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Full >e: & C iti f acce a ue ca be fu athttp://<<<.ta f li e.c:/acti /;u alI f:ati ?;u alC e=ft0 :fFRf: ;k [=igi ia >ech ibaie] :: lk 3 Nve:be 01 + At: 0/:.8 Alexa A x l AAzk &Mic-ih.H ua 0 .11i-. 1H u R l0 gfxa:R EftlI:Clk E IkPPFFF* : +fR l*eftPRf P+ H& ,:Cl f+ -ffak . l l C: f : El /f 9E:el +fa l:el El D a OfaR O:a8Rl/: la /:f3p: b N eE:lR 8* -x3lplavf e l E :a eRlk Alexa e a zka & Michael A. Hu zeke 01 Rage f H : E te teI ig ati a the t Cha ce f Peace i the Fit *l *a+ ,ecuit- ,tu ie+ .:.+//-/9 + DOI: 10.1080/09/3/.1.01 .110313 vf R p f E :a eRlk http:// x. i.g/10.1080/09/3/.1.01 .110313 Publihe li e: 0 Nv 01 . ,ub:it -u aticle t thi ;u al Aticle vie<: 11 =ie< elate aticle =ie< C:ak ata SecurityStudies,24:662Ð695,2015Copyright©Taylor&FrancisGroup,LLCISSN:0963-6412print/1556-1852onlineDOI:10.1080/09636412.2015.1103135 RageofHonor:EntenteIndignationandtheLostChanceforPeaceintheFirstWorldWarALEXANDERLANOSZKAANDMICHAELA.HUNZEKERWhytheFirstWorldWarendedin1918andnotearlierremainsamajorpuzzle.Weproposeanewtheorythatemphasizeshowhonorprolongswarsbeyondwhatrationalisttheoriescanexplain.Itar-guesthatwhenhonorisinsulted,anaffrontedactorwillstrivetopunishtheoffender.Absentanapology,thepursuitofasatisfactorypunishmentleadstheaffrontedbelligerenttoignoreunfavorablebattleÞeldinformation,holdlogicallyirreconcilablebeliefs,processinformationinemotionalterms,andobsessoverstatus.Wepre-dictthatwarsofpreventionandterritorialoccupationaremostlikelytoelicithonorconsiderations.WetestourargumentagainstanobscureepisodeinthewarwhereGermanyandtheUnitedStatesmadepeaceoverturesinDecember1916.WedemonstratethathonorconcernsmadeEntentedecisionmakersseeGermanaggressionasanaffronttotheirhonorthatonlythedestructionofGermanyÕspoliticalregimecouldredress.WhydidtheFirstWorldWarendinNovember1918andnotbefore?ThoughtherationalistliteratureonwarterminationoffersreasonswhytheFirstWorldWarendedwhenitdid,theseexplanationshaveimportantempiricalandtheoreticalshortcomings.Information-basedargumentscannotaccountforwhydecisionmakerscontinuedthewarafteritshouldhavebecomeapparenttoallsidesin1916thatprolongedwarfarewouldjeopardizetheirsurvival.Similarly,theargumentthatcommitmentproblemsundercutcredi-blebargaininglacksempiricalsupport.Theterritorialpartitionsandpolitical AlexanderLanoszkaisaUSForeignPolicyandInternationalSecurityPostdoctoralFellowattheJ.S.DickeyCenterforInternationalUnderstandingatDartmouthCollege.MichaelA.HunzekerisassistantprofessorattheSchoolofPolicy,GovernmentandInternationalAffairsatGeorgeMasonUniversity. RageofHonorcompromisesmadein1918and1919aswellastheadjustmentofwaraimsthroughouttheconßictdemonstratethedivisibilityoftheissuesatstake.Fi-nally,recenthistoricalscholarshipchallengestheviewthatciviliandecisionmakerscontinuedthewartoensuretheirpoliticalandpersonalsurvival.Alternativeapproacheshardlyfarebetter.Socialpsychologicaltheoriesgen-erallyfocusontheJulyCrisis,payinglittleattentiontohowthewarendedorwhyitendured.Similarly,purelyhistoricalaccountsofthewaroftentaketheexpansionofcombatantwaraims,andthecorrespondingeliminationofapotentialbargainingspace,asgiven.Thehistoricalpuzzledeepenswhenweconsideranoft-forgottenepisodeinthewar.Towardstheendof1916,ayearinwhichthebelligerentsincurredmassivecasualtiesandsawtheirmilitarystrategiescontinuouslyfailontheWesternFront,aseriesofdiplomaticoverturesforpeaceoccurred.GermanywastheÞrsttoproposetalks,buttheUnitedStatesandotherneutralcountriesadvancedtheirownproposalsshortlythereafter.YettheEntentequicklyrejectedtheseofferstonegotiate.Astheirinternaldelibera-tionsindicate,Ententeeliteswerefarmoreconcernedwithhowtheyshouldarticulatetheirrejectionthantheywerewiththesubstanceoftheproposals.UnsatisÞedwithexistingexplanationsforthisepisode,weproposeatheoryofhonorthatbuildsoninsightsfromsocialpsychologyandthecon-structivistliteratureonstatuscompetitionandontologicalsecurity.WearguethathonorconsiderationsinducedtheEntentetobypassthisopportunitytoconsideratleastnegotiatingasettlement.Honorandthepursuitofsuchstatusbecameanendontoitselfratherthanameanstosecurity.HonorledthemtoignorenegativebattleÞeldinformation,pursuediscreditedstrategies,holdlogicallyirreconcilablebeliefsandheightenedthreatperceptions,takepersonalumbragewithpeaceovertures,andignoreapromisingopportunitytostrikeawar-endingbargain.HonorÑspeciÞcally,BritishhonorÑcausedtheEntentetorejectthe1916proposalsoffhand.SinceBritainwasthedominantglobalpowerin1914,GermanyÕspreventivewarandviolationofBelgianterritoryandneu-tralityimpugnedBritainÕshonorwhilechallengingitsstatusandcontinentalcommitments.Withnoapologyorpolicyreversalforthcoming,Britishelitesfelttremendouspressuretodefendtheirhonor,andsoresortedtoviolenceinordertohumiliateGermany.Asthewarprogressed,protectingBritishhonorgraduallyevolvedtomeanthedestructionoftheGermanregime.HonoralsocausedBritishleaderstodiscountorotherwiseignoreclearevidencethatthewarwasgoingfarworsethanplanned,andthatitsprosecutionjeopardizedtheEmpireÕsÞnancialunderpinnings.Honorthuseliminatedthebargain-ingspacethatotherwiseexistedin1916becauseitmadeBritainregardtheconßictasabrute-forceÞghttotheÞnish. HewStrachan,TheFirstWorldWar(NewYork:Penguin,2005),226.SeealsoDavidStevenson,TheFirstWorldWarandInternationalPolitics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1988). A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerOurexplanationilluminateswhythewarendureduntil1918.TheCentralPowersÑAustria-Hungary,Bulgaria,Germany,andtheOttomanEmpireÑoriginallysawthewarincoerciveterms.TheBritish-ledrejectionoftheDecember1916proposalsmadethemrevisethisassumption:thewarwasnowaboutsurvival.Consequently,theCentralPowersbegantoignorerationalopportunitiestonegotiatepeace.Ratherthanreaptheeasternre-wardsoftheTreatyofBrest-Litovsk,GermanylaunchedtheSpringOffensivethat,althoughtacticallysuccessful,resultedinstrategicfailureanddefeatintheFirstWorldWar.TheirwareffortbetweenJanuary1917andNovember1918waslessagambleforresurrectionthanafutileefforttomoderateanim-placableadversarydedicatedtoitsdestruction.Thus,althoughtherationalistliteraturecaststhiswarasabargainingprocess,ourÞndingscomplicatethisview.BruteforceratherthancoercionlargelydeÞnedthiswarofattrition,whichonlyendedwhenitdidbecauseGermanywasÞnallyexhausted.Weproceedasfollows.Section1reviewsexistingexplanationsforwhytheFirstWorldWarended.Section2deÞneshonoranddescribeshowitcouldaffectthewaybelligerentsÞghtwars.Sections3and4evaluateourtheorybyexaminingBritishwarbehaviorin1916.Consistentwithourtheory,section3showsthattheBritishignoredandthencherry-pickedbat-tleÞeldinformation,lackedstrategy,andsubordinatedpolicytowar.Section4demonstratesthatthesepathologiesculminatedintheiremotionalbutcynicaldismissaloftheGermanandAmericanpeaceovertures.Section4assessesalternativearguments.Section5describestheimplicationsofourstudyandoutlinesdirectionsforfutureresearch.EXPLAININGTHEENDOFTHEFIRSTWORLDWARToexplainwar,rationalistapproachesassumethatstates,ledbyrisk-aversedecisionmakers,prefertoavoidinefÞcientÞghtingbystrikingamutuallyac-ceptablebargain.Bargainingmightbreakdownforthreereasons,leadingtowar.First,becausetheinternationalsystemisanarchic,stateshaveincentivestomisrepresenttheirresolveandcapabilities.Consequently,informationasymmetriesleadstatestoadoptinappropriateestimatesofcostsandproba-bilitiesofvictory.Second,theanarchicinternationalsystemcomplicatestheenforcementofagreements.IfstatescannotprovidesufÞcientassurancesandabidebytheiragreements,thenstatesÞghttoresolvethesecommit-mentproblems.Third,somegoodsareindivisible:anydivisionstrongly