hadpreviouslyadhered,sincetheyappearedtoconducttheiroperationsinwaysth - PDF document

hadpreviouslyadhered,sincetheyappearedtoconducttheiroperationsinwaysthatsoughttominimizeriskstotheircombatants,evenwhenthatinvolvedforeseeablyincreasingtheharmtheycausedtoPalestiniancivilians.Whilethecasualtyguresaredisputed,virtuallyeveryoneacceptsthatmorethanonethousandPalestinianswerekilled,andmostobserversagreethatthemajorityofthemwerecivilians.Bycontrast,onlytenIsraelisoldierswerekilled,ofwhomfourwerekilledbywhatisbizarrelycalled“friendlyre.”TheratioofPalestiniancivilianskilledbyIsraelicombatantstoIsraelicombatantskilledbyPalestinianghterswasthereforeprobablygreaterthanonehundredtoone.BothNATOandIsraelwerewidelycriticizedforthewaysinwhichtheyconductedthesewars—rightly,Ithink,inbothinstances,thoughthecasesweredifferentinrelevantrespectsthatmadetheIsraeliactionratherlessdefensible,asIwillexplainlater.Bothcasesdo,however,raisethesamegeneralissue,whichishowtoresolvetrade-offsbetween“forceprotection”andminimizingtheharmone’sforcescausetocivilians.ManycommentatorsonrecentwarshavecontendedthattheUnitedStatesanditsallieshavebecomeconcernedtoavoidharmingcivilians,atthecostofboththelivesoftheircombatantsandthesuccessoftheirmissions.InaNewYorkTimeseditorialcommentingonGeneralMcChrystal’srecentrestrictionsonairstrikesinAfghanistan,onedefenseanalystassertedthat“thependulumhasswungtoofarinfavorofavoidingthedeathofinnocentsatallcost.GeneralMcChrystal’sdirectivewaswellintentioned,buttheloftyidealatitsheartisalie,andanimmoraloneatthat,becauseitpretendsthatwarcanbefairorhumane.”whosharethisanalyst’sviewofkillingciviliansarenotpoliticalrealistsbutbelievethatwarshouldbescrupulouslyconductedinmorallyper-missibleways.Yettheyalsobelievethatstatesaremorallypermittedorevenrequiredtogiveacertainprioritytotheprotectionoftheirowncombatantsovertheavoidanceofharmtoenemycivilians—or,asIwillsuggestismorecoherent,thatcombatantsthemselvesarepermittedorrequiredtogiveacertainprioritytothepreservationoftheirownlives.Iwillrefertothisasthedoctrineofthe“priorityofcombatants.”This.LaraM.Dadkhah,“EmptySkiesOverAfghanistan,”NewYorkTimes,February.Noteherchoiceofthephrase“deathofinnocents”ratherthanthemoreaccurate“killingofinnocents,”aswellasthecuriousassumptionthatitistosupposethatwarshouldbeconductedhumanely.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants combatantsghtinginajustwar.Ifthedoctrineprovesuntenableinthisrestrictedform,itwill,afortiori,beuntenableinitsuniversalformaswell.Fourotherpointsaboutthesubsequentdiscussionarealsoworthnotingattheoutset.First,thepriorityofcombatantsisaandassuchiscompatiblewithavarietyofclaimsaboutwhatthelawofwarisoroughttobe.Second,thediscussionwillbelimitedtocasesinvolvingharmstociviliansthatareforeseeablebutunintendedeffectsofmilitaryoperations,whichIwillrefertoassideeffects.Theintentionalharmingorkillingofciviliansinwarraisesquitedifferentissues.Third,althoughIwillgenerallydiscusscasesinvolvingkillingcivilians,allowingcivilianstodie,orsavingcivilians’lives,theclaimsIwillmakeshouldalsoapplytocasesofinicting,allowing,orpreventinglesser,nonlethalharms.Fourth,Iwillgenerallyargueontheassumptionthatallciviliansareinnocentinthegenericsense—thatis,thattheyarenotmorallyliabletosuffertheinictionofanyharmsinwar,whetherintendedorunin-tended.ButIwillconsiderthepossibilitythatsomeciviliansmaybeliabletosuffercertainharms,particularlyharmsthataresideeffectsofotherwiselegitimateattacksonmilitarytargets.Finally,itwillhelptoavoidmisunderstandingifIdeneattheoutsetsomeofthetermsIwilluse.Thosewhoghtinjustwarsarejustcom-,whilethosewhoghtinwarsthatareunjustbecausetheylackajustcauseareunjustcombatants.(BecauseIwillassumethatthedoc-trineofthepriorityofcombatantsappliesonlytojustcombatants,shouldbeunderstoodtorefertojustcombatants.)Civiliansinastatethatisghtingajustwararejustcivilians,whilethoseinastateghtingawarthatlacksajustcauseareunjustcivilians.Civiliansinneutralstatesareneutralcivilians.Although,strictlyspeaking,arenotsynonymous,Iwillforconveniencetreatthemasiftheywere.Intheremainderofthisessay,Iwillcriticizeboththemostinuentialdefenseandthemostinuentialcritiqueofthepriorityofcombatants.I.Ihavedefendedtheideathatnoncombatantsmightbeliabletobeharmedincertainways—forexample,tobeforcedtopayreparations,tosuffertheeffectsofeconomicsanctions,toenduretheburdensofmilitaryoccupation,andinsomecasestosufferharmasasideeffectofmilitaryaction—inKillinginWar(Oxford:ClarendonPress,),chap.