so also the uni

verse is given a certainamount of indepe
verse is given a certainamount of independence. Secondly, Polkinghorne holds that an openuniverse allows creativity, and it is actually God that is being creative. SoGod acts in the quantum gaps, the open bits, creatively reacting to theworldÑif it moves this way he is able to respond to that, like a chess grand,27who is able to think very quickly about what has happened,reacting to the developments and inßuencing it to go the way he wants.PolkinghorneÕs idea is that in the quantum gaps there is informationtransferring from God to the physical system, although energy does not. In this way chance becomes GodÕs steering wheel.But PolkinghorneÕs idea seems to involve a contradiction. God controlsthe chancy bits, but did not the chancy bits bring independence to theworld? But if God is controlling them as well as the Þxed bits, then there isno independence for the world. And, further, since God caused the Þxedbits by his initial creation and ordering of the laws of nature, why does heneed to steer the world? So in what sense is God guiding a world with itsown independence? (Perhaps Polkinghorne means that some of the chancybits are independent, and some of the chancy bits are used by God to turnthings back again.)These difÞculties aside, if God directs the chancy developments in theuniverse then chance is no affront to providence. If God direc

ts the chancy25MacKay, D. The Open Mind
ts the chancy25MacKay, D. The Open Mind and Other Essays. Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press (1988), pp.197Ð211.26Polkinghorne, J. One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology. London: SPCK(1986), p. 69. See also the review by Doye, J., Goldby, I., Line, C., Lloyd, S., Shellard, P. andTricker, D. ÔContemporary Perspectives on Chance, Providence and Free WillÕ, Science andChristian Belief (1995) 7, 117Ð139.27Cited in Doye et al, ÔContemporary Perspectives on Chance, Providence and Free WillÕ,Science and Christian Belief (1995), 7, 136.Chance and ProvidenceScience & Christian Belief, Vol 9, No. 1c15logical Argument,29an argument due for example, to the Islamic philo-sopher al Ghazali. The Þrst premise is the Law of Causality: everythingthat comes into existence has a cause of its coming into existence. Thesecond premise is: the universe had a beginning in time. Thus there was aÞrst physical event in the universe, and al Ghazali gave various mathemat-ical proofs as to why there must be a Þrst event in time. From those twopremises it follows there has to be something which is not part of theuniverse which is the creator of the universe, which brings about that Þrstcause. Interestingly, Stephen Hawking seems to believe this argument. Inhis book A Brief History of Time30Hawking argues like this: if the Big Bangis a singularity in space an

d time, where it all began, then you cou
d time, where it all began, then you could inferthat God started it up.31So, Hawking offers his own Ôno-boundary condi-tionÕ cosmological model where there is no singularity point; and insteadof the standard cone shaped Big Bang the universe is like a big fruit bowlor globe in imaginary time. And at the end of that chapter Hawking says,Ôbut if the universe is really completely self contained, having no boundaryor edge it would have neither beginning nor end, it would simply be. Whatplace then for a creator?Õ The way the story is presented in A Brief Historyof Time, one might be forgiven for thinking that the whole reason for thismodel is to avoid saying that God is the Þrst cause.One problem with HawkingÕs model is that it appeals to an imaginaryaxis of time, yet it is supposed to be a model of actual reality. HawkingÕsreply is that such models are not supposed to be telling you what is reallythere; they are just tools for making predictions,32which is a very strangeposition for an author who is seeking a theory of everything which willreveal to us the mind of God. But the main point is that Hawking seems tothink the Kalam Cosmological Argument is valid; that if the universebegan with a space-time singularity then you would have to say that God isthere to start it up.By analogy with the Kalam Cosmological argument, consider the Quan-tum Cos

mological Argument (to my knowledge this
mological Argument (to my knowledge this has never seriouslybeen proposed). The Þrst premise is the Law of CausalityÑeverything hasto have a sufÞcient cause. The second premise is that there are genuineobjective chances in quantum physicsÑthere are things in our worldwhich do not have a sufÞcient physical cause. So the conclusion is thatthere must be a non-physical causeÑGodÑto bring about these events.s Theorem proves God.I am not seriously proposing this argument, because the Law ofCausality itself is very hard to offer any argument for; it is one of thosefundamental assumptions that cannot really be proved. It is commonly29Not to be confused with the Ôargument from contingentsÕÑwhich is also called thecosmological argumentÑas given by Aquinas, Leibniz and many others. See Peterson, M.,Hasker, W., Reichenbach, B. and Basinger, D. Reason and Religious Belief. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press (1991), pp. 74Ð80.30Hawking, S. A Brief History of Time. Toronto: Bantam Press (1988), ch. 8.31ibid. pp. 143Ð144.32ibid pp. 147Ð148.Chance and ProvidenceScience & Christian Belief, Vol 9, No. 1c17right where the baby had been. If the conjunction of these two eventsÑthewomanÕs dream and the light fallingÑhas no explanation then it is just acoincidence. If there is some explanation then it is not a coincidence atAnother example is the case whe

re a mother watches in despair as herchi
re a mother watches in despair as herchild runs out onto a train track just as a train is due to come around thecorner but then, for some reason, the train just stops. It could not havestopped because the train driver saw the child, because it had alreadystarted to stop before it turned the corner. What happened was that thedriver had died just at that moment and by chance he had slumped ontothe brake.This is a coincidence only if there is no reason why the driver died atjust the same time that the child wandered on to the track. LeibnizÕPrinciple of SufÞcient Reason, and absolute providence, say that there areno accidents. Every event and every aspect of every event has a reason. SoLeibniz held that there are no coincidences. It is no coincidence that thetrain driver slumped just thenÑthis is part of the world that God had setup from the beginning to be the best possible world, and part of that worldwas that that child would not die that way. ItÕs no coincidenceÑit has areason.Coincidences are not explained just if the two separate events eachhave a sufÞcient explanation. There may be a sufÞcient reason why thetrain stopped right then, in terms of the driverÕs condition and the way hewas sitting. There also may be a sufÞcient reason why the child ran on tothe track, in terms of the childÕs routine, character and desires. But thateach of

the individual events has a sufÞcient
the individual events has a sufÞcient reason, does not mean thatthe coincidence has a reason. This requires a reason why the two thingshappen at the same time.Consider now meaningless coincidences. The examples just consideredboth were meaningful, very important in the life of the people concerned.But think of meaningless coincidences, such as a leaf falling from the treeoutside my window just at the very instant I wrote the word ÔbabyÕ. ThatÕsa coincidenceÑitÕs just as improbable as the train driver and the child. ButitÕs also quite meaninglessÑwho cares if a leaf falls just as I write ÔbabyÕ?Such meaningless coincidences occur all the time.What, in the doctrine of special providence, requires that God hascomplete reasons for these kinds of coincidences? What reason is there inthe Bible for thinking God has reasons for meaningless coincidence? Forexample, in the texts that Calvin adduces to prove the importance of thisdoctrine for comforting believers, none are about meaningless coinci-34This suggests that the doctrine of Absolute Providence could berelaxed so that it does not apply to meaningless coincidences, withoutaffecting the theological signiÞcance of the doctrine. God controls all34Calvin, J. Institutes of the Christian Religion. London: James Clarke and Co. (1949), p.171Ð181.Chance and ProvidenceScience & Christian Belief,