Yashodhan Ghorpade 5 th December 2014 Aid and Violent Conflict Addressing grievances that give rise to conflict Winning hearts and minds Berman Shapiro and Felter 2009 Political Science literature ID: 180815
Download Presentation The PPT/PDF document "Calamity, Conflict and Cash Transfers: H..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.
Slide1
Calamity, Conflict and Cash Transfers: How Violence Affects Access to Aid in Pakistan
Yashodhan Ghorpade
5
th
December 2014Slide2
Aid and Violent ConflictAddressing grievances that give rise to conflict“
Winning hearts and minds
”
Berman, Shapiro and
Felter
2009
Political Science literature:
does aid reduce conflict?
Yes –
Justino - India (2011,
forthcoming
);
Berman, Shapiro and
Felter
(2009) – Iraq
No –
Crost
and Johnston (2014
) –
Phillipines
Mixed evidence -
Beath
,
Cristea
and
Enikolopov
(2012
) NSP, Afghanistan
Development Economics literature:
Does conflict affect programme impact?
Higher conflict makes people use transfer to migrate out –
Mesnard
(2009) – Familias
en
Accion
, Colombia
Higher impact on school enrolment in conflict areas –
Wald and
Bozzoli
(2009),
Familias
en
Accion
, Colombia Slide3
Why is the link between conflict and aid important?Assumptions by both, political actors and development community critical to success
Pathway
to understanding political landscape of areas affected by conflict – actors, incentives, capabilities – and therefore options
Better understand considerations while extending aid to conflict-affected areasSlide4
StructureCase study setting and contextData and Identification StrategyIV Estimation and 1
st
Stage Results
Does conflict reduce access to aid?
YES
Mechanisms: How does conflict reduce access to aid?
ARMED
GROUPS
Conclusions and Policy ImplicationsSlide5
Case Study Setting and ContextPakistan – several forms of violenceMarked increase in violence from 2001 – present
Terrorist, insurgency, sectarian motives for internal political violence
Post 2010 flood period. Soon after democratic transition, marked by high violenceSlide6Slide7
Fatalities due to Conflict in Pakistan 2001 –2010: BFRS and SATP dataSlide8
Aid Programmes in PakistanReforming Social Protection landscape: democratic transition in 2008
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP)
–
UCC based on poverty score card
Regular monthly payments to chronic poor households, women recipients
CDCP (
W
atan
)
- Cash transfer-based flood relief programme in 2010
Universal except in KPK – based on house damageSlide9
Data and MethodologyCDCP Impact Evaluation Baseline data; collected
after the 2010 floods
7802 households, representative for flooded areas at the Province, National levels
Key modules
: Shocks and Coping Strategies, Demographics, Assets, Flood Exposure, SP receipts
Conflict data: sub-district level conflict exposure measures using
SATP
data for 2001 – June 2010 (pre-floods)
Measured as Log (1+n) killings between 2001-10 at sub-district levelSlide10
Identification StrategyConflict not random, not neatly demarcated by an exogenous break: contagion over time Violence over 2000s direct spill-over from War on Terror in Afghanistan, history and politics studied by several authors
(Gul 2009; Rashid 2012; Shapiro and
Gulzar
2012;
Gunaratna
and Iqbal
2010; Jones and Fair 2010;
Hussian
2008)
IV estimation
: Distance to
Afghanistan
Control for confounding factors Slide11
Mapping district-level conflict intensity in PakistanSlide12Slide13Slide14Slide15Slide16Slide17Slide18Slide19Slide20Slide21Slide22
IV EstimationCausal Relationship of Interest:
IV First Stage:
2
nd
Stage:
Slide23
IV Estimation: Potential Threats and MitigationAssociation between proximity to Afghanistan and Access to Aid
Remoteness
: Province Dummies, Distance from Administrative Centres
(Provincial, District)
Topography
: Dummy for topography type
(Mountain, Hill, Plateau, Valley, Coastal Plains, Inland Plains)
State Presence
: Community-level
Index
(Govt
. schools, health facilities, immunisation camps, community health workers, post offices administrative HQs)
Infrastructure
: Community-level Index (Bus/wagon stop,
Motorable Road, Railway Station, Retail Shop, Wholesale market, Bank
, Flour mill, Tractor rental centre, Fertiliser depot, Electricity, Gas, Drainage
)Linguistic Fractionalisation: Index a la Alesina et al. (2003)Army Control: Distance to Army Cantonments Province-specific features, capacity: Province DummiesSlide24
IV First Stage Results
(1)
(2)
(3)
Distance to Afghan Border
-0.877
***
-
0.494
***
-
0.266
***
(-12.61)
(-10.09)
(-
12.13)
Controls
NO
YES
YES
Province dummies
NO
NO
YES
N
7802
7786
7786
F-statistic (1, 496)
160.93
101.82
14.99
Prob. > F
0.0000
0.0001
0.0001
Adjusted R-squared
0.3373
0.5411
0.5683Slide25
Causal Impact of conflict on likelihood of receiving transfers?