JamesD.Fearon,ÒRationalistExplanationsforWar,ÓInternationalOrganization49,no.3(Summer1995):379Ð414.Foranapproachemphasizingideasandperceptions,seeStephenVanEvera,CausesofWar:PowerandtheRootsofConßict(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1999).RobertPowell,ÒWarasaCommitmentProblem,ÓInternationalOrganization60,no.1(Winter2006):169Ð203;DaleC.Copeland,TheOriginsofMajorWar(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2000);DanReiter,HowWarsEnd(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009). RageofHonordiminishestheirvalue,thusreducingthebargainingrangetozero.warsbegin,statesstillbargain,butcostlyÞghtingistheprincipalmeansofreachingasettlement.InternationalrelationsscholarshipbuildsuponthesetheoriestoexplainwhytheFirstWorldWarendedinNovember1918.Itemphasizesthereso-lutionofcommitmentproblemsandtheincentivesleadersfacedforwagingthewar.Itdoesnotviewinformationasymmetryasaffectingthelengthofthewar.Ifthiswasthecase,belligerentsshouldhavestartedseekingpeacebyfallof1916whenitbecameapparentthatthewarhadbecomeextremelyScholarshighlightthreecommitmentproblemsthatunderminedeffortstoendtheFirstWorldWar.DaleC.CopelandarguesthatGermanylaunchedapreventivewartoforestalltheriseofRussia.DanReiterhighlightstheinternationalstatusofBelgium,arguingthatGermanleadersfelttheywouldremainvulnerableunlesstheyannexedBelgium.Finally,AlexWiesigerÕsanalysisofunlimitedwarsimpliesthattheGermanscreatedadispositionalcommitmentproblemwhentheylaunchedapreventivewaragainstBelgiumandallowedatrocitiestooccurduringtheinvasion.SuchactionsledtheEntentetoseeGermanyasinsatiablyaggressive,makingregimechangetheonlysolutiontothiscommitmentproblem.AnotherrationalistexplanationforthewarÕslengthemphasizesdomes-ticpolitics.HeinGoemansarguesthatleadersofregimesthatmixautocraticanddemocraticfeaturespickwar-Þghtingstrategiesthatensuretheirsurvival.Forleadersofsuchstates,militarydefeatjeopardizestheirpoliticalandper-sonalsurvival.Thus,inthefaceofunfavorableinformationaboutbattleÞeldoutcomes,leadersofmixedregimesgambleforresurrection.Accordingly,Germanleadersadoptedriskywarstrategiesinearly1917toretainpower.OnlywhenthedomesticthreatintensiÞedinthefallof1918andmilitarylossesreachedatippingpointdidGermanleadersseekpeacefulresolution.Bycontrast,GreatBritainandFrancefoughtthewarinamannerexpectedbyrationalistexplanationsofwar,adjustingtheirwaraimsbasedontheinformationreceivedfromthebattleÞeld.Still,importantpuzzlesremain.ItisunclearwhyGermanleadersdidnotseekpeaceontheWesternFrontfollowingRussiaÕscapitulation.The SeeStacieE.Goddard,ÒUncommonGround:IndivisibleTerritoryandthePoliticsofLegitimacy,ÓInternationalOrganization60,no.1(Winter2006):35Ð68;andRonE.Hassner,ÒÔToHalveandtoHoldÕ:ConßictsoverSacredSpaceandtheProblemofIndivisibility,ÓSecurityStudies12,no.4(October2003):OriginsofMajorWarHowWarsEndAlexWiesiger,LogicsofWar:ExplanationsforLimitedandUnlimitedConßicts(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2013).HeinGoemans,WarandPunishment:TheCausesofWarTerminationandtheEndoftheFirstWorldWar(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2000). A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerhighlyfavorabletermsthatGermanyextractedfromtheTreatyofBrest-LitovskshouldhaveatleastresolvedconcernsaboutRussiaÕsfuturegrowthinpower.Yet,ratherthansettling,GermanylaunchedamajoroffensiveontheWesternFront.Moreover,evidenceofGermanapprehensionsoverthestatusofBelgiumissparse.AsGoemanscommentedinanassessmentofReiterÕsargument,continuingtoÞghtoutofworryforfutureBritishandFrenchexploitationwastochooseÒsuicideforfearofdeath.ÓButGoe-mansÕsdomesticexplanationsimilarlycannotelucidateGermanyÕsdecisiontolaunchOperationMichaelandnotusetheTreatyofBrest-Litovsktopla-catedomesticopposition.WiesigerÕsdiscussionofdispositionalcommitmentproblemshasseveralweaknessesaswell.ConsiderÞrstthetheory.Whenonestatelaunchesapre-ventivewartoresolvealong-termcommitmentproblem,thetargetofthepreventiveaggressionoftenmisinterpretstheaggressorÕsmotivesandobjec-tives.Consequently,targetsofpreventiveaggressionoftenadoptunlimitedwaraims,believingthatonlyregimechangecanpreventfutureattacksbe-causetheaggressorisseenasnaturallyandirredeemablyaggressive.Thus,eveniftheaggressorofferstodiscusspeace,suchoverturesareconsideredinsincere.Asaresult,allbelligerentsendupÞghtingtotheÞnish.shortcomingsofthisargumentarethreefold.First,psychologicalresearchhasuncoveredthatattributionbiasispervasive.Individualsaremorelikelytoattributenegativebehaviorstothedispositionofothersbuttakecreditfortheirpositivebehaviors.Sowhyshouldattributionbiasprimarilyariseinpreventivewarsandnototherwars?Ifthereisalinkbetweenpreventiveandunlimitedwar,whydoweseefarmoreunlimitedwarsthanpreven-tiveones?Second,thetheoryofferslittleinsightastothepsychologicalmechanismthroughwhichbelligerentdecisionmakersevolvefrommakingsituationalassessmentsoftheiradversariestodispositionalones,orwhyonlythedispositionalassessmentsshouldendure.Itdoesnotadequatelyaddresshowsuchcollectivebeliefsemergeandconstraindecisionmakerstopursuewardespitetheattendantcostsanduncertainties.Finally,theargumentcouldbereversed.Ifabelligerenthasadispositionalcommitmentproblem,andtheadversaryseesitasaninsurmountableobstacleshortofregimechangeandthereforewagesunlimitedwar,thenthebelligerentmightbelievethatitsadversaryhasadispositionalcommitmentproblemofitsown.IntheFirstWorldWar,GermanyhadtheproblemofbeingPrussianmilitaristwhereasGreatBritainhadtheproblemoflegitimatingitswareffortinoppositiontosuchvalues.Rationally,bothstatesshouldrecognizethatsuchmutualbeliefs HeinGoemans,ÒH-DiploRoundtableReviewofDanReiterÕsHowWarsEnd3,no.19(2012):14.http://h-diplo.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-3-19.pdf.LogicsofWar.HaroldH.KelleyandJohnL.Michela,ÒAttributionTheoryandResearch,ÓAnnualReviewof31(1980):457Ð501. RageofHonorforeclosedanybargainingandthusdisavowthemintheinterestsofsettlingTheweaknessesthatcharacterizeWiesigerÕsotherwiseexcellentstudyreßectatendencyamongaccountscenteredonsocialpsychologicalvari-ablestoexplainwar.SuchworkshavedifÞcultyexplainingwhybelliger-entsshouldcontinuetowagewarwithoutevercomingtotheirsenses.Take,forexample,DominicD.P.JohnsonandDominicTierneyÕsclaimthatonceleadersdeliberatelychoosewar,theyadoptanÒimplementalmindsetÓthatmakesthemoverconÞdent,risk-acceptant,andlessreceptivetodisconÞrm-ingevidence.Itisunclearwhetherandwhenthesemindsetsattenuateovertime.AccountsemphasizingtheÒcultoftheoffensiveÓfacethesameIfthereasonforwhichawarendsalsoilluminatesitsinitia-tionandcontinuation,asrationalistexplanationsofwarclaim,thensocialpsychologicalapproacheshaveanimportantshortcoming.ATHEORYOFHONORMindfuloftheseissues,weadvanceanewtheoryofhowhonoraffectsÞghting.WeÞrstdeÞnehonorbeforediscussingitseffectsonwar.DeÞningHonorIndividualsstrivetoenhancetheirself-esteem.Asubjectiveself-evaluationofoneÕsworth,self-esteemisvaluablebecauseindividualspreferpositiveconceptionsofthemselvestothefeelingsofshameandinadequacythatpoorself-esteemproduces.Onewaytogainself-esteeminvolvesimprovingthestatusofthegroupinwhichtheindividualisamember.Accordingtosocialidentitytheory,individualsbolstertheirself-imagebypraisingthegroupinwhichtheybelongattheexpenseofothers.ACanadianthusmightÞndit See,forexample,RobertJervis,PerceptionandMisperceptioninInternationalPoliticsNJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976);RoseMcDermott,PoliticalPsychologyinInternationalRelations(AnnArbor,MI:UniversityofMichiganPress,2004);JackS.LevyandWilliamR.Thompson,Causesof(Oxford:Wiley-Blackwell,2010);VanEvera,CausesofWar.DominicD.P.JohnsonandDominicTierney,ÒTheRubiconTheoryofWar:HowthePathtoConßictReachesthePointofNoReturn,ÓInternationalSecurity36,no.1(Summer2011):7Ð40.See,forexample,StephenVanEvera,ÒWhyCooperationFailedin1914,ÓWorldPolitics38,no.1(October1985):80Ð117.R.HarrisonWagner,ÒBargainingandWar,ÓJournalofPoliticalScience44,no.3(July2000):469Ð84.WagnerdrawsonCarlvonClausewitzÕsinsightthatwarisanalternativeformofpolitics,butoverlookshowClausewitzintendedthisstatementtobenormativeratherthanempirical.RichardNedLebow,ACulturalTheoryofInternationalRelations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress,2008):15Ð16.MichaelA.Hogg,ÒSocialIdentityTheory,ÓinContemporarySocialPsychologicalTheories,ed.PeterJ.Burke(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2006). A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerusefulholdingnegativeviewsofAmericansbecauseitwouldgiveherpridebelievingthatCanadaissuperiortotheUnitedStates.Honorsuggestsstrongself-esteem,yetthesetermsarenotsynonymous.HonorhasÞvedistinguishingattributes.First,itisasocialassetthatbothconfersandreinforcesareputationforabidingbycommitmentsandrespect-ingcustoms.Maintainingcommitmentscangivesomeonehonor,justasthedesiretopreservehonorconstrainshertokeepthoseverycommitments.Second,honorÒrevolvesaroundapersonÕscapacitytocommanddeferentialtreatmentfromotherswhoare,inotherrespects,likethemselves.