NO US The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons OHN URRI Hu - PDF document

TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsBonJourattemptstoelicittherelevantanti-externalistintuitionthroughavividdescriptionofexternalismspurportedessence.Theinternalistidea[is]thatthejustifyingreasonfor[anybelief]mustsome-howbecognitivelyavailabletothebelieverhimself,withinhiscognitivegrasporken.Atfirstglance,thecredentialsofthisideaseemquiteclearandstraight-forward:Ifthebeliefistobejustifiedforthatparticularperson(ratherthanperhapsforsomeoneelse),thenitseemsatleastinitiallyobviousthatthereasonforthinkingittobetruemustbeonetowhichthatpersonhimselfhasaccess.(BonJour2003:24…25;seealsoBonJour2002:222)Itisthisinternalistrequirementthatthejustifyingreasonbecognitivelyavailable,ŽBonJourexplains,thatexternalistviewsproposetodiscard.ŽTheexternalistsbasicidea:therearespecialsortsofreasonsŽthatjustifybeliefdespitebeingcognitivelyunavailabletotheperson.ŽExternalistswhoarealsostatists(callthem)cansimplygranttheinternalistideaŽthatallyourreasonsarereadilyavailabletoyou,be-causeontheirviewreasonsarenothingbutyourveryownmentalstates.Thecounterintuitivenessofexternalism,asBonJourdescribesit,derivespartlyfromillegitimatelyweddingittofactualism.Ofcoursenoinac-cessiblefactcouldbeyourreasonforbelieving,becausenofactplaysthatrole„mentalstatesdo.E-statistsofcourseacceptthatexternalfactssometimeshelpdeterminethequalityofyourreason,i.e.whetheryourreasonsaregoodorbad.SomeofthesefactsmaywellbeunavailableŽtoyouatthetime(e.g.whetheryourcolorvisionisreliableincertainconditions).ButthatdoesntcommitthemtosayingthatthoseunavailableŽfactscountasyourreasonsforbelieving.Noteverythingrelevanttoyourbeliefsepistemicqualitygetscountedasoneofyourreasonsforholdingthebelief.Wenowshifttothepapersmainarguments.Ifirstaddressaninfluentialargumentagainstpsychologism(section3).ThenIargueagainstabstraction-ismandfactualism,thetwomostinfluentialversionsofanti-psychologism(sections4and5).NextIpresentanargumentforstatism,theversionofpsy-chologismIadvocate(section6).FinallyIrespondtofourcommonconcerns(section7).3.PsychologismRefuted?Manyauthorsdistinguishbetweenmotivatingnormativereasons(e.g.Smith1994).Insofarasthissuggeststhatmotivatingreasonsarenotalsonormative,itisaseriousmistake(Dancy2000).Whenitcomestoepistemicreasons,therearenottwosortsofreasons,butratheronesortofthingthat Conversation4A[toC]:WhydoesBbelievethatWoodswillsinktheputt?C:Because(ofthefactthat)Woodsexcelsatputting.A[walksacrossthehallwaytoconfrontB]:WhydoyoubelievethatWoodsexcelsatputting?Assecondquestionagainsoundsperfectlynatural.Maybeitsnotalwaysoddtoinquiredirectlyaboutanenablingcondition.Itmightbeperfectlyappropriateincertaincontexts.Butthatisbesidethepoint.Normallyitisodd.Thesubjectsmentalstatesdonotbehavelikeenablingconditions.Toencapsulatemyresponse:9.Ifthesubjectsmentalstatesweremereenablingconditions,thennormallyitwouldbeoddtoinquiredirectlyafterthem.(Premise)10.Butitisnotnormallyoddtoinquiredirectlyafterthem.(Premise)11.Thereforethesubjectsmentalstatesarenotmereenablingconditions.(From9and10)TwinsIntuitivelyyouandyourvictimizedtwinbelievewhatyoudoforthesamereasons.EarlierImarshaledthisintuitioninfavorofstatism.Butifreasonsarementalstates,thenyouandyourtwindonthavethesamereasonsafterall:yourmentalstatesbelongtoyou,andVicstoVic.Hencethisintuitionironicallyworkagainststatism.Theobjectionconfusesnumericalandqualitativesensesofthesame.WheneachoftwopeopleownsaVolkswagenBeetle,wesaytheyownthesamecar,Žbutthisobviouslymeansthattheyownqualitativesimilarcars„i.e.carsofthesamekind„notnumericallyoneandthesamecar.Likewiseyourreasonsarenotnumericallyoneandthesameasyourtwins,buttheyareexactlysimilar.YouhaveaperceptualexperienceasofQ,whichisyourreasonforbelievingQ;VichasaperceptualexperienceasofQ,whichisVicsreasonforbelievingQ.Youbothhavethesamereason:aperceptualexperienceasofQ.Itsatruismthatweoftenshareourreasonswithoneanother.Canstatismdojusticetothis?Yes.Wecanandoftendoshareourthoughtsandexperienceswithoneanother.YouaskmewhatitwaslikegrowingupinDetroitinthe1980s,andIsharesomeofmyexperienceswithyou.IaskyouwhethertheDemocratswillregainatleastonehouseofCongressin2006,andyousharesomeofyourhopesandexpectationswithme.Weshareourmentalstateswithoneanotherbyexpressingordepictingthem. TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsexample,intracingouttheevidentialchainassociatedwithCarefulsbelief[thatFilcherstolethepainting],wemighthavetheaboutthefingerprintsandthepossessionofthepaintingsasthereasonsfor[Carefulsbelief].Therewillbefurtherreasonsforeachofthese,perhapsinvolvingtheresultsofthefingerprinttestsandthelike.(Feldman2003:50,boldemphasisadded)Withinthespanofaparagraphwearetoldthatreasonsarebeliefs,propo-sitions,andfacts.ConsideralsothesetypicalpassagesfromPeterKlein,valiantproponentofinfinitism:Infinitismislikefoundationalisminholdingthattherearefeaturesoftheworldthatmakeaareason.Infinitismisunlikefoundationalismbecauseinfinitismholdsthattherearenoultimate,foundationalreasons[T]hechainofreasonscannotendwithanarbitraryreason„oneforwhichthereisnofurtherreasonarbitrarybeliefs,beliefsforwhichnoreasonisavailable,shouldbeavoided.(Klein1999:298…299,boldemphasisadded)Thereisaninfinitechainofpropositionsforeveryproposition.Butonlysomechainscontainreasons.Hence,noteverypropositionwillhaveajustificationbecauseapropositionhasajustificationonlyifeachmemberofthechainisavailableasareason.(Klein1999:312,boldemphasisadded)FinallyconsiderthesepassagesfromJamesPryor:WeintroducedthenotionofagroundtodistinguishbetweencaseswhereyoubelievePforgoodreasons,orongroundsthatjustifyyouinbelievingP,andcaseswhereyoubelievePonbadgrounds,onesthatdonotjustifythatbelief.WhatdoesittakeforyourbelieftobegroundedonconditionCthatyouarein?(Pryor2005:195,boldemphasisadded)SaythatsomegroundsEyouhaveallowŽapossibilityiffthefollowingcounterfactualistrue:ifobtained,youwouldstillpossessthesamegroundsE.Manyskepticalscenariosareincompatiblewithwhatwepurporttoknowonthebasisofourexperiences,butareallowedŽbythoseexperiences,inthissense.Forinstance,yourexperiencesatthezooseemtojustifyyouinbelievingthatthereisazebrainthepen.Thisbeliefisincompatiblewiththehypothesisthattheanimalinthepenisamulepaintedtolooklikeazebra.ButthatisahypothesiswhichisallowedŽbyyourexperiences.Ifitwereapaintedmuleinthepen,youwouldmostlikelybehavingthesameexperiences,andhence,thesamegroundsforbelievingthatthereisazebrainthepen.(Pryor2000:527,boldemphasisadded)Sowhatareepistemicreasons„aretheymentalstates,suchasexperiencesorbeliefs?Propositions?Facts?Somethingelseentirely?Ethicistsandactiontheoristsstudyananalogousquestion.Weactforreasonsallthetimetoo,butwhatkindofthingarepracticalreasons?The believingQ,thenyouaretherebymovinginacircle.Thisopensupabstrac-tionismtothechargethatitinvitesskepticismaboutperceptualjustificationandknowledge.Butevenifwereconcileourselvestotheideathatmovinginacirclecouldenhancejustificationandyieldknowledge,westilloughttorejectabstractionismbecauseitentailsthattoheedthecallofexperienceistomoveinacircle.Notahintofcircularityinfectssuchatransition.Letmepreciselystatethisargument,usingthephrasetoheedthecallofexperiencetoneutrallyexpresswhatIwouldotherwisestatebysayingtobelieveQdirectlyonthebasisofanexperienceasofQ.1.Ifabstractionismistrue,thentoheedthecallofexperienceistobelieveQdirectlyonthebasisofQitself.