Bob Spies Oil Spill Response Symposium University of New Hampshire October 28 2014 Overview I am an effects expert not a response expert but I have a few observations and opinions on response ie ID: 632485
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Slide1
Looking back 25 years
EVOS in the rear view mirror
Bob Spies
Oil Spill Response Symposium
University of New Hampshire
October 28, 2014Slide2
Overview
I am an effects expert not a response expert; but I have a few observations and opinions on response (i.e.,
caveat emptor
)
History of the EVOS and the scientific effort
Confronting uncertainty in spill science
The early toll
Early years: 1989-1994
Late years: 1994-2002
How “bad” was it?
Lessons learnedSlide3
What happened in April 1989 in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska?
Also, what happened in Valdez, Cordova, Anchorage, Juneau, Houston and Washington D.C. after that?
Context? How “bad” was it compared to the 1964 earthquake? Global warming or ocean acidification?
Lessons for the Arctic?
EVOS: The black swan, a metaphor and
a real tragedySlide4
History of the
spill-human folly on full display
Ship left Valdez March 23, 1989
reef collision; 8/11 holds rupture
12M gallons spilled
Oil pooled near ship, then the storm
1500-2000km shoreline contaminated
3-year cleanup
Small amount remains in beachesEvidence for 15-20 year effectSlide5
Why did this happen?Slide6
Energy flow in
petroecology
Proximate causesSlide7
Risk assessments were probably off (once in 200+ yrs); major spill 10 years after the oil started flowing
Cleanup equipment not availableLack of tugs, radar
Adds up to: complacency and lack of preparation.
In addition…Slide8
Oil spreads through the northern Gulf of AlaskaSlide9Slide10
“Do something…”Slide11
Scientific studies
Started immediately
40+ in 1989; 100s over the next
20
years
Assessed damage, tracked recovery, studied ecosystem constraints to recovery
Over 300
publications
from EVOSTC studies, hundreds from Exxon-sponsored scientistsSlide12
Two scientific camps
Exxon has had similar/parallel studies with different conclusions
Why?
Different definitions of injury
Different standards of proof
Different frame of reference
Different power of
studiesSlide13
Effects of oil on juvenile pink salmon in PWS in 1989
EXXON: “ Post hoc ergo propter hoc”One thing following another is not proof of cause and effect…….
Government:
….. nor is it reason to deny a relationship. Weight of evidence approach.
An example of controversy..Slide14Slide15
Growth of oiled juvenile salmonSlide16
Oil biomarker in pink salmon embryoSlide17
Juvenile salmon growth is reduced by oil in foodSlide18
Immediate spill toll
~2000 sea
otters
~200-300 harbor
seals
killer whales ?
150,000-250,000
sea birds
200-300 bald eaglesEarly life history stages of pink salmon and herring damaged1500 kilometers of intertidal habitat oiledSlide19
Early years
1989-1994
Science
:
Mainly assessment of damage
i.e., how many of each species were killed
Workshops on pink salmon, sea otters, sockeye salmon,
murres, killer whales, harbor seals for litigation Economic studies done in secret: Formulation of Restoration Plan No publications in 1989-1990 because of litigation Fisheries failures; oil persistence Policy: Trustee Council made most decisions; Management team was in charge of day-to-day activities Early settlement with Exxon for $1 billion Peer review on sidelines after settlement in 1990 Injured species list Slide20
Later years
1994-2002
Science
:
Why weren’t some species recovering?
Ecosystem studies brings integrative approach to science
Emphasis on publication
Gulf ecosystem monitoring: How to do it. Policy: Hickel becomes Governor; appts. Charley Cole. Executive Director role expands; More reliance on peer review input Valdez blockade; SEA, NVP, APEX ecosystem studies Slide21
How bad was it? Context
Comparison with another natural catastrophe : 1964 earthquake
Common features:
Similar geographic area affected
Springtime
Big impact on intertidal zone
Impacted salmon spawning streams
25 years for recovery of resources ?
Slide22
EVOS and long-term climate change
The scale of decadal change, i.e. the 1977 regime shift, has shown
Itself to be much more extensive than occurred as a result of EVOS.
Extensive changes in the ecological communities on the shelf of the northern GOA as a result of climate change provide a potential measuring stick of the minimum magnitude of changes to be expected from climate change.Slide23
Lessons learned
Value of ecosystem studies in understanding perturbations.
Thorough study of injuries is necessary; emerging injuries.
Long-term dividends of study of ecosystem that supplies
irreplaceable services.
Ecosystem studies involving public agencies produce synthetic advantages.
Dealing with uncertainty logically is key to moving from findings to good policy decisions.
Strong peer review is necessary to make adaptive management work in restoration.Slide24
What have we learned?
“Do something” is always the message, but not always a good idea
Clean up only recovers an insignificantly small proportion of spilled oil
Dispersants are oversold and work only under a narrow range of conditions
Booms often not very effective
Treatment of uncertainty is key to communicating spill effectsSlide25
Drilling in the Chukchi Sea?
The margin for human error is much
slimmer
Oil spill clean-up is mostly wishful thinking