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Cutting a Birthday Cake Cutting a Birthday Cake

Cutting a Birthday Cake - PowerPoint Presentation

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Cutting a Birthday Cake - PPT Presentation

Yonatan Aumann Bar Ilan University How should the cake be divided I want lots of flowers I love white decorations No writing on my piece at all Model The cake 1dimentional ID: 272819

welfare player piece utilitarian player welfare utilitarian piece envy price players egalitarian pareto fairness improvement division cake dumping free

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Slide1

Cutting a Birthday Cake

Yonatan Aumann, Bar Ilan UniversitySlide2

How should the cake be divided?

“I want lots of flowers”

“I love white decorations”

“No writing on my piece at all!”Slide3

Model

The cake:1-dimentionalthe interval [0,1]Valuations:Non atomic measures on [0,1]Normalized: the entire cake is worth 1

Division:

Single piece to each player, or

Any number of piecesSlide4

How should the cake be divided?

“I want lots of flowers”

“I love white decorations”

“No writing on my piece at all!”Slide5

Fair Division

Proportional:

Each player gets a piece worth to her

at least 1/n

Envy Free:

No player prefers a piece allotted to someone else

Equitable:

All players assign the same value to their allotted piecesSlide6

Cut and Choose

Alice likes the candies

Bob likes the base

Alice cuts in the middle

Bob chooses

Bob

Alice

Proportional

Envy free

EquitableSlide7

Previous Work

Problem first presented by H. Steinhaus (1940)Existence theorems (e.g. [DS61,Str80])Algorithms for different variants of the problem:Finite Algorithms (e.g. [Str49,EP84])

“Moving knife” algorithms (e.g. [Str80])

Lower bounds on the number of steps required for divisions (e.g. [SW03,EP06,Pro09])

Books: [BT96,RW98,Mou04]Slide8

Player 1

Player 2

Example

Players 3,4

Total: 1.5

Total: 2

Player 1

Player 3

Player 2

Player 4

Player 1

Player 2

Fairness

 Maximum UtilitySlide9

Social Welfare

Utilitarian: Sum of players’ utilities

Egalitarian:

Minimum of players’ utilitiesSlide10

with Y. Dombb

Fairness vs. WelfareSlide11

The Price of Fairness

Given an instance:max welfare using any division

max

welfare

using

fair

division

PoF

=

Price of equitability

Price of proportionality

Price of envy-freeness

utilitarian

egalitarianSlide12

Player 1

Player 2

Example

Players 3,4

Total: 1.5

Total: 2

Utilitarian Price of Envy-Freeness:

4/3

Envy-free

Utilitarian optimumSlide13

The Price of Fairness

Given an instance:max welfare using any division

max

welfare

using

fair

division

PoF

=

Seek bounds on the

Price of Fairness

First defined in [CKKK09] for non-connected divisionsSlide14

Results

Price of

Proportionality

Envy freeness

Equitability

Utilitarian

Egalitarian

1

1Slide15

Utilitarian Price of Envy FreenessLower Bound

Player 1

Player 2

Player 3

Player

3

Best possible utilitarian:

Best proportional/envy-free utilitarian:

players

Utilitarian Price of envy-freeness: Slide16

Utilitarian Price of Envy FreenessUpper Bound

Key observation:In order to increase a player’s utility by

, her new piece must span at least (

-1)

cuts.

Envy-free piece x

new piece:

 x

new piece:

 2x

new piece:

 3xSlide17

Utilitarian Price of Envy FreenessUpper Bound

Maximize

:

Subject to:

x

i

- utility

i – number of cuts

Total number of cuts

Always holds for envy-free

Final utility does not exceed 1

We bound the solution to the program by Slide18

Trading Fairness for Welfare

Definitions: - un-proportional: exists player that gets at most 1/n - envy: exists player that values another player’s piece as worth at least  times her own piece

 - un-

equale

: exists player that values her allotted piece as worth more than  times what another player values her allotted pieceSlide19

Trading Fairness for Welfare

Optimal utilitarian may require infinite unfairness (under all three definitions of fairness)Optimal egalitarian may require n-1 envyEgalitarian fairness does conflict with proportionality or equitabilitySlide20

with O. Artzi and Y. Dombb

Throw One’s Cake and Have It TooSlide21

Example

Alice

Bob

Utilitarian welfare: 1

Utilitarian welfare: (1.5-

)

How much can be gained by such “dumping”?

Bob

AliceSlide22

The Dumping Effect

Utilitarian: dumping can increase the utilitarian welfare by (n)Egalitarian: dumping can increase the egalitarian welfare by n/3Asymptotically tightSlide23

Pareto Improvement

Pareto Improvement: No player is worse-off and some are better-offStrict Pareto Improvement: All players are better-offTheorem: Dumping cannot provide strict Pareto improvement

Proof:

Each player that improves must get a cut.

There are only n-1 cuts.Slide24

Pareto Improvement

Dumping can provide Pareto improvement in which: n-2 players double their utility2 players stay the sameSlide25

Player 2

Player 3

Player 4

Player 5

Player 6

Player 7

Pareto Improvement

Player 1

Player 8

Player 8

Player 1

Player 2

Player 3

Player 4

Player 5

Player 6

Player 7Slide26

Player 2

Player 3

Player 4

Player 5

Player 6

Player 7

Pareto Improvement

Player 1

Player 8

Player 1

Player 2

Player 3

Player 4

Player 5

Player 6

Player 7

Player 8: 1/n

Players 1-7: 0.5

Player 8: 1/n

Player 1: 0.5

Players 2-7: 1Slide27

with Y. Dombb and A. Hassidim

Computing Socially Optimal DivisionsSlide28

Computing Socially Optimal Divisions

Input: evaluation functions of all playersExplicitPiece-wise constantOracleFind: Socially optimal division

Utilitarian

EgalitarianSlide29

Hardness

It is NP-complete to decide if there is a division which achieves a certain welfare thresholdFor both welfare functionsEven for piece-wise constant evaluation functionsSlide30

The Discrete Version

Player x

Player y

Player zSlide31

Approximations

Hard to approximate the egalitarian optimum to within (2-)No FPTAS for utilitarian welfare8+o(1) approximation algorithm for utilitarian welfare

In the oracle input modelSlide32

Open ProblemsSlide33

Optimizing Social Welfare

Approximating egalitarian welfareTighter bounds for approximating utilitarian welfareOptimizing welfare with strategic playersSlide34

Dumping

Algorithmic procedures“Optimal” Pareto improvementCan dumping help in other economic settings?Slide35

General

Two dimensional cakeBounded number of piecesChoresSlide36

Questions?

Happy Birthday !