(Premise)2.TobelieveQdirectlyonthebasisofQitselfistomoveinacircle.(Premise)3.Thereforeifabstractionismistrue,thentoheedthecallofexperienceistomoveinacircle.(From1and2)4.Butitisnotthecasethattoheedthecallofexperienceistomoveinacircle.(Premise)5.Thereforeabstractionismisnottrue.(From3and4)Theargumentisvalidsoabstractionistswillwanttorejectoneormorepremises.Somemightdeny1onthegroundsthatperceptualcontentisnon-propositional.Ifitisnon-propositional,thenitdoesnotfeature,sotheresnodangerofcircularity.Butmanyabstractionistswillwanttoavoidthisroute(e.g.Brewer2005).Andregardlesswhetherperceptualexperienceisnon-propositional,thesameproblemarisesincaseswhereyoubelieveQuponintuitingQ,becausetheintuitionfeatures.Noonedisputesthatintuitionshavepropositionalcontent.Butagain,toendorsethecontentofanintuitionisnottomoveinacircle.Othersmightdeny1onthegroundsthatnothingintheprecipitatingexperiencescontentexactlymatchestheperceptualbeliefscontent.Youcouldimplementthisstrategybyarguingthatwehaveonlyasinglegenericpropositionalattitude,andtreatingintuitioninanintuitionthatQaspartofthecontent.LikewiseforbeliefinabeliefthatQ,hopeinahopethatQ,andperceptioninaperceptionthatQ,etc.Thusratherthanhavingdifferentkindsofattitudewiththesamecontent,wegetasingletypeofattitudewithdifferentlycoloredŽcontent,yieldingacontentmismatch:theattitudethatwouldbebasedonthecontentperception-Q.Cleverasitis,thisdrasticresponseforcesustorelinquishthemanydistinctpropositionalattitudesfeaturedinfolkpsychology,whichweshouldavoidifpossible.Anditisalsoimplausibletolumpperceptioninwiththepropositionalattitudes,astheproposalenvisions(Millar1991:Chapter1). asanironicorhumorouswayofsayingthatthereisnoreasontobelievethemoonismadeofcheese.Attheveryleast,thereisaperfectlyrespectablesenseinwhichsomethingisntareasonatalltobelieveQifitisntagoodreasontobelieveQ.ItisthissenseIintend.RamNeta(2003:esp.21…26)sayssomethingsthat,suitablymodified(hetalksofevi-denceŽratherthanreasonsŽ),mightsuggestaviewalongtheselines.Forstandardcontextualisttheories,seeLewis1996,DeRose1999,andCohen1998,RecallthismemorablescenefromthemovieCrocodileDundee(1986).Brandishingaswitchblade,amuggerthreatensSueCharltonandCrocodileDundee.SuesaystoDundee,Givehimyourwallet.ŽDundeeasks,Whatfor?ŽSueresponds,Hesgotaknife,ŽwhereuponDundeechuckles,Thatsnotaknife,ŽdrawsagiantBowieknifeandsays,Thatsaknife.ŽEvenmyopponentsagree,e.g.Dancy2000:3.Thisalsomightneedtoinvolvesomerestrictiononwhichmentalstatescanbereasons.Iwontpursuethedetailshere.TracesofthiscanbedetectedinsomeofBonJoursearliestwritingsonthesubject.SeeBonJour1978:266…269[SectionsIII…IV],wherehecriticizesArmstrongsexternalisttheoryofknowledge,andalsoBonJour1992:134…135.Huemer(2007:42…8)appearstomakearelatedmistake(ironically,inarguingagainstBonJour,amongothers),butinanothercontext(2009:227)goessomewaytowarddispellingtheappearance.Minorterminologicalnote:Inwhatfollows,forconvenienceIoftenusenormativeratherthannormativeorevaluative,understandingthenormativebroadlytoincludetheevaluative.Someprefertoreservenormativefordeontologicalmatters(e.g.requirementsandpermissions),andevaluativeforaxiologicalmatters(e.g.goodandbad).Dancy(2000)discussesthethree-partstory,Žwhichproponentsofpsychologismal-legedlywilltellwhentryingtoreconcilethemotivationalandnormativedimensionsofreasonsunderstoodaspsychologicalitems.ThenormativeconstraintŽstatesthatmotivatingreasonsmustbecapableofbeinggoodreasons.InDancyswords,thenormativeconstraintrequiresthatamotivatingreasonbethesortofthingthatiscapableofbeingamongthereasonsinfavorofsoacting;itmust,inthissense,bepossibletoactforagoodreason,Ž(103).Dancythensays,Thethree-partstoryfailsthenormativeconstraintinaveryblatantway,foritrendersusmoreorlessincapableofdoinganactionforanyofthereasonsthatmakeitright.Itmakesitimpossible,thatis,forthereasonswhyweacttobethereasonsinfavorofacting,Ž(103).LaterDancyextendsthisthoughttoepistemicreasons:Ihavebeentryingtoshowthatthethree-partstoryiscommittedtotheparadoxicalclaimthatitisimpossibletodoanactionforthereasonthatmakesitright.AsIputitearlier,thereasonswhyweactcanneverbeamongthereasonsinfavorofactingifthethree-partstoryistrue.Thisparadoxisevenmoremarkedinthetheoryoftheoreticalreasons(reasonsforbelief)thaninthetheoryofpracticalreasons,Ž(105,emphasisadded).Seethepreviousnoteforanexplanationofthebracketedmaterial.Miller2008:234alsoslidesfromnormativereasonsŽtogoodreasons.ŽHereIthinkofFumerton(1995),whoendorsesalogicaltheoryofprobabilityastheonlyplausibleresponsetoskepticism,andBonJour(2003),wholikewiseendorsesinferencetothebestexplanationastheonlyplausibleresponse.SeealsoChisholm1989:52andFeldmanHarman1986persuasivelycriticizestheideathatwecanreadoffepistemicnormsfromlogicalrelationsamongpropositions.Arefereesuggestedtomethattheydseenaversionofthisproblembefore.Imyselfdonotrecallseeingitdiscussed.Inanyevent,Itrustthattheensuingsetofobjections,responses,replies,etc.helpsadvancethediscussion.StrictlyspeakingIshouldsay,thepropositionheresarectangularsurfacemyreasonsforbelievingheresarectangularsurface.ŽThiscomplicationmakesnodifferencetomyargument,andcouldbestipulatedawayifnecessary,soIsetitaside. NO  US43:3(2009)490…512 TheOntologyofEpistemicReasons J OHN T URRI HuronUniversityCollege Abstract Epistemicreasonsarementalstates.Theyarenotpropositionsornon- mentalfacts.Thediscussionproceedsasfollows.Section1introducesthe topic.Section2givestwoconcreteexamplesofhowourtopicdirectlyaffects theinternalism/externalismdebateinnormativeepistemology.Section3 respondstoanargumentagainsttheviewthatreasonsarementalstates. Section4presentstwoproblemsfortheviewthatreasonsarepropositions. Section5presentstwoproblemsfortheviewthatreasonsarenon-mental facts.Section6arguesthatreasonsarementalstates.Section7respondsto objections. 1.Introduction Heresanuncontroversialstartingpoint:webelievethingsforreasonsall thetime.Notevenskepticsneeddisagree,fortheywouldbevindicatedifit turnedoutthatallourbeliefswerebasedonbadreasons.Ofcoursemost ofuswilldisagreewiththeskepticonthislatterpoint.ButIfirstwantto getcleareronourcommonpointofagreement.Justwhatkindofthingare reasonstobeginwith? Letsreservetheterm epistemicreason forthosereasonsuponwhichour beliefsarebased.SometimesIspeakofreasonsforbelieving,Žintending exactlysamemeaning.WhatIcallthebasisofbelief,someauthorscallthe groundsŽofbelief(Alston1985,Pryor2005). Confusionaboundsinepistemologyonourquestion.Considerthispas- sagefromRichardFeldman: [A]chainofreasonsoranevidentialchain ... isastructuredsequenceof beliefs , eachofwhichisjustifiedbyitspredecessors.Itisimportanttonoticethatan evidentialchainneednothavejustone proposition ateachlinkorlevel.For C  2009WileyPeriodicals,Inc. 490 Miller,Christian.2008.MotivationinAgents.