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants thanitsdutiestopeoplewhoarenotunderitscontrol.Ifthatisright,theyclaim,then“wherethestatedoesnothaveeffectivecontrolofthevicinity[inwhichitsforcesoperate],itdoesnothavetoshoulderrespon-sibilityforthefactthat[itsenemies]operateinthevicinityof[innocentbystanders].Jeopardizingcombatantsratherthanbystanders...wouldmeanshoulderingresponsibilityforthemixednatureofthevicinityfornoreasonatall.”Thissecondargumentshouldnotbeconfusedwiththerelatedclaimthatwhencombatantschoosetooperatenearnoncombatants,effec-tivelyusingthemasinnocentshields,responsibilityforanyharmsthenoncombatantssufferlieswiththecombatantswhohaveplacedthematrisk,notwiththecombatantswhomayactuallyhaveinictedtheharm.NodoubtKasherandYadlinbelieve,correctly,thatcombatantswhodeliberatelyplacenoncombatantsatriskdeservemostoftheanyharmstheysuffer.Buttheirsecondargumentappealstothedifferentclaimthat“itistheresponsibilityofthestatetoprotectthelifeofapersonunderitseffectivecontrol.”Onthisview,ifunjustcombatantsofstateAmakeitnecessaryforjustcombatantsofstateBtoghtthemontheterritoryofstateC,itisstateC,notstateB,thathastherespon-sibilitytoprotectitsownnoncombatantsfrombeingharmed,evenifmostoftheblameforanyharmtheysufferwillliewithstateAanditscombatants.TherstofKasherandYadlin’stwoargumentsisanonsequitur.Noonehasarguedthatcombatantsshouldtakerisksormakesacricestoavoidkillingnoncombatantsonthegroundthattheirliveshavelessvalue.Therearevariousargumentsforgivingprioritytononcombatantsovercombatants,someofwhichIwillreviewshortly,butnoneofthemclaimsthatthelivesofcombatantsarelesspreciousthanthoseofnoncombatants..Onesourceofthisideaisinternationallaw.AccordingtoEyalBenvenisti,“humanrightstreatiesdeneagencybyassigningtheobligationtorespectandtoensure[respectforrights]onstateswithrespectonlytoindividuals‘withintheirjurisdiction,’atermthatwasinterpretedtoextendtoallareasofdirect‘effectivecontrol’ofindividuals,butnotbeyondthat....Theattenuateddutiesthatarmieshavetowardenemyciviliansarepredi-catedontheirlimitedandnon-exclusivepoweroverenemyterritory.”SeeEyalBenvenisti,“HumanDignityinCombat:TheDutytoSpareEnemyCivilians,”IsraelLawReview,atpp..KasherandYadlin,“MilitaryEthics,”p..Ibid.,p.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants whentheotherconditionsofajustwararesatised,authorizationfromthestate(whichsomethinkisrequiredbythejustwarcriterionof“legiti-mateauthority”)maybenecessarytomakeitpermissibleforsoldierstoght.Note,however,thatevenifthisisso,thestatedoesnotreallyapermissiononthebasisofitsdutytoitscitizens.Itisnotthestate’sauthorizationthatmakespermissible.Thepermissibilityofwarderivesfromthesatisfactionoftheotherconditionsofajustwar.Thestatemerelyanantecedentpermissiontoght.Thus,ifthepoliticalauthoritiesweretoauthorizethemilitarytoght(because,forexample,theenemy’scaptureofthecapitolhadisolatedthegovernmentfromcommunication),thenormalproceduralcon-straintscouldlapseorbeoverridden,makingitpermissibleforsoldierstoghtwithoutpoliticalauthorization.Itseemsclear,therefore,thatjustasmymother’sdutytoprotectmecannotmakeitpermissibleformetoinictgreaterharmoninnocentbystandersthanIwouldbepermittedtoinictwereIanorphan,soastate’sdutytoprotectitscitizens,includingitscombatants,cannotmakeitpermissibleforitscombatantstoinictgreaterharmonenemyciviliansthantheywouldotherwisebepermittedtoinict.ItmaybepossibletointerpretKasherandYadlindifferently.Imme-diatelyafterobservingthat“acombatantisacitizeninuniform,”theygoontosaythatthestatemust“haveacompellingreasonforjeopardizingacitizen’slife,whetherornotheorsheisinuniform.”Onemightinter-pretthemhereasclaimingthattheresponsibilitiesofthestatetoitscitizensaresuchthatitsimplycannotdemandofacitizenthathesac-ricehislifeforthesakeofsomeonewhoisnotacitizen.Butifthisiswhattheymean,itdoesnotsupporttheirconclusion.Theamountofharmthatastatemaypermissiblyinictoninnocentciviliansinothercountriescannotdependonhowmuchsacriceitmaylegitimatelydemandfromitsowncitizens.Ifastatemaydemandonlyacertainlevelofsacricefromitscombatantsbutcanonlyavoiddefeateitherbycompellingthemtomakesacricesbeyondthatlimitorbyinictinganimpermissiblelevelofharmoninnocentcivilians,itisinthetragicposi-tionofhavingnopermissiblealternativetotheacceptanceofdefeat.Ifthecostsoftheirowndefensearetoogreatforthestatetoforceitsown.ThisunderstandingofKasherandYadlin’sargumentwassuggestedbyanEditorofPublicAffairsTheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants ofcerwhohasandwillhavenoroleinaparticularwarisneverthelessalegitimatetargetinthatwar,whereasanacademicconsultanttothegovernmentwhoassistsintheformulationofstrategyisnot.IwillthusrefertoMargalitandWalzer’sviewastheGroupMembershipAccountpermissiblekillinginwar.ThereisarevisionistaccountofthejustwarthatrejectsthecentralelementsofthetraditionalGroupMembershipAccount.Accordingtothisaccount,thepermissibilityofconductinwarcannotbeisolatedfromthegoalsofthewar.Ifthegoalsareunjust,actsofwarintendedtoachievethosegoalsareunlikelytobepermissible.Inparticular,combat-antswhoghtinajustwarareseldomlegitimatetargetsofattack,astheyhavenormallydonenothingtowaiveorforfeittheirrightnottobeattacked.Bycontrast,somecivilianswhoareresponsibleformakingsignicantcontributionstoanunjustwarmaybeliabletosuffercertainharms—forexample,harmsthatresultassideeffectsofnecessarymili-taryactionbyjustcombatants.Accordingtothisview,apersonisalegitimatetargetinwaronlyifthroughhisindividualactionhehasmadehimselfmorallyliabletoattack.IwillcallthistheIndividualLiabilityofpermissiblekillinginwar.MargalitandWalzerbelievethattheIndividualLiabilityAccountsup-portsthedoctrineofthepriorityofcombatantswhiletheGroupMem-bershipAccountentailsthatthisdoctrineisfalse.TheyexplainwhythedoctrinefollowsfromtheIndividualLiabilityAccountasfollows:Thepositionthatwe...opposeis...thatonlythesidethatisght-ingforajustcause(ourside)hasarighttoght,andthatsoldiersontheothersidehavenorightsatall.Anythingtheydoisimmoral,whethertheyattackoursoldiersorourcivilians.Andsinceoursol-diersandciviliansareequallyinnocent,wecannotaskoursoldierstotakeriskstoprotectenemycivilians.Intheirefforttorefutethepriorityofcombatants,theythereforearguenotonlyinfavoroftheGroupMembershipAccountbutalsoagainsttheIndividualLiabilityAccount.Iwillargue,inoppositiontothis,thattheirargumentsfortheirinterpretationoftherequirementofdiscriminationareunsuccessfulandthereforethattheirappealtowhattheyrefertoasthe“categoricaldistinctionbetweencombatantsandnoncombatants”.Ibid.,pp.