New Results of Quantum-proof Randomness
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New Results of Quantum-proof Randomness

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New Results of Quantum-proof Randomness




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Presentation on theme: "New Results of Quantum-proof Randomness"— Presentation transcript:

Slide1

New Results of Quantum-proof Randomness Extractors

Xiaodi Wu (MIT)1st Trustworthy Quantum Information Workshop Ann Arbor, USA

1

b

ased on work w/ Kai-Min Chung and Xin Li,

arXiv

: 1411.2315 and

work w/Kai-Min Chung,

in

preparation

Slide2

Randomness Extractor: Seeded

[SV84,Vaz85,VV85,CG85,Vaz87,CW89,Zuc90,Zuc91,…] A deterministic function converts indep. weak random sources with entropy to almost-uniform

randomness

2

seed

 

source

uniform output

 

X

U

d

Z

Slide3

Randomness Extractor: Multi-source

[CG85, BIK04, Raz, Rao, Bourgain, Li ……] A deterministic function converts

indep. weak random

sources with entropy to

almost-uniform

randomness

3

 

weak random

source

uniform output

 

w

eak random source

X

1

X

t

Z

 

Slide4

Applications beyond randomness

Classical TCSCryptography, Derandomization [Sis88, NZ93,…], Distributed algorithms [WZ95], Data structures [Ta02], Hardness of Approximation [Zuc93,…]Quantum InformationPrivacy amplification (QKD)

[BB84,

BBR

…]

,

device-independent

crypto

[VV12, MS14, CSW14, B+, …]Bounded-storage model [DFSS08,…]4

Slide5

5

This talk: Q

. Seeded

Extractors with

O

ptimal Parameters:

(Chung, W, in preparation)

* a new construction optimal w/ inverse poly rate source * new techniques for quantum-proof condensers

Q. Side

Info Model for Multi-source Extraction: (Chung, Li, W, arXiv

: 1411.2315)

* a proposal naturally unifying and extending existing models

* q. multi-source extractors w/ matching paras to classical

Slide6

6

Q. Seeded

Extractors with

O

ptimal Parameters:

(Chung, W, in preparation)

* a new construction

optimal

w/ inverse poly rate source * new techniques for quantum-proof condensers

Slide7

Quantum Side Info

: seeded extractionSource: a cq-state

Entropy measure: cond. min-entropy

H

min

(X|E)

= log ( 1/Pr[guess X correctly given E] )

Def: is a

k-source if Hmin(X|E)

> k

Characterize amount of extractable randomness [KMR05]Distance measure: trace distance |

|tr: max advantage to distinguish and

Def:

X, Y is -close if |

|tr <

 

7

Slide8

Seeded Extractors against Side Info [R05,KMR05,KT08,DV10,T11,DPVR11]

is

quantum-secure

(k

,

)

-extractor if

k

-source ,

is

-close to

Um is quantum-secure (k,

)

-strong extractor if k-source ,

is

-close to

U

m 8

seed

 

source

uniform output

 

Seeded Randomness Extractor

X

U

d

Z

 

adversary

classical-secure

classical-secure

marginal-secure

marginal-secure

f

or classical side-info

f

or no side-info

Slide9

What do we want?

Extraction from low min-entropy sourcesk = polylog(n) or

for

(0,1)

Minimize seed length

d

= O(log n)Maximize output length

: m kMinimize

the error:

(2

-k)Classical Ext: extract

0.99k bits with O(log n/) seed for all k, >0 [LRVW,GUV]

 

9Quantum Ext: (only when k=

)

 

Trevisan

[T, DV, DPVR]m=k0.98d=O(log(n))=1/poly(n)

Left-over hashing[KMR, TSSR]m~=k

d=O(m+log(n/))

Trevisan[T, DV, DPVR]

m=k0.98d=O(log(n))Left-over hashing[KMR,

TSSR]m~=k

Slide10

10

What GUV requires?GUV:

Very

Good

Condenser

Block

Extraction

& Composition

Partial

Progress: Cond. Inv. polyExtends to quantum setting

Q.

Extractor: (new even classically)

Main Thm: quantum-secure extractor

Ext : {0,1}

n x {0,1}

d -> {0,1}m, s.t., for any (n,k) source, k=na, w/ seed length

O(log(n/)), output length m=0.99k

, =(2-k^0.99).

Optimal! Remark:

inverse-poly rate sources are good for most applications!Our Contribution:

Slide11

Our strategy

Refer to Chung’s talk for technique limitationsResort

to extractor paradigm

[NZ,SZ

,

Zuc

]

before Trevisian, based on block-sampling & block-extraction. Our Observation

: A) this paradigm extends to

the quantum setting B) A new

condenser/extractor

in this paradigm

11

(n,k

) sourceSampling a subset:

Hope

:

min-entropy rate remainsNon-trivial to prove classically

(e.g, Zuc97, Vad03).