CDCP - I (Flood Relief)
BISP
probit
IV probit
probit
IV probit
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil level
0.003
-0.438
***
0.002
-0.257
**
-0.7
(-3.29)
-0.49
(-2.07)
Controls
Y
Y
Y
Y
Province Dummies
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
7802
7802
7802
7802Slide26
Conflict and Household-level Access to AidConflict reduces access to aid at the household level for both CDCP and BISP programmes
Controlling for a range of characteristics that determine eligibility and enable accessing aid (demand), and factors that facilitate rollout at the community level (supply)
Stronger effect on CDCP than BISP
Effect
NOT driven by differential eligibility
. In fact, on some indicators households in conflict-affected areas more eligible for aidSlide27
How does conflict reduce access to aid? MechanismsImportant to note controls – infrastructure, state presence, remoteness, topography – impact of conflict is over and above the effect of these factors
Test one hypothesis/ plausible mechanisms:
Presence/ Control of Non-State Armed groups
Armed
groups
resent
efforts by the government to win over political support
Gompert
et al.,
2009;
Crost
and Johnston
2014Targeting of state services, development interventions: Attacks on NGOs, abduction of aid workers, attacks on immunisation camps, BISP office (Turbat)
- Gul 2010; Jones and Fair 2011; Gunaratna and Iqbal 2010Slide28
Armed non-State Actors in PakistanAstounding increase not only in violence but also in the presence and influence of extremist and militant groups
, especially in the NW
Avowed aim to overthrow/ transform the nature of the Pakistani state, delink from the US, adopt Sharia, enforce worldview
Groups loosely coalescing under the umbrella of the
Tehrik
-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) since 2007
Several groups
view state as enemy Slide29
Measuring the presence of armed groupsNo published data – NOT straightforward!
Violence not a perfect proxy of armed group presence
; violence erupts where there is contest, not in domain of opponents’ complete dominance
(
Kalyvas
2006; Justino and Ibanez 2014)
Proxied
attempting to model the
influence of TTP groups on girls’ primary schooling
Extensive reportage of TTP opposition to girls’ education in areas of their control
Residual Analysis from Community-level estimations of Girls’ SchoolingSlide30Slide31
Modelling Community-level Female Primary EnrolmentComplete Model:
Observed Model:
However,
Slide32
Observed :
If
negative, predicted enrolment higher than observed enrolment
More likely associated with presence of ANSA:
Divide communities by +/- residuals, test effects of conflict on aid over sub-populations
If ANSA more likely in communities with negative residual, negative
could explain effect on aid receipts?
If
is indeed random error, communities with
< 0 similar to communities with
>
0 (random error with mean 0); expect similar effects of conflict on aid
Slide33
Estimating Community-level Female Primary Enrolment RateDemand Side
Adult Education (Female)
Adult Education (Male)
Sex Ratio (Adult)
Receipt of Remittances
Average Income level
Land Ownership Patterns
Wealth Status
Enterprise Ownership
Displacement status (Flood)
Linguistic Identity
Supply Side
Presence of Govt. and Private Girls’ and Co-Ed Schools in Community
Community InfrastructureState Presence
Remoteness from AdministrationElectricity AccessFormer Princely StateSlide34
Effect of Armed non-State Actors presence on CDCP Receipts
Full Sample
Effect of conflict on Receipt of CDCP (Flood Relief Transfers): Over Residuals
of Female Primary
Enrollment
Estimation
>
0
< 0
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Log (1+n) killings
-0.541***
-0.267
-0.757***
(-4.08)
(-1.25)
(-6.31)
N
7786
4254
3532
Full Sample
Effect of conflict on Receipt of CDCP (Flood Relief Transfers): Over Residuals
of Female Primary
Enrollment
Estimation
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Log (1+n) killings
-0.541***
-0.267
-0.757***
(-4.08)
(-1.25)
(-6.31)
N
7786
4254
3532Slide35
Effect of Armed non-State Actors presence on BISP Receipts
Full Sample
Effect of conflict on Receipt of CDCP (Flood Relief Transfers): Over Residuals
of Female Primary
Enrolment
Estimation
>
0
< 0
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Log (1+n) killings
-0.463***
-0.333
**
-0.645***
(-3.81)
(-2.38)
(-3.48)
N
7786
4254
3532
Full Sample
Effect of conflict on Receipt of CDCP (Flood Relief Transfers): Over Residuals
of Female Primary
Enrolment
Estimation
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Log (1+n) killings
-0.463***
-0.333
**
-0.645***
(-3.81)
(-2.38)
(-3.48)
N
7786
4254
3532Slide36
Effect of Armed non-State Actors presence on BISP Receipts
Full Sample
Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment Estimation
Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender Gap Estimation
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Panel A
Conflict-affected tehsil (dummy)
-1.890
***
-1.457
**
-2.184***
-0.207
-2.568***
(-3.75)
(-2.20)
(-3.34)
(-1.43)
(-4.06)
N
7786
4254
3532
3651
4135
Panel B
Log (1+n) killings
-0.463***
-0.333
**
-0.645***
-0.057
-0.576***
(-3.81)
(-2.38)
(-3.48)
(-1.53)
(-3.50)
N
7786
4254
3532
3651
4135Slide37
Armed Group Presence and AidStrong and significant results for both programmesEchoed in qualitative, anecdotal references to the presence/ control of armed non state actors limiting access to aid
Armed group presence deters aid workers/ bureaucrats to enter/ operate in areas of their control (
supply
of aid) ?
Inhibits households from overtly seeking state aid (
demand
for aid) ? Slide38
Conclusions & Policy RecommendationsConflict reduces access to both cash transfer programmes
Robustness
: Results hold when using dummy for conflict-affected sub district
Presence of TTP-linked armed groups
lowers access to aid
Reduces supply by threats to aid workers, officials, AND demand by threats of retaliation, reduced mobility of local populations
Robust
to estimation of community-level gender gap in primary schooling
This is worrying: The
lack of access to aid may
exacerbate development shortfalls
, horizontal inequalities – with implications for future peace and
development
Need to question more carefully the ability to implement programmes in conflict-affected areas to achieve development, political goalsNeed for conflict-sensitive analyses
to inform development policy and operations in conflict-affected areas. Realities too distinction for “development as usual”.Reaching households may require striking a deal with/ paying off armed groups – ultimately a political, tactical decision, e.g. Tsunami aid in Sri LankaSlide39
Discussion: Winning Hearts and Minds or Losing Lands and People?Clear intent to use aid to win hearts and minds, foster nation-buildingAid as an instrument for achieving state goals – popular support, redress of historic grievances, and tactical support in fight against militants/ insurgents
“Conflict
in NWFP [old acronym of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province], FATA and Balochistan has severely challenged the ability of the state as well as the legitimacy of the idea of a functioning state in Pakistan.