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants shiftthisriskontothosewhohaven’tbeentrained,wholackthecapacitytoinjure;whethertheyarebrothersorothers.Theirthirdandnalreasonisaninstrumentalexplanationofwhycombatantsarerequiredbytheirroletoacceptrisksthatarenotrequiredofothers.Themoraljusticationforthisrequirementliesintheideathatvio-lenceisevil,andthatweshouldlimitthescopeofviolenceasmuchasisrealisticallypossible.Asasoldier,youareaskedtotakeanextrariskforthesakeoflimitingthescopeofthewar.Thereasonwhyrequiringcombatantstoassumerisksandacceptharmsfunctionstolimittheevilofviolenceispragmatic:“Thecrucialmeansforlimitingthescopeofwarfareistodrawasharplinebetweencombatantsandnoncombatants.Thisistheonlymorallyrelevantdistinctionthatallthoseinvolvedinawarcanagreeon.”Bydistinguishingbetweenlegiti-mateandillegitimatetargetsinawaythatattractsgeneralagreement,wecanbestsucceedininsulatingsignicantareasofhumanlifefromthedestructiveeffectsofwar.Noticethatthesereasonsforseekingtoconnetheharmsofwartocombatantsmakenoreferencetotheideathattheirliveshavelessvaluethanthoseofnoncombatants.AlthoughIaminagreementwithMargalitandWalzeronthemajorsubstantiveissues,theirreasonsforrejectingthepriorityofcombatantsare,Iwillargue,largelythoughnotentirelymistaken.Theyareonthesideoftheangels,buttheangelsdeservebetterargumentsthanthoseMargalitandWalzerprovide.Theirinitialclaimthatcombatantsmaypermissiblybekilledbecausetheyhavethecapacitytoinjureothersispresumablygroundedintheassumptionthatthosewhoposeathreattoothersmaypermissiblybeopposedbynecessarydefensiveviolence.Butfewacceptthatthisistrueinformsofconictotherthanwar.Inindi-vidualself-defenseorthird-partydefenseofothers,forexample,thosewhoengageinjustieddefenseagainstculpableaggressorsmayopposedbydefensiveviolence.Ihavearguedelsewherethatthereisno.Ibid.,p..Ibid..Ibid.,p.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants thatitservestoreducetheevilofviolenceagainsttheinnocent.ThisfurtherdiminishesthemoralsignicancethatMargalitandWalzerclaimforthedistinctionbetweencombatantsandnoncombatants.FortheaimofreducingtheoveralllevelofviolenceisnotonlysubordinatetobutmayevenconictwiththeaimofreducingMargalitandWalzerdorecognizeafurtheraimthattheprinciplesgoverningwaroughttobedesignedtoachieve.Theyclaimthat“thepointofjustwartheoryistoregulatewarfare,tolimititsoccasions.”Thepoint,inotherwords,isnotonlytoregulateandcontrolwarwhenitoccursbutalsotopreventitsoccurrence.Buttheaimofpreventingtheoccurrenceofwarissensible,asageneralmatter,onlywhen“war”isunderstoodtorefertotheseriesofeventscomprisingthebelligerentactsofallthepartiestotheconict.Itis,forexample,plausiblethatitwouldhavebeenbetteriftheSecondWorldWarhadbeenprevented—thoughnotiftheonlyalternativehadbeencapitulationtoGermany.“War”can,however,refertothebelligerentactsofonlyonesideinaconict.Itisonlyinthissensethatwarcanbejustorunjust.TheSecondWorldWar,forexample,wasneitherjustnorunjust,thoughBritain’swaragainstGermanywasjust.LetussaythattheSecondWorldWarwasawarinthewidesense,whileBritain’swaragainstGermanywasawarinthenarrowsense.Whileitissensible,ingeneral,totrytopreventwarsinthewidesense,itisnotsensibletotrytopreventallwarsinthenarrowsense.Itisingeneralimportanttotrytopreventunjustwars,butitmaybewrongtopreventjustwars.Assume,then,thatMargalitandWalzermeanthatoneoftheaimsofjustwartheoryistopreventwarsinthewidesense.Butthemostimportantmeansofachievingthataimisprobablytopreventtheoccurrenceofwarsinthenarrowsensethatareunjust.EvenifgeneralconformitywithMargalitandWalzer’sdoctrinewouldachievetheirrstaimofminimizingoverallviolencewhenwaroccurs,itwouldbecounterproductivewithrespecttotheirsecondaimofprevent-ingwarsinthewidesensefromoccurring.Accordingtotheirview,allcombatants,includingjustcombatants,arelegitimatetargetsinwar;thereforeunjustcombatantsdonowronginkillingjustcombatants..MargalitandWalzer,“CiviliansandCombatants,”p..Forapersuasiveargumentthattherecanbecasesinwhichitwouldbewrongtopreventanunjustwar,seeSabaBazargan,“ThePermissibilityofAidingandAbettingUnjustWars,”JournalofMoralPhilosophyTheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants even,thoughmorerarely,asameans.TheGroupMembershipAccountseemsthereforetoaffordsignicantlygreaterprotectiontononcombatants.Itisimportanttodistinguishbetweentwoquitedifferentformsofprotection:practicalandmoral.ItcanbearguedthattheGroupMem-bershipAccountoffersgreaterpracticalprotectioninthatifitiswidelyacceptedandfollowed,fewernoncombatantswillbeattackedorkilledinwarthanwouldbeiftheIndividualLiabilityAccountwerefollowedinstead.Oritmightbearguedthatitconfersgreatermoralprotectioninthatitimpliesthatthemoralconstraintagainstharmingorkillingnon-combatantsisstrongerthantheIndividualLiabilityAccountrecognizes.Iwillsuggest,however,thatneitheroftheseclaimsisobviouslytrue.NoticerstthattheclaimthattheGroupMembershipAccountpro-videsgreaterpracticalprotectionisirrelevanttothequestionwhetheritasanaccountofpermissiblekillinginwar—unless,pragmatist,ruleconsequentialist,orcontractualistaccountofthenatureofmoralityistrue.Itis,atanyrate,compatiblewiththetruthoftheIndividualLiabilityAccountthatweought,forreasons,totrytopersuadepeoplethattheGroupMembershipAccountistrue,sothattheywillactonit,evenifitisfalse.Butthatwouldbeunnecessary.Suppose,asIbelieve,thattheIndividualLiabilityAccountistrue.Weshouldthenacceptthatsomeunjustcivilians(thoughnotjustcivilians)maybemorallyliabletobeharmedinwar,eitherasasideeffector,morerarely,asameans.Butwemustalsorecognizethatthereisalwaysdis-agreementaboutwhichsidehasajustcauseandthatthosewhoareinfactunjustcombatantsalmostalwaysthattheyarejustcombat-antsandareencouragedinthisbeliefbytheirgovernment.Theywillthereforebelievethatitispermissibleforthemtodowhatevermoralitysaysthatitispermissibleforjustcombatantstodo.IftheyacceptthattheIndividualLiabilityAccountistrueandthatitholdsthatitcanbeper-missibleincertainconditionsforjustcombatantstokillnoncombatants,unjustcombatantswillthenbelikelytobelievethatmoralityhasgiventhemcarteblancheforthekillingofcivilians,withdisastrousresults.Theseresultscan,however,beavoided.Wemustrecognizethatthisisanareainwhichpeopletendtomakebadjudgmentsiftheytrytoactinconformitywithmoralityinconditionsofsignicantmoraluncertainty.Theproperresponsetothisisnottopretendthatmoralityisotherthanitis,buttoimposedesignedtomotivatepeopletoactinwaysthatTheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants noncombatantbystandersandnoncombatantbeneficiariesThenalobjectiontothepositionofMargalitandWalzeristhemostimportantinthiscontextbecauseitbearsdirectlyontheissueofthejustdistributionofharmorriskbetweencombatantsandnoncombatants.Astheyunderstandit,thedoctrineofnoncombatantimmunityinvolvesmorethanjustthedenialthatnoncombatantscanbeliabletobeattackedorotherwiseintentionallyharmedinwar.WhenMargalitandWalzerclaimthatcombatantsaremorallyrequiredtoexposethemselvestoadditionalrisksinordertosparenoncombatants,theyarenotclaim-ingthatcombatantsareliabletoanyharmstheymighttherebysuffer.Theirconceptionofimmunitygoesbeyondconsiderationsofliabilityandtheabsenceofliability.Theyholdthatitisessentialforlimitingtheviolenceofwarthateveryoneshouldacceptthatbothintendedandunintendedharmsought,whenpossible,tobesufferedbycombatants,whilenoncombatantsoughttobeprotectedfromharmtothegreatestreasonabledegree.Becausenoncombatantstatusisrelativelyeasytoidentify,andbecausepeoplegenerallyagreethatithasmoralsigni-cance(whetherornotitreallydoes),itisofinstrumentalvaluetoassignimmunityonthebasisofthatstatus.Andbecausenoncombatantstatusisall-or-nothing,noncombatantimmunityisnotamatterofdegree;itisinvariantratherthansensitivetocontext.Thismatteris,however,morecomplicatedthanMargalitandWalzer’sviewrecognizes.Iwillarguethatnoncombatantimmunityisamatterofdegreeandthatinsomecasesitispermissibleforjustcombatantstoghtinawaythatwillforeseeablyharminnocentnoncombatantsasasideeffectratherthanghtinadifferentwaythatwouldinvolvegreaterriskstothemselves.Thereareoccasions,inotherwords,whenitisper-missibleforjustcombatantsineffecttoforceinnocentnoncombatantstoshareintherisksofwar.Noncombatantsonwhomitmaynotbeunfairforjustcombatantstoimposesomeoftherisksofawararethosewhoareexpectedbenecia-riesofthewar,inthefollowingsense.Warsthatarejustareoften,indeedtypically,foughttodefendinnocentnoncombatantsfromathreatofunjustharm—forexample,athreatofdeath,injury,orsignicantlossofpoliticalliberty.Whennoncombatantsarealreadyatriskinthisway,andtheiroverallriskofbeingharmed(whichtakesintoaccountboththeprobabilityoftheirbeingharmedandthemagnitudeoftheharmstheyTheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants necessaryfortheoverallreductionoftheirownrisk.Itwouldbeunjusttoimposethoserisksonneutralciviliansinstead.Theneutralciviliansaremerebystanderswhodonotstandtobenetfromeitheroption,andthereis,wemayassume(thatis,wecanmakethisafeatureoftheexample),nospecialreasonwhyitwouldbebetterforveofthemtobekilledthanforveofthepotentialvictimstobekilled.Thatbeneciariesratherthanbystandersought,ifpossible,tobeartheunavoidablecostsoftheirowndefenseisclearerincasesinvolvingactualnetbeneciariesratherthanmerelyexpectedbeneciaries.Suppose,forexample,thatVillainwillcauseVictimtolosealimbunlessathirdparty,Defender,takesdefensiveactiononVictim’sbehalf.Defenderhastwoequallyeffectiveoptions,eachofwhichwill,however,haveasanunavoidablesideeffectthebreakingofaninnocentperson’sarm.OneoptionwouldbreakinnocentVictim’sarmwhiletheotherwouldbreakinnocentBystander’s.ItisclearthatDefenderoughttochoosetheoptionthatwillbreakVictim’sarm.ThisoptionwouldinvolveharmingVictimforhisownsake;hewouldbebetteroffoverallforbeingdefendedevenatthecostofabrokenarm.ButthesecondoptionwouldinvolveharmingBystanderforthesakeofanotherandwouldleavehimworseoff.IfDefenderbreaksVictim’sarm,VictimwillhavenogroundsforcomplaintagainstDefender.VictimwillbeowedcompensationbyVillain,butifVillaincannotbemadetopayit,VictimwillnotbeowedcompensationbyDefender.ButifDefenderbreaksBystander’sarmratherthanVictim’sandVillaincannotbemadetopaycompensation,itseemsthatthedutytocompensateBystandertoDefender(thoughperhapsVictimwouldthenbemorallyrequiredtopaythecompensationonDefender’sbehalf,asthiswouldineffecttrans-ferthecostofthedefensetothebeneciary).Partoftheintuitiveforceofthiscasederivesfromthefactthatthebeneciaryofthedefensiveactionemergesbetteroffevenafterbearingthecostofthedefense.Theintuitionisweakerincases,suchasthecaseofhumanitarianinterventionsketchedearlier,inwhichsomeoftheexpectedbeneciariesarenotmadebetteroff,orareevenmadeworseoff,intheactualoutcome.Butthetheoreticalclaimremainsstrong—namely,thattheofdefensiveactionoughttobebornebythosewhostandtobenetfromtheactionratherthanimposedonuninvolvedthirdparties,evenwhentherisksarerealizedandsomeoftheexpectedben-eciariesfailtobenetorareactuallymadeworseoff.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants Thisobjectionisrightinitsassumptionthatrisksaretemporallyrela-tive,inthesensethatasconditionsevolve,riskscanincreaseordecrease.Thisistrueevenaccordingtowhatisarguablythebestaccountofobjec-tiveprobability:therelativefrequencyaccount.Thechallengeistoexplainwhyaperson’sbeinganexpectedbeneciaryatonetimecanjustifyexposinghimtorisksbygoingtowarandthus,ifthoserisksarelaterrealized,knowinglydoingwhatwillmakehimanvictim.Theexplanationliesinthenatureofwar,whichrequirestheimplementationofstrategies,whoseconstituentactsarejustiednotonlybytheiriso-latedeffectsbutalsobythecontributiontheymaketothesuccessfulcarryingoutofthestrategy.Supposethatatthetimeadecisionhastobemadeaboutwhethertoghtawarindefenseofagroupofnoncombat-ants,allthosenoncombatantsareexpectedbeneciariesofthewar,evenifthewarwillbefoughtinawaythatwillexposethemtonewrisks.Theyallhavereason,atthattime,towantthewartobefought.Yettheyknowthatthestrategywilllaterrequireactsthatwillconvertsomeofthemfromexpectedbeneciariesintoexpectedoractualvictims.Theyalsoknowthatifitwereaconstraintontheimplementationofthestrategythatnoindividualactofwarcouldbedoneunlessallthosenoncombatantsitwouldexposetoriskwouldbeexpectedbeneciariesofit,itwouldbeimpossibletoimplementthestrategy.Theythereforeknowthatiftheirluckisbad,theywillhavenorighttoexpectthestrategytobeabandoned.Thestrategycanbejustiedinthiswayeventothosewhoturnouttobeitsactualvictims.Andthisexplainswhywhatisrelevanttothejusticationofthestrategyiswhetherthosewhomitwillexposetoriskareexpectedbeneciarieswhenitisadopted,ratherthanlaterduringitsimplementation.TheconclusionIthinkweshoulddrawfromthislengthydiscussionisthatitdoesmakeadifferencetothedegreetowhichnoncombatantsaremorallyimmuneinwarwhethertheyarebystanderstomilitaryactionorexpectedbeneciariesofit.Noncombatantbystandersareimmunetoagreaterdegreeinthesensethattherangeofcasesinwhichjustcombat-antsarepermittedtoimposesomeoftherisksandburdensoftheirmilitaryactiononthecivilianbeneciariesofitismoreextensivethantherangeofcasesinwhichtheymaysimilarlyimposerisksandburdens.SeeStephenPerry,“Risk,HarmandResponsibility,”inPhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLaw,ed.DavidG.Owen(Oxford:ClarendonPress,),pp.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants againstbeingkilledifindoingsotheywouldunavoidablykillanequalorgreaternumberofinnocentbystandersasasideeffect.Ifthemoralimmunityofcivilianbeneciariesisinsomerespectsweakerthanthatofcivilianbystanders,thissupportstheviewthatNATO’sactioninKosovowas,inonerespectatleast,lessmorallyobjec-tionablethanIsrael’sactioninGaza.ForinKosovo,manyofthevictimsofNATO’sdefensiveactionwereexpectedbeneciariesoftheaction,whereasinGazathenoncombatantvictimsofIsrael’sactionwerebystanderstrappedintheareaofcombat.whythedoctrineofthepriorityofcombatantsisfalseIhavearguedthatthedifferenceinimmunitybetweencivilianbystand-ersandcivilianbeneciariesunderminesMargalitandWalzer’sexpla-nationofwhythepriorityofcombatantsiswrong.Itmayseem,however,thatmyargumentdoesmorethanthis,thatitactuallysupportsthedoctrineofthepriorityofcombatants,atleastwhenjustcombatantsmustchoosebetweenexposingthemselvestocertainrisksandreducingthoserisksviaactionthatrisksharmingorkillingcivilianswhoarenev-erthelesstheexpectedbeneciariesoftheirmilitaryaction.Suppose,again,thatjustcombatantsghtinginawarofhumanitarianinterven-tiondiscoverthattheenemygovernmentisholdingonehundredinno-centciviliansfromwhichitwill,unlessprevented,randomlyselectftytobekilled.Thejustcombatantscanpreventthekillingsineitheroftwoways.Oneofthesewouldpredictablykillveofthesesameonehundredciviliansasasideeffect;theotherwouldexposethejustcombatantstogreaterrisks,makingitstatisticallyalmostcertainthatveofthemwouldbekilledbyunjustcombatants.If,asIhaveargued,theexpectedben-eciariesofdefensiveactionhavereasontobearatleastsomeoftherisksoftheirowndefense,itmayseemthatitwouldbepermissibleforthecombatantstoadopttherstcourseofaction,killingveinnocentcivil-iansasasideeffectofpreventingforty-veothersfrombeingkilled.Itmightindeedbepermissibleforthemtopursuethisoptionevenifthenumberofjustcombatantsthatwouldbekilledinthealternativewouldbefewerthanve.Althoughtheseclaims,iftrue,providesomesupportforthepriorityofcombatants,thatsupportislimited,sincetheclaimswouldnotapplyifthecivilianswerebystandersratherthanbeneciaries.