S trade policy Nominal concessions Signi731cant concessions Total Success rate Sanctions threatened 31 40 71 56 34 Sanctions imposed 10 5 15 33 33 Total 41 45 86 52 33 Source Bayard and Elliott 1994 and Elliott and Richardson 1997 Note Pearson chisqu ID: 42327
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JeffreySchottandKimberlyAnnElliottsurveytheuseofsanctionsfrom1900to1990anddeclareasuccessrateof34percentforsanctionsimposedafter1973thesuccessratefallsto24percentRobertPapearguesthatHufbauerandElliottarefartoogeneroushiscriticalreassessmentoftheirdatacon-cludesthatonly5percentofsanctionsattemptssucceedTheseassessmentshaveaffectedthetrajectoryofthisliteratureRecentworkfocusesonexplainingthedurationofsanctionsinsteadofanalyzingtheirutilityTheassumptionunderly-ingthesestudiesisthatsanctionsareanimportantindicatorofdomesticandsymbolicpoliticsbutinconsequentialasatoolofstatecraftGame-theoreticapproachestostudyingeconomicsanctionsarguethatbecauseofstrategicinteractiononeshouldobservemostofthefailuresbutmissmostofthesuccessesTheimpositionofsanctionsrepresentsadeadweightlossofutilityforboththesenderandtargetintheformofdisruptedeconomicexchangetheactorshaveanincentivetoreachanagreementbeforeimpositionIfthesenderprefersthestatusquotoimposingsanctionsthenthereshouldbenocoer-cionattemptIfthetargetprefersconcedingtoincurringthecostofsanctionshasanincentivetoacquiescebeforetheimpositionofsanctionsThedif®cultyofobservingthreatsthatneverneedtobeexecutedparticularlythreatsmadebehindcloseddoorsraisesthepossibilitythatselectionbiashasseriouslyaffectedempir-icalstudiesofeconomicstatecraftIfthisistruethenthesanctionsliteraturehasgrosslyunderestimatedtheutilityofeconomicdiplomacyTotesttheselectioneffectsargumentthecrucialcasestostudyarethoseinwhichcoercionisthreatenedbutnotimplementedIfthesecasesexistinsigni®-cantquantityandhaveanappreciablyhighersuccessratethancasesinwhichsanctionsareimposeditstrengthenstheargumentthatselectionbiashasad-verselyaffectedthetrajectoryofresearchaboutsanctionsunderestimatingtheroleofstrategicinteractionlocatingthesecasesisanempiricalchallengebecauseofthedif®cultyinidentifyingsanctionseventsthatendatthethreatstageHastherebeenafailuretoappreciatethestrategicinteractionunderlyingtheuseofeconomiccoercion?Istheresigni®cantselectionbias?TheanswertobothquestionsisyesThisarticlearguesthatthemostpromisingveinofdatatotestforselectionbiasinvolvessanctionsemployedinthepursuitofeconomicorreg-ulatorygoalsbecauseoftheabilitytoobservethreatsAstatisticalanalysisofthesecasesstronglysuggeststhatselectioneffectsarepresentandthatmodelsofeconomicstatecraftemphasizingstrategicinteractionholdmorepromiseasacom-prehensiveexplanationofeconomicstatecraftThedatashowsthatasigni®cantnumberofcoercionattemptsendatthethreatstagebeforesanctionsareimposedThesecasesyieldsigni®cantlylargerconcessionswhencomparedtoinstancesinwhichsanctionsareimposedandElliott1990Pape1997SeeBolksandAl-Sowayel2000DorussenandMo2001andMcGillivrayandStam2001InternationalOrganization These®ndingshavesigni®cantimplicationsforpolicyandtheoryTheystronglysuggestthatthecurrentconsensusamongpunditsandpolicymakersaboutthefu-tilityofsanctionsismisplacedEconomiccoercionisamoreusefultoolthantheconventionalwisdombelievesTherami®cationsforscholarshiparealsoim-portantAtaminimumtheempiricalfocusofthesanctionsliteratureneedstomovebeyondanexclusiverelianceontheHufbauerandElliottdata4percentoftheobservationsintheirdatasetconsistofsanctionsthatwerethreat-enedbutnotimplementedSigni®cantresearchshouldbedevotedtodetectingandcodinginstanceswhensanctionswerethreatenedbutnotimposedThisarticleisdividedinto®vesectionsThenextsectionreviewsthegame-theoreticliteratureoneconomicstatecrafttoelaboratetheunderpinningsofthere-lationshipbetweenstrategicinteractionandselectioneffectsThethirdsectiondiscussesthedataonUsanctionsinpursuitofeconomicorregulatorygoalstoseeifitissuitablefortestingthestrategicinteractionargumentThefourthsectionprovidesastatisticalanalysisofthreedifferentsetsofthisdatathepatternofsanc-tionsoutcomessupportsthepresenceofselectioneffectsandstrategicinteractionThe®nalsectionconsiderstheimplicationsofthese®ndingsforpolicyandtheoryStrategicInteractioninEconomicCoercionMosttheoriesofcoercionpositasimilarmodelofactionasseeninFigure1senderthreatenstointerruptthestatusquoandblockastreamofeconomicex-changewiththetargetunlessthesanctionedcountryacquiescestoaspeci®cde-mandmadebythesenderIfthetargetcompliessanctionsarenotimposedIfthetargetstands®rmthesenderfacesachoicebetweenbackingdownorcarryingoutitsthreatandimposingsanctionsSanctionsimposecostsonboththetargetandsenderrelativetothestatusquobydisruptingeconomicexchangeTherearedifferenceswithintheindividualmodelingeffortsbutthisisthebasicnarrativeGame-theoreticmodelsofcoercionthattreatthesenderandtargetasrationalunitaryactorsshareacommonpredictionsuccessfulinstancesofeconomiccoer-cionaremuchmorelikelytoendatthethreatstagethantheimpositionstageThisinsightishardlyoriginaltothestudyofeconomiccoercionitcomesfromtheeconomicsliteratureonbargainingAnagreementbeforeimplementationavoidsthedeadweightcostofthesanctionsimpositionforboththetargetandsenderItisamoreªef®cientºoutcomeforrationalutilitymaximizersForanexampleofhowhighupthepolicyfoodchainthisbeliefexistsseeCheney1999ElliottacknowledgesthatwithregardtoepisodesofthreatenedsanctionsªtherearemanythatwehavemissedºE-mailcorrespondencewiththeauthor21August2001Somemodelsendwiththetargetmakingthe®naldecisionofbackingdowntosanctionsorstanding®rmRubinstein1982EatonandEngers1999EconomicCoercion conditionsoffullinformationperfectlydivisibledemandsandrationalutilitymaxi-thereareonlytwoequilibriumoutcomesEitherthesenderwilldeclinetothreatencoercionorthetargetwillacquiescetothesender'sthreatofcoercionUndertheseconditionsthethreatofsanctionsshouldhavea100percentsuccessandsanctionsshouldneverbeimposedthisdoesnotmirrorwhatoneobservesininternationalrelationsThetheoreticalresponsehasbeentotweaktheassumptionsunderlyingthisbasicbargainingmodelTheuseofforceandtheuseofsanctionshavesimilardynam-soisnotsurprisingthatgame-theoreticmodelsofeconomicsanctionsechoJamesFearon'smenuofexplanationsforwhyrationalunitaryactorsgotowarratherthancometoanincentive-compatiblebargainbeforetheoutbreakofhostil-Fearonoffersthreepossibleexplanationsprivateinformationaboutanactor'sresolvecombinedwithanincentivetomisrepresentsuchinformationaninabilityforoneorbothstatestocrediblycommittomutuallypreferablebargainsadisputedissuethatisinherentlyindivisibleThemodelsde-scribedbelowdifferonwhichcombinationoftheseexplanationsisresponsibleFearon1995 FIGURE1AmodelofeconomiccoercionInternationalOrganization forsanctionsimpositionNeverthelessthesemodelsagreewiththebargainingªfolktheoremºinthosesituationswhensanctionsaremostlikelytoworkareleastlikelytobeimposedDanielDreznercombinesissueindivisibilityandtheinabilitytocrediblycom-mittoexplaintheimpositionofsanctionsHepresentsacompleteinformationmodelinwhichthetargetwillmakeconcessionsifthesenderprefersadeadlockoutcomeofsanctionsimpositiontobackingdownInthebasicversionofthemodeloneshouldonlyobservethreatsorverybriefimpositionofsanctionsInare®nedversionofthemodelsanctionsimpositioncanbeanequilibriumoutcomevidedtwoconditionsaremetthedemandisindivisibleandexpectationsoffuturecon¯ictarehighUnderconditionsofhighcon¯ictexpectationsboththesenderandtargetfearthatanyconcessionsmadeinthepresentwillleavetheminaweak-enedbargainingpositioninfuturecon¯ictsmakingcrediblecommitmentsmoredif®culttoachievethemodelpredictsthatwhensanctionsareactu-allyimposedtheoutcomeisasustaineddeadlockbetweenadversariesThecasesofeconomiccoercionthatgenerateconcessionswillendatthethreatstageandarethusmoredif®culttoobserveThreemodelingeffortscombineimperfectinformationandissueindivisibilitytoexplaintherationalimpositionofsanctionsAlistairSmithaswellasTMorganandAnneMiersdevelopone-sidedincompleteinformationmodelsofeco-nomiccoercionthatleadtosimilarempiricalpredictionsInbothmodelssenderdoesnotknowwhetherthetargetpreferstostand®rmorpreferstoacqui-escetothesender'sdemandsratherthansufferthecostofsanctionsThemodelsdifferinthatMorganandMiersassumeadiscreteone-shotgamewhereasSmithusesacontinuoustimeapproachThepredictedoutcomesaresimilarForMorganandMiersthesender'slackofinformationaboutthetarget'sresolveandthetar-get'sincentivetosignalahighdegreeofresolvecanleadtotheimpositionofMorganandMiers'resultspredictthattheprobabilityofasuccessfuluseofeconomiccoercionisgreateratthethreatstagethanattheimplementationTheyconcludeªtherearesevereselectionbiasproblemswithempiricalstudiesthatfocusonlyonthosecasesinwhichsanctionswereappliedtionsstrategiesmaybefarmoresuccessfulthanonewouldconcludefromlookingonlyatthesecasesSmithcomestoasimilarconclusionÐifthetargetcon-itwilldosoatthethreatstageHeobservesªthelengthofsanctionswillbeshortInfactonemayneveractuallyseethesanctionsatallParticularlyifitiscostlytobackdowninthefaceofsanctionsthetargetmaypreemptsanc-tionsandunilaterallychangeitspolicyTheseconclusionsandempiricalpre-dictionsareconsistentwithDrezner'smodelDrezner1999SeeSmith1996andMorganandMiers1999MorganandMiers1999Smith1996EconomicCoercion DeanLacyandEmersonNioucreateamodelwithincompleteinformationonbothsidesthesenderdoesnotknowhowresolutethetargetstateisandthetar-getdoesnotknowwhetherthesenderstateisresoluteSimilartoSmithandMor-ganandMierstheseauthorsalsoassumeissueindivisibilityLacyandNiou'sconclusionsareidenticaltotheseotherapproachesEmpiricalstudiesthatexaminecasesonlyinwhichsanctionswereimposedsystematicallyomitaclassofcasesthatrepresentsuccessfulsanctionsthesanctionswerethreatenedbutnotimposedExaminingcasesofonlyim-posedsanctionsgeneratesaseriousselectionbiasinempiricalresearchonToreiteratethesemodelsprovidedifferentexplanationsforwhyoneshouldob-servetheimpositionofsanctionsbutprovidethesameexplanationforwhymostsuccessfulusesofeconomiccoercionshouldendbeforesanctionsareimposedtargetthatprefersconcedingtodeadlockandbelievesthatthesenderwillcarryoutitsthreatwillacquiescebeforeimpositiontoavoidincurringthecostofsanc-BecauseallofthesemodelsrelyonthesamegamestructuretheyshareasimilarempiricalpredictionsanctionsshouldyieldmoreconcessionsatthethreatstagethanattheimplementationstageTherobustnessofthispredictiontothedifferentassumptionsaboutthedistributionofinformationisquitestrikingThispredictionalsostandsinmarkedcontrasttoalternativetheoriesofeconomicTheassumptionthatsanctionsaregenerallyineffectivehasgivengreaterpurchasetoapproachesthatstressdomesticorsymbolicreasonsforemployingKimRichardNossalarguesthateconomicstatecraftisusedaccordingtothelogicofappropriatenessasaformofpunishmentratherthananattemptatScholarsemphasizingdomesticpoliticsarguethatsanctionsareim-posedevenifthesanctioninggovernmentexpectsthemtofailtosatiatepublicpressureforactioninacrisisortodirectbene®tstowardsrent-seekingcoali-ThesetheoriesassumethatforsanctionstohaveanyutilitytothesendertheymustbeimposedTestingforSelectionBiasTodeterminethevalidityoftheselectioneffectargumentitisnecessarytofocusoneventswhensanctionsarethreatenedbutnotimposedTheexistenceofaLacyandNiou200018±19Nossal1989SeeDrury1998KaempferandLowenberg1988and1992andHiscox2000Nooruddin2002testsforselectionbiasintheHufbauerandElliottdatausingacen-soredprobitmodelbuthismethodologyhastwosigni®cant¯awshismodelofsanctionsimpo-sitiondoesnothaveathreatstagehisdependentvariablecon¯atessanctionssuccesswiththedurationofimpositionwhichleavestheempiricalresultsextremelysensitivetooutliercasesinwhichsanctionshavebeenimposedinde®nitelysuchastheUembargoesagainstCubaorNorthKoreaInternationalOrganization