Ž,vol.42,no.2,222…266.Moore,G.E.1962.ProofofanExternalWorld.ŽReprintedinSosa&Kim,eds.Neta,Ram.2002.SKnowsThatP.Ž,vol.36,no.4,663…681.„„„.2003.ContextualismandtheProblemoftheExternalWorld.ŽPhilosophyandPhe-nomenologicalResearch,vol.LXVI,no.1,January2003.Nozick,Robert.1981.PhilosophicalExplanations.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Pryor,James.2000.TheSkepticandtheDogmatist.Ž,vol.34,no.4,517…549.„„„.2005.ThereisImmediateJustification.ŽInSteup&Sosa,eds.Rieber,Steven.1998.SkepticismandContrastiveExplanation.Ž,vol.32,no.2,189…204.Scanlon,Thomas.1999.WhatWeOwetoEachOther.Cambridge,MA:BelknapPress.Schaffer,Jonathan.2005.ContrastiveCausation.ŽThePhilosophicalReview,vol.114,no.3(July2005),327…358.Smith,Michael.1994.TheMoralProblem.Malden,MA:Blackwell.Sorensen,RoyA.1991.P,Therefore,PWithoutCircularity.ŽTheJournalofPhilosophyvol.88,no.5(May1991),245…266.Sosa,Ernest.1991.KnowledgeinPerspective.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.„„„.2003.EpistemicJustification:Internalismvs.Externalism,Foundationsvs.VirtuesLaurenceBonJour).Malden,MA:Blackwell.Sosa,Ernest&JaegwonKim,eds.2000.Epistemology:AnAnthology.Malden,MA:Blackwell.Steup,Matthias&ErnestSosa,eds.2005.ContemporaryDebatesinEpistemology.Malden,MA:Blackwell.Stoutland,Fredrick.1998.TheRealReasons.ŽInBransenandCuypers,eds. TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsAnotherpossibleview,whichIdonothereevaluate,iscontextual-ismaboutreasons(orreasonascriptions).ThisviewstatesthatthetruthconditionsforexpressionsoftheformSsbeliefthatQisbasedonRorRisSsreasonforbelievingQvarywithfeaturesofthespeakerscontext.InordinarycontextsyoucouldtruthfullysayMooresbeliefthathehashandsisbasedonthefactthathehashands.Buttospeaktruthfullyincontextswherethepossibilityofperceptualhallucinationorsystematicdeceptionhasbeenraised,youwouldinsteadhavetosayMooresbeliefisbasedonhisexperienceasoftwohands.Youmightendorsethisviewbecause,ontheonehand,reasonsareexplanatoryand,ontheother,explanationiscontext-sensitive.Itwouldthusbeunsurprisingifreasons-talkwascontext-sensitive.Youcouldthendeployreasons-contextualismtohelpsolvestubbornskepti-calpuzzles,justasfamiliarcontextualisttheoriesinnormativeepistemologyhavebeen.Reasons-contextualismholdsatleastoneadvantageoverstandardcontextualisttheories.Whereasthelattertypicallyinvokecontroversialthesesaboutthesemanticsofknowstoexplainthepurportedcontext-sensitivityofknowledgeascriptions,theformerneedinvokeonlythecomparativelyuncontroversialthesisthatexplanationiscontext-sensitive(compareRieber1998:194ffandGreco2003).Atleastfourobservationsoughttoconstrainourtheoryofreasons.First,reasonsareexplanatory.Tosaythisisnottoconfuseepistemicreasonswithmerelycausalreasons.WhenyoubelieveQforareason,youbelieveofthatreason„thereasonexplainsyourbelief.Anadequatetheorymustrespectthis.Second,ideallyatheoryshouldrespectthefollowingintuition.Yourvictimizedtwin,Vic,recentlyensnaredbyanevilgenius,undergoesanindefinitesuccessionofexperiencesindistinguishablefromyours.Respondingtotheverysamekindsofsensoryexperiencesasyou,Vicbelievesthatheorsheisreadinganepistemologypaper.Intuitivelyyouandyourtwinbelievewhatyoudoforthesamereasons(compareBerkeley1710:20,Nozick1981:184…185,Foley1990:184,BonJour2003:185…186,Sosa2003:150,andHuemer2007:48).Third,atheoryofreasonsshouldgeneralizebeyondbeliefandapplyequallywelltodisbeliefandwithholding.Fourth,atheoryofreasonsshouldnotmakeourjobinconstructinganadequatenormativeepistemologytoodifficult„forinstance,whenexplainingthereasonablenessofperceptualbeliefs.Asalreadysuggested,Iassumethatitispossibletobelievebasedonabadreason.Iammorethancomfortablelettingmyargumentultimatelyrestonthisassumption,shoulditcometothatpoint.True,sometimespeoplesayabadreasonisnoreasonatall.ŽButweunderstandthistomeanthatitisnotagoodreason,justaswemightrespondtoabadargumentbysayingthatsnotanargument,Žorcharacterizeamediocrefastballasnofastballatall,Žorsaythatadefectiveknifeisnotaknife.ŽTherearebadreasons,justastherearebadarguments,mediocrefastballs,anddefectiveknives. SeeMill1846:198andLewis1986:162.Theyspeakofananalogousdistinctionforcausation(backgroundconditionsversuscausesproper),whereaswefocusonthemoregeneralnotionofexplanation.HartandHonore1985.Onemightworry,asdidananonymousreferee,thatmydiscussionpresupposesatheo-reticalaccountoftheexplanans/enablerdistinctionthatmyopponentswillreject.Ihavethreeresponsestothisworry.First,myopponentshavenotindicatedthattheyfavorordisfavoranyparticulartheoreticalaccountofthedistinction„see,e.g.,Dancy2000:127„sothisworryissomewhatspeculative.Second,tofullyinsureagainstthepresupposition,Icouldmakeaweakerpointandstilladvancethedialectic.Myexamplesfeatureparadigmcasesofenablingcondi-tions.Thesubjectsmentalstatesarecertainlyunlikeparadigmcasesofenablingconditions,andanyadequatetheoryofthedistinctionshouldrespectthisverdict.Thisdoesnotruleoutthattheyformamarginalclassofenablers.Butthereisnoquickroutetomyopponentsgoalshere,andtheywillneedtopresentanaccountoftheexplanans/enablerdistinctiontoconvinceusthatmentalstatesdoformamarginalclassofenablers.Third,grantforthesakeofargumentthatallthepointsImakeherepresupposeanaccountofthedistinctionthatmyopponentswillreject.Thatinitselfdoesnotevinceanydefect.Ifmyresponsewouldtendtopersuadeaneutralthird-partythatmentalstatesarenotmereenablers,thenIshallcountitasuccess.Collins1997andKim1998.Moore1962:24.Forhelpfulconversationsandfeedback,Ithank:JonathanDancy,JamesDreier,MylanEngel,DerekEttinger,BenFiedor,JohnGreco,StephenGrimm,AllanHazlett,JonathanIchikawa,BenJarvis,ChristopherKane,PeterKlein,ClaytonLittlejohn,JohnMcDowell,EugeneMills,AlastairNorcross,BruceRussell,MarkSchroeder(twice?),ErnestSosa,MatthiasSteup,JamesVanCleve,andtwoanonymousreferees.ThanksalsotoaudiencesattheBrownPhilosophyGraduateForuminDecember2005andtheRussellIIConferenceinMarch2006.ReferencesAlston,WilliamP.2005.BeyondJustificationŽ:DimensionsofEpistemicEvaluation.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Alvarez,Maria.2005.Agents,Actions,andReasons.ŽPhilosophicalBooks,vol.46,no.1,Bergmann,Michael.2007.IsKleinanInfinitistaboutDoxasticJustification?Ž,vol.134,no.1(May2007),19…24.Berkeley,George.1710.ATreatiseConcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledgeBonJour,Laurence.1978.CanEmpiricalKnowledgeHaveaFoundation?ŽAmericanPhilo-sophicalQuarterly,vol.15,no.1,1…13.ReprintedinSosa&Kim,eds.„„„.1980.ExternalistTheoriesofEmpiricalKnowledge.ŽMidwestStudiesinPhilosophyvol.V,1980,53…71.ReprintedinCrumley,ed.„„„.1985.TheStructureofEmpiricalKnowledge.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.„„„.1992.Externalism/Internalism.ŽInDancy&Sosa1992.„„„.2001.Replies.ŽPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,vol.63,no.3(Nov.2001),„„„.2002.Epistemology:ClassicalProblemsandContemporaryResponses.NewYork:Rowman&Littlefield.„„„.2003.EpistemicJustification:Internalismvs.Externalism,Foundationsvs.VirtuesErnestSosa).Malden,MA:Blackwell.„„„.2005.InDefenseoftheaPriori.ŽInSteup&Sosa,eds.Brandom,RobertB.2000.ArticulatingReasons:AnIntroductiontoInferentialism.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. thepropositionGodexistsonlyifitisfalsethatthereisunnecessarysuf-feringintheworldandthepropositionthereisunnecessarysufferingintheworld.ButthismakesNevilsoundcompletelyunreasonable:surelyheoughttodisbelievethatGodexistsbasedonthosereasons!YetNevilisntbeingunreasonable.Abstractionismseemstoyieldthewrongverdicthere.Secondstage:NowNevilgetshitonthehead,whichsimultaneouslyknockshimunconsciousandcauseshimtobelievethatthereisunneces-sarysufferingintheworld.(Note:Nevildoesthinkhehasbeenhitontheheadandreasonfromtheretotheconclusionthatthereisunneces-sarysufferingintheworld;rather,thehitsimplycausesthebeliefthroughsomenon-rationalprocess.)Uponwaking,Nevilupdateshisotherattitudesaccordingly.NowhedisbelievesthatGodexists.WhatarehisreasonsfordisbelievingthatGodexists?Statistsanswer:hisbeliefthatthereisunnecessarysufferingintheworld,andhisbeliefthatGodexistsonlyifitisfalsethatthereisunnecessarysufferingintheworld.Nowcomesthepeculiarpart.AbstractionistsagainanswerthatNevilsreasonsarethepropositionGodexistsonlyifitisfalsethatthereisunnecessarysuffer-ingintheworldandthepropositionthereisunnecessarysufferingintheworld.Inotherwords,ontheirviewNevil(inthesecondstage)disbelievesthatGodexistsfortheexactsamereasonshepreviously(inthefirststage)withheldonwhetherGodexists.Thisresultisextremelycounterintuitive.Inresponseabstractionistsmightdenythatwithholdingisagenuinepropositionalattitudeandreplaceitwithspecialbeliefs.Soinsteadofwith-holdingonthereisunnecessarysufferingintheworldinthefirststage,Nevilbelievesthepropositionitsunclearwhetherthereisunnecessarysuf-feringintheworld.Thisresponsemighthandletheexample,butatasteepcost:itisimplausibleonphenomenologicalgroundsanditcontradictsabroadconsensusinepistemologythatwithholdingisagenuinepropositionalattitude,onethatyouareattimesrequiredtotaketowardaproposition(e.g.Chisholm1989,FeldmanandConee1985,Sosa1991).Alternativelyabstractionistsmightlookforpropositionsintheneighbor-hoodŽoftheoriginalstoserveasNevilsreasons.Forinstancetheymightsayhisreasonsarepropositionshismentalstates.SointhefirststageNevilsreasonsareIbelievethatGodexistsonlyifitisfalsethatunnecessarysufferingexistsintheworldIwithholdonwhetherun-necessarysufferingexistsintheworld,whileinthesecondstagetheyareIbelievethatGodexistsonlyifitisfalsethatunnecessarysufferingexistsintheworldIbelievethatunnecessarysufferingexistsintheworldButthisresponsefailstoaddresstheunderlyingproblem.Toseewhy,noticewecanstipulatethatNevillackstheconceptualresourcestoentertainthepropositionIwithholdonwhetherunnecessarysufferingexistsintheworldbecausehelackstheconceptWITHHOLDING.Andifhecannotentertainthatproposition,thenitobviouslycannotbehisreasonforholdinganydoxasticattitude. Havingtherelevantmentalstatesinplaceandappropriatelyrelatedisforustounderstandyourreasons.Tounderstandapersonsrea-sons,allweneedisforhismentalstates„inmostcasessomeverysmallportionofthem„andtherelationsamongthemtobedisplayed.ConsiderBarry.Barryhasanordinaryvisualexperienceasofabearinhisyard,whichinconjunctionwithhishabitoftakingexperienceatfacevaluecauseshimtobelievethattheresabearoutthere.ThatdescriptionallowsyoutounderstandBarrysreason.Puttingthosetwothingstogether,havingtherelevantmentalstatesinplaceandappropriatelyrelatedisbothnecessaryandsufficientforustounderstandyourreasons.Statismbestexplainsthestrikingfactexpressedbythatbiconditional.Ifyourreasonsjustareyourmentalstates,thenobviouslyhavingtherelevantmentalstatesinplaceandrelatedintherightwayisbothnecessaryandsufficientforareasons-explanation.Bycontraststatismscompetitorsclaimthatsomeotheritemsareyourreasons.Butitissuperfluoustointroducefurtheritemsintothereasons-explanation,giventhatthementalstatesarethemselvesbothnecessaryandsufficient.Therefore,byinferencetothebestexplanation,statismistrue.Callthisthemasterargumentforstatism7.ResponsetoCommonConcernsThissectionrespondstofourcommonconcernsaboutstatism.EnablersIencounteracommonchallengetotheexplanatoryrelevanceofthesubjectsmentalstates.Thechallengebeginsbydistinguishingitemsthatreallydotheexplanatorywork(theexplanans)frommerebackgroundorenablingcon-ditions.Thisdistinctionismotivatedindependentlyofthepresentdiscussion.TakeoneofTigerWoodssclutchputts.Hisskillandexecutionexplainwhytheballfallsintothecup.OfcoursetheballwouldnothavefallenintothecuphadEarthsgravityweakenedsignificantly,but(thestrengthof)EarthsgravitymerelyformspartofthebackgroundconditionsenablingWoodstosinktheputtthroughskillandexecution.Thechallengecontinuesbyspecu-latingthatthesubjectsmentalstatesmerelyenabletherealreason„beitapropositionorsomenon-mentalfact„toexplainthesubjectsbelief.Wemightrespondbyrejectingthedistinctionbetweenexplanansandenablingconditions,onthegroundsthatanyattemptatsortingfactorsintothetwocategorieswillinvolvecapriciousŽorinvidiousŽdiscrimination.ButIwillnotrespondthatway.InsteadIwillgrantthedistinctionsviabilityandaskwhetherthesubjectsmentalstatesbehavelikeenablingconditionsinreasons-explanations.Reflectingonourexplanatorypracticesrevealsthattheydonot.(Beforeproceeding,itmeritsemphasisthatmyopponentshave arefactsorstatesofaffairs.Factualistscannotrespondthiswaywithoutabandoningtheirview.Indeedleadingfactualistsexplicitlyrejectit.Theysaythatitandstatismareunite[d]inoppositionŽagainsttheirview(Dancy2000:122;seealsoCollins1997).Inlightofthemotivationforfactualism,wecaneasilyseewhy.TheProblemofFalseFactsSometimesfactsŽarenotreallyfacts.Dickgotthefactswrong.Theintelli-gencereportsdidntsay,asDickmistakenlybelieves,Iraqdoespossessnu-clearweapons,Žbutrather,Iraqdoespossessnuclearweapons.ŽDicksbeliefcannotbebasedonthefactthatthereportssay,Iraqdoespossessnuclearweapons,Žbecausenosuchfactexists.SurelyfactualistsdontwanttosaythatDickbelieveswhathedoesfornoreason,becausethatsobviouslyfalse.Butthenwhatcanfactualistssay?(Casesofhallucination,wherenothingevenapproximatingthepurportedfactisaroundtodotherelevantwork,representthemostextremeversionofthisproblem.Butnothingsoextravagantisneededtoillustratethepoint.Iwanttoavoidtheimpressionthattheproblemisendemictoextravagantcases,soIpreferanunremarkablecaseoffalsebelieforperceptualerrorOnepopularstrategyistheappositionalaccount,whichstatesthatreasonsarefactsasthesubjectunderstandsthem,orastheyseemtothesubject(Collins1997:120…1;Dancy2000:110…11,132…5).Onthisapproach,DicksreasonforbelievingthatIraqposesathreattotheUnitedStatesisthefactthattheintelligencereportssaythatIraqpossessesnuclearweapons,asheunderstandsthings.Crucialtothisstrategyistheclaimthatthemodifierasheunderstandsthingsisnot,inArthurCollinswords,ashifttothementalrealm.