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants likeotherpaidprofessionaldefendersorrescuers,suchaspolice,re-ghters,bodyguards,andlifeguards.Allsuchpeoplehaveprofessionalrole-baseddutiestotakerisksandevenonoccasiontoallowthemselvestobeharmedwhenthatisnecessarytofulllthefunctionsoftheirrole.Toseetheimportanceoftheprofessionalroleincasesofthird-partydefense,supposethataninnocentpersonisbeingseverelybeatenbythemembersofagang.Apoliceofcerisnearbyandhastwooptionsforstoppingtheattack.Oneoptionwouldbeentirelysafefortheofcerbutwouldharmthevictimasasideeffectinawaythatwouldbemuchlessseriousthantheharmthevictimwouldsufferiftheofcerdidnotinter-veneatall.Theotheroptionwouldinvolvenoharmtothevictimbutwouldrequiretheofcertosufferaharmthatwouldbelessseriousthanthatwhichhewouldinictonthevictimintheotheroption.Intuitively,itseemsthattheofceroughttochoosethesecondoption.Butifthepotentialrescuerwasamerepasserbyratherthanapoliceofcer,itseemsthatitwouldbepermissibleforhimtochoosetherstoption.Certainly,thevictimwouldhavenojustiedcomplaintaboutbeingdefendedinthatwaybysomeonewithnoprofessionaldutytoengageinrescues.Nextconsiderahypotheticalinstanceofhumanitarianinterventionconductednotbycombatantsbutbyprivateindividuals.Imagine,forexample,thatagroupofindividualswithoutanyofcialstatushadbeeninKosovoatthetimeoftheSerbianeffortstoexpelethnicAlbaniansfromtheregionandthattheyhadhadtheabilitytopreventagreatmanyAlbanianciviliansfrombeingkilled.Supposetheseindividualshadhadtwodefensiveoptions,oneofwhichwouldhaverequiredsomeofthemtosacricetheirliveswhiletheotherwouldhavekilledanequalnumberoftheexpectedAlbanianbeneciariesasasideeffect.Assumingthatinterventionbythemwassupererogatory,itwouldhavebeenpermissibleforthemtodefendtheAlbaniansinthesecondway,killingacertainnumberofAlbaniansasasideeffectofpreventingamuchlargernumberofthemfrombeingkilledbySerbianforces.Astheexpectedbeneciariesofthisunofcialdefensiveaction,theAlbanianswouldhavehadreasontobegratefulandwouldnothavebeenentitledtocomplainthattheinterveningindividualsoughttohavesacricedtheirownlivesinstead.Inmanycases,thereasonthatcombatantshaveaprofessionaldutytotakerisksissimplythattheychosetotakethejob,alongwithitsTheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants theirmilitaryaction.Thismaybeparticularlyclearwhenpeoplehavebeenforciblyconscriptedtoghtinawarthatisjustbutsupererogatory,suchasawarofhumanitarianinterventionorcollectivedefense(thatis,awarfoughtindefenseofanallythathasbeenunjustlyattacked).Thisdoesnotmean,however,thattheyhavenoreasontogivethelivesofnoncombatantspriorityovertheirown,butonlythatwhateverreasonstheymighthavedonotderivefromtheiroccupancyoftheroleofcom-batant,whichintheircaseisneithermorallyrequirednorvoluntary.Casesinwhichjustcombatantslacktheusualrole-baseddutytotakerisksseemtobequiterare.Forsuchcasesarecharacterizedbythreefeaturesthatarerarelycompatible:thewarisjust,thecombatanthadnodutytoenlist,butheorshewasunjustlyconscripted.Ifthewarisjustandthemilitaryisinsufcientlystaffedtoghtit,sothatthereisaneedforconscription,itseemsthatmosteligiblepeopleshouldhaveadutytoenlist.Ifconscriptionisnecessary,thatisprobablybecauseciviliansarefailingtofullltheirdutytoenlist;hencetheconscriptionisunlikelytobeunjust.Itthereforeseemssafetoconcludethatmostjustcombatants,includingconscripts,haveaprofessionalrole-baseddutytotakeaddi-tionalriskstoavoidharmingnoncombatants.Thesecondelementoftheexplanationofwhythepriorityofcombat-antsismistakenisthatthekindofchoicethatisofmostconcern—thechoicethatcombatantsfrequentlyhavebetweencausinggreaterharmtononcombatantsasasideeffectandexposingthemselvestogreaterrisk—isachoicebetweendoingharmandallowingharmtooccur.Morespecically,itisoftenachoicebetweenkillingandlettingdie.Virtuallyallofus,evenconsequentialists,actonthepresuppositionthatthecon-straintagainstharmfulkillingisingeneralstrongerthantheconstraintagainstharmfullyallowingsomeonetodie,whenallotherrelevantfactors,suchasintention,arethesameinbothcases.Thismoralasym-metrybetweenkillingandlettingdieprovides,amongotherthings,partoftheexplanationofwhyitisimpermissibletokillaninnocentbystanderasameansofpreservingone’sownlife,andperhapsthefullexplanationofwhyitisimpermissibletokillaninnocentbystanderasasideeffectofdefendingorpreservingone’sownlife.Althoughvirtuallyallofusacceptthatindividualsareentitledtoacertaindegreeofself-preferenceinlife-and-deathchoices,sothatapersonmaybepermittedtosaveherself,orherchild,ratherthansavingtwostrangers,wealsotendtoacceptthatlegitimateself-preferenceisoutweighedwhensavingTheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants thenegativedutynottokillinnocentpeople.KasherandYadlin’srejec-tionoftherelevanceofthemoralasymmetrybetweenkillingandlettingdieinthiscontextisthusentirelyunsupported.Otherwritershaveobscuredtherelevanceofthedistinctionbetweenkillingandlettingdiebywritingasiftherelevantchoiceswerebetweenenemycivilianstobeharmedandtheminawaythatjustcombatantstobeharmed.Forexample,inanarticlethatdefendsthepriorityofcombatants,EyalBenvenistiwritesatcertainpointsasiftheissueiswhetherastatemayimposerisksonitscombat-ants“toprotectenemycivilians.”Butthisjustchangesthesubject:protectingpeopleandrefrainingfromkillingthemarequitedistinct.Yetthetendencytowritethiswayispervasive.ShlomoAvinerirespondedtoMargalitandWalzerbyclaimingthat“nodemocraticallyelectedpoliti-calleadercanbeimaginedtomaintainthathisgovernmentwilltakethesamecare,andputitsownsoldiersindangerinthesameway,inenemyciviliansasitdoesindefendingitsowncivilianpopulation.”MargalitandWalzerinfactinvitedthisshiftofthediscussiontoanentirelydistinctandeasierissuebyreferringtothe“understandablebutmorallymisguidedsentimentthatcreepsintotheKasher-Yadlinpaperwhentheywrite:‘Acombatantisacitizeninuniform’—soastoconvinceusthatweshouldnotaskoursoldierstotakeriskstothelivesofnoncombatantsontheotherside.”Later,inresponsetoAvineri,theydidtrytorefocusthedebateontherealissue,thoughnotasclearlyorexplicitlyastheymighthave.TocorrectAvineri’smisunderstanding,theywrotethatthestate“hastoprotectitsownciviliansagainstanyattack,fromanyquarter.Ithastoprotectforeignciviliansonlywhenitisitselfattacking”—thatis,toprotectthemfromitselfbynotkillingAllofthecontributorstothedebateaboutthepriorityofcombatantswhomIhavequoted,boththosewhodefendthedoctrineandthosewhorejectit,acceptthatthereisingeneralamoralasymmetrybetween.Benvenisti,“HumanDignityinCombat,”p..ShlomoAvineri,“‘Israel:CiviliansandNoncombatants’:AnExchange,”NewYorkReviewofBooks),p..(Italicsadded.).MargalitandWalzer,“CiviliansandCombatants,”p..(Italicsadded.).AvishaiMargalitandMichaelWalzer,“‘Israel:CiviliansandNoncombatants’:AnNewYorkReviewofBooks),p.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants professionaldefenders,themoralasymmetrybetweendoingandallow-ing,andthespecialwaysinwhichtheymayberelatedtothenoncom-batantstheydefend.Butthesevariousfactorscombineindifferentwaysindifferentcases.Injustwarsofhumanitarianintervention,justciviliansarerarelyatrisk.Bycontrast,noncombatantsinthestatethatisthetargetoftheinterventionareoftenatrisk.Theselatternoncombatantsdivideintoexpectedbeneciariesandbystanders.Intrade-offsbetweenharmstojustcombatantsandharmstononcombatantbeneciaries,theimmu-nityofthenoncombatantsisdiminishedbytheirstatusasbeneciaries.Itisnotunfairforthemtohavetosharewiththeirdefenderssomeoftherisksandburdensoftheirowndefense.Itisthereforeinthesetrade-offsthatthedoctrineofthepriorityofcombatantshasitsgreatestplausibil-ity.Buttheeffectofthenoncombatants’beneciarystatusisoffsetbythejustcombatants’role-baseddutiesandthemoralasymmetrybetweendoingandallowing.Soeveninthesecases,justcombatantsdonothavetheprioritythatdefendersofthedoctrineclaimforthem.ThisiswhythewaythatNATOconducteditsinterventioninKosovowaswrong.ThereasonsthatNATOcombatantshadtoexposethem-selvestoriskwerepartiallycounterbalancedbythefactthatAlbanianKosovarciviliansweretheexpectedand,asagroup,actualbenecia-riesoftheintervention.NATOcombatantswerethereforeentitledtoshiftsomeofthecostsoftheinterventiontothosewhowould,unlikethemselves,benetfromit.ButNATO’stacticswentfarbeyondthis,givingvirtuallyabsoluteprioritytothesafetyofcombatants,whokilledagreatmanyoftheirintendedbeneciariesasasideeffectofthebombingswithoutsufferingasinglecasualtyamongthem-selves.Whileitwaspermissibleforthemtoimposeofthecostsontheexpectedbeneciaries,theirprofessionalroleandthecon-straintagainstdoingharmprohibitedtheirshiftingofthecostsawayfromthemselves.Injustwarsofnationalself-defense,justciviliansareexpectedben-eciariesofthejustcombatants’militaryaction.Itseemstofollow,accordingtotheviewforwhichIhaveargued,thattheirimmunityisweakenedvis-à-visthosewhodefendthem.Yetnoonewhodefendsthepriorityofcombatantsthinksthatitappliestocombatantsinrelationtotheirownfellowcitizens.ItholdsonlythatthelivesofcombatantshaveacertainpriorityoverthoseofciviliansandperhapsthoseofTheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants beneciaries).Injustwarsofnationalself-defense,bystandersincludeneutralciviliansandunjustcivilians(justciviliansarebeneciaries).Theclaimthattheimmunityofcivilianbystandersisgreaterindegreethanthatofcivilianbeneciarieshastwoapparentimplicationsthatarequitecounterintuitive.Oneemergesinwarsofhumanitarianinterven-tion.SupposethatinKosovo,NATOcombatantshadhadtochoosebetweentwomilitaryoptionsthatwouldhavebeenequallyeffectiveinreducingtheharmthatSerbianforcescouldhavedonetoAlbanianKosovarcivilianswhoweretheexpectedbeneciariesoftheinterven-tion.OneoptionwouldhavekilledacertainnumberofAlbaniancivil-iansasasideeffect,thoughfarfewerthanitwouldhavesaved.TheotheroptionwouldhavekilledanequalnumberofSerbiancivilians,whowerenotthreatenedbySerbianforcesandthuswerenotbeneciariesoftheNATOintervention.AccordingtotheviewforwhichIhaveargued,NATOought,intheabsenceofotherrelevantfactors,tohavechosentheoptionthatwouldhavekilledciviliansofAlbanianethnicity,sincetheyweretheexpectedbeneciarieswhiletheSerbswerebystanders.Butthisseemswrong.TheAlbanianswerealreadyvictimized.Howcoulditbejustiabletodiscriminateagainstthemfurtherevenintheactofdefendingthem?Thisexamplemaynotactuallychallengethesignicanceofthedis-tinctionbetweenbeneciariesandbystanders,sincethereisanalter-nativeexplanationanddefenseofourintuitiveresponse.Ifone’sintuitionisthatNATOcombatantsoughttohavepursuedtheoptionthatwouldhavekilledSerbianciviliansratherthanAlbanians,thatmaybebecauseonerecognizesthatmanySerbiancivilianshadbeencom-plicitinthepersecutionoftheAlbaniansandmaythereforehavebeenliabletosufferthesideeffectsofajustiedmilitarydefenseoftheAlba-nians—anintuitionthatsupportstheIndividualLiabilityAccount.Serbianciviliansmayhavebeenbystanders,butmanywerenotinno-centbystanders.Totestwhetherthisconsiderationaffectsone’sintui-tions,supposethatthechoicehadinsteadbeenbetweenkillingacertainnumberofexpectedAlbanianbeneciariesasasideeffectandkillinganequalnumberofneutralcivilians,suchasGreeksorBulgar-ians,asasideeffect,perhapsasAlbanianrefugeesedacrosstheborder.Insuchacaseinvolvinggenuinelyinnocentbystanders,itmayseemwrongtoforceGreeksorBulgarianstopaywiththeirlivesfortheprotectionofanequalnumberofAlbanians.ItmighthavebeenTheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants asasideeffect.Theexplanationforthisliesprincipallyinthemoralasymmetrybetweendoingandallowing.Ingeneral,peopleactinginself-orother-defensemayharminnocentbystandersasasideeffectonlyiftheharmtheypreventsignicantlyexceedstheharmtheycause.Theremay,however,beanexceptiontotheseclaimsincertaincasesofother-defense.Itseemstomanypeople,myselfincluded,thatitismorethanmerelyexcusableifapersonsavesherchildwhenherdoingsounavoid-ablykillsaninnocentbystander(orperhapseventwoinnocentbystand-ers)asasideeffect.Iamnotsurewhattosayaboutthisratherpowerfulintuition,excepttonotethatcasesofthissortariseonlyrarelyinwar,sincetherelationsbetweenjustcombatantsandjustciviliansareingeneralfarlessmorallysignicantthantherelationbetweenaparentandchild.Itseems,therefore,thatthispossibleexceptiontothegeneralclaimaboutproportionalityislargelyirrelevanttothecaseofwar.Itseems,therefore,tobethatjustcombatantsmaynotdefendthelivesofjustciviliansbyactionthatwouldkillanequalorevenaslightlylessernumberofinnocentbystanders,suchasneutralciviliansorunjustcivilians.Yetiftheattitudesofpeopleinpastwarsareanyguide,mostpeoplearelikelytonditprofoundlycounterintuitivetosupposethatjustcombatantsmustallowtheirownfellowcitizenstobekilledbyaggressorsratherthantakedefensiveactionthatwouldkillanequalnumberofenemyciviliansasasideeffect.Totheextentthatthecommonintuitionisdefensible,Ithinkthedefensemusttaketheformofanappealtoatheoryofnoncombatantliabilityratherthananappealtonationalpartiality.Beforeconcludingthissection,itisimportanttonoteoneconsider-ationthatdoessupportgivingcombatantspriorityincertainconditions,aconsiderationthatmayweighheavilyagainstthefactorsthatIhaveidentiedasgivingcombatantsreasonstotakerisksratherthanharmnoncombatantsasasideeffect.Thisisthatinsomecasesthepreserva-tionofthelivesofcombatantsmaybenecessaryfortheultimateachievementoftheirjustcause,sothatitbecomesjustiabletoreducetheriskstheyface,evenatthecostofcausinggreaterharmtononcom-batantsasasideeffect.Manypeoplewillndthisplausibleifthenoncombatantswhohavetobeharmedareenemyorneutralcivilians..CompareBenvenisti:“Thesecurityoftheattackingforcesmaybeviewedaspartofthemilitarygoalsoftheattackingarmy”(“HumanDignityinCombat,”p.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants thejustcombatantstoactinthewaythatwillinvolvetheirkillingacoupleofinnocentnoncombatants,orwhethertheyoughtinsteadtofollowthealternativecourseofactionthatwillkillfewerornononcom-batants,butwillresultinfourofthembeingkilledratherthannone.Thisissuecannotbeamatterofdiscrimination,proportionality,ornecessity,fortherstofthetwoactsisbyhypothesisdiscriminate,proportionate,andnecessaryintherelevantsensefortheachievementofthejustaim.Ifthereisstillaquestionwhetherthatrstactispermissible—andthereis—thentherelevantquestionisnotonethatisaddressedbyanyofthethreetraditionalprinciplesofjusinbello.Ifwearetoanswerit,wemustappeal,atleastimplicitly,toaprinciplethatwillbeentirelynewinthetheoryofthejustwar.Justwartheorymustbeexpandedtoincludeanewprinciplegoverningthejustdistributionofharmbetweencombatantsandnoncombatants.Theissueofthejustdistributionofharmbetweencombatantsandnoncombatantsis,however,onlyoneinstantiationofabroaderissue:thejustdistributionofriskandharmamongdefenders,potentialvictims,andbystanders.Andjustasthereisnoprincipleinthetradi-tionaljustwartheorythataddressesthatissue,sothereisnocorre-spondingprincipleintheliteratureoneitherthemoralityofself-andother-defenseorthelawofself-andother-defense.Theargumentsofthisessaythereforecallforanexpansionnotonlyofourunderstandingofthejustwarbutalsooftheprinciplesgoverningindividualself-defenseandthird-partydefenseofothers.TheJustDistributionofHarmBetweenCombatantsandNoncombatants