The quantum version by Koenig & Renner 11

However, this does not

condense! Block-Sampling!

Slide12

Block Sampling

& Extraction [NZ,SZ,Zuc]12

(

n,k

)

source

Block-

Sampling

(one by

one)

:

Structure Entropywhile keeping the rate

Block-

Extraction (one by one): Competing Parameters: 1) able to sample

2) able to extract => optimal paras for const

entropy-rate

sources

[Zuc]

Exp.

increase Seed length Our

Contribution: this construction is also quantum-proof.

Observation:

w

ell,

it

does

not

need

to

be

able

to

sample

&

extract

at

the

same

time!

When

fails

to

sample,

it

condenses!

A

win-win

argument!

Slide13

Condenser:

1/poly rate -> const rate (Win-Win argument)

13

(

n,k

)

Sampling (

if success -> extraction, otherwise condensing

)

E

1

E

2

Sample again on a shorter input

……

E

3

C

0

length k……

const Rounds(C0, E1,E2,…) -> const rate source

Quantum: 1) sampling [KR] 2) remaining analysis & comp.

Slide14

Summary:

14Zuckerman’s Extractor

Win-Win

Condenser

Main

Thm

:

quantum-secure extractor Ext : {0,1}n x {0,1}d

-> {0,1}m, s.t., for any (

n,k) source,

k=na, w/

seed length O(log(n/)), output length m=0.99k , =(2-k^0.99).

Optimal! 

Slide15

15

Q. Side Info Model for Multi-source Extraction:

(Chung, Li, W, arXiv

: 1411.2315)

* a proposal naturally

unifying

and

extending existing models * q. multi-source extractors w/ matching paras to classical

Slide16

Multi-source Extractors [BIW04]

is

(

t,k

,

)

-extractor if

indep k

-sources X1,…, Xt,

Z is

-close to Um

is XS-strong if (Z, XS) is -close to (Um, XS)

 

16

 

source

uniform output

 

source

X

1

X

t

Z

 

Multi-source

Extractor

Slide17

Side Info.

of multiple sources?17Want: a general definition of entropy

& sufficient entropy => extractability

.

 

adversary

Possible:

side info E=

any

function of

?

then entropy = some conditional min-entropy on E?

 

No!

Consider E= the 1st bit of Ext

, a reasonable entropy should be large. Fail on the extractor

Ext

.

 Restriction on E is necessary!

Slide18

Simple Models

Independent Adversary (IA): each source leaks own

side information

However,

IA

fails

to consider the entanglement

/correlation. Bounded Storage

Adv (BS): allow entangle; one-round leaking

[KK12]

May

break independence; non-trivial even for classical side info

20

 

source

uniform output

 

source

X

1

X

2

Z

Two-source

Extractor

 

adversary

 

adversary

A

2

E

2

A

1

E

1

Slide19

Kasher &

Kempe 1219The [DEOR04] extractor works with comparable parameters in both IA &

BS models

,

although

side

info breaks independence. ISSUEs:No

unified model & No unified entropy measure

Technique-wise very specific to

the

[DEOR04] extractor

Our Contribution:A Unified & Generalized Model: General Entangled (GE) model

Take

the one-round leaking model [KK12] + right entropy measure Prove most existing two-/multi-source

extractors are GE-securee.g.,

Raz

, Bourgain

, Li, BRSW, Rao, …. Remarks on the model:1. Could refer to a practical scenario of generating side-info: when parties are far apart from each other & leaking procedure is short!2. Unclear about extension to multiple rounds. Could fall into the previous counter-example .

Slide20

Entropy measure: problematic

[KK12]A natural def of (k1,k2

)-source

H

min

(X

1

|E

1

E

2)

> k

1 and Hmin(X

2|E1E2) > k2 A classical counter-example: Ext, (X

1,X

2,E1,E2) s.t. Hmin(X1|E1E2)

=Hmin(X2|E1

E2

)

> n-4, but, Ext(X1,X2) is determined given E1, E2Allow interference between sources: X

1 = X2

(W1 W2)Allow double counting entropy:

Hmin(X1X2|W1W2

) = n < Hmin(X1|W1W2

) + Hmin(X2|W1W2

)

 

Slide21

Allow general entanglement; new way to measure

entropy, avoid interferenceMeasure entropy of Xi right after receiving E

i

k

i

=

H

min(Xi|EiA-i)

No interference: entropy of X-i don’t go to Xi

 

E

t

Contribution I: General Entangled (GE) Model21

adversary

X

2

X

t

X

1

 

A

1

A

t

E

1

A

2

E

2

A

1

A

t

Slide22

Allow general entanglement

; new way to measure entropy, avoid interferenceMeasure entropy of Xi right after receiving E

i

k

i

=

H

min(Xi|EiA-i)

No interference: entropy of X-i don’t go to Xi

No double counting entropy: Hmin(X1…X

t

|E1…Et)

