/
JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013,pp.632 JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013,pp.632

JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013,pp.632 - PDF document

calandra-battersby
calandra-battersby . @calandra-battersby
Follow
457 views
Uploaded On 2015-11-22

JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013,pp.632 - PPT Presentation

ThisresearchwassupportedbygrantRES000224453fromtheESRCtoSSandgrant20120006587fromtheNationalResearchFoundationofKoreatoDJYCopyright ID: 201606

ThisresearchwassupportedbygrantRES-000-22-4453fromtheESRCtoS.S.andgrant2012-0006587fromtheNationalResearchFoundationofKoreatoD.-J.Y.Copyright:

Share:

Link:

Embed:

Download Presentation from below link

Download Pdf The PPT/PDF document "JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,Sep..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.


Presentation Transcript

JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013,pp.632–638Socialdistancedecreasesresponders'sensitivitytofairnessintheultimatumgameHyunjiKimSimoneSchnallyDo-JoonYizMathewP.WhitexAbstractStudiesusingtheUltimatumGamehaveshownthatparticipantsrejectunfairoffersextendedbyanotherpersonalthoughthisincursanancialcost.Previousresearchsuggeststhatonepossibleexplanationforthisapparentlyself-defeatingresponseisthatunfairoffersinvolvestrongnegativeresponsesthatdecreasethechancesofrespondersaccept-ingoffersthatwouldobjectivelyconstituteanetprot.Wetestedthehypothesisthatonewayofreducingresponders'rejectionsofunfairoffersisthroughincreasedpsychologicaldistance,sothatparticipantsmoveawayfromtheconcretefeelingofbeingunfairlytreated.SocialdistancewasmanipulatedbyhavingparticipantsplaytheUltimatumGameeitherforthemselves,orforanotherperson.Comparedtodecidingforone'sselforaclosesocialcontact,participantsshowedlesssensitivitytofairnesswhendecidingforastranger,asindicatedbyfewerrejectedunfairoffers.WesuggestthatsocialdistancehelpspeoplemovebeyondimmediatefairnessconcernsintheUltimatumGame.Keywords:ultimatumgame;psychologicaldistance;hotcoldempathygap;emotion;decisionmaking.1IntroductionIneverydaylifefeelingsoftenserveadaptivepurposesinregulatingpeople'sinteractions.Forexample,asuddenexperienceofirritationatthenegotiationtablemightindi-catedisapprovaloftheotherperson'sproposal,andresultinarequestforbettertermsandconditions.Goingwithone'sfeelingscanthereforebeusefulinsecuringabetteroutcome.Atothertimes,however,onemightregretthechoicesmadeasaresultofsuchresponses.Forexample,adisproportionateoutburstofanger,evenifseeminglyjustiedinamomentoffrustrationduringthenegotiationprocess,maydolong-termdamagetoanotherwisepos-itivebusinessrelationship.Thus,althoughinmanycon-textsfeelingsareadaptivebecausetheyproviderelevantinformationabouthowtoengagewithone'simmediateenvironment,andwhatactionstotake(Damasio,1994;Schwarz&Clore,2007),atothertimesfreeingoneselffromspontaneousnegativeresponsesmightleadtobetteroutcomes.Oneexperimentalparadigmtostudysuboptimaldeci-sionsresultingfromspontaneousfeelingsistheUltima- ThisresearchwassupportedbygrantRES-000-22-4453fromtheESRCtoS.S.andgrant2012-0006587fromtheNationalResearchFoundationofKoreatoD.-J.Y.Copyright:©2013.TheauthorslicensethisarticleunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttribution3.0License.DepartmentofPsychology,UniversityofCambridge,DowningStreet,Cambridge,CB23EB,U.K.Email:hk340@cam.ac.uk.yUniversityofCambridgezYonseiUniversityxUniversityofExeterMedicalSchooltumGame(Güth,Schmittberger&Schwarze,1982).Inthisgame,aproposermakesanofferregardinghowtosplitasumofmoney,whichcaneitherberejectedoracceptedbyaresponder.Iftheresponderaccepts,thesplittakesplaceasproposed;however,iftheresponderrejects,neitherofthetwoindividualsreceivesanymoney.Arationaldecisionmakerwouldacceptanygivenof-fer,becauseintheinterestofmaximizingprot,gettingsomethingshouldalwaysbebetterthangettingnothing(Thaler,1988).However,thisisusuallynotthecase.Be-ingconfrontedwithunfairofferscanleadtonegativeaf-fectandrejectionofoffersevenwhentheofferisgreaterthanzero(Pillutla&Murnighan,1996;Sanfey,Rilling,Aronson,Nystrom&Cohen,2003).Indeed,whencon-sideringunfairoffers,peopleexhibitemotionalarousalasreectedinincreasedskinconductance(van'tWout,Kahn,Sanfey&Alemen,2006),largerelectrodermalre-sponses(Dunn,Evans,Makarova,White&Clark,2012),andsubtleexpressionsoffacialdisgust(Chapman,Kim,Susskind,&Anderson,2009),andthesereactionspre-dictrejectionratesofunfairoffers.Further,apartici-pants'decisiontoacceptorrejectunfairoffersiscor-relatedwithactivationintheanteriorinsula,astructureknowntobeinvolvedintheexperienceofdisgust(San-feyetal.,2003).Experimentallymanipulatedmoodscanalsoswaywhetherparticipantsacceptorrejectoffers:in-ducedsadness(Harlé&Sanfey,2007)andinducedanger(Andrade&Ariely,2009)leadtohigherrejectionratesofunfairofferscomparedtoneutralmoods.Therefore,neg-ativefeelingsseemtomediatetheeffectofunfairoffersonrejectionrates.632 JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013Socialdistanceandtheultimatumgame633Evenifmotivatedbycurrentemotionalstates,peo-ple'srefusalofunfairtreatmentmighthaveanadaptivepurposebecausepunishingothersenforcesnormsoffair-ness(Sanfey,Loewenstein,McClure,&Cohen,2006).Inotherwords,thosewhodonotactfairlyfaceexclusionfromthegroup,andthisprospectmightactasadeter-rent.Thisstrategy,however,onlymakessenseunderthepremisethatpeoplerepeatedlyinteractwitheachother,andthatonekeepstrackofeachindividual'sreputationasafaircooperativepartner.Yet,peoplerejectunfairof-fersintheUltimatumGameeveninone-shotdecisionsinalaboratory,whentheyhavenoexpectationofhavingrepeatedcontactwiththeotherperson(Güthetal.,1982;Hoffman,McCabe,&Smith,1996).Underthiscircum-stancethebeststrategywouldbetoacceptanygivenofferinordertomaximizeone'soverallprot.Whydopeoplestillturndownoffers,andforgotheirownsmallrewardjusttopreventtheotherpersonfromgettingalargerre-ward?Oneanswermaylieinpeople'sfailuretoappreci-atethevalueofagivenrewardwhentheyaretoocaughtupinthecurrentmoment'sconcernforfairness.Indeed,peopleoftenmakedecisionsguidedbyvisceralreactionsthatmightinterferewithrationalchoices.Forexample,the“hot-coldempathygap”(Loewenstein,1996;2000)describesthephenomenonthatwheninanemotional,“hot”state,suchaswhenfeelingangry,peoplenditdif-culttoimagineamore“cold”,rationalstate,andthiscanbiastheirdecisionprocesses.However,bymovingawayfromthecurrentexperience,decisionmakingismorelikelytobeguidedby“cold”processing.Thegapbetweenthesetwoprocessesmighthelpunderstandtheunderlyingprocessofpeople'sdecisionmakingduringtheUltimatumGame:whenparticipantsareconfrontedwithunfairoffers,visceralreactionsconstitute“hot”pro-cessing,whichplacesthefeelingofbeingunfairlytreatedatthecentreofattention.However,ifwecouldproduceashifttowardmore“cold”processing,adifferenttypeofmind-setmightguideparticipantstorepresentthegiveneventwithamorerationalandgoal-focusedperspectivethatisremovedfromcurrentexperiences.Inthepresentresearch,wesuggestawaytoachievethis,namelybyincreasingpsychologicaldistance.Next,weintroduceatheoreticalframeworkthatsuggestsawaytocogni-tivelymoveawayfromhotprocessinginordertofacil-itate“cold”processing.1.1Psychologicaldistanceasamethodoffacilitating“cold”processingMuchofthetime,ourmindsareoccupiedwithimmedi-ategoals,currentactivitiesandafocusontheself.How-ever,humanmindsarealsocapableoftranscendingthepresentself,projectingoneselfontoapastorfutureself,anotherselfinadifferentplace,andevenontootherper-sons'minds(Buckner&Carroll,2007;Schacter&Ad-dis,2007;Spreng,Mar&Kim,2009).Thiscapabilityen-ablespeopletoplaninadvance,comprehendcomplexcir-cumstancesandunderstandothers'behaviour.Onewayofdoingthisistoadoptadistantperspective:Psycholog-icaldistancecreatesgreaterobjectivitytowardsatargetobjectorevent,enablingustorepresentagivensituationinamorerationalandgeneralfashion,freefrominciden-talconcerns.Manystudiesnowconrmthatpeoplemakejudgmentsanddecisionsinamoreself-controlledandfar-sightedmannerwhentheyuseadistantpsychologicalperspec-tive,ratherthanaclosepsychologicalperspective(e.g.,Fujita,Trope,Liberman,&Levin-Sagi,2006;Trope&Liberman,2003,2010).Forexample,participantschoseadvertisementsappealingtotheirdesiredselfratherthantotheircurrentneedsunderadistantperspective(Fre-itas,Langsam,Clark,&Moeller,2008).Further,peoplepreferalargerlaterrewardtoasmallerimmediatetreatwhenasituationisframedunderincreasedpsychologicaldistance(Trope&Liberman,2000).Similarly,tempta-tionsareconsideredinmorenegativetermswhenapply-ingadistantinsteadofimmediatepsychologicalperspec-tive(Fujitaetal.,2006).WethereforeproposethattheUltimatumGamecanbeinterpretedintermsofpsychologicaldistance:Whenre-spondersdecidewhethertoacceptanunfairoffertheyareinuencedbytheimmediatefeelingofbeingunfairlytreated.Eventsthatinvolveintenseemotionalarousalaremorestronglyassociatedwithaproximatepsycho-logicaldistancethananincreasedpsychologicaldistance(VanBoven,Kane,McGraw&Dale,2010;Watkins,Moberly&Moulds,2008).Onewayofreducingrespon-ders'tendencytorejectunfairoffersintheUltimatumGamemightthereforebetoincreasepsychologicaldis-tancesothattheycanreinterpretthesituationwithanob-jectiveperspective.Thismighthelpparticipantsmoveawayfromtheexperienceoffeelingunfairlytreatedandthereforebecomelesssensitivetounfairness.WetestedthehypothesisthatincreasedpsychologicaldistanceallowsrespondersintheUltimatumGametodis-engagefromimmediatefairnessconcernscausedbyun-fairoffers.Asaresult,weexpectedparticipantstobemorewillingtoacceptunfairoffersunderincreasedpsy-chologicaldistance.Toinducepsychologicaldistance,wemanipulatedsocialdistance,whichdescribesthesub-jectiveclosenesstowardatargetperson,andcanvaryfrombeingveryclosetoverydistant(Nan,2007;Trope&Liberman,2003).Forexample,aclosefriendfeelsso-ciallycloserthanamereacquaintance,andhisorherin-tentionsarethereforemoreeasilyunderstoodthanthoseoftherelativestranger.Atthesametime,aclosefriend'sbehaviourmaystillbelessunderstandablethanone'sownbehavior.Sometimes,however,thissubjectivecloseness JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013Socialdistanceandtheultimatumgame634mayinterferewithadaptivedecisionmaking,andwebe-lievetheUltimatumGameconstitutessuchasituation,becausewhenmakingdecisionsforoneself,onthemostimmediatelevelofsocialdistance,strongreactionstoun-fairoffersmaygetinthewayofacceptingunfair,yet-nanciallyprotableoffers.Weinducedthreetypesofsocialdistanceinvolvingei-thertheself,aclosecontact(bestfriend)oradistantcon-tact(stranger),andparticipantsmadeUltimatumGamedecisionseitheronbehalfofthistargetperson,orforthemselves.Basedonresearchshowingthatpeoplejudgeandperceivecloseothers'intentionsandbehavioursassimilartotheirown(Ames,2004;Mitchell,Banaji,&Macrae,2005;Prentice,1990),weexpecteddecisionsfortheclosecontacttobemoresimilartothosefortheselfthandecisionsmadeforastranger.Morespecically,wepredictedhigherlevelsofacceptanceofunfairoffersforadistantsocialtarget,comparedtotheclosesocialcontact,orforoneself.2MethodParticipantsplayedtheUltimatumGameonacomputerscreenwithahypotheticalproposer,andmadedecisionsbypressingabuttontoacceptorrejectthegivenoffer,imaginingthattheywereplayingthegameforatargetperson.Weusedthreetargetsthatimpliedincreasinglev-elsofsocialdistance:Self,bestfriend,andstranger.Par-ticipantsweretoldthatallofferswereindependentfromeachother,suchthateachtrialwasaone-shotdecision,andarejectionoracceptanceofanofferdidnotaffectanysubsequentoffers.2.1ParticipantsTwenty-fourundergraduatestudents(14males)atYonseiUniversityparticipatedinexchangeforcoursecredit.12.2MaterialsInductionofPsychologicalDistance.SocialdistancewasinducedusingtheproceduredevelopedbyJonesandRachlin(2006).Participantswereinstructedtoimag-inecreatingalistof100peopleclosesttothem,rangingfromthedearestfriendorfamilymemberatposition1toamereacquaintanceatposition100.Tofurtherac-tivatethoughtsrelatedtothetargetpersonparticipantswereaskedtoimaginevedifferenteventsorthoughtsthatmightoccurtothetargetpersonatthepresentmo-ment,andwritedownthoseeventsorthoughtsonasheet 1AlthoughnoagedatawerecollectedinExperiment1allpartici-pantsweretakingundergraduatecoursesatthetimeoftheexperiments,suggestingagesrangingbetween18and23.ofpaper.Thistaskwastimedto3minutes.Forexample,forthe“Self”condition,participantswrote“I'mthinkingoftheexamIhavetopreparefornextweek.”orforthe“BestFriend”condition,“Heisprobablygoingoutforlunchwithhisgirlfriend.”UltimatumGame.Twoamountsofmoneywereusedtotestwhethertheeffectwasdifferentforhighorlowamounts:10,000and40,000Koreanwon(approximatelyequivalentto10and40USdollars).Thisallowedustoexplorewhetherdifferentamountsofmoneyatstakemightinteractwitheitherofferfairnessorsocialdistance.Forinstance,itisconceivablethatonceoffersbecomelargerinabsolutetermswhiletheleveloffairnessre-mainsthesame,peoplemaybemorewillingtoacceptunfairoffers.Therewere10differentratiosofoffersforeachamount,rangingfromfair(5:5)toveryunfairoffers(0.5:9.5).Thus,eachconditionconsistedof20trials(2Amountsx10Ratios).Theofferswerepresentedinanincreasing(i.e.,fromtheveryunfairtothefairoffer)oradecreasing(i.e.,fromthefairoffertotheveryunfairoffer)fashionrandomlychosenforeachamount.Eachparticipantreceivedthe“Self”,“BestFriend”and“Stranger”conditionscounterbalancedfororder.Ontopofthecomputerscreen,participantssaw“You”,“1stper-sononthelist”or“100thpersononthelist”ineachsocialdistancecondition.Offerswerepresentedonthescreen.Forexample,inthe“Self”anofferwouldbephrasedas“Splittingthesumof10,000won,theopponenttakes7,000won.Youreceive3,000won.Whatwouldyoudo?”whereasinthe“BestFriend”or“Stranger”condi-tions,participantsread“Splittingthesumof10,000won,theopponenttakes7,000won.Thetargetpersonreceives3,000won.Ifyouwereinthepositionofthetargetper-son,whatwouldbeyourdecision?”2.3ProcedureThestudyusedafullywithin-participantsdesign.Anex-perimenterexplainedhowtoplaytheUltimatumGameandguidedparticipantsintoanexperimentalcubicle.Eachparticipantwasexposedtothreesocialdistancecon-ditions:“Self”,“BestFriend”and“Stranger”,withordercounterbalancedacrossparticipants.Priortoimplement-ingeachsocialdistancecondition,participantscompletedtheinductionofpsychologicaldistancedescribedabove.Forthe“Self”condition,participantswereinstructedtoimaginethattheywereplayingthegameandmakinghy-potheticaldecisionsforthemselves,whereasfor“BestFriend”and“Stranger”conditions,participantsimaginedthatthetargetpersonwasplayingtheUltimatumGame,andtheymadedecisionsforthattargetperson.Partici-pantsrespondedbypressingakeyboardbutton.Attheendoftheexperiment,participantsweredebriefedand JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013Socialdistanceandtheultimatumgame635probedforsuspicionregardingthepurposeofthestudy.Noparticipantsguessedthehypothesisofthestudy.2.4ResultsA10(Offer:5:5to0.5:9.5)by3(Target:Self,Friend,Stranger)by2(Amount:10,000vs40,000won)fullyrepeated-measuresANOVAwasconducted.Mauchly'stestindicatedthattheassumptionofsphericityhadbeenviolatedforthemaineffectsofTarget,2(2)=6.33,p=.04,andOffer,2(44)=191.05,p.001.Therefore,degreesoffreedomwerecorrectedusingGreenhouse-Geisserestimatesofsphericity("=.80forthemaineffectofconditionand.31forthemaineffectofoffer).Therewasamaineffectofoffer,suggestingthatparticipants'acceptanceratedecreasedasoffersbecamemoreunfair,F(2.80,64.45)=35.11,p.001,2=.59(seeFigure1formeans,collapsedacrossamounts).Thiseffectofre-jectionofunfairoffersisconsistentwithearlierndingsfortheUltimatumGame(e.g.,Güthetal.,1982;Camerer&Thaler,1995).Moreimportantly,however,themaineffectoftargetpersonwasalsosignicant,F(1.60,36.80)=4.51,p=.02,2=.06.Within-subjectscontrastsrevealedthatac-ceptanceratesforthe“Stranger”conditionwerehigherthanforthe“BestFriend”condition,F(1,23)=5.01,p=.04,2=.13,andthe“Self”conditionF(1,23)=6.62,p=.02,2=.20.Incontrast,acceptanceratesforthe“Self”and“Bestfriend”conditionsdidnotdiffer,F(1,23)=.094,p=.76,2=.004.Theonlysignicantinter-actionwasbetweenAmountandOffer,F(1,23)=2.94,p=.03,2=.09,showingasteeperdecreaseinacceptanceratefor10,000woncomparedto40,000won,indicatingthatparticipantsresponsesweremoresensitivetounfair-nesswhentheamountwassmaller.Themaineffectofamountwasnotsignicant,F(1,23)=3.05,p=.09,2=.09,neitheritsinteractionwiththesocialdistancecondi-tion,F(1.83,41.97)=.91,p=.40,2=.03.3DiscussionAshypothesized,acceptanceratesintheUltimatumGameweresignicantlyhigherwhenparticipantsmadedecisionsforastrangercomparedtodecisionsforthem-selvesortheirbestfriend.Inotherwords,participantsweremorewillingtoacceptunfairofferswhentherecip-ientwasrepresentedinamoredistantmannerratherthaninaproximatemanner.Theresultsthussupporttheideathatsocialdistancingleadspeopletobemorefreefromconcernsrelatedtounfairness.Wearguethatthesere-sultsareduetoamore“objective”perspectiveinducedbyincreasedpsychologicaldistance.Ourndingsarecon-sistentwithpreviousresearchsuggestingthatunderin-creasedpsychologicaldistance,peoplemakemoreadap-tiveandprotablechoices(Fujitaetal.,2006;Metcalfe&Mischel,1999;Trope&Liberman,2000).Weextendpreviousresearchandsuggestthatpeoplemakedecisionsthatarelesssensitivetofairnesswhentheymovebeyondsituationalconcerns.Interestingly,the“BestFriend”conditiondidnotdif-ferfromthe“Self”conditionintermsofparticipants'acceptancerate.Thissuggeststhatthesubjectiveso-cialdistancetowardstheirbestfriendswasnotenoughtoinducefunctionallysufcientdistance.Indeed,peopletendtojudgesimilarothers'intentionsbasedontheirownthoughtsandbeliefs(Mitchelletal.,2005),andperceiveclosecontacts'thoughtsorbehavioursimilartotheirown(Ames,2004;Prentice,1990).However,doesthismeanthatoneshouldtrytoalwaysestablishapsychologicaldistanceorignoreone'sfeel-ingswhenmakingdecisions?Wewanttomakeveryclearthatoursuggestionisnotthatintuitionsorfeel-ingsshouldtobedisregardedinordertoarriveatbet-terdecisions.Indeed,immediateconcernsoftenserveanadaptivepurpose(Damasio,1994;Schnall,Haidt,Clore&Jordan,2008;Schwarz&Clore,2007).Forexample,considerasituationrequiringnegotiationbetweentwoparties.Whenoneproposesanunfaircontract,theotherislikelytoexperienceanegativeemotionalresponsebutignoringitandtryingtobe“rational”mightbecounter-productive.Inordertoachieveanoptimalexchange,oneshouldusetheemotionalresponseasawayofpreventinglossinthelongrun.Similarly,whenpeoplefaceothers'moraltransgressions,theyspontaneouslyexperienceneg-ativeaffect(Cannon,Schnall,&White,2011;Schnalletal.,2008),andthesefeelingscanbeimportantsignalsindecidingwhethercertainbehaviorsareacceptableornot.Therefore,psychologicaldistancecanprovideabenetwhensubjectiveandvisceralreactionsgetinthewayandmisleaddecisions,butatthesametime,whenfeelingsessentialtounderstandingasituation,psychologicaldis-tancemightbedetrimental.Thus,thereneedstobeadelicatebalancebetweenwhentopayattentiontoone'sfeelings,andwhentofo-cusonotherrequirementsofagivensituation.Onecru-cialfactortoconsideriswhetherthegivensituationin-volvesacontinuousinteractionorasingleencounter.Acontinuousinteractionrequiresastrategythatbringsthemostbenetintheend,whichmeansthatwhileattempt-ingtoarriveatthebeststrategy,onemighthavetosacri-cesomeresourcesintheshortrun.However,aone-shotengagementrequiresanobjectivestrategythatcalculatesthegreatestbenetwhenconsideringonlythatsingleen-counter.Thecurrentresearchinvolvedaone-shotdeci-sionforeachtrialduringtheUltimatumGame.Infact,manydecisionsmadeonadailybasisresemblethecur-rentexperimentalsituation.Peoplemakeajudgement JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013Socialdistanceandtheultimatumgame636Figure1:AcceptanceratesfortheUltimatumGamewiththreesocialdistanceconditions:Self,bestfriend,andstranger.Errorbarsindicate±standarderrorsofthemean. 5:5 5.5:4.5 6:4 6.5:3.5 7:3 7.5:2.5 8:2 8.5:1.5 9:1 9.5:0.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Ratio (Proposer: Responder)Acceptance Rate (%) Self Best friend Stranger guidedbytheirimmediateconcernsfordecisionsthatdonotpromiseasecondchance,andthewrongchoicecanbecomeasourceofregret.Forinstance,peopleoftenchoosetoeatachocolatebardespitetheirdietplan,orspendmoneyonbuyingclotheswhiledisregardingtheoverduecreditcardbill.Insuchcontexts,ourndingssuggestthatpsychologicaldistancingmightpreventpeo-plefrommakingregrettablechoices.Thecurrentndingsarecloselyrelatedtointerpretinghumandecisionmakingintermsof“hot”and“cold”pro-cessing(Loewenstein,2000).Itisoftenhardtodisentan-glethesetwoprocessesinadecisionmakingsituation,butpsychologicaldistancingmightprovideasimplewayofdoingso.Asobservedinthecurrentresearch,inducingdistancehelpedpeoplemoveawayfrom“hot”emotionalprocessinginordertofacilitate“cold”cognitiveprocess-ing.Ourndingsshedlightonthepossibilitythatdif-ferencesinpsychologicaldistancemightberesponsiblefordiscrepanciesindecisionsresultingfromthehotandcoldempathygap.Peopledifferinpredictionwhentheyareactuallyexperiencingthe“hot”statecomparedtothe“cold”state.Forinstance,peoplewhoarehungryex-pressgreaterinterestineatingspaghettiforbreakfastthefollowingdaythanthosewhohavejusteaten(Gilbert,Gill,&Wilson,2002).Similarly,afterexercising,ex-periencingthirstleadsparticipantstoreportthattheyaremorebotheredbythissensationthanparticipantswhoareabouttobegintheirexercise(VanBoven&Loewenstein,2003).Suchadisparitycanberesolvedwhenagivensit-uationisconstruedatadistantsociallevel,andthereforeisremovedfromthecurrentstate.Similarly,construingataclosesociallevelcouldbenetincorrectingpredictionerrorswhenpeopleareina“cold”state.AnotherrelevanttheoreticalframeworkisConstrualLevelTheory(CLT)withitscoreconstructofpsychologi-caldistance(Trope&Liberman,2003;2010).Accordingtothetheory,psychologicaldistanceinvolvesdifferentmentalrepresentationsofevents,suchthatthinkingaboutthedistantpast,distantfuture,andothers'mindsinvolveshigh-levelconstrualsthatareabstract,decontextualizedandremovedfromdirectexperience,whereasthinkingaboutthehereandnowinvolveslow-levelconstrualsthatareconcreteandgroundedinphysicalandperceptualex-perience.Inrelationtoournding,itmightbethatpartic-ipantsformeddifferentcognitiveconstrualsthathadledtodistinctchoicesintheUltimatumGame.Onewaytotestthispossibilityistoapplyotherdimensionsofpsy-chologicaldistanceproposedbyCLT.Forexample,basedonthefunctionalequivalenceamongvariousdimensionsofpsychologicaldistance(Bar-Anan,Liberman,Trope&Algom,2007;Fiedler,Jung,Wänke,Alexopoulos,2012;Trope&Liberman,2003;2010;Pronin&Ross,2006;Pronin,Olivola,&Kennedy,2008),wepredictthatsim-ilarpatternsinacceptanceratesmightoccurirrespectiveofwhetherthepsychologicaldistanceissocial,tempo-ral,orspatial.Supportingthisprediction,recentndingshaveshownthat,whenmakingajudgementordecision,atemporallydistantselfsuchasapastorfutureselfis JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013Socialdistanceandtheultimatumgame637oftentreatedlikeasociallydistantother(Pronin&Ross,2006;Proninetal.,2008).Thecurrentresearchpointstonewdirectionsofinves-tigatingdecisionmaking.WhereaspreviousworkontheUltimatumGamemainlyfocusedonwhetherchangingparticipants'moodorthecharacteristicsoftheopponentcouldchangeresponders'decisions(e.g.,Harlé&San-fey,2007;Solnick&Schweitzer,1999;van'tWoutetal.,2006),weintroducedadifferentwayofinuencingrespondersbymanipulatingtheirpsychologicaldistance.Otherparadigmsthatinvestigatedecisionmakingmightsimilarlybenetfromsuchmanipulations.Forexample,peoplemightbemorelikelytodelaygraticationwhenmakingdecisionsforadistantperson.Likewise,con-sumersmightbeabletooptimizetheirchoiceswithinalimitedbudgetiftheypretendedtousesomebodyelse'sbudgetandshoppinglist.Decisionstiedtocurrentemo-tionalfeelingsmightalsobenetfrompsychologicaldis-tancing.Forinstance,beforereactingtoaninsultwithanoutburstofanger,onemightinsteadtrytoimaginewhethertheresponseseemsappropriatewhenconsideredfromathird-personperspective.Thus,ourresearchpro-videsarststepinilluminatinghowdecisionprocessesoccurringonadailybasisareshapedbyconsiderationsofpsychologicaldistance,andthismightholdthekeyforovercomingvariousbiasesinjudgmentsanddecisions.ReferencesAmes,D.(2004).Strategiesforsocialinference:Asim-ilaritycontingencymodelofprojectionandstereotyp-inginattributeprevalenceestimates.JournalofPer-sonalityandSocialPsychology,87,340–353.Andrade,E.B.,&Ariely,D.(2009).Theenduringim-pactoftransientemotionsondecisionmaking.Orga-nizationalBehaviourandHumanDecisionProcesses,109,1–8.Bar-Anan,Y.,Liberman,N.,Trope,Y.,&Algom,D.(2007).Automaticprocessingofpsychologicaldis-tance:EvidencefromaStrooptask.JournalofEx-perimentalPsychology:General,136,610–622.Buckner,R.L.,&Carroll,D.C.(2007).Self-projectionandthebrain.TrendsinCognitiveScience,11,49–57.Camerer,C.F.,&Thaler,R.H.(1995).Anomalies:Ulti-matums,dictators,andmanners.JournalofEcomomicPerspectives,9,209–219.Cannon,P.R.,Schnall,S.,&White,M.(2011).Trans-gressionsandexpressions:Affectivefacialmuscleac-tivitypredictsmoraljudgments.SocialPsychologicalandPersonalityScience,2,325–331.Chapman,H.A.,Kim,D.A.,Sussking,J.M.,&Ander-son,A.K.(2009).Inbadtaste:Evidencefortheoraloriginsofmoraldisgust.Science,323,1222–1226.Damasio,A,(1994).Descartes'error:Emotion,reason,andthehumanbrain.NewYork:Putnam.Dunn,B.D.,Evans,D.,Makarova,D.,White,J.,&Clark,L.(2012).Gutfeelingsandthereactiontoperceivedinequity:Theinterplaybetweenbodilyre-sponses,regulation,andperceptionshapestherejec-tionofunfairoffersontheultimatumgame.Cognitive,Affective,&BehavioralNeuroscience,12,419–429.Fiedler,K.,Jung,J.,Wänke,M.,&Alexopoulos,T.(2012).Ontherelationsbetweendistinctaspectsofpsychologicaldistance:Anecologicalbasisofconstrual-leveltheory.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,48,1014–1021.Freitas,A.L.,Langsam,K.L.,Clark,S.,&Moeller,S.J.(2008).Seeingoneselfinone'schoices:Construallevelandself-pertinenceofelectoralandconsumerde-cisions.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,44,1174-1179.Fujita,K.,Trope,Y.,Liberman,N.,&Levin-Sagi,M.(2006).Construallevelsandself-control.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,90,351-367.Gilbert,D.T.,Gill,M.J.,&Wilson,T.D.(2002).Thefutureisnow:temporalcorrectioninaffectivefore-casting.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDeci-sionProcesses,88,430–444.Güth,W.,Schmittberger,R.,&Schwarze,B.(1982).Anexperimentalanalysisofultimatumbargaining.Jour-nalofEconomicsBehavior&Organization,3,367–388.Harlé,K.M.,&Sanfey,A.G.(2007).Incidentalsad-nessbiasessocialeconomicdecisionsintheUltima-tumGame.Emotion,7,876–881.Hoffman,E.,McCabe,K.&Smith,V.L.(1996).So-cialdistanceandotherregardingbehaviorindictatorgames.AmericanEconomicReview,86,653–660.Jones,B.,&Rachlin,H.(2006).Socialdiscounting.Psy-chologicalScience,17,283–286.Loewenstein,G.(1996).Outofcontrol:Visceralinu-encesonbehavior.OrganizationalBehaviorandHu-manDecisionProcesses,65,272–292.Loewenstein,G.(2000).Emotionsineconomictheoryandeconomicbehavior.AmericanEconomicReview,90,426-432.Metcalfe,J.,&Mischel,W.(1999).Ahot/cool-systemanalysisofdelayofgratication:Dynamicsofwillpower.PsychologicalReview,106,3–19.Mitchell,J.P.,Banaji,M.R.&Macrae,C.N.(2005).Thelinkbetweensocialcognitionandself-referentialthoughtinthemedialprefrontalcortex.JournalofCognitiveNeuroscience,17,1306–1315.Nan,X.(2007).Socialdistance,framing,andjudgment:Aconstruallevelperspective.HumanCommunicationResearch,33,489–514. JudgmentandDecisionMaking,Vol.8,No.5,September2013Socialdistanceandtheultimatumgame638Pillutla,M.M.,&Murnighan,J.K.(1996).Unfairness,anger,andspite:Emotionalrejectionsofultimatumof-fers.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDecisionProcesses,68,208-224.Prentice,D.A.(1990).Familiarityanddifferencesinself-andother-representations.JournalofPersonal-ityandSocialPsychology,59,369–383.Pronin,E.,Olivola,C.Y.,&Kennedy,K.A.(2008).Do-inguntofutureselvesasyouwoulddountoothers:Psychologicaldistanceanddecisionmaking.Person-alityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,34,224–236.Pronin,E.,&Ross,L.(2006).Temporaldifferencesintraitself-ascription:Whentheselfisseenasanother.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,90,197–209.Sanfey,A.G.,Rilling,J.K.,Aronson,J.A.,Nystrom,L.E.,&Cohen,J.D.(2003).Theneuralbasisofeco-nomicdecision-makingintheUltimatumGame.Sci-ence,300,1755-1758.SanfeyA.G.,LoewensteinG.,McClureS.M,&CohenJ.D.(2006).Neuroeconomics:Cross-currentsinre-searchondecision-making.TrendsinCognitiveSci-ence,10,108–116.SchacterD.L,AddisD.R.(2007).Thecognitiveneu-roscienceofconstructivememory:Rememberingthepastandimaginingthefuture.PhilosophicalTransac-tionsoftheRoyalSocietyB:BiologicalSciences,362,773–786.Schnall,S.,Haidt,J.,Clore,G.L.,&Jordan,A.(2008).Disgustasembodiedmoraljudgment.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,34,1096–1109.Schwarz,N.,&Clore,G.L.(2007).Feelingsandphe-nomenalexperiences.InA.Kruglanski&E.T.Hig-gins(Eds.),Socialpsychology:Handbookofbasicprinciples(2nded.,pp.385-407).NewYork:Guil-ford.Solnick,S.J.,&Schweitzer,M.(1999).Theinuenceofphysicalattractivenessandgenderonultimatumgamedecisions.OrganizationalBehaviorandHumanDeci-sionProcesses,79,199–215.Spreng,R.N.,Mar,R.A.,&Kim,A.S.(2009).Thecommonneuralbasisofautobiographicalmemory,prospection,navigation,theoryofmindandthedefaultmode:Aquantitativemeta-analysis.JournalofCogni-tiveNeuroscience,21,489–510.Thaler,R.H.(1988).Anomalies:TheUltimatumGame.JournalofEconomicPerspectives,2,195–206.Trope,Y.,&Liberman,N.(2000).Temporalconstrualandtime-dependentchangesinpreference.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,79,876–889.Trope,Y.,&Liberman,N.(2003).Temporalconstrual.PsychologicalReview,110,403–420.Trope,Y.,&Liberman,N.(2010).Construal-leveltheoryofpsychologicaldistance.PsychologicalReview,117,440–463.VanBoven,L.,Kane,J.,McGraw,A.P.,&Dale,J.(2010).Feelingclose:Emotionalintensityreducesperceivedpsychologicaldistance.JournalofPerson-alityandSocialPsychology,98,872–885.VanBoven,L.,&Loewenstein,G.(2003).Socialpro-jectionoftransientdrivestates.PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin,29,1159–1168.van'tWout,M.,Kahn,R.S.,Sanfey,A.G.,&Aleman,A.(2006).Affectivestateanddecision-makingintheultimatumgame.ExperimentalBrainResearch,169,564–568.Watkins,E.,Moberly,N.J.,&Moulds,M.L.(2008).Processingmodecausallyinuencesemotionalreac-tivity:Distincteffectsofabstractversusconcretecon-strualonemotionalresponse.Emotion,8,364–378.