ŽyetImunabletohearitasanythingbutthat.Inaword,itstrikesmesimplyasaconvolutedwayofcapitulatingtopsychologism.Itisthesubjectsunderstandingofthefactsthatpromptsbelief.Whynotjustsettlefortheflat-footedresponse,accordingtowhichDicksreasonforbelievingthatIraqposesathreattotheUnitedStatesisthefactthattheintelligencereportssaidthatIraqdoesnotpossessnuclearweapons?Becausethiscureisworsethanthedisease.ItmakesDicklookflat-outirrational,perhapsincomprehensible.(WecouldofcoursebuildupthecasesothatDickknewthefollowingconditional:IraqpossessesnuclearweaponsaimedattheUnitedStatesifandonlyiftheintelligencereportsaysthatIraqdoesnotpossessnuclearweapons.Perhapshehasexcellentevidencetosuspectthattheintelligencecommunitywilltrytodeceivehimonthismatter.Nothingofthesortistrueinthepresentcase.)Sometimesbeliefpromptedbyperceptualerrorisperfectlyreasonable.MuchbetterwouldbetosaythatDicksreasonishisperceptualexperienceasoftheintelligencereportsayingso-and-so. playstworoles.Manyofourbeliefsarebasedonreasons,andintuitivelymanyofthosereasons„theverysameonesthatmotivateourbeliefs„aregood.Soanacceptabletheoryofreasonsshouldrespecttheirnormativerole.Somebelievethisspellsdoomforpsychologism.ConsiderthefollowingargumentsuggestedbyJonathanDancysdiscussionofpsychologism(Dancy2000:102…8;seealsoMiller2008:233).D1.Ifpsychologismistrue,thenitisimpossibletobelieveforagoodreason.(Premise)D2.Butitispossibletobelieveforagoodreason.(Premise)D3.Thereforepsychologismisnottrue.(FromD1andD2)SkepticsmightdenyD2,butIwont.TheculpritisD1.Psychologismisconsistentwithawidevarietyofviewsaboutwhatmakesreasonsgood.Supposeforthesakeofargumentthatreasonsarementalstates.Andsup-posethatsimplereliabilismprovidesasufficientconditionforgoodreasons:ifyourmentalstateMreliablyindicatesthatQ,thenMisagoodreasonforyoutobelieveQ.Iampresentlyundergoinganexperienceasofarectangularsurface,whichexperiencereliablyindicatesthepresenceofarectangularsur-facebeforeme.Basedonthatexperience,Ibelievethatarectangularsurfaceliesbeforeme,andconsequentlybelieveforagoodreason.Orsupposethatreliabilitydoesnotsufficeforgoodreasons:youmustalsobeawarethatMreliablyindicatesthatQ.Thisfurtherconditionpresentsnogreatdifficulty.WecansimplyaddtothedescriptionofthecasethatIamawarethatmyvisualexperiencereliablyindicatesthatarectangularsurfaceliesbeforeme.Ortotakeamoreunorthodoxsuggestion,supposethatdivinecommandepistemologyiscorrect:MisagoodreasonforyoutobelieveQifandonlyGodwillsyoutobelieveQbasedonM.IpresentlyhaveanintuitionthattheexistenceofunnecessaryevilprecludesGodsexistence.GodwillsthatIendorsethecontentofthatintuition.Idosoandconsequentlybelieveforagoodreason.Wecouldmultiplyexamplesbutthebasicpointisalreadyclear.Psychol-ogismdoesnotruleoutbelievingforagoodreason.ButthenwhydosomepeoplefindD1plausible?ThemistakederivesfromconflatingnormativereasonsŽ(ornormativestatesofaffairsŽ)withgoodreasons.ŽConsiderforexamplehowDancydescribesreasonsnormativedimension:[Thenormativedimension]requiresthatamotivatingreasonbethesortofthingthatiscapableofbeingamongthereasonsinfavorofso[believing];itmust,inthissense,bepossibleto[believe]foragoodreason.(Dancy2000: 2.ApplicationsThissectionexplainstwowaysanontologicaltheoryofreasonscouldaffectdebatesinnormativeepistemology.AccordingtoEarlConeeandRichardFeldman,webestunderstandepiste-mologicalinternalismasacommitmenttothiscoreprinciple:nocontingentnon-mentalfactorcanhelpdeterminewhetheryouareepistemicallyjusti-fiedinholdinganydoxasticattitude(ConeeandFeldman2001:57…8).Theyadvocatethisprincipleandcalltheirviewmentalism.ŽUnquestionablyyourreasonforbelievingsomethinghelpsdeterminewhetheryourbeliefisepistemicallyjustified.NowsupposeforthesakeofargumentthatfactualismisthecorrecttheoryofreasonsandthatConeeandFeldmanarecorrectaboutinternalism.Butthenitfollowsthatinternalismisfalse.Formybeliefthat,say,aschoolbusisparkedatthecornerisbasedontheindisputablycontingentnon-mentalfactthataschoolbusisparkedatthecorner,renderingmybeliefsjustificationdependentonacontingentnon-mentalfact.Approachingthematterfromaslightlydifferentdirection,considerwhatafactualistwouldsayaboutMooresbeliefthathehastwohands.WhatreasondoesMoorehavethatpropositionallyjustifiesIhavetwohandsforhim?(Iuseanglebracketstonamepropositions.)Inotherwords,whatreasondoesMoorehavethatmakestheepistemicallyappropriateattitudeforhimtotaketowardIhavetwohands?Dependingonwhichversionoffactualismweconsider,itmightbethefactthathehastwohands,orthestateofaffairsconsistingofhimhavingtwohands,orevenhishandsthemselves.Onanyoftheseversions,Mooresreasonisnon-mentalandcontingent.ItisaplainlyexternalfactorŽthatpartlydetermineswhichdoxasticattitudeisjustifiedforMoore.Iffactualismistrue,thenmentalismisfalse.BonJoursObjectionLaurenceBonJourobjectstoexternalismaboutepistemicjustificationbe-causeitsupposedlyentailsthatapersonsreasonscanbeoutsidehiscog-nitivegraspŽorcognitivelyunavailableŽtohim(BonJour2003:24…7).ButBonJoursobjectionappearscompellingonlyifwefailtoadequatelydistin-guishthedebatesbetweeninternalistsandexternalistsontheonehand,andstatistsandfactualistsontheother.(Awordofcaution:BonJours(2002:223)viewoftheinternalism/externalismdisputeinepistemologydiffersmarkedlyfromConeeandFeldmans,soyoushouldntexpectmydiscussioninthissubsectiontocohereseamlesslywiththeprevioussubsectionsclaimsorim-plicationsaboutthenatureofinternalism.) TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsButagoodreasonneedntcompriseallthefactorscontributingtoitsgood-ness.Consideragainoursimplereliabilisttheoryofgoodreasons.Myvisualexperienceisareliableindication,andhencegoodreasonformetobelieve,thatarectangularsurfaceliesbeforeme.Muchbesidesmypsychologyhelpsmaketheexperiencereliable,includingnaturallawsconnectingtheambientconditions,thesurfacesreflectanceproperties,andmyvisualsystemsout-put.Orconsideragaindivinecommandepistemology.Godswillmakesmyintuitionagoodreason,butobviouslymyintuitiondoesnotincludeGodsDancyandothersthinkthatanti-psychologismholdsanadvantagebe-causeitrespectstheideathatgoodreasonscanbe,orbegroundedin,considerationsotherthanthoseconcerningthepsychologyoftheagent,ŽinparticularfeaturesofoursurroundingsŽ(Dancy2000:137).Buttheirviewenjoysnosuchadvantage.Psychologismsproponentscanfullyandconsis-tentlyendorsetheclaimthatnon-psychologicalfeaturesofoursurroundingscontributetoareasonsquality.WeshouldnoteanimportantsimilaritybetweenDancysandBonJoursdiscussions.BonJoursdiscussionmighteasilyleadustomistakestatismsvirtuesforinternalismsvirtues.SimilarlyDancysdiscussionmighteasilyleadustomistakeexternalismsvirtuesforfactualismsvirtues.4.TwoProblemsforAbstractionismThissectionpresentstwoproblemsforabstractionism.Butletmefirstsaysomethingaboutwhatmotivatesabstractionism.Abstractionismisattractive,Ithink,partlybecauseitcomplementstheviewthatevidentialrelationsarefoundedinlogicalrelationsamongpropo-sitions.Ifyouthoughtthatreasonswerepropositions,andyouthought,asatleastsomeleadingepistemologistsdo,thatlogicalrelationsdetermineevidentialrelations,thenyourontologicaltheoryofreasonswouldcoherenicelywithyourtheoryofevidence.Ourbeliefswouldbebasedontheverysamethingsenteringintoevidentialrelationswithoneanother.Whetherornotthismotivationultimatelywithstandsscrutiny,IcanseehowsuchacombinationmightinitiallyseemattractiveTheProblemofCircularitySupposeIundergoaperceptualexperiencewiththecontentheresarectan-gularsurface,whereuponIcometobelieveheresarectangularsurfaceThisseemslikeaperfectlygoodwaytocometoknowthattheresarectan-gularsurfacebeforeme.Accordingtoabstractionism,insuchacasemyreasonforbelievingthepropositionheresarectangularsurfaceisthepropositionheresarect-angularsurfaceButthismeansthatinheedingthecallofperceptualexperience,Iammovinginacircle.Forifisamongyourreasonsfor TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsFirst-personPerspectiveWhendeliberatingwithaneyetowardreachingaconclusion,wefocusonoutwardfactsandobjectsbutnotonourmentalstates(exceptinspecialWhenadducinghisreasonsforbelievingthatthereareexternalobjects,Moorefocusedonhishands,nothisbeliefsabouthishands.Hesaid,Hereisonehand,andhereisanother.ŽHedidntsay,Hereisonebeliefthatheresahand,andhereisanother.ŽSurelysomedeferenceisduetothephenomenologyofdeliberation.Butcanstatistsdojusticetoit?Yes,bycitingthementalstatesthatconstitute(therelevantaspectsof)thesubjectsfirst-personperspective.WhenMooresays,Hereisonehand,andhereisanother,Žheexpressestwoconsciousoccurrentbeliefs,whichpartlyconstitutehisperspective.Inutteringthosewords,hecommunicateshisper-spectivetous.Heexpresseshisreasonstous.Andofcourseheexpresseshisbeliefs,nothishands.ThesurroundingcontextsuggeststhatFeldmanthinksreasonsarebeliefs,notproposi-tionsorfacts.Alvarez2005reviewssomerecentwork.IbelieveJonathanDancyintroducedthetermspsychologismandanti-psychologismintotheliterature.Stoutland(1998:61)appearstoadvocatethisview.StatistsincludeDavidson(1983:141),Swain(1981:Chapter3),Pollock(1986:Chapter5),Neta(2002:669),andBergmann(2007).SometimesMcDowell(1979:Section5;1994:10)saysthingsthatputhimsquarelyinthestatistcamp,butothertimes(e.g.1994:36,39)hesoundslikeafactualist„reasonsarefacts,Žfeaturesoftheworld,Žorstatesofaffairs.ŽHeinformsmethathefavorsfactualism.StatismdoesnotruleoutMcDowells(1994:LectureII)viewofempiricalcontent,accordingtowhichthecontentofaperceptualstateoratrueperceptualjudgmentisliterallysomeexternal,non-mentalfact.CombiningstatismwithMcDowellsviewofempiricalcontent„orwithClarkandChalmerss(1998)extendedmindhypothesis„wewouldsaythatreasonsarepsychologicalitems,(atleast)someofwhichliterallycontainnon-psychologicalitems.Somemightviewthiscombinationasasatisfyingwaytosplitthedifferencebetweenpsychologismandanti-psychologism.Apotentiallyattractiveversionofstatism,whichIdonotconsiderhereindetail,saysthatreasonsare(tokenpropertiesofmentalstates;thismightbeErnestSosasview.AbstractionistsincludeDarwall(1983:31…32),Scanlon(1999:56…57),andBrandom(2000:18).FactualistsincludeDancy(2000),Collins(1997),andMcDowell(1994).Theviewasstatedneedsqualification.Factualistswillagreethatourintrospectivebeliefsarebasedonmentalfactsorstates,buttheydeemtheseuninterestingspecialcases,andinsistthatthisqualificationdoesnotspoilthespiritoftheirview.Ithinkthispresentsmoreofaproblemthanfactualistswanttoadmit,perhapsindicatingthatmanyfactualistsareultimatelydualists.ButIwontexplorethematterhere.Interminologyfamiliarfromtheliteratureonpracticalreasons,Iunderstandthecompeti-torsastheoriesofmotivatingreasons.Irevisitthedistinctionbetweenmotivatingandnormativereasonsbelowinsection3.See,e.g.,Darwall1983:30…31,Scanlon1998:18…19,andDancy2000:Chapter1.Onemightsay,Thereareplentyofreasonstobelievethemoonismadeofcheese„andtheyreallbad!ŽButtomyear,takenliterallythissoundslikearetraction.Idcooperativelyunderstandit metaphysicalterritoryhereisbetterexplored,soIwillusetheirtaxonomytoguideourinquiryintoepistemicreasons.Themainoptionsare:Psychologism:Allreasonsarepsychologicalitems.Anti-psychologism:Noreasonisapsychologicalitem.:Somebutnotallreasonsarepsychologicalitems.Psychologicalitemsincludementalstates,events,processesandmentalfactsaboutthesubject.Wellfocusononespecificversionofpsychologismandtwoversionsofanti-psychologism.Idefendthisversionofpsychologism::Reasonsarethesubjectsmentalstatesorevents.Icritiquetheseversionsofanti-psychologism:Abstractionism:Reasonsarethepropositionalcontentsofthesubjectsmentalstates.Factualism:Reasonsarenon-mentalfactsorstatesofaffairs.Iwontexplicitlycritiquedualism,whichfindsrelativelyfewexplicitadvo-catesintheliterature.Butmypositiveargumentinsection6worksequallywellagainstdualism.Letmeclarifywhatthesearetheoriesof.TheyarenottheoriesofreasonsthattherearebelieveQ,whichdifferimportantlyfromepistemicreasonsinthesensewearedealingwith,foratleasttworeasons.reasonsthattherearetobelieveQneednotbehad.Theremightbereasonsnoneofushastobelievethataninfluenzapandemicwilloccur.Buttobelieveonthebasisofareason,youmusthaveit.Second,reasonsthattherearetobelieveQarealwaysgoodreasonstobelieveQ.ButyoucanbelieveQonthebasisofreasons.ThecompetitorsarelikewisenottheoriesofthereasonswhyyoubelieveQ.Moreprecisely,noneisageneraltheoryofthereasonswhy.Epistemicreasonsformapropersubsetofthereasonswhyyoubelieve.Whydoeshethinkthat?ispotentiallyambiguousinawaythatWhatshisreasonforthinkingthat?isnt.Explanationsaboundforwhywebelievewhatwedo,notallofwhichrevealourreasons.Considermyvictimizedtwin,ensnaredanddeceivedbyapowerfulevilgenius.Mytwinbelievesthatheissittinginhisoffice.Whydoeshebelievethat?Onecorrectanswer:becausetheevilgeniusdeceiveshim.Thishelpsexplainhisbelief,butsurelyitsnothisreasonforthinkinghesinhisoffice!Mistakingthatforhisreasonleadstothefalseconclusionthatmytwinisstartlinglyirrational. TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsAlternativelyabstractionistscoulddeny2.Butgiven2sintuitivecreden-tials,thiswillnotbeeasy.HereabstractionistsfindhelpfromRoySorensen(1991),whodeniesacloselyrelatedprincipleconcerningarguments.SorensenarguesthatatleastsomeargumentsoftheformQ,thereforeQarenotcircular.Considertheseexamples,inspiredbySorensens:(A)Someargumentscontaintheirconclusionasapremise. Someargumentscontaintheirconclusionasapremise.(B)Somesentencescontainfewerthanseventy-twowords. Somesentencescontainfewerthanseventy-twowords.(C)Youhaveconsideredatleastoneargument. Youhaveconsideredatleastoneargument.Sorensenreasonsasfollows.EachofA…Cisrationallypersuasive.Yeteachcontainstheconclusionasapremise.Andnorationallypersuasiveargumentiscircular.ŽThereforeA…Carenoncircular(Sorensen1991:248).WemightextendSorensensreasoningtocoverthementaltransitionfromaperceptualexperienceorintuitionthatQtothebeliefthatQ.Havingaperceptualexperience(orintuition)thatQrationallypersuadesustobelievethatQ.Butmovinginacircleneverrationallypersuades.Thereforethetransitionfromaperceptualexperience(orintuition)thatQtoabeliefthatQdoesnotconstitutemovinginacircle.Sorensensargumentsweaklinkisthepremisethatnocircularargumenteverrationallypersuades.Sorensenclaimsthisisanecessaryfeatureofcircu-lararguments(Sorensen1991:248).Butthisseemsfalse.Anargumentcouldbeblatantlycircularorsubtlycircular.Asubtlyandundetectedlycircularar-gumentmightrationallypersuade.Peopleweknowtobeexpertsmightevenreassureusthattheargumentisnotcircular.Insuchacasetheargumentcouldrationallypersuadeus.