[KK12]’s example in GE Model: no entropy k

1 =

Hmin(X1|E1A2) = Hmin(X1|W1R) = 0

 

General Entangled (GE) Model

22

Slide23

Allow general entanglement

; new way to measure entropyMeasure entropy of Xi right after receiving Ei k

i = H

min

(

X

i

|E

iA-i)Def:

is a GE-

(t,k)-source if ki

= H

min(Xi|EiA

-i) k for every i [t]IA =

GE with independent

Ai’sBS = GE with bounded size Ei’s  

General Entangled (GE) Model23

Slide24

GE-secure Multi-source Extractors

is

GE

-secure

(

t,k

,

)

-extractor if

GE

-(t,k)-source

,

is

-close to Um

is X

S-strong if is -close to Um

 

24

 

source

uniform output

 

source

X

1

X

t

Z

 

Multi-source

Extractor

 

adversary

Slide25

Existing

Two-source Extractors (e.g.,

Raz,

Bourgain

,

existential

ones) are GE-secure.Any Multi-source

Extractors (e.g., Li, BRSW, Rao)

can be upgraded to

be

GE-secure. Both w/

matching parameters. 25Contribution II: GE-secure extractors

GE-

Strong OA Security Equivalence! Obtain Strong OA

Security: XOR, +1 source, block-source

Omitted!

Slide26

Only get side info from a single sourceat adversary’s choice (without seeing the sources)

Weaker than IA & GEOA-sources & OA-secure extractors defined similarlyOne-sided Adversary (OA

) Model

26

adversary

X

i

X

t

X

1

 

A

i

E

i

 

Slide27

Strong OA-

GE Security EquivalenceThm: For any S [t] with

|S|=t-1,if

Ext

is

X

S

-strong

OA-secure (t,k,)-extractor,

Ext is XS-strong GE-secure (

t,k,)-extractor.

 

27

MOAIABS

GE

classical

side-info

no side-info

strong ext.

Slide28

Strong OA-

GE Security EquivalenceThm: Let S [t-1],if

Ext is X

S

-strong

OA

-secure

(

t,k,)-extractor,

Ext is XS-strong GE-secure (t,k,

)-extractor.

 

28

Et

adversary

X

2

X

t

X

1

 

A

1

A

t

E

1

A

2

E

2

A

1

A

2

Apply

Ext

S

Leaking

on X

S

Slide29

Proof: simulation b/c

29Apply OA Ext Leaking

on XS

COMMUTE

(strong)

Leaking

on

Xt, Leaking on X

S, Apply Ext Leaking on X

t, Apply Ext , Leaking on XS

=

Apply OA security w/ sufficient entropy

Slide30

Summary

GE multi-source side info modelavoid interference in measuring entropyStrong OA-GE security equivalenceSimple techniques to obtain strong OA-security

Handle quantum side info

for free

!

 

30

M

OA

IA

BS

GE

strong ext.

Slide31

31

Conclusions: Q.

Seeded Extractor

optimal

w/ inv

.

poly rate sources

Q. Multi-source: side

info model &

extractors

Open

Questions: Better Q. Extractor/Condenser? Optimal Parameters for any source?

Alternative/General

Side Info Model allowing extraction?

Slide32

Thanks!Questions?

32

Slide33

Obtain Strong OA

-security (I): +1 sourceThm: M-secure (t,k,

)-multi-source extractor +

Q

-secure

(k,

)

-strong seeded extractor OA-secure X[t]

-strong (t+1,k,2)-multi-source extractor

 33

 

X

1

X

t

Y

 

X

t+1

 

Z

LIFT

: marginal uniform + seeded quantum extractor

-> quantum-proof uniform

Slide34

Obtain Strong OA-security (II):

M OA 

Thm: Any

M

-secure extractor outputs

m

-bits with error

is OA-secure with error

Generic: holds for seeded/two/multi-source extractorsBased on techniques in [KK12] (in turn based on

[KT08])OA-secure two-source extractors with “same” paramsExtract m=

(k)

bits with = 2-m

Raz/Bourgain/DEOR extractors are GE-secureDo not yield better seeded extractors 34

Slide35

Entropy measure: problematic

[KK12]A natural def of (k1,k2)

-source

H

min

(X

1

|E

1

E

2)

> k

1 and Hmin(X2

|E1E2) > k2 A classical counter example: Ext, (X1,X2

,E

1,E2) s.t. Ext(X1,X2) is far from uniform given E1, E2Ext(X1,X2) =

X1 X

2 --- inner product extractor

[CG88]

Hmin(X1|W1W2) = n Hmin(X1|E

1E2) > n-4X1

X2 = (1/2) (B1 + B2

- |W1 W2| mod 4)

 35

X

1

X

2

adversary

B

1

= |X

1

| mod 4

E

1

= (W

1

,B

1

)

 

B

2

= |X

2

| mod 4

E

2

= (W

2

,B

2

)

 

: uniform

 

: Hamming weight