ÓAnindi-vidualthathasadominantstatusinhermilieuexpectssubordinatebehaviorfromothers.Third,commitmentsacquireapersonaldimensionbecausebreakingthemimpliesdishonorandthusdamagestheidentityoftheindi-vidual.Withouthonoratstake,commitmentscanbejettisonedwithlegalandpoliticalcosts,butnotpsychologicalcost.Fortheoffensetoaffecthonor,itmustinvolveadirectchallengetothestatusandprestigethatthetargetbe-lievesitpossessesandvalues.Honorhasanemotionalvalence;perceivedlossestoitaredisproportionatetotheobjectiveharmitself.Fourth,becausehonorreßectsstatusinequality,actorstendtotreatitaszero-sum.Whenonepartyinaconßictgainshonor,theotherpartynec-essarilyloseshonor.Afterall,ifeverypartyinadisputeclaimstohaveincreasedtheirhonorwhenthatdisputeisresolved,thenhonorlosessomeofitsintrinsicvalue,especiallyincaseswherebesmirchedhonordemandsrestitution.Conversely,onesidecandeliberatelydishonoritscompetitorinordertoenhanceitsownsenseofhonor.Thesociologicalliteratureonhonorrecognizesthisperverseincentive.AsPitt-Riversargues,ÒthevictorinanycompetitionforhonorÞndshisreputationenhancedbythehumiliationofthevanquished.ÓHonorÕslastdistinguishingattributeisthatprotecting Althoughwetreathonorasadistinctconceptfortheory-buildingpurposes,werecognizethatitisnotalwayspossibletodisentanglehonorfromsuchrelatedconceptsasself-image,status,pride,andrevenge.Wethususehonorasshorthandforalltheseassociatedemotions.Onreputationandstatus,seeAllanDafoe,JonathanRenshon,andPaulHuth,ÒReputationandStatusasMotivesforWar,ÓAnnualReviewofPoliticalScience17(2014):371Ð93.QuoteisfromRuthHorowitzandGarySchwartz,ÒHonor,NormativeAmbiguityandGangViolence,ÓAmericanSociological39,no.2(April1974):240.Oninternationalstatusseeking,seeDeborahWelchLarsonandAlexeiShevchenko,ÒStatusSeekers:ChineseandRussianResponsestoUSPrimacy,ÓInternationalSecurityno.4(Spring2010):63Ð95;andTudorA.Onea,ÒBetweenDominanceandDecline:StatusAnxietyandGreatPowerRivalry,ÓReviewofInternationalStudies40,no.1(January2014):125Ð52.Onoffensesaffectinghonor,seePatriciaM.RodriguezMosquera,AntonyS.R.Manstead,andAgnetaH.Fischer,ÒTheRoleofHonourConcernsinEmotionalReactionstoOffences,ÓCognitionand16,no.1(2002):146Ð47.SeealsoJonathanMercer,ÒEmotionalBeliefs,ÓInternationalOrganiza-64,no.1(January2010):1Ð31.Ontherelationshipbetweenhonorandreputation,seeJ.G.Peristiany,HonourandShame:TheValuesofMediterraneanSociety(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1965);F.H.Stewart,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1994).OurdescriptionofhonormakessenseofDarylPressÕsobservationthatdecisionmakerscaregreatlyabouttheirownreputationbutignorethoseoftheiradversaries.SeeDarylG.Press,Credibility:HowLeadersAssessMilitaryThreats(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2005).JulianPitt-Rivers,ÒHonourandSocialStatus,ÓinHonourandShame,ed.J.G.Peristiany,24. RageofHonorhonorcanbesuchapowerfulmotivethatindividualsandgroupsalikewillstaketheirexistenceonit.Thatis,thedesiretopreserveorrestorehonorcanleadtoreversalsinpreference.Suchreversalsareinherentlyirrational,sincerationalityimpliesthatpreferencesarecomplete,transient,andreßex-ive.TheaffrontedindividualcanprioritizehonorpreservationoverphysicalYetwearguethatthispreferencereversalisnotalwaysinstantaneous.Nordoeseverythreatorinsulttohonorleadtoapreferencereversal.Evenintheheatofthemoment,especiallywhencommitmentsandsecurityarethreatened,honorcanremainlesssalientthanrationalconcernsforsecu-rity.Nevertheless,honorconcernscangrowinsalienceovertime,aswhenonemovesdeeperintothedomainoflosses.Themoretheaffrontedpartyexperiencesfailureinitseffortstorestoreitshonor,themoreimportantitshonorbecomes.Accordingly,theaffrontedpartybecomesmorelikelytoprivilegeitsreputationoveritsownsurvival.Theoppositeisalsotrue.ThemoreeffectiveanaffrontedpartyÕsattemptstorestoreitshonor,themorelikelyhonorwillremainsubordinatetosurvival.TheseÞveattributessuggestthathonorpreservationisnecessaryforontologicalsecurity.Ratherthaninvolvingphysicalsurvival,ontologicalse-curityconcernsoneÕsbeingoroneÕsself-identity.Withontologicalsecurity,individualsadoptroutinestoreducefundamentaluncertaintyaboutwhotheyareandtheirplaceinsociety.Ontologicalsecurityisnotalwayspos-itive:individualscanremaincommittedtoabusiverelationshipsbecauseseparationunderminestheirself-conceptionandentailsmoreuncertaintythantheycantolerate.Ontologicallyinsecureindividualsfeeldisplacedfromtheirownself-identityandunsurehowtonavigatethesocialworld.Indeed,ifindividualsdonotbehaveconsistentlywiththeirsenseofself(thatis,adishonorableaction),theyriskfeelingsofshameandinadequacythatfur-thererodestheirself-esteem.FightingforhonorisÞghtingforontologicalHonorhaspsychologicaleffects,butculturalnormscandeterminethedegreetowhichactorsexplicitlyrefertohonorinexplainingandjustifyingtheirbehavior.Asaresult,weshouldexpectvariationovertimeandbe-tweencontexts.RichardNedLebowdocumentshowhonorconcernswere AvnerOffer,ÒGoingtoWarin1914:AMatterofHonor,ÓPolitics&Society23,no.2(June1995):Besmirchedhonoralsoimpliesalackofduerecognition,therebyproducingsuboptimalforeignpolicies.MichelleMurray,ÒIdentity,Insecurity,andGreatPowerPolitics:TheTragedyofGermanNavalAmbitionbeforetheFirstWorldWar,ÓSecurityStudies19,no.4(October2010):656Ð88.SeeAnthonyGiddens,ModernityandSelf-Identity:SelfandSocietyintheLateModernAgeford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,1991);BrentJ.Steele,ÒOntologicalSecurityandthePowerofSelf-Identity:BritishNeutralityandtheAmericanCivilWar,ÓReviewofInternationalStudies31,no.3(July2005):524Ð30;JenniferMitzen,ÒOntologicalSecurityinWorldPolitics:StateIdentityandtheSecurityEuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations12,no.3(September2006):341Ð70. A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerparamountinancientGreeceandre-emergedinmedievalEurope.RiversÕsanthropologicalworkhighlightedtheprominenceofhonorinmid-twentieth-centuryMediterraneansociety.Yethonorisnotanarchaism.Modernityhasobscuredhonorconsiderationswithtermssuchascredibility,will,resolve,andreputation.Despitethisrhetoricalshift,theunderlyingneedforontologicalsecurityremainsunchanged.Tothisday,individualsstillinternalizehonor,seeitasintegraltoself-identity,andactaccordingtoitsdemands.HonorandEscalatoryViolenceWhenhonorisimpugned,theefforttorestoreitunfoldsinstages.Afteranaffrontedpartyfeelsthatitshonorhasbeensullied,itÞrstseeksanapologyfromtheoffender.Asincereapologyusuallyresolvesthematter,butrefusingtoapologizeampliÞestheoriginaloffensebecauseitfurtherchallengestheauthorityoftheaffrontedparty.Violencebecomeslikely:theaffrontedpartyneedstopunishtheoffenderphysicallyinordertoprotectitsWhetherthroughapologyorphysicalpunishment,theaffrontedpartymustrestoreitssenseofhonorbyimposingacommensurateamountofshameontheoffender.Honorconsiderationscanthusexhibitaratchetingeffect.Whenanof-fendermanagestoresistpunishment,theaffrontedpartybecomesfrustratedandgrowsmoreemotionallyinvestedinhonor.Fromtheperspectiveoftheaffrontedparty,theproblemshiftsfromÒmyadversaryhasoffendedmyhonorandshouldbepunishedÓtoÒmyadversarycontinuestooffendmyhonorandshouldbepunishedmore.ÓConsequently,theconßictintensi-Þesratherthanabates,honorassumesgreaterimportancethansurvival,thepunishmentsdemandedincrease,andthreatassessmentsexpand.Therefore,whenoperatinginthedomainoflosses,honorpreventscoolerheadsfrom CulturalTheoryPitt-Rivers,ÒHonourandSocialStatus.