largecacheoftheseeventswouldsupportthelogicofstrategicinteractionIfthosecasesyieldsigni®cantconcessionsfromthetargetthislogicwouldbefurtherbol-Ifthesecasesdonotgenerateahighersuccessratetheselectioneffectsargumentwouldbefalsi®edgivingmorecredencetoexistingexplanationsofsanc-tionsbehaviorForsanctionsinpursuitofsecuritygoalsidentifyingtheexistenceofcoercionepisodesthatendatthethreatstageisadif®culttaskCoercionepisodesthatendbeforesanctionsimplementationmaybetoobrieftogeneratemuchof®cialdocu-Whatdocumentsdoexistabouttheseincidentsarelikelytobeclassi-BoththesenderandtargetgovernmentshaveanincentivetokeepsuchepisodessecretThetargetsprefernottopublicizetheeventsbecausetheydonotwanttomaketheiracquiescenceknowntoeitherdomesticorinternationalThesendersprefersecrecytopreservetheirvictoryorconcealtheirdecisiontobackdownInmanycasesthesenderwishestoavoidembarrassinglong-standingalliesNotsurprisinglyandElliottdocumentonlycasesÐoutof116ÐthatendatthethreatstageThetraditionaldatasourceonsanctionsisoflittlehelptheanswermaylieinusingnontraditionalsourcesofdataEconomiccoercionemployedinthepursuitofeconomicorregulatorygoalscouldproveusefulinevaluatingthesetheoriesOverthepastthreedecadestheUnitedStateshasusedsanctionsasameanstoforceothercountriesintoreducingtradebarriersrespectingcorelaborstandardsandprotectingtheenvironmentScholarshavealreadycollectedtheseobserva-tionsandcodedwhethertheygeneratedsigni®cantconcessionsfromthetargetThesecaseshavenotbeenpreviouslyusedtoevaluatetheoriesofeconomiccoer-theyareanidealtestinggroundforselectionbiasbecausethecasesareisomorphicintheirgamestructuretothesanctionscasescollectedinandElliottthesendercountrythreatenstodisruptsomeeco-nomicexchangeunlessthetargetcountrychangesitspolicyinaparticularissueAsigni®cantnumberofscholarsde®neeconomiccoerciontoincludeanyin-stancewhenagovernmentusesthethreattodisrupteconomicexchangetoachieveThe®vecasesareLeagueofNationsvYugoslaviaLeagueofNationsvUSSRvUnitedStatesvSouthKoreaandUnitedStatesvElSalvadorItisworthobservingthatHufbauerandElliott1990codefourofthese®vecasesascompleteamuchhighersuccessratethanfortheoveralldatasetThisisconsistentwiththeselectioneffectsargumentAcomparisonofDrezner1999andtheInstituteforInternationalEconomics2001dataonsanctionseventsofthepastdecadeisrevealingintheirdifferencesregardingRussia'suseofeconomicIIErecords®vecasesofRussiaimposingsanctionsagainstothercountriesingatthesametimeperiodrecordsthirty-nineseparateRussianusesorthreatsofeconomicsanc-ThesuccessrateofthesecasesinDrezneris59percentIncontrastthecasesidenti®edbyIIErecordasuccessrateofonly40percentThesecontrastingresultsareconsistentwithaselectionef-fectsargumentEconomicCoercion adesiredendAsDavidBaldwinnotesªSettingeconomicsanctionsinthecon-textofchoicerequiresthattheybede®nedintermsofmeansratherthanendsAstoolsofforeignpolicytheyarepresumablyavailabletopolicy-makersforavarietyofpurposesandnotrestrictedtoparticularforeignpolicysomescholarsarguethatsanctionsusedinthepursuitofªlowpoli-economicandregulatorydisputesaredifferentfromsanctionsusedinthepursuitofªhighpoliticsºsecurityandpoliticaldisputesTherearethreeratio-nalesgivenforthissegmentationtheoptionofmilitaryforceisnotonthetableinmattersoflowpoliticssanctionsshouldbemoreeffectiveinlow-politicscasesbecausethestakesarelowerstatescareonlyaboutwealthmaximizationwhensanctionsareusedinlow-politicsdisputeswhereashigh-politicscasesinvolvebroadersecurityconcernsdrasticallyloweringthechancesforsanctionssuccessIftheseargumentsarevalidthentreatingthelow-politicscasesaspartofthesanctionsuniversewouldbeproblematicastheoristswouldbeaskedtoexplainconceptuallydistinctphenomenaonreviewobjectionsdonotholduptocarefulscrutinyTheprospectofmilitaryforceisthemostseriousobjectionIfsanctionsforhigh-politicscasesareusedasasignalfortheuseofforceandmilitaryforceisnotanoptioninlow-politicscasesthequestionisraisedofwhetherthebargain-ingprocessforlowpoliticsisfundamentallydifferenttherearereasonstodoubtthattheprospectofmilitarystatecraftisrelevantmilitarycoerciondoesnothaveasigni®canteffectonhigh-politicssanctionsAtleastsixeconomet-rictestsofsanctionssuccessincludethethreatofmilitarystatecraftorthemili-tarybalanceofpowerasacausalvariableNoneofthesestudies®ndthethreatoruseofforcetobeasigni®cantcontributingfactoringeneratingconcessionsfromthetargetOnestudy®ndsmilitarystatecrafttobestatisticallysigni®cantnegativelycorrelatedwithsanctionssuccessTheseresultsareconsistentwiththetheoreticalargumentthateconomiccoercionactsasaforeignpolicysubstituteformilitarycoercionratherthanacomplementIfthethreatofforcehasnoeffectonsanctionsoutcomesandpolicymakersvieweconomicstatecraftasasub-SeeEatonandEngers1992MorganandSchwebach1997Baldwin1999andDreznerBaldwin1999Pape199795±97ThisdoesnotmeanthathighpoliticsaresimilartolowpoliticsineverydimensionwithregardtohowthethreatofeconomiccoercionisemployedIamarguingthatthesimilaritiesarewhatmatterSeeLam1990DehejiaandWood1992ElliottandUimonen1993MorganandSchwebachDrezner1999andHart2000ElliottandUimonen1993MorganandMiers2000InternationalOrganization stituteformilitarystatecraftthentheconceptualdistinctionbetweenthehigh-politicsandlow-politicscasesfallsapartTheothertwoobjectionsÐhigh-politicscasesinvolvegreaterstakesandmorezero-sumbargainingÐcanbechallengedonsubstantiveandconceptualgroundsCertainlydemandsregardingterritorialdisputesaremoreimportantthanregula-tionsgoverningtunadriftnetsdemandsofthatmagnitudeareararephenomenonevenwithinthecategoryofªhighpoliticsºAmajorityofthecasesinHufbauerandElliottconsistofthesenderrequestingªmodestchangesºintargetpolicyFurthermorethiscriticismunderestimatesthedemandsthataremadeinmattersoflowpoliticsAskingstatestoaltertheirdomesticlawsorregulationsisanintrinsicallypoliticaldemandequivalenttoaskingnation-statestoaltertheirhumanrightsregimeorotherinternalpoliticalarrangementsThesedemandsviolateWestphaliansovereigntyÐtheexclusionofexternalac-torsfromdomesticauthoritystructuresÐandassuchrepresentasigni®cantpo-liticaldemandThe®nalcriticismisthatbecausestatescareonlyaboutwealthmaximizationinlow-politicsdisputestheywillrespondmorereadilytosanctionsthaninhigh-politicsdisputesThepremisebehindthiscritiqueÐthatstatescareonlyaboutabsolutegainsindisputesovereconomicorregulatoryissuesÐdoesnotrestonsolidconceptualfootingSomeprominentinternationalrelationstheoristsarguethatstatescareabouttheirrelativeeconomicpositionasmuchaswealthmaximi-AtaminimumthehistoryoftheSection301mechanismindicatesthattheUnitedStatesstrengthensandusesthissanctionsmechanismwhenitwantstomaximizeitsrelativepositionvis-°-visitseconomicrivalsItshouldalsobenotedthatforthepurposesofthisstudythelattertwoobjec-tionsareconceptuallyirrelevantAssumeforthemomentthattheobjectionsareAstowhethermilitarystatecraftisnotanoptioninlow-politicscaseshistoryprovidesseveralGreatBritainuseditsnavalpowerinitstradewarwiththeHanseaticLeagueduringthe®fteenthcenturyintheseventeenthcenturyGreatBritainusedforceagaintoadvancecommercialinterestsagainsttheNetherlandsSeeConybeare1987InthenineteenthcenturytheUnitedStatesusedthethreatofnavalpowertosuccessfullycompelJapanintoopeningitsmarkettoAmeri-cangoodsIraqinvadedKuwaitbecauseofcon¯ictsoveroilpricesanddebtrepaymentIn1995Canadiannavalvessel®redatandseizedaSpanishtrawlertogaintheupperhandinadisputeover®shingrightsSeeDeSombre2000ForcemaynotbeusedinmostmoderneconomicdisputesthatdoesnotprecludethepossibilityofitsuseandElliott199084±85ItisnotsurprisingthatinresponsetoUeconomiccoercionregardingChina'slaxenforce-mentofintellectualpropertyrightsBeijinginvokedsovereigntylanguageverysimilartoitsresponsetoAmericancriticismsandthreatsaboutChina'shumanrightssituationSeeChien-Hale1997Krasner1999Atleastsomeofthelow-politicscasesareidenticaltothehigh-politicscasesandElliottincludeUdemandsforatargetstatetoimproveitshumanrightsre-Giventhatin1988Congressexpandeditsde®nitionofhumanrightstoincludecorelaborstan-thedistinctionbetweenthehighpoliticsofhumanrightsandthelowpoliticsoflaborregulationhasdisappearedPape1997SeeWaltz1979Grieco1990Gowa1994Mastanduno1998andSkÔlnes2000SeeGoldstein1993BayardandElliott1994andNoland1997EconomicCoercion