Munger and Munger Slides for Chapter 9 Voting as a Collective Action Problem Outline of Chapter 9 Reasons for abstention Voting and collective action The classical model Turnout and strategic uncertainty ID: 159160
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Choosing in GroupsMunger and Munger
Slides for Chapter 9Voting as a Collective Action ProblemSlide2
Outline of Chapter 9 Reasons for abstention
Voting and collective actionThe classical modelTurnout and strategic uncertaintyCollective actionDuty and expressive voting
Self-interest and probability
The paradox of not voting
Conclusion
Slides Produced by Jeremy
Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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Reasons for abstentionApathy
Little perceived difference between candidatesBelief that one’s vote is unlikely to influence outcomeBigger pictureParticular election is unimportant in the greater scheme of things
WeatherBad weather raises cost of voting
Lack of trust
Politicians will not improve the situation regardless of vote
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Slides Produced by Jeremy
Spater
, Duke University. All rights reserved.Slide4
Voting and collective actionParticipation rate is product of four ratios:
Each step is a potential barrier to participation
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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The classical modelThree circumstances in which eligible voter might not vote:
Indifference: No important differences between optionsAlienation: All options are too far from voter’s positionExpected net benefit: Cost of voting is high enough to deter the voter
Classical model does not include voter’s consideration of what others will do
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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Turnout and strategic uncertaintyVoting is costly in terms of time and inconvenience
If voters believe their candidate is far ahead/behind, one vote won’t affect outcomeVoters more likely to vote if they believe race is closeVoting is a collective action problem
If no one else votes, one person can show up to the polls and become dictator
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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Collective actionFree riding is a problem in elections
I assume that others will vote, so I don’t need toI can get the benefits of voting for free, without votingDownsian modelIncorporates sense of civic duty
I vote if:
where:
P is prob. of my vote swinging election
NCD is net benefit from my candidate winning
D is benefit I receive from voting (civic duty)C is cost of voting
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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Duty and expressive votingIf D > C, I always vote, regardless of probabilities
Voting is a consumption activity, rather than a rational investmentIn this case, rational choice theory is not particularly enlighteningVoting as fashion: might do it just to be seen
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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Self-interest and probabilityIf the electorate size is 2N+1, my vote is decisive if others split votes evenly
The probability of this is given byFor electorate of 1 million, prob. is 8/100,000
Non-trivial
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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The paradox of not votingIn Downs’ model, if p = 0, no one will vote
If no one votes, then p = 1.Game theory provides means of resolving paradoxMixed strategy equilibriumData vs. theory: more people vote than theory predicts
Models of “voter taste” address this gap
Altruism
Stigma of not voting
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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Conclusion“Investment” model of voting under-predicts turnout
“Consumption” model provides account of determinants of votingHowever, voting involves choice, not just consumptionProblematically, voters fail to update beliefs in light of information
Is there an obligation to vote?Democracy requires participation
However, ignorant voters will often choose incorrectly
Takeaway:
Healthy skepticism, while maintaining core optimism
Slides Produced by Jeremy Spater, Duke University. All rights reserved.
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