ÓBarryOÕNeill,Honor,Symbols,andWar(AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress,1999),85Ð86.JamesG.MarchandJohanP.OlsendescribehowindividualscaninternalizeprinciplesofconducttocalculateexpectedutilityinÒInstitutionalPerspectivesonPoliticalInstitutions,Ó9,no.3(July1996):247Ð64.Honor,Symbols,andWar,117;Pitt-Rivers,ÒHonourandSocialStatus,Ó26.Foranotherviewofapologies,seeJenniferLind,SorryStates:ApologiesinInternationalRelations(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2010).OurviewofpunishmentresemblesthedescriptionofvengeancefoundinOdedLowenheimandGadiHeimann,ÒRevengeinInternationalPolitics,ÓSecurityStudies17,no.4(October2008):684Ð724.Inouranalysis,besmirchedhonorconstitutestheprimarymoraloutragethatelicitsthegrievance,creatinganintenseneedtodefendontologicalsecurityandstatus.Still,thedistinctionshouldnotbeexaggeratedsincebesmirchedhonordemandsvengeance.Exacerbatingthesituationfurther,thelossesborneinattemptstoprotecthonoralsobecomeanissueofhonor. RageofHonorThismechanismresemblesprospecttheory,whichpredictsthatactorswillgrowmoreriskacceptantwhenfacedwithlosses.However,akeydifferenceexistsbetweenprospecttheoryandhonorconsiderations.Withhonorthelossesarenotsimplymaterial(evenifmateriallosses,suchasthelossofterritory,triggerthelossofhonor).Theyarealsopsychologicalbecausereputationandstatusareconcerned.Prospecttheorysuggeststhatextremelyseverelossesmayleadtheaffrontedpartytogambleforresurrection.Yetdeeplyoffendedhonormeansthatsurvivalisnolongertheprimarygoal.WhenhonorisatstakeandtheaffrontedpartyÞndsitselfinthedomainoflosses,theaggrievedpartybecomeswillingtogambleforHonorconsiderationsalsohavetheunfortunateeffectofinteractingwithtwootherpsychologicalbiases.TheÞrstistheimplementalmindset.Onceagroupdecidesonagoal,suchasrestoringhonor,ittendstodis-playÒareducedreceptivitytonewinformationthatmayquestionthede-sirabilityorfeasibilityofthechosengoal,ÓpreferringinsteadÒinformationthatsupportsthechoicealreadymade.ÓTheaffrontedpartythusbecomesmorepronetoexperiencingcognitivedissonance,wherebyittriestorec-onciletwoormorecontradictorybeliefs.Withregardstohonor,thispro-clivitymakesitdifÞcultfortheaggrievedpartytorealizethatitsattempttorestorehonorjeopardizessurvival.ThesecondresemblesthegamblerÕsfallacywherebypeopletendtoassumethataseriesoflosses(orvicto-ries)mustbefollowedbyavictory(orloss).Amidhonorconsiderationsinthedomainofwarlosses,thiscognitivebiasgeneratesanundueop-timismthatvictoryisimminent.TheaggrievedpartystartsbelievingthatcontinuingtopunishtheresistingadversarywillÞnallyreachasatisfactoryObservableImplicationsforWarTerminationLikemuchoftheontologicalsecurityandconstructivistliteraturesinthestudyofinternationalsecurity,wescaleupourindividual-leveltheorytoOurunitofanalysisisthepartofgovernmentthatexertsultimate JackS.Levy,ÒProspectTheory,RationalChoice,andInternationalRelations,ÓInternationalStudies41,no.1(March1997):87Ð112.CulturalTheory,365Ð68.JohnsonandTierney,ÒRubiconTheory,Ó18.JoelCooper,CognitiveDissonance:FiftyYearsofaClassicTheory(London:Sage,2007);LeonATheoryofCognitiveDissonance(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,1957).AmosTverskyandDanielKahneman,ÒJudgmentunderUncertainty:HeuristicsandBiases,Ó185,no.4157(September1974):1124Ð31.ConstructivistsclaimthatÒstates,likeindividuals,havephysicalandsocialdrives.ÓSteele,ÒOnto-logicalSecurity,Ó524. A.LanoszkaandM.A.Hunzekerauthorityoverforeignpolicy(forexample,theNationalSecurityCouncil).Weareagnosticaboutwhetherdecisionmakersseektodefendtheirownhonororthatofthenationalpopulation.Wearguethathonorpreservationaffectsdecisionstocontinuewar-Þghtinginsixways.First,withnoapologyforthcoming,theaffrontedbel-ligerentwillnotbesatisÞeduntiltheoffendingadversaryispunishedandhumiliated.Second,iftheadversarymilitarilyresistspunishment,thenthegrowingfrustrationoftheaffrontedbelligerentproducesaratchetingeffect.Honorassumesevengreaterimportance,makingthreatestimatesmorese-vereandexpandingwaraims.AffrontedbelligerentswillÞndithardertodisentanglethegoalstheyseekfromthepricetheypaytoachievethem.Consequently,honorconsiderationsoverridewhateverdisputeorunderly-ingcommitmentproblemthattriggeredwarintheÞrstplace.Inextremis,theaffrontedbelligerentseekstodestroytheadversaryÕspoliticalregime.Third,belligerentsÞghtingforhonorlacktheintrospectionnecessarytoassessbattleÞeldinformationobjectively.Whenbelligerentsrefertobattle-Þeldinformation,weshouldseethemcherry-pickinformationthatjustiÞestheirdrivetocontinueÞghting.Fourth,warstrategygoesunalteredbe-causethatwouldinvolvehonestadjustmentstonewbattleÞeldinformation.SpeciÞcally,unfavorablebattleÞeldinformationdoesnotcausethemtore-considerorreducewaraims.Fifth,theaffrontedbelligerentwilldismisseffortsbytheoffendingpartytoopenpeacetalksiftheoverturelackstheself-humiliatingapologythatremediesthebesmirchedhonor.Finally,thetypesofconßictmostlikelytoelicithonorconsiderationsarepreven-tivewarsbetweenarisingstateandadominantstateorwhenterritoryisseizedandoccupied.Incasesofpreventivewars,theprivilegedsta-tusandreputationofthedominantstateisthreatened,especiallyiftherisingstateattacksitscommitments.Asforterritorialoccupation,thevi-olationofexistingnationalboundariesinsultsnationalprideandidentity,therebypubliclydemonstratingtheaffrontedstateÕsmilitaryweakness.Los-ingterritorysuggeststhattheaffectedstateisincapableofdefendingitsownCertainpiecesofevidencewoulddisproveourhonor-basedtheoryandconÞrmarationalistaccount.First,theaggrievedstaterefusestoconsiderde-escalationeventhoughtheaggressorissuesanapologythatisperceivedasgenuineandsufÞcientlyhumble;second,theaggrievedstatedecidestode-escalateeveniftheaggressoravoids/resistspunishment;third,theaggrievedstatecontinuouslyandobjectivelyreassessesitsstrategicsituation,withreferencetotherelevantpolitical,economic,diplomatic,andmilitaryindicators;fourth,theaggrievedstateiswillingtoreviseeitheritsstrategiesoritsgoalswhensuchstrategicassessmentssuggestitsendsandmeansarenolongeraligned;andÞnally,thepreventivewarfailstotriggerhonor RageofHonorTherationalistchallengetoourhonor-basedargumentgeneratesaverydifferentsetofexpectationsforhowwarsshouldevolveandend.Tobe-gin,belligerentscollectbattleÞeldinformationtounderstandtheirstrategicsituation.Informationcollectionshouldoccurindependentlyofdiplomaticinitiativespursuedbytheadversary.Moreover,waraimsshouldadjustac-cordingtoinformationreceivedfromthebattleÞeld.SpeciÞcally,negativebattleÞeldinformationshouldmoderatewaraimsandleadbelligerentstoaltertheirstrategies,reßectingthefewermeansattheirdisposal.Whenonecombatantofferstodiscusspeace,belligerentsshouldatleastconsideritintermsoftheresolveandcapabilitiestheofferreveals.Belligerentsshoulddismissthetoneofanofferascheaptalkandrealizethatanyambiguitycontainedintheofferservesasahedgeagainstconveyingweakness.TheyshouldignoreblusterorstatementsassigningmoralculpabilityÑsuchthingsshouldnotemotionallydisturbthem.Notbeinglockedintoanemotionalimplementalmindset,belligerentsshouldcoollydiscusstheofferamongthemselvesonitsobjectivemerits.Lastly,thelimitsofourargumentneedclariÞcation.Asnoted,theim-portanceofhonorisvariableacrossspaceandtime.Accordingly,noteveryconßictinvolveshonor.Indeed,wecanarraythemotivationsofaconßictonaspectrumthatrangesfrominvolvingpurelymaterialinterestconsiderations(forexample,wealth)topurelystatus(orhonor)considerations.HonorisnotalwaysatstakeÑitmightbeabsentsometimes.Yetatothertimesthehonor-basedmechanismweoutlinecantrumpanyandallmaterialmotiva-tions.Itisevenpossibleformaterialandhonor-basedmotivationstoexertanequalinßuenceondecisionmakers.Insuchsituations,decisionmakerscanbetornbecauserationalitypointstoonepolicywhereashonorpointstoanother.Unsatisfyingasitmaybe,atthispointwearenotabletopredictasystematicrelationshipbetweendifferenttypesofconßictandwhetherma-terialorhonor-basedmotivationswilldominate.Ataminimum,wesimplyreiteratethetestableclaimthathonorconsiderationswilldominateinpre-ventivewarsbetweenrisinganddominantpowersandwarsinvolvingthelossofsovereignterritory.BecausetheWesternFrontoftheFirstWorldWarinvolvedbothapreventivewarandtheviolationandoccupationofsovereignterritory,weusetherestofthispapertoarguethatthebalancewastiltedmoretowardsnonrationalistfactorsifwearetounderstandthatHOWHONORDISTORTSINFORMATIONANDIMPLEMENTATIONINWARNonrationalistfactorsplayedaroleinthebeginningoftheFirstWorldWar.LebowdocumentshowhonorinßuencedAustrianandGermandiplomacy A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerleadinguptothewarÑawarthatcanbeconstruedasbeingfoughtbetweenadominantstate(GreatBritain)andarisingstate(Germany).Honorconsid-erationsaffectedBritishdecisionmakersaswell.Indeed,honorframedtheinitialdecisiontointervene.SirEdwardGreyevenarguedthatBritishhonorwasatstakeoverwhethertoassistFranceandBelgium.Inhis3August1914addresstoParliament,hedeclared:ÒIf,inacrisislikethis,werunawayfromthoseobligationsofhonourandinterestasregardstheBelgiantreaty,Idoubtwhether,whatevermaterialforcewemighthaveattheend,itwouldbeofverymuchvalueinfaceoftherespectthatweshouldhavelost.