(Iwagerthatwithsomeingenuitywecouldcreateanactualsituationlikethisinnearlyanyintroductorylogiccourse.)Circularitydoesnotprecluderationalpersuasiveness.TheProblemofWithholdingIlldemonstratethisproblemwithatwo-stageexample.Firststage:Nevilwithholdsonthequestionwhetherthereisunnecessarysufferingintheworld.HealsobelievesthatGodexistsonlyifitisfalsethatthereisunnecessarysufferingintheworld.ThewithholdingandbelieftogetherpromptNeviltowithholdonwhetherGodexists.WhatareNevilsreasonsforwithholdingonwhetherGodexists?Statistsanswer:hiswithholdingonwhetherthereisunnecessarysufferingintheworld,andhisbeliefthatGodexistsonlyifitisfalsethatthereisunneces-sarysufferingintheworld.Truetoform,abstractionistsanswerthatNevilsreasonsarethepropositionalcontentsofthementalstatescitedbythestatist: TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsBransen,J.&S.E.Cuypers,eds.1998.HumanAction,Deliberation,andCausation.Dordrecht:Kluwer.Chisholm,Roderick.1989.TheoryofKnowledgeeds.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall.Clark,Andy&DavidChalmers.1998.TheExtendedMind.ŽAnalysisvol.58,no.1(January1998),7…19.Cohen,Stewart.1998.ContextualistSolutionstoEpistemologicalProblems:Skepticism,Get-tier,andtheLottery.ŽAustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,vol.76,no.2,289…306.„„„.2005.ContextualismDefended.ŽInSteupandSosa,eds.Collins,Arthur.1997.ThePsychologicalRealityofReasons.ŽRatio,vol.10,no.2,108…123.Conee,Earl&RichardFeldman.2001.InternalismDefended.ŽAmericanPhilosophicalQuar-terly38(2001),1…18.ReprintedinConee&Feldman2004.„„„&„„„.2004.Evidentialism:EssaysinEpistemology.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.CrumleyII,JackS.,ed.1999.ReadingsinEpistemology.MountainView,CA:MayfieldPub-lishingCo.Dancy,Jonathan.2000.PracticalReality.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Darwall,Stephen.1983.ImpartialReason.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Davidson,Donald.1983.ACoherenceTheoryofTruthandKnowledge.ŽReprintedinDavid-son2001.„„„.2001.Subjective,Intersubjective,Objective.Oxford:ClarendonPress.DeRose,Keith.1999.Contextualism:AnExplanationandDefense.ŽInGreco&Sosa,eds.DePaul,Michael&LindaZagzebski,eds.2003.IntellectualVirtue:PerspectivesfromEthicsandEpistemology.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Feldman,Richard.1995.AuthoritarianEpistemology.ŽPhilosophicalTopics,23(1995),147…169.ReprintedinConee&Feldman2004.„„„.2002.Epistemology.UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:PrenticeHall.Feldman,Richard&EarlConee.1985.Evidentialism.ŽReprintedinSosa&Kim,eds.Foley,Richard.1990.SkepticismandRationality.ŽInSosa&Kim,eds.Fumerton,Richard.1995.MetaepistemologyandSkepticism.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Greco,John.2003.KnowledgeasCreditforTrueBelief.ŽInDePaulandZagzebski,eds.Greco,John&ErnestSosa,eds.TheBlackwellGuidetoEpistemology.Malden,MA:Blackwell.Harman,Gilbert.1986.ChangeinView.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Hart,H.L.A.&A.M.Honore.1985[orig.1959].CausationintheLaw.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Hookway,Christopher.2006.ReasonsforBelief,Reasoning,andVirtues.ŽPhilosophicalStud-,vol.130,47…70.Huemer,Michael.2007.CompassionatePhenomenalConservatism.ŽPhilosophyandPhe-nomenologicalResearch,January2007,30…55.„„„.2009.ApologyofaModestIntuitionist.ŽPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearchJanuary2009,222…236.Kim,Jaegwon.1998.ReasonsandtheFirstPerson.ŽInBransen&Cuypers,eds.Klein,PeterD.1999.HumanKnowledgeandtheInfiniteRegressofReasons.ŽPerspectives,13,Epistemology,1999Lewis,David.1986.Causation.ŽReprintedinLewis1987.„„„.1987.PhilosophicalPapers2.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.„„„.1996.ElusiveKnowledge.ŽAustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,vol.74,no.4,McDowell,John.1979.VirtueandReason.ŽReprintedinMcDowell1998.„„„.1994.MindandWorld.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.„„„.1998.Mind,Value,andReality.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Mill,J.S.1846.ASystemofLogic.NewYork:Harper&Brothers.Millar,Alan.1991.ReasonsandExperience.Oxford:ClarendonPress. TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsThankstoEugeneMillsforconversationonthispoint.Ifthelogicoftoistoisnotclearenough,wecanrecasttheargumentusingconditionalsinstead.1.Ifabstractionismistrue,thenifSheedsthecallofexperience,thenStherebybelievesQdirectlyonthebasisofQitself.(Premise)2.IfS(thereby)believesQdirectlyonthebasisofQitself,thenStherebymovesinacircle.(Premise)3.Thereforeifabstractionismistrue,thenifSheedsthecallofexperience,thenStherebymovesinacircle.(From1and2)4.ItisnotthecasethatifSheedsthecallofexperience,thenStherebymovesinacircle.(Premise)5.Thereforeabstractionismisnottrue.(From3and4)BonJour(2001:677;2005:100)claimsthatthemostfundamentalintuitionsmusthavenon-propositionalcontent.Butmanyretailintuitionsundoubtedlyhavepropositionalcontent,whichsufficesformypurpose.Anothermoveinlogicalspace,availabletoabstractionistsatthispoint,islessplausiblebutperhapsworthmentioning.AbstractionistscouldacceptthatperceptualexperiencehaspropositionalcontentandacceptthatthetypicalperceptualbeliefthatQisprecipitatedbyaperceptualexperienceasofQ,butneverthelessinsistthatthebeliefisbasedonsomeotheraspectoftheprecipitatingexperiencesscontent.Propositionalcontentdoesnotexhaustperceptualcontent„intuitively,thereisalsorawsensorycontent„andatypicalexperiencewillpresentmorethanonepropositionastrue.SoforexamplesupposeIbelieveheresarectangleprecipitatedbyaperceptualexperiencewiththecontentheresarectangleandalsowiththecontentheressomething.Ontheviewunderconsideration,mybeliefthatheresarectanglemightbebasedonheressomethingratherthanheresarectangle,thusavoidingcircularity.AsIsaid,thisisapossibleview,butwhatmotivationisthereforit?WhereIusewithholdsothersmayusesuspendsjudgmentorreservesjudgment.Theseexpressionsaresynonymous.Somewillrightlywonderwhetherthisviolatesthespiritofanti-psychologism.Iwontpursuethematterhere.TwocrucialpassagesfromCollins1997:Inotherwords,inthecontextofreason-givingexplanation,therestatementthatmovesfrombecausethebridgeisclosed,tobecauseIbelievethatthebridgeisclosed,doesnotdeletetheclaimaboutthebridge.Itmakesthatclaim,anditaddsthequalifyingadmissionthatmakingitmaybemakingamistake.Theclaimmadeintheexplanationisaclaimaboutanobjectivecircumstance.[Your]restatementisnotapsychologisingrestatement.[Youdo]notdeletetheclaimabouttheobjectivecircumstancemadeintheunrestatedform.If[you]deletedthatclaim[you]woulddroptheexplanationthat[you]firstgave.(113…114)[T]heexplanationprofferedby[]becauseIbelievethatabsolutelydependsonthefactthatthesewordsdoexpressthespeakerscommitmenttothetruthofTheexplanationmakestheclaimabouttheobjectivecircumstanceandcannotdeletethatclaim.Noformulathatthespeakercouldsubstitutethatactuallydeletesthiscommitmentinfavorofsomeothersubjectmatter,suchastheexistenceorcharacterofaninnerrealityinthespeaker,canconveytherightexplanation.(118)Evenstatismsopponentsconcedethis.SeeScanlon1999:56,Collins1997:121,andKim1998:78.JamesDreierputtheobjectiontomeinconversation.Dancy(2000:127…128)alsopresentsaversionofit,thoughheexpressesonlyminimalconfidenceinitsprospects.Hookway2006employsthereason/enablerdistinction,butinadifferentway. TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsdonenomorethanthatthesubjectsmentalstatesareenablingconditions.Noevidenceorargumentforthisclaimisyetforthcoming.)Considerthefollowingconversation:Conversation1A:WhywereallBellesbelongingsdestroyed?B:Becauseafirebrokeoutinherapartment.A:Whywasthereoxygeninherapartment?Oxygenspresenceisaparadigmcaseofanenablingcondition.Assecondquestionwouldseemoddinanynormalcontext.HadAwantedtobetterunderstandwhyBellesbelongingsweredestroyed,wemighthaveexpectedhimtoask,Whywasthereafireinherapartment?ŽConsideralso:Conversation2A:Whydidthevasebreak?B:Becauseitfellfromthewindow.A:Whywasthereawindow?Againthewindowspresenceisanenablingcondition.AndagainAssecondquestionwouldsoundstrangeinanynormalcontextbecausehesinquiringdirectlyafteranenablingcondition.Onewouldhaveexpectedaquestionsuchas,Whydiditfall?ŽNowconsiderthisexchange:Conversation3A:WhydoyoubelievethatWoodswillsinktheputt?B:Because(ofthefactthat)Woodsexcelsatputting.A:Whydoyoubelievethatheexcelsatputting?HereAssecondquestionsoundsperfectlynatural(andthisdespiteBsan-swerbeingentirelyfavorabletoanti-psychologism).ThisdistinguishesBsbelieffromtheenablingconditionsmentionedinthepreviousconversations.OnemightobjectthatAssecondquestioninConversation3soundsnat-uralbecauseBassertsthatWoodsexcelsatputting,therebyexpressingherbeliefthatWoodsexcelsatputting,therebymakingherbelieffairconver-sationalgame.AdetectsthisandquestionsBaccordingly.ThisobjectionmisfiresbecausewecanconstructasimilarexamplewithoutBexpressingabeliefatall. TheOntologyofEpistemicReasonsCollinsArgumentBeforemovingon,IdliketoaddressanargumentduetoArthurCollins(1997:esp.112…14,117…18).Collinsfocusesonreasonsforactionratherthanbelief,buthisdiscussionchallengesstatismacrosstheboard.Collinssargumentissubtleandsometimeselusivebutitappearstocomedowntothis.Supposesomeoneasksyouwhyyoubelievetheferryisyouronlyoptionforcrossingtheriver.Yousincerelyrespond,Ibelieveitbecausethebridgeisclosed.ŽThisisthefactualistexplanation:youciteafactasyourreason.Inofferingityouexpressyourbeliefthatthebridgeisclosed.Butsupposeyouhadinsteadresponded,IbelieveitbecauseIbelievethatthebridgeisclosed.ŽThisisthestatistexplanation:youciteamentalstateasyourreason.Youmustbelievethebridgeisclosedifthisexplanationiscorrect,soinofferingityouexpressyourbeliefthatthebridgeisclosed.Thestatistexplanationcommitsyoutoeverythingthefactualistonedoes,ineffectmerelyre-expressingthefactualistexplanationindifferentwords.Wemightputthepointthisway:thestatistexplanationisjustthefactualistexplanationindisguise.Theargumentcommitsamistake.Fromthefactthatthestatistexpla-nationiscorrectonlyifyoubelievethebridgeisclosed,itdoesnotfollowthatinofferingityouexpressyourbeliefthatthebridgeisclosed.Considerasimilarcase.YouaskRandywhyhesleavingthecountryandhecalmlyreplies,ImleavingthecountrybecauseImenragedatmyfather.ŽHisex-planationiscorrectonlyifheisinfactenragedathisfather.Yethedoesnotexpresshisragebyofferingtheexplanation.WehavenoreasontotreatyourexplanationdifferentlyfromRandysinthisrespect.6.AnArgumentForStatismHavingdemonstratedthecompetitionsmajorweaknesses,IwillnowpresentwhatIconsiderthebestargumentforstatism.WhenyoubelieveQforareason,thereasonexplainsyourbelief.Identify-ingyourreasonallowsustounderstandyourcognitiveperformance.Weseekthisexplanationbyreasons„whatIllcallareasons-explanation„whenweask,Whatsyourreasonforbelievingthat?ŽorWhydoesshethinkthat?ŽUnderstandingisthefirststeptowardevaluating.Ofcourse,understandingmightrevealthatyouperformedpoorly.Havingtherelevantmentalstatesinplaceisnecessaryforustounderstandyourreasons.Statismsopponentssaythatreasonsarepropositions,orfacts,orobjects,orstatesofaffairs,etc.ForittobeevenremotelyplausiblethatanysuchthingisyourreasonforbelievingQ,somementalstateofyoursmusttakeitasanobjectordepictit.IfIreportthatJebbelieveshewillwintheelectionbecausehesaheadinthepolls,butJebisntevenawarethathesaheadinthepolls,thenmyreportisobviouslyfalse. TheOntologyofEpistemicReasons5.TwoProblemsforFactualismThissectionpresentstwoproblemsforfactualism.ButfirstIwilldiscussthemotivationforfactualism.SupposeyouaskDickwhathisreasonisforbelievingthatIraqposesathreattotheUnitedStates.ItwouldbeperfectlynaturalforDicktore-spond,ThefactthattheintelligencereportssaythatIraqpossessesnuclearweapons.ŽSimilarlyinresponsetothequestionWhatsyourreasonforthinkingyouhavehands?onenaturalresponsewouldbeThefactthatIdo.Factualiststakesuchtalkatfacevalueandbuildatheoryofreasonsthatreflectsit,claimingordinaryusageasamotivationfortheirview.Butfac-tualiststreadondangerousgroundhere.Unreflectiveordinaryusageclearlyfavors.Weciteasreasonspsychologicalitemstoo.Ifaskedwhatmyreasonisforthinkingthatthisistherightpersonforthejob,anaturalresponsewouldbeMyconvictionthatsheistrustworthy.Factualismalsoenablesasimple,distinctiveresponsetocertainformsofskepticism.Factualismsaysourreasonsreachallthewayoutintothenon-mentalworld,andourbeliefsarebasedonthefactsthemselvesratherthansomementalitemthatcouldhavebeeninplaceevenhadthefactsbeenradicallydifferent.Factualismthusprovidesforakindofinfallibilism.Ifyourbeliefthattheresalecterninfrontofyouisbasedonthefactthattheresalecterninfrontofyou,thengivenitsbasis,yourbeliefcouldnthavebeenfalse.Butofcoursepsychologismitselfdoesnotruleoutthistypebasis-relativeinfallibilism.Ifcombinedwithastrongversionofexternalismaboutmentalcontentormentalstates,psychologismcouldlikewiseprovidebasis-relativeinfallibility.TheEvilDemonProblemTheevildemonproblemderivesfromthepreviouslymentionedintuitionthatyouandyourvictimizedtwineachbelieveImreadinganepistemologypaperforthesamereasons.Factualismrunsafoulofthisintuition,foritisafactthatyourereadingapaper,butitisnotafactthatVicisreadingone.Tostatetheargumentprecisely:6.Iffactualismistrue,thenyouandVicdonotbelieveforthesamereasons.(Premise)7.YouandVicdobelieveforthesamereasons.(Premise)8.Thereforefactualismisnottrue.(From6,7)Butdontfactualistshaveaneasyresponse?Ifreasonsarefacts,then6isfalsebecauseforeverymentalfactaboutyou,thereisamatch-ingfactaboutVic(asstipulatedinthecasesdescription).ThisprovidesastraightforwardsenseinwhichyouandVicbelieveforthesamereasons.Yetthingsarenotsosimple.Recallthatfactualismistheviewthatreasons