PPT-DNSSEC

Lutz Donnerhacke db089309 1c1c 6311 ef09 d819 e029 65be bfb6 c9cb dig dnssec 165375146394e164arpa naptr A protocol from better times An ancient protocol People were. Eric Osterweil. Dan Massey. Lixia Zhang. 1. Motivation: Why Use DNSSEC?. DNS cache poisoning has been a known attack against DNS since the 1990s [1]. Now there is a new variant: the . Kaminsky. attack. Sanjaya. Services Area Director. Key Deliverables. Delivering Value. Resource delegation. Resource Quality Assurance. Member services. Supporting Internet Development. DNSSEC. Root Server deployment. Homework #1. Count . 35. Minimum Value . 47.00. Maximum Value 1. 00.00. Average. . 84.94. 90 . - 100 . 9. 80 - 89 . 14. 70 - 79 . 10. 40 . - . 49. . 1. Midterm. Count . 35. Minimum Value 34.00. Geoff Huston. APNIC Labs, May 2015. The Internet is all about US!. What’s the question?. How many users do <x>?. How many users can are running IPv6?. How many users are using DNSSEC validation?. domainfest.asia. . 20 Sep 2016 Hong Kong richard.lamb@icann.org. What’s all this I hear about the Internet of Things?. (A recent visit to CES in Las Vegas). BS or Not BS?. Does it matter?. Where do “WE” fit in?. 1. Fundamental Problems of . Network Security. Internet was designed without security in mind. Initial design focused more on how to make it work, than on how to prevent abuses. Initial environment mostly consisted of research institutions---assumption on the benign behaviors of users. APNIC. https://. xkcd.com. /1361/. Why?. Because everything you do on the net starts with a call to the DNS. If we could see your stream of queries in real time we could assemble a detailed profile of you and interests and activities. APNIC. https://. xkcd.com. /1361/. Why?. Because everything you do on the net starts with a call to the DNS. If we could see your stream of queries in real time we could assemble a detailed profile of you and interests and activities. Jan . Žorž. , Internet Society. zorz@isoc.org. . Acknowledgement. I would like to thank Internet Society to let me spend some of my ISOC working time in go6lab and test all this new and exciting protocols and mechanisms that makes Internet a bit better and more secure place. Geoff Huston. October 2020. Three broad topics:. DNSSEC. DNS Privacy. Other Stuff. 1. DNSSEC – Why?. How can you believe what the DNS tells you?. You can’t!. DNS interception and rewriting is common these days. Chief Scientist . APNIC Labs. Why pick on the DNS?. The DNS is very . easy . to. tap . and. tamper. DNS queries are open and unencrypted. DNS payloads are not secured and tampering cannot be detected. DNS. Geoff Huston AM. Chief Scientist, APNIC. DNS System Architecture. Authoritative Servers. Recursive Resolver. Stub Resolver. Cache. Application. DNS System Architecture. Authoritative Servers. Recursive Resolver. Geoff Huston. APNIC. The Internet’s routing system works by rumour. “I tell you what I know, and you tell your mates, and your mates tell their mates, and …”. But what if I tell you a lie? . Or someone maliciously alters what I’m trying to tell you?. Huston. APNIC. February 2014. The E. volution of Evil. It used to be that . they sent . evil packets to . their . chosen . victim. but this exposed the attacker, and limited the damage they could cause.