ÓAndsoGermanyÕsinvasionofBelgiumdirectlyimpugnedBritainÕsstatusasguarantor.Nevertheless,securitymotivessuchaspreventingEuropefrombeingdominatedbyasinglepowerwereinitiallyprominentaswell.WhenGermanyneitherapologizednorwithdrew,thewarexpanded.Effortsbytheopposingarmiestooutßankeachotherinthefallof1914resultedinstalemateandafortiÞedsystemoftrenches.OntheWesternFront,theAlliesrepeatedlytriedandfailedtomakeabreakthroughwhileGermanymadeimportantgainsintheeast.Germanywasprovidingampleresistancethroughout1914,1915,and1916,theDecemberofwhichitmadepeaceoverturesthattheEntenteßatlyrejected.BelowwedemonstratethattheobservableimplicationsofourtheoryweremanifestinBritishdecisionmakingin1916.Consistentwithourexpec-tations,weÞndthat,asaffrontedbelligerents,Britainignoredunfavorablebattleinformationwhileratchetingupmilitaryactionwhennocompellingstrategicreasonfordoingsoexisted.TheywerelockedinanimplementalmindsetcoloredbyanemotionalobsessionwithBritishgloryandGermanIgnoringUnfavorableInformationBritishleadersadoptedanattritionstrategytodefeatGermany,anunder-standablestrategygiventherelativedistributionofmilitaryandeconomicpower.However,attritionstrategiesrequireappropriatemeasuresofstrate-giceffectivenesstowork.Otherwise,ariskexistsofexhaustingoneselfbeforetheenemy.BritainÕssupremecommandfailedtodevelopusefulmea-suresofstrategiceffectiveness.Itdidnotcollectinformationonimportant CulturalTheory,305Ð70.SpeechbySirEdwardGreytotheBritishHouseofCommons,3August1914,65Parl.Deb.,H.C.(5thser.)(1914),1823.http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1914/aug/03/statement-by-sir-edward-grey.ChristopherClark,TheSleepwalkers:HowEuropeWenttoWarin1914(NewYork:HarperCollins,2013),541Ð47.ScottSigmundGartner,StrategicAssessmentinWar(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1997);StephenP.Rosen,WinningtheNextWar:InnovationandtheModernMilitary(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1994). RageofHonoraspectsofthewareffort,cherry-pickinginsteadwhatinformationtheydidreceive.Suchbehavioraccordswithourhonor-basedtheory.Frommid-to-late1916,theminutesfromWarCommitteemeetingssug-gestastartlingindifferencetoBritainÕscasualties;tothelackofprogressontheall-importantWesternFront;toBritainÕseconomic,industrial,andÞnan-cialposition;andtoitsalliesÕeconomic,industrialandÞnancialsituations.WarestimatesduringthisperiodlargelyfocusedonGermanmanpowerandThisomissiondidnotgocompletelyunnoticed.InaninternalWarCommitteememosubmittedon13November,LordLansdownenotedthatBritainhadthusfarneglectedtoassessaccuratelythewarÕscosts.withtheoverarchingplantoexhaustGermany,LansdownewarnedthatwithoutafairandobjectiveassessmentofBritainÕsstrategicsituation,BritainriskedwinningaPyrrhicvictory:Itisnonethelessourdutytoconsider,afteracarefulreviewofthefacts,whatourplight,andtheplightofthecivilizedworldwillbeafteranotheryear,or,aswearesometimestold,twoorthreemoreyearsofastruggleasexhaustingasthatinwhichweareengaged.Nooneforamomentbelievesthatwearegoingtolosethewar;butwhatisourchanceofwinningitinsuchamanner,andwithinsuchlimitsoftime,aswillenableustobeatourenemytothegroundandimposeuponhimthekindoftermswhichwesofreelydiscuss?GiventhatBritishPrimeMinisterLloydGeorgedidnotinviteLansdownetorejointhereorganizedWarCabinetinDecember,andthatLansdownewasexcoriatedayearlaterafterhepublicallycalledforpeace,itistemptingtodismisshisNovember1916memo.Nevertheless,theWarCommitteetookhimseriously.ManydepartmentalstudiesfollowedandtheWarCommitteeactivelybegantoassessBritishperformancealongkeyparameters.YetevenwhentheWarCommitteeÞnallyundertookarigorousandcomprehensivereviewofitsstrategicpositionbyNovember1916,itcontin-uedtodrawbiasedandunwarrantedconclusionsfromitsnewlycollecteddata.Thedepartmentstaskedwithmakingthesestudiespaintedagloomy SeeRecordsoftheCabinetOfÞce(CAB)37/157/25,BritishNationalArchives(BNA),Kew,Rich-mond,Surrey;CAB37/157/32,BNA;37/158/5,BNA.LordLansdownewasamemberoftheHouseofLords.Hehelddifferenthigh-levelgovernmentpositionsbeforethewar.HeservedonHerbertHenryAsquithÕscoalitioncabinetuntilDecember1916.CAB37/159/32,BNA.ThedifferencesbetweentheWarCommitteeandtheWarCabinetmeritclariÞcationsincetheBritishgovernmentcontinuallychangeditsapproachtocoordinatingthewareffort.Inlate1914itcreatedtheWarCouncilasanadvisorybodytotheprimeminister.InMay1915,itreconstitutedtheWarCouncilastheDardanellesCommittee.InNovember1915,theDardanellesCommitteebecametheWarCommittee.Finally,LloydGeorgeturnedtheWarCommitteeintoWarCabinetafterassumingofÞceinDecember1916.SeeCAB37/160/1,3,13,15,21,25and31,BNA. A.LanoszkaandM.A.Hunzekerpictureofshrinkingresourcesandaresilientadversary.Still,Britishdecisionmakersremainedunfazedand,consistentwiththegamblerÕsfallacy,actedasifmoreofthesamewouldresultinvictory.BiasedAssessmentoftheProspectsforVictoryThisnewinformationdidnotcauseBritishleaderstoquestionwhetherEn-tentevictorywasinevitable.ButthedatacollecteddidnotofferasoundbasisforthinkingtheEntenteÕsprospectsweretrendingupward.AlthoughdocumentssuggestthatsomedecisionmakersandgovernmentofÞcialswereawareofthefalteringBritishwareffort,theyremainedunfailinglyoptimisticoverthemilitarychancesforsuccessin1917.WritingtotheWarCommittee,LordRobertCecilcautionedthatÒoursituationisgraveÓandÒmaybecomedesperateÓasÒthepositioninAlliedcountriesisevenmoreserious.ÓAdmit-tingthathewasignorantabouthowGermanywascopinginthewar,CecilimplausiblyconcludedthatÒourmilitaryadviserstellusthattheybelievenextyearwehaveaprospectofagreatmilitarysuccess,andifthisbeso,IdonotbelievethattheresistingpoweroftheCentralEmpirescouldsur-viveit.Ifthereforewecancarryonforanotheryearwehaveareasonableprospectofvictory.Apeacenowcouldonlybedisastrous.ÓHeofferednoexplanationastowhytheEntentewouldbemoreeffectiveandsuccessfulin1917thanitwasin1916.BiasedAssessmentofMeansBritishleadersweresimilarlybiasedintheirassessmentoftheFrenchArmyÕsnewestwar-winningdoctrine.HistorianssuggestLloydGeorgeeschewedpeacebecausehebelievedGeneralJosephJoffreÕsreplacement,GeneralRobertNivelle,hadasolutiontothestalemate:hisso-calledbatailledeHowever,NivelleÕsconceptwasßawedinwaysthatshouldhavebeenapparentatthetime.First,itwasdevelopedagainsttherelativelyshallowGermandefensesatVerdun,butbytheendof1916GermanunitsalongtherestoftheWesternFronthadadoptedmuchdeeperandmoreßexiblepositions.Second,soldiersstilladvancedinwaves,leavingthemdangerouslyexposedtoßankingÞre.Third,theconceptdidnotresolvetheunderlying