Thisimpliesthateconomicsanctionsinpursuitofhighpoliticsshouldhavealoweroverallsuccessratethaneconomicsanctionsinpursuitoflowpoliticsthatdoesnotalterthehypothesistobetestedherewhichisthatsuc-cessfulinstancesofeconomiccoercionaremorelikelytoendwithoutsanctionseverbeingimposedTheeffectofrelative-gainsconcernorlargestakeswouldbetoincreasetheoverallfailurerateforallhigh-politicscasesAssumingasimilargamestructureforhigh-politicscasesandlow-politicscasessuchargumentsdonotaffectthehypothesisthatwhentheconditionsarepresentforsanctionsinpur-suitofpoliticalgoalstosucceedsanctionsarelesslikelytobeimplementedTestingforStrategicInteractionAmpledataalreadyexistsonUeconomiccoercionemployedintradeandlabordisputesThomasBayardKimberlyElliottandDavidRichard-soncompiledataontheuseofUeconomiccoerciontoextracttradeconcessionsviaSection301from1975to1994TheycodethetargetasmakingsubstantialconcessionsifthetargetcountrychangesitslawsinaccordancewithUprefer-andthenisobservedimplementingthoselawsIfthetargetcountrychangesitslawsbutfailstoenforcethoselawsconcessionsarecodedasnominalKimberlyElliottcatalogsthethreatsandsuspensionsofGeneralizedSystemofPreferencesbene®tstodevelopingcountriestoenforcecorelaborstandardssincethe1988OmnibusTradeActShecodestargetgovernmentsasmakingsigni®-cantconcessionsifgovernmentalandnongovernmentalorganizationsrecordasigni®cantchangeinthetarget'sbehaviorElizabethDeSombrechron-iclesUsanctioningactivitytoraiseothercountries'environmentalstandardsfromthemid-1970stothepresentdayShecodesasuccesswhenthetargetgov-ernmentpassesandenforceslawconsistentwithUForallthreecategoriesofdatathetargetstatemustactuallycarryoutitspromisesforthecon-cessiontobecodedassigni®cantthesedataarelesslikelytosufferfromtheselectionbiasproblemsthatplaguehigh-politicscasesForeachoftheseissueareasthereisahighlybureaucratizedprocessthatmakesthethreatsofeconomiccoercionexplicitandAsDeSombreobservesªMostUenvironmentalsanctioninglegis-lationincludesprovisionsestablishingaprocessbywhichsanctionsareof®ciallyInthiswayof®cialthreatscanbenotedandstudiedThisob-SeeBayardandElliott1994andElliottandRichardson1997Elliott2000ThegovernmentsourceistheannualStateDepartmentreportonothercountries'humanrightsTheNGOsourcesareFreedomHouseandtheInternationalLaborRightsFundSeeElliottDesombre2000DeSombre1995InternationalOrganization servationholdsforsanctionsinvolvinglaborstandardsandtradedisputesaswellTheroutinizationofthesanctionsprocessmakesitmucheasiertodetectwhensanctionsaremerelythreatenedinadditiontowhentheyareimplementedafterbeingthreatenedTables1and3displaythepatternofsanctionsoutcomeswithregardtotradelaborstandardsandenvironmentalprotectiontablesofferstrongsupportfortheselectioneffectsthesisTable1displaysthepatternofthreatsandoutcomeswhentheUnitedStatesusesSection301asawaytoforceothercountriestoreducetheirtradebarriersThedatashowsthatinmorethan80percentoftheobservationstheUnitedStatesthreatenedbutdidnotim-Thesuccessratewasconsiderablyhigherforthosesanctionsthatendedatthethreatstage56percentthanthosecasesinwhichsanctionswereactuallyimposed33percentThestatisticalsigni®canceofthecorrelationjustmissesthetenpercentlevelbutthetrendsupportstheselectioneffectsargumentTheresultsofsanctionsusedinsupportofregulatorygoalslendevenstrongersupportfortheselectioneffectsargumentTable2showsthepatternofthreatsandoutcomesforUsanctionstoenforcecorelaborstandardsInmorethan75percentofthecasestheUnitedStatesterminatedthedisputeatthethreatstageThesecasesweresuccessfulmorethanhalfthetimeNoneofthecasesinwhichsanctionswereimposedhaveledtosigni®cantconcessionsThecorrelationbe-tweenthreatandsuccessissigni®cantattheonepercentlevelTable3looksattheuseofeconomiccoercioninsupportofenvironmentalgoalsExactlyhalfofthesesanctionsattemptsterminatedatthethreatstageThesecasesweresuccessfulatanastonishingsuccessrateof92percentÐsigni®cantlyhigherthanwhensanctionswereimposedThecorrelationbetweentheimpositionofsanc-tionsandalowsuccessrateisstatisticallysigni®cantattheonepercentlevelsuccessratewhensanctionswereimposedisstillimpressive52percentIamnotsuggestingthatthisdatacapturestheentireuniverseofcasesItisquitelikelythatpotentialtargetstrytocomplywithUdemandsbeforethearticulationofathreatparedtotheHufbauerandElliottdatatheselectionbiasproblemshouldbemuchlesspervasiveTABLEThreatsandsanctionsinU.S.tradepolicy concessionsTotalSanctionsthreatened31407156Sanctionsimposed1051533Total41458652Source:BayardandElliott1994andElliottandRichardson1997Pearsonchi-squareis2likelihood-ratiois2GammaisandKendall'sEconomicCoercion DeSombresuggestsanexplanationconsistentwiththestrategicinteractionargu-Inmanycasesthetargetchangedtheirbehaviorwithinafewdaysoftheimpositionofsanctionsafterrealizingthatthesender'sthreatwasnotabluffApreliminaryreviewofsanctionsemployedinthepursuitofeconomicorreg-ulatorygoalsprovidesstrongempiricalsupportfortheselectioneffectsargumentAsurveyofthisdata®ndsalargenumberofobservationsthatendedbeforetheimplementationofsanctionsConsistentwiththestrategicinteractionhypothesisthesecaseshaveamuchhighersuccessratethanwhensanctionswereactuallyAggregatingthethreecategoriesofdatasanctionswerenotimposedin69percentofthecasesThesuccessrateofthesecaseswas667percentasop-posedtoasuccessrateof417percentwhensanctionswereactuallyimposedOverthe195observationsthecorrelationbetweentheimpositionofsanctionsandalowsuccessrateisstatisticallysigni®cantattheonetenthofonepercentthese®ndingsarehardlyconclusiveandmoreresearchisneededGame-theoreticmodelsofeconomiccoercionpointoutthatthesuccessrateofsanctionsmaybeunderstatedbecauseofselectioneffectsthemostsuccessfulco-ercionepisodesarelikelytoendbeforesanctionsareimposedApreliminarytestof195episodesofsanctionsusedorthreatenedinthepursuitofeconomicorreg-ulatorygoalssupportsthisargumentAmajorityofthesecasesendedwithoutsanc-tionsbeingimposedThecorrelationbetweensanctionsimpositionandafailuretogenerateconcessionsisstatisticallysigni®cantTheimplicationsofthisarticlearesigni®cantforthetheoryandpracticeofeconomicstatecraftThepolicyimplicationsareobviousinfocusingonlyonthoseinstanceswhensanctionshavebeenimposedpolicyanalystshaveoverlookedtheDeSombre2000TABLEThreatsandsanctionsinenforcingcorelaborstandards concessionsTotalSanctionsthreatened11152657Sanctionsimposed7070Total18153345Source:Elliott2000Pearsonchi-squareis7likelihood-ratioisnGammaisandKendall'stau-bInternationalOrganization signi®cantnumberofinstancesinwhichthethreatofcoerciondidnothavetobecarriedoutThesecasesarefarmorelikelytogeneratesuccessfuloutcomesthanwhensanctionsareimposedUnderestimatingtheutilityofeconomiccoercioncallsintoseriousdoubttheargumentthateconomicinducementsareamoreusefultoolofstatecraftthaneconomiccoercionThisdoesnotmeanthatsanctionsareamagicbullettogenerateconcessionsItdoesmeanthatthetoolismoreusefulthancurrentlyunderstoodtheresultsgeneratedheresuggesttheneedforamajorreorienta-tioninthestudyofeconomicstatecraftTheproblemswithignoringstrategicin-teractioninthestudyofmilitarizeddisputesarealreadyapparentthisarticlesuggeststhattheseproblemsarejustasacutefordisputesinvolvingeconomicresearchoneconomicstatecraftreliesonadatasetÐHufbauerandElliott'sÐthatincludesveryfewcasesofsanctionsthatwerethreat-enedbutnotimplementedTheextenttowhichthesestudiestakesamplebiasintoaccountintheirstatisticalanalysesmustbeconsideredinappraisingthevalueItisalsopossiblethataselectionbiasrunsintheotherdirectionÐtheremaybeinstancesinwhichasendercontemplatedsanctionsbutchosenottothreatenthembecauseofthelikelihoodthattheywouldfailtheremayalsobeinstancesinwhichatargetrefrainsfromactingagainstthesender'spreferencesbecauseoftheanticipationofsanctionsSeeSislin1994Cortright1997andHaassandO'Sullivan2000Aninterestingquestioniswhypolicymakerstendtodenigratesanctionseveniftheyhavein-sideraccesstoinstanceswhentheyworkSeeEland1995andHaass1997Basedoninterviewswithgovernmentof®cialsatmultiplelevelsIproffertworeasonsgovernmentof®cialsaremuchmoreattentivetofailuresthansuccessesbecausetherami®cationsofpublicfailuretotheircareerscanbeconsiderableTheverypublicfailureofsanctionsinvariousepisodesisthusthemoresalientfactforpolicymakerspolicymakersde®nethetermªsanctionsºmuchmorenarrowlythanInthepolicymakers'argotªsanctionsºimpliestheimpositionofcomprehensiveandpublicactionstorestricttradeasinCubaorIraqMostpolicymakersbelievesanctionswillfailThesepol-icymakershavegreaterfaithinªeconomicleverageºwhichincludesthreatsaswellasactsand®nan-cialaswellastradesanctionsSeeSignorino1999andMorton1999SeeMartin1992ElliottandUimonen1993andRadcliff1997MorganandSchwebach1997Pape1997Drury1998andDrezner1999TABLEThreatsandsanctionsinenforcingenvironmentalregulations concessionsTotalSanctionsthreatened335389211%Sanctionsimposed18203852Total21557672Source:DeSombre2000Pearsonchi-squareis14likelihood-ratiois16GammaisandKendall'sEconomicCoercion oftheirworkItisnotsurprisingthatempiricalassessmentsofsanctionsstrat-egiesarelargelynegativeThereisaclearneedtoexpandtheavailabledatatoincludecasesinwhichsanctionswerethreatenedbutnotimplementedAcrucialstepforfutureempiricalresearchwillbetofocusoninvestigatingandanalyzingeventswhensanctionsarethreatenedbutnotimposedCasualem-piricismsuggeststhatsuchcasesdoexistformattersofªhighpoliticsºTherearenumerousepisodesofRussiasuccessfullythreateningitsneighborswitheco-nomiccoercionandextractingsigni®cantconcessionsincludingthetransferofnuclearweaponsIn1990theBushadministrationexplicitlyandsuccessfullylinkedtheapprovalofatradeagreementwiththeSovietUniontoMikhailGorbachev'spromisenottointervenemilitarilyinLithuaniaInearly2001theUthreattowithdrawaidtoYugoslaviaclearlyforcedtherulinggovernmenttoarrestSlo-bodanMilosevicandturnhimovertotheUNWarCrimesTribunalmoresystematicworkisneededinthisareabuttheresultsproducedheresuggestsuchresearchwouldprovefruitfulTherami®cationsforthestudyofinternationalrelationsareequallysigni®cantForthepastquarter-centurytherehasbeenanunresolveddebateaboutwhethereconomicinterdependencecanconstrainthebehaviorofstatesinananarchicSanctionsarethemostvisibleexerciseofthepowerthatasymmetricin-terdependencecancreateSkepticsofinterdependenceoftencitethefutilityofeconomicsanctionstosupporttheirargumentsEveninternationallawyersthatstresstheroleofinternationalinstitutionsarguethatsanctionsareaweaktoolofTheargumentandevidencepresentedinthisarticlesuggestthatinternationalrelationstheoristsshouldreconsidertheshadowthateconomiccoer-cioncancastinworldpoliticsReferencesDavidAEconomicStatecraftPrincetonUniversityPressTheSanctionsDebateandtheLogicofChoiceInternationalSecurity80±107ThomasOandKimberlyAnnElliottReciprocityandRetaliationinU.S.TradePolicyWashingtonInstituteforInternationalEconomicsEmpiricalworkonSection301datasuggeststhatthecon¯ictexpectationsapproachcanex-plaincasesofthreataswellDrezner2001SeeMarinov2003foranexampleofthistypeofinquiryOnRussianeconomiccoercionseeDrezner1999PartIIOntheSovietcaseseeBeschlossandTalbott1993206±24onSerbiaandMilosevicseeJanePerlezªAsExpectedBelgradeWins`Cooperative'SealfromUNewYorkTimes3April2001SeeKnorr1975KeohaneandNye1977Buzan1984Wagner1988Mans®eld1994RipsmanandBlanchard1996Papayoanou1999Waltz1999andBlanchardandRipsman2000Gilpin1987ChayesandChayes1995InternationalOrganization 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