Social protection must be part of the strategy to reclaim the space and legitimacy for the state in Pakistan
, through protection to the basic entitlements of people in the conflict-affected
areas…
“Expanded
social protection programmes, particularly directed at the conflict-affected areas are essential to protect innocent victims of conflict, and to
regain legitimacy for the idea of a functioning state
through creating, expanding and ensuring the delivery of citizenship-based entitlements
.”
GoP
(2010), pp.
145Slide40
… Yet, Ability may curtail intent:
“The
challenge in NWFP and FATA comes from groups that seek to impose their own vision of society on the majority. They violate democratic norms, actively and violently oppose social policy and development initiatives such as
girls’ schooling
, immunization campaigns, and
even income transfers to women
. The armed activities of militants and the state’s armed response has led to large-scale loss of life, displacement, and destruction of infrastructure, particularly social infrastructure. There has been massive disruption to livelihoods and economic activity
.”
(
GoP
2010), pp. 145Slide41
Robustness Tests: Conflict Dummy
CDCP – Phase I
BISP
CDCP – Phase I
BISP
probit
probit
probit
probit
IV probit
IV probit
IV probit
IV probit
Conflict-affected tehsil (dummy)
0.118***
-0.016
-1.619
***
-1.100
**
-4.36
(-0.24)
(-3.44)
(-2.05)
Controls
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Province Dummies
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
7802
7802
7802
7802
7802
7802
7802
7802Slide42
Likelihood of entire community being excluded from programme
CDCP - I
BISP
Conflict-affected Tehsil
Log (1+n) killings - tehsil
Conflict-affected Tehsil
Log (1+n) killings - tehsil
Conflict-affected Tehsil (dummy)
1.275
2.457***
(1.45)
(7.38)
Log (1+n) killings - tehsil
0.188**
0.613***
(2.16)
(3.88)
N
497
497
497
497Slide43
Community-level coverage rates of programmes
CDCP - I
BISP
Log (1+n) killings - tehsil
Conflict-affected Tehsil
Log (1+n) killings - tehsil
Conflict-affected Tehsil
Conflict-affected Tehsil (dummy)
-1.475
-0.847*
(-1.41)
(-1.75)
Log (1+n) killings - tehsil
-0.256**
-0.156**
(-2.30)
(-2.48)
N
497
497
497
497Slide44
Estimation of Female Primary Enrolment
N
439
R2
0.517
adj. R2
0.472
F
11.59
Prob. F > 0
0.0000Slide45
Effect of Armed non-State Actors presence on CDCP Receipts
Full Sample
Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment Estimation
Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender Gap Estimation
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Panel A
Conflict-affected tehsil (dummy)
-1.959
***
-1.126
-2.344***
-0.367
-2.575***
(-4.13)
(-1.22)
(-5.66)
(-1.12)
(-5.38)
N
7786
4254
3532
3651
4135
Panel B
Log (1+n) killings
-0.541***
-0.267
-0.757***
-0.101
-0.696***
(-4.08)
(-1.25)
(-6.31)
(-1.25)
(-5.02)
N
7786
4254
3532
3651
4135Slide46
Effect of Armed non-State Actors presence on BISP Receipts
Full Sample
Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment Estimation
Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender Gap Estimation
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Taliban likely not present
Taliban likely present
Panel A
Conflict-affected tehsil (dummy)
-1.890
***
-1.457
**
-2.184***
-0.207
-2.568***
(-3.75)
(-2.20)
(-3.34)
(-1.43)
(-4.06)
N
7786
4254
3532
3651
4135
Panel B
Log (1+n) killings
-0.463***
-0.333
**
-0.645***
-0.057
-0.576***
(-3.81)
(-2.38)
(-3.48)
(-1.53)
(-3.50)
N
7786
4254
3532
3651
4135