EvenLansdowneexpressedthisbelief.QuotesfromCAB37/160/21,BNA.PaddyGrifÞth,TheGreatWarontheWesternFront:AShortHistory(Barnsley,UK:PenandSword2008),59.NivelleÞrstemployedthisconceptatVerdun.Itusedheavysuppressive(ratherthandestructive)artillerybombardmentsfollowedbyinfantryassaultswherebyunitsplungedasdeepaspossiblewithoutregardforßanksecurity. RageofHonortechnologicaldeÞciencythatunderminedalloffensivesintheFirstWorldWar:mobileinfantrymencouldnotcoordinatewithstaticartillerysupport.Byinsistingondeeppenetrations,Nivelleguaranteedthathisinfantryhadnowaytoadjustartillerysupport,allowingGermandefenderstoÞreonthemwithimpunity.EveniftheseproblemswerenotobvioustoLloydGeorgeorthemilitaryofÞcersinhisWarCabinetexante(althoughhispositionastheSecretaryofStateforWarsuggeststhatheshouldhavebeenfamiliarwiththem),thedecisiontopredicateBritishstrategyonalargelyuntestedconceptwasimpetuousatbest.Afterall,NivellewasnottheÞrstgeneraltodiscoverasolutiontothedeadlock.Upuntilthatpointinthewar,everyEntentecommanderinchiefhadmadetheexactsameclaim.ThatLloydGeorgerejectedpeacebecauseofanuntesteddoctrinalconcept,whensomanypreviouswar-winningdoctrineshadalreadyfailed,isinexplicablewithoutreferencetocognitivebiases.BiasedAssessmentofEndsTheWarCommitteeÕsstrategicreviewinNovemberandDecember1916didnottriggerarevisionofBritainÕsexistingwaraims.Itisreasonabletodiscountnegativeinformationanddemandmorefromtheadversarywhenfavorablestrategicchangesareafoot.However,suchoptimismwasunwar-rantedatthetime.Theabsenceofsuchareappraisaliscuriousgiventhelogicalconnectionbetweenends(whichremainedunaltered)andmeans(whichwereclearlydiminishing).Ofcourse,thefactthatBritishwaraimsdidnotchangeinlate1916shouldnotobscurethefactthattheyhadgrownmanifoldsince1914.In-deed,asBritishlossesmounted,sotoodidbothitsassessmentoftheGermanthreatanditsdesiretopunishGermanaggression.WhenBritainintervenedinAugust1914,itdidsowithlimitedwaraimsinformedbyitsstrategicandcommercialinterests.DismantlingtheGermanregimewasnotoneofitsgoals.YetthemoreitfailedtoachievetheseobjectivesÑthelongerGermany HeinGoemansconcursbutnoteshowBritainlesseneditsdemandsintheSykes-PicotAgreement.Frenchdemandsgrewnevertheless.WhatfewshiftsinwaraimsthatoccurredreßectedalliancepoliticssoastoaccommodateItaly.FrancestillinsistedonallofAlsace-Lorraine.BothalliesagreedtodestroytheOttomanEmpire,therebyenablingthemtosecurethebargainsmadeintheSykes-PicotAgreement.WarandPunishment,245.OnÒtheTurkishquestion,ÓseeCAB23/1/6,BNA.HewStrachan,TheFirstWorldWarVolumeI:ToArms(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001), A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerresistedpunishmentÑthemoreBritishelitescastGermanyasinherentlyag-gressive.Thisexpansionofwaraimsculminatedin1916withtheconsensusbeliefthatdestroyingtheGermanregimewasnecessaryforendingthewar.EmotionalImplementationBritishleadersÕwillfulignoranceandprocessingofinformationreßectsanimplementalmindset.Butjustbecauseleadershaveanimplementalmind-set,ourtheoryisnotnecessarilyconÞrmed.Historically,manyleadersandbureaucratsbehavedlikemyopicautomatonsforreasonsotherthanhonor.However,inlate1916itwasclearthatseniorBritishofÞcialsdidnotjustapproachthewar(andthepeaceovertures)withanimplementalmindset.Theirimplementalmindsetwasitselfcouchedinemotionalterms.Emotionandhonorframedtheissue,narrowedoptions,andtruncateddebate.OnestrikingexampleoccurredinlateNovember,asvariousgovern-mentdepartmentsweresubmittingtheiraforementionedreportstotheWarCommittee.GeneralRobertson,chiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff,submittedareportlacedwithvitrioliclanguage.HearguedthatÒwhileitwouldunques-tionablybeacrimetoprolongthewarforonedaylongerthanisnecessary,itwouldbeagreaterandacowardlycrimetoßinchfromtheeffortwhichwemayhopewillgiveusajustandlastingpeace.ÓHethenaccusedtheBritisheliteofbeinginÞltratedbyÒacertainnumberofcranks,cowards,andphilosophers,someofwhomareafraidoftheirownskinsbeinghurt,whilstothersarecapableofprovingtothosesufÞcientlyweak-mindedtolistentothemthatwegainmorebylosingthewarthanbywinningit.ÓRobertsonconcludedthatÒweneedpaynoattentiontothesemiserablemembersofsociety.ItismorepleasingtorememberthattheEmpireasawhole,withtheexceptionofIreland,isreadytofaceanythinginordertowinthewar....Inshort,weneedtohavethesamecourageinLondonashaveourleadersintheNorthSeaandFrance.ÓRobertsonÕsmemorandumisastonishingconsideringBritainÕslongstand-ingobsessionwithmaintainingciviliancontroloverthemilitary.Theemo-tionallychargedmissivechallengedhisciviliansuperiorsandslanderedtheloyaltyandcourageofanyonewhodareddisagreewithhim.Nevertheless,Robertsonwasallowedtoframethesubsequentdebate.Evenastheycriti-cizedRobertsonandhismemorandum,BritainÕsmostseniorcivilianleadersfeltobligedtoreiteratetheirpatriotism,courage,andfaithinBritishvictory.TheForeignOfÞceÕsreplywasthesharpest,notleastbecauseRobertsonclaimeddiplomaticfailuresundercutmilitarysuccess.ItupbraidedRobertson MemorandumofConversation[hereafterMemCon],5April1916,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedUnitedFRUS]1916,Supplement,TheWorldWar(Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOfÞce[GPO],1929),22.CAB37/160/15,BNA. RageofHonorforallowingemotionandrhetorictocloudhisjudgment.Still,itconcludedbysayingRobertsonwasinthebestpositiontodeterminewhetherthetimewasripeforpeace.Lansdownepennedasimilarlyharshrebuttal,buthetooprefacedhiscritiquebyassertinghispatriotismandconÞdenceintheBritisharmy.ThatBritainÕscivilianleadersfeltkowtowedbyincendiarychallengestotheirmasculinityandnationalismistelling.Itsuggeststhatasenseofindivid-ualhonorcompelledeventhewarÕsmostpowerfulcriticstopaylipservicetoBritainÕsinevitablevictory.SinceeveryonebelievedthateveryoneelsebelievedinaBritishvictory,itisunsurprisingthatnoonewouldseriouslyconsiderpeace.PEACEOVERTURESASINDIGNATIONNostrategicrationaleexistedforrejectingGermanyÕsoffertonegotiate.BritishwaraimsexpandeddespitebattleÞeldinformationgrowingincreas-inglyunfavorable.Optimismhadlittlebasis.Moreover,Britishleadershardlychangedtheiroverarchingstrategy.Thus,bythetimetheyreceivedtheGer-manpeaceoverture,informationandstrategywerealmostdivorcedfromeachother.WenowfocusontheDecember1916peaceovertures.Thisepisodebeganon12December1916whentheGermangovern-mentissuedapeacenotetotheEntentethroughneutralintermediaries.ChancellorTheoboldvonBethmann-HollwegpubliclyannouncedthepeaceinitiativeintheReichstagthatafternoon,andLloydGeorgeÕsnewlyreorga-nizedWarCabinetdiscusseditduringanoonsessionon13December.ItsoonbecameevidentthattheEntentewouldrejecttheoffer.On15De-cember,theU.S.ambassadorinLondoncabledSecretaryofStateLansing,noting:ÒTheundoubtedoverwhelmingfeelinginandoutofofÞciallifeisopposedtotheacceptanceoreventoseriousconsiderationofanyproposalunlessdeÞniteandfavorabletermsareputforwardbytheGermangovern-ment.Nobodybelievesthatsuchtermswillbeauthoritativelyputforth.Thelanguageandthetoneoftheproposalareconsideredinsultingbecauseofitsboastfulnessanditsthreat.ÓFourdayslater,inaspeechtotheHouseofCommons,LloydGeorgesuggestedthatacceptingtheGermanofferwouldbeÒthecostliestactof CAB37/160/20,BNA.CAB37/160/22,BNA.FO371/2941,BNA.TelegramfromViennatoLansing,11December1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,85andTelegramfromBerlintoVienna,11December1916,Ibid.,85Ð86.TheGermanHighCommandÞrstconsideredmakingapeaceofferinthelatesummer.ErichvonLudendorff,LudendorffÕsOwnStory,August1914-November1918,(NewYork:Harper,1919),1:365.CAB37/161/19,BNA.Thecabinetminutesdedicatedonlyaquarterofapagetotheovertures.TelegramfromLondontoLansing,15December1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,92Ð93. A.LanoszkaandM.A.Hunzekerfooleryeverperpetratedbyanystatesmen.ÓBritaincouldnotstopÞghtinguntilitridEuropeofmilitarydespotism.AlthoughtheEntentedidnotissueaformalrejectionuntil1January,LloydGeorgeÕsÞeryrebukeremovedanydoubtwithintheGermanHighCommandthattheEntentewouldcontinueWewillnowdemonstratethattheresponseoftheEntentereßectedtheimplementalmindsetconsistentwithourhonor-basedexplanation.Wethenshowthattheyevaluatedtheoverturesinanemotionallychargedmannerobsessedwithstatus.NoPeacewithImplementalMindsetLloydGeorgeÕsWarCabinetspentlittletimediscussingtheGermanpeacenote.AstheminutesfromtheWarCabinetmeetingsheldbetween13Decem-berand1Januaryindicate,Britishleadersneverdeliberatedoverwhethertheoverturewasgenuine.Nordidtheydiscusswhetheracompromisebetweenrejectingandacceptingtheoverturemightexist;orwhethertheymightac-cepttheoffertonegotiate.Instead,afterÞrstlearningabouttheofferinthemorningpaperson13December,theWarCabinetthoughttheonlyquestionworthponderingwaswhytheBritishdelegationatTheHaguehadfailedtotelegraphafullcopytoLondon.ThecabinetquicklyagreedtoÒmakeafullinvestigationÓforthisadministrativeoversightandÒtoensurethatsuchlapsesshallnotrecur.ÓItthenshelvedthematterandspenttherestofthemeetingdiscussingGreeceandhowtorepatriateSerbsintheUnitedStatestoreturntoEuropesotheycouldÞghtintheEntenteÕsarmies.ThecabinetdidnotrevisittheGermanofferuntil15December,despitehavingmettwiceon13December(todiscussfoodproductionandacaptainofamerchantraiderbeingtriedbytheGermans)andonceon14December(todiscussmanpower,femalelabor,Ireland,andreportsfromtheIndiaofÞce).Evenduringthe15Decembermeeting,thecabinetsimplypointedoutthatitstillhadnotyetreceivedanofÞcialcopyoftheovertureandcouldnotthereforedeliberate.Itthenproceededtodiscussmerchantshipping,aircraftconstruction,theMesopotamiancampaign,theArabuprising,theBalkans,andrailwayshipmentstoFrance.On16December,withoutoncehavingdiscussedthepeaceoverture,theWarCabinetconcludedthatÒthepresentpeacemovement,inauguratedbytheGermanChancellor,couldonly TelegramfromLondontoLansing,19December1916,ibid.,101.TelegramfromParistoLansing,29December1916,ibid.,123Ð125.WarCabinetmeetings4to23.SeeCAB37/161/19,20,21,26,30,34,38,42,46andCAB37/162/3,4,11,12,17,19,20,25,28,29,BNA.Britishleadersinterpretedtheovertureasaneither/orpropositionwhereasLudendorffintendeditastheÞrststepinaniterativenegotiation.Ludendorff,OwnStory,1:367.CAB37/161/19,BNA. RageofHonorberegardedasapoliticalmaneuver.ÓTheWarCabinetdidnotmeeton17Its18Decembermeetingcontainedwhatwouldbeitslongestsingleconsiderationofthematter.DespiteacknowledgingthatitwouldbeÒbadpolicytodismisstheproposalwithoutexamination,Óthecabinetimmediatelyfocusedonhowtogoaboutrejectingit.SpeciÞcally,itdebatedwhethertoholdaninter-alliedconferenceonthesubject.However,suchaconfer-enceÒwouldtendtogivetheimpressionthattheAllieswereexaminingthequestionindetail,andwereconsideringcounterproposals.ÓAndyetaninter-alliedconferenceÒwouldprobablyhavetheeffectofproducingawrongatmosphereinregardtothewar...andmightraisefalsehopes.ÓTheWarCabinetcompromised,decidingthattheAlliesshouldcooperatetowriteacommonrejection,alreadydraftedbytheFrench.ItthenturneditsattentiontoConstantinople,Greece,theItaliancampaign,aprogramtoshiprißestoRomania,andnewgovernmentappointments.ThecabinetonlydiscussedtheGermanofferonemoretimeÑon28December,andonlyinconjunctionwiththeAmericanpeacenoteÑbeforepublishingitsformalrejection.WhenexaminingthewholeoftheWarCabinetÕsdeliberationsduringthisperiod,itbecomesapparentthatBritishleaderswereoperatingwithanimplementalmindset.Indeed,theWarCabinetminutescontainednodiscussionregardingthecostsandbeneÞtsofentertainingtheovertures.Theslightconsiderationgiventotheoverturefocusedonlyonjustifyingitsrejectioninawaythatwaspropagandisticallyvaluable.Britishleadersotherwisesawnoreasontodeliberateovermattersofstrategy:theyhadalreadydedicatedthemselvestowarÞghting.Thewarwasnolongerpoliticsbyothermeans;policyhadinsteadbecomesubordinatetowar.HonorandtheEntenteÕsReasoningWhenitÞnallyissuedaformalresponse,theEntentearticulatedsixreasonsforrefusingGermanyÕsoverture.First,theofferobscuredresponsibilityforthewarwhilesuggestingthattheCentralPowershadtheadvantage,Òanas-sertionwhichisdoublyinexactandwhichissufÞcienttorenderbarrenanyattemptatnegotiation.ÓSecond,theofferwascouchedinhaughtyrhetoric,suggestingtheCentralPowerswereneitherseriousaboutnegotiatingnorawareoftheirprecariousstrategicsituation.Third,theofferwasastrategicployintendedtodivideneutralopinionandjustifyunrestrictedsubmarinewarfare.Fourth,theofferwashollow.Itlackedprecisetermsforinitiatingnegotiations.Fifth,theCentralPowerscouldnotbetrustedtoabidebya CAB37/161/34,BNA.CAB37/161/38,BNA.TelegramfromParistoLansing,29December1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,123Ð25. A.LanoszkaandM.A.Hunzekerpeacesettlement,preciselybecausetheyviolatedtheirinternationalcom-mitmentsin1914.Finally,theofferwasbasedonawarmapthatwouldbeneÞttheCentralPowersalone.TheÞrstfourjustiÞcationscoincidewithourhonor-basedexplanationandsowediscussthembrießyinthissection.Thelasttwoexplanationsseemconsistentwitharationalistaccount,andwethereforeaddresstheminthenextsection.ArroganceandObscuredResponsibility?BritishleaderstookumbragewiththepeaceofferÕstoneandGermanyÕsrefusaltoacceptblameforthewar.AsonediplomatdescribedtheBritishreaction,Òthelanguageandthetoneoftheproposalareconsideredinsultingbecauseofitsboastfulness.ÓBritishandFrenchleaderswerelikewiseirri-tatedbytheGermanthreattocontinueÞghtingÒtoavictoriousend,whilesolemnlydisclaiminganyresponsibilitybeforemankindandhistoryÓiftheofferwasrefused.Germanyseemedsteadfastlyunapologetic,suggestingalackofcontritionthatvexedBritishdecisionmakers.AlthoughtheGermanoverturewaspoorlyworded,tonedoesnotpro-videarationalbasisforrejectinganegotiationoffer.Indeed,bytakingthenoteÕsrhetoricpersonally,theEntentedemonstratedapoorgraspofbar-gaining.Asinpoker,oneshouldactasifonehasastronghand.Inhispostwarmemoirs,GeneralLudendorffdescribeshisirritationafterlearningtheEntentewasoffendedbytheovertureÕswording:ÒTheobjection,thatthetoneofourofferhadfromtheÞrstmadeanyacceptanceimpossible,wasquiteunsound.OurwholepositioncompelledustoadoptatoneofconÞ-dence...itwasessentialthatthepeaceoffershouldnotimpairtheÞghtingqualityofthearmy....IftheEntentehadhonestlydesiredapeaceofjusticeandreconciliationitcouldhaveandshouldhaveenteredintonegotiationsandbroughtforwarditsdemands.ÓAdmittingguiltforstartingthewarintheinitialoverturewouldhavedamagedGermanyÕsbargainingpositionanditsarmyÕsmorale.Ententeleaderswouldhaveusedsuchanadmissiontodemandmorereparations.Haughtyrhetoricservedanotherpurpose.ByßoatingapeaceballoonintheÞrstplace,Germanyriskedsignalingweakness.Asdiscussedbelow,suchfearswerejustiÞedsincetheEntentedidinferweaknessfromtheoffer.Usinganarroganttoneanddescribinginßatedbargainingadvantages GermanyhadcommittedtorespectBelgianneutrality.MemorandumofTextofGermanPeaceOfferfromSecretaryofStatetoDiplomaticRepresenta-tivesinGreatBritain,France,Russia,Italy,Japan,RomaniaandSerbia,16December1916,FRUS1916Supplement,94.OwnStory,1:367Ð68. RageofHonorhedgedagainstsuchrisksbecauseGermanleadersknewtheirofferwouldbepublicized.Sincethisofferarosefromchoiceandnotnecessity,ithadtobeframedsoastoreassureGermancitizensandsoldiers.Becausetheygoverneddemocraticpolities,Ententeleadersshouldhaverecognizedthisconstraint.Thoughitwasreasonableforthemtoexpressoutragetoplacatetheirowndomesticaudiences,theydidnothavetotaketherhetoricsoDuplicitousandHollow?Sincereapologiescanrestorehonor,butforBritishdecisionmakersthepeaceoverturescommittedthedoublesinofbeingunapologeticandinsin-cere.Inprivatedeliberations,publicspeeches,andtheirofÞcialrejection,EntenteleadersemphaticallyportrayedtheGermanpeaceofferasduplici-tousmaneuveringÑÒaveritablewarruse.ÓTheysawseveralulteriormo-tivesatplay,including:buttressingdomesticpublicopinion,underminingpublicopinionintheEntente,swayingpublicopinioninneutralcountries,andjustifyingillegalwartimepracticeslikeunrestrictedsubmarinewarfare.Consistentwiththesenseofthreatthatbesmirchedhonorgenerates,theEntentemadecontradictoryclaimsaboutthepeaceovertures.TheEntenteaccusedtheCentralPowersofcheaptalk.YettheysimultaneouslyimbuedthischeaptalkwiththepowertoshapeglobalopiniondespitebeingacostlysignalofGermanweakness.Twoyearsintoaglobalwaritisincomprehen-siblethatasinglepeaceoffercoulddeceivepublicopinionandundercutmorale.IfapublicinvitationtonegotiatewaspowerfulenoughtoalteranadversaryÕsdomesticopinion,thenwhydidGermanywaituntil1916beforetrying?Whyweretherenotmorepeaceovertures,especiallywhenthemili-tarybalancewasmorelopsided?Ifcheapploysworkedthiseffectively,thenwhydidtheEntentenotattemptsomethingsimilar?Declaringtheofferadeceptiveploy(tomaximizedubiousbeneÞts)ignoresitsveryrealcosts.Makinganovertureriskssignalingweakness.Tomitigatethisconcern,theGermanssoughttousetheUnitedStatesasaclearinghouseforpeaceoverturesasearlyasSeptember1916.apprehensionswerejustiÞed.TheEntenteÕsdiplomaticandpoliticaldelibera-tionsshowthatitsleaderssawtheofferasindicatingÒsevereeconomicstrain MemCon,15December1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,92Ð93;MemCon,16December1916,ibid.,95;TextofLloydGeorgeÕsSpeechtotheHouseofCommonsasDescribedinMemCon,19December1916,ibid.,101;ErichvonLudendorff,TheGeneralStaffanditsProblems:TheHistoryoftheRelationsBetweentheHighCommandandtheGermanImperialGovernmentasRevealedbyOfÞcialDocuments(NewYork:DuttonandCompany,1920),1:301Ð2.Thetwosidesmightnothavemadeoverturesknowingthattheyrepresentedineffectivecheaptalk.Thishypothesisexplainstherelativeabsenceofpeaceoffersthroughout1914and1915,butitleavesunexplainedwhyGermanywouldmakeanoverturein1916.GaryUzonyiandPaulPoast,ÒWhyisConßictMediationRare?:ResolveandSignalinginConßictResolutionÓ(workingpaper,MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,Chicago,IL,April2012).TheAmbassadorinGermanytoLansing,25September1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,55. A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerandofgreaterweaknessthantheEnglishhadsuspected.ÓTheGermanswereacutelyawareofthisrisk.ItinformedGeneralLudendorffÕsdecisiontomaketheofferafterBucharestfellandtoframeitinvictoriousterms.TheEntentealsoclaimedthattheGermanofferwasinsincerebecauseitfailedtoincludespeciÞcterms.Thisargumentfailstowithstandscrutiny.Severalcompellingreasonsexistedforomittingterms.AlthoughGermanelitesagreedthatapeacewindowexisted,theycouldnotagreeontheTheydidnotwanttomissoutonanopportunitytoconcludethewaroverinternalbickering,sotheycompromisedonageneraloverture.EntenteleaderscannotbefaultedfornotknowingaboutinternaldebateswithintheGermangovernment.However,theyshouldhavestillrecognizedthestrategiclogicbehindambiguity.Specifyingtermshadtworisks:iftheyweretooharsh,theyriskedscuttlingtalksbeforetheybegan;iftheyweretoosoft,theyriskedconcedingtoomuchattheoutset.Thus,evenifGermanleadersagreedontheirgoalsandredlines,itwasreasonablenottodisclosesuchinformationatÞrst.TheEntenteonceagaininvokedinconsistentlogic.AstheirofÞcialre-jectiontelegrammakesclear(andpublicspeechesaswellasprivatedeliber-ationsreiterate),theEntentefoundtheGermanofferunacceptablebecauseitfailedtoaddresstheircoreterms:ÒNopeaceispossibleaslongastherepa-rationofviolatedrightsandliberties,theacknowledgementoftheprincipleofnationalitiesandofthefreeexistenceofsmallstatesshallnotbeassured;aslongasthereisnoassuranceofasettlementtosuppressdeÞnitelythecauseswhichforsolongastimehavemenacednationsandtogivetheonlyefÞcaciousguaranteesforthesecurityoftheworld.ÓIftheGermanofferlackedspeciÞcity,thentheEntentecouldnothaveknowntheGermanswouldrejecttheEntenteÕscoretermsbeforenegotia-tions.Conversely,iftheEntentefeltcompelledtorejecttalksbecauseitknewitstermswereincompatiblewithGermangoals,thentheoffermustnothavebeenambiguous.TheGermanofferneededtoberejectedbecauseeitheritlackedtermsoritexpressedfundamentallydisagreeableterms.Onlyoneofthesetwoclaimscouldlogicallybetrue.TheEntentebehavedasthoughbothwere.AThirdWay?ThechoicewasnotbetweenacceptingorrejectingGermanyÕspeaceover-ture,sincetheUnitedStatesadvanceditsownoverture.On20December, MemCon,15December1916,ibid.,92Ð3.OwnStory,1:364Ð66andLudendorff,GeneralStaff,1:283Ð87.GeneralStaff,1:275Ð87.TextofAlliedReplytotheCentralPowerstoDiscussPeace,ConversationoftheAmbassadorinGreatBritainandSecretaryofState,29December1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,123Ð24.CAB23/1/13,BNA. RageofHonorU.S.presidentWoodrowWilsonofÞciallyextendedhisofferforthebel-ligerentstoenternegotiationsunderhismediation.UpondisassociatinghispeaceoverturefromtheGermanone,Wilsonaskedallbelligerentstoclarifytheirtermsforpeaceandwhichassurancestheywouldneedbeforeengaginginnegotiations.Henotedwhatheperceivedtobethesimilaritiesbetweenthebelligerents:ÒTheobjectswhichthestatesmenofthebelliger-entsonbothsideshaveinmindinthiswararevirtuallythesame....EachsidedesirestomaketherightsandprivilegesofweakpeoplesandsmallStatesassecureagainstaggressionordenialinthefutureastherightsandprivilegesofthegreatandpowerfulstatesnowatwar.Eachwishesitselftobemadesecureinthefuture.ÓWilsonconcludedthenotebydisingenuouslyexplainingthathewasneitherÒproposingpeaceÓnorÒofferingmediation.ÓRather,hewantedthebelligerentstoopendialogue.TheEntenterespondedtoWilsonÕsnotenegatively.Honorconcernsonceagainresurfaced.TheEntentedecriedtheinsinuationthattheirwaraims,andthustheirresponsibilityfortheconßict,wereidenticaltothoseoftheCentralPowers.Wilsonalsoimpugnedtheirhonor-basedconcep-tionofthemselves.TheBritishpermanentunder-secretaryoftheForeignOfÞcefoundtheletterasanunfriendlyÒslimy...massofmurkinessÓin-tendedtocausedissensionwithintheEntente.AfterreadingWilsonÕsstate-ment,KingGeorgeVallegedlyÒweptwhileheexpressedhissurpriseandBritishelitesalsoexpresseddismaythatWilsonÕsnoteappearedsosoonaftertheGermanoffer.TheU.S.ambassadortoBritainsoughttoassuageconcernsofcollusion,emphasizingthattheUnitedStateshadtheÒintentionÓtomakesuchastatementÒindependentoftheGermannote.ÓbecausetheGermansapproachedhiminSeptembertoactasathird-partymediator,WilsonmadehisstatementaftertheGermanoverturetosaveface.ShouldtheEntenterejecttheGermannote,theEntentecouldrefertoWilsonÕsovertureifitwishedtonegotiatewithouthavingGermanyseemthemostinterestedinpeace.YettheBritishfearedWilsonÕsinterventionbecauseoftheÞnancialpowerthattheUnitedStatescouldhavebroughttobear.CecilnotedthatÒit On21December,SecretaryofStateRobertLansingintimatedthattheUnitedStatesneededtolearnbelligerentwaraimsbeforeenteringthewar.HistoriansdisputewhetherLansingshapedtheBritishresponsesinceLansingÕsstatementfailedtoendorseEntentewaraims.SeeSterlingKernek,ÒTheBritishGovernmentÕsReactionstoPresidentWilsonÕsÔPeaceÕNoteofDecember1916,ÓHistoricalJournalno.4(December1970):736Ð43.WeonlyfoundevidencethatLansingÕsstatementdismayed(andthusdidnotembolden)theEntentedecisionmakers.FormoreonWilson,seeElizabethSanders,ÒTheWarandPeaceElectionof1916,ÓinAmericaattheBallotBox:ElectionsandAmericanPoliticalHistory,ed.GarethDaviesandJulianZelizer(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2015).CAB23/1/13,BNA.Kernek,ÒBritishGovernmentÕsReactions,Ó747.MemCon,22December1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,108Ð9.CAB23/1/10/2. A.LanoszkaandM.A.Hunzekermust...berecognizedthatifhe[Wilson]desiredtoputastoptothewar,andwaspreparedtopaythepricefordoingso,suchanachievementisinhispower.ÓFollowingtheFederalReserveBoardactionsagainstthepoundsterlinginlateNovember,theBritishcommissionedaninternalinvestigationtounderstandthepotentialimpactofU.S.Þnancialcoercion.SuchconcernsintensiÞedwiththepeaceovertures.CecilobservedthatÒunlessImisreadhischaracter,itisnotimpossiblethathemighttakeevenveryviolentactiontoenforceheregardedasajustpeace.ÓLordArthurBalfourechoedthisTheBritishwantedtorejectthepeaceovertures,butonlyinawaythatwouldavoidU.S.Þnancialpressure.Theimplementalmindsetshapedthesedeliberations.InconsideringWilsonÕsnote,Britishdecisionmakersagreedthattheresponseshouldar-ticulatemoralprinciplessoastobroadenitsappeal,sincepropagandaef-fortsintheUnitedStateswerefailing.Appealingtomoralprinciples,intheirview,wouldhelpdefeatthenotionofpursuingpeacewithoutmilitaryAccordingly,someBritishdecisionmakerswantedtoexploitthelanguageofWilsonÕsnotetoechotheU.S.presidentÕsmoralsentiments.Afterall,theyweredissatisÞedwithBritishpropagandaeffortsintheUnitedAsBalfourexpressed:ÒHisMajestyÕsGovernmentdesiretoexpresstheirappreciationoftheserviceswhichthePresidenthasperformedforthecauseofhumanitybypubliclyexpressingtotheworldsuffering,asneverbefore,underthehorrorsofwar,thatthemereterminationofhos-tilitieswouldprovidenosufÞcientcureforourills;thatwhatcivilizationrequiresissomesecuritythatpeacewhenitcomesshallbehonourableandTheBritishwishedtoobtaingreatersympathyfortheEntente,especiallyamongAmericans.TheyusedthereplytoWilsonÕsnotetoimproveEntentepropagandaintheUnitedStates.SuchwasthethoroughnessoftheEntenteÕsdisinclinationtoconsiderpeacefulnegotiations.ALTERNATIVEEXPLANATIONSFORTHEPEACEINITIATIVEÕSFAILUREBritishdecisionmakersdisregardednegativebattleÞeldinformation,re-mainedcommittedtodiscreditedstrategies,escalatedmilitaryactionandwar QuotedinKernek,ÒBritishGovernmentÕsReactions,Ó727.SeealsoCAB37/162/3,BNA.CAB23/1/13/1,BNA.CAB1/21/8,BNA.Kernek,ÒBritishGovernmentÕsReactions,Ó765.CAB24/3/39,BNA.USsympathyfortheEntenteÕscausewanedduring1916.W.B.Fest,ÒBritishWarAimsandGermanPeaceFeelersduringtheFirstWorldWar(December1916ÐNovember1918),ÓHistoricalJournal15,no.2(June1972):291.CAB37/162/31.SeealsoKernek,ÒBritishGovernmentÕsReactions,Ó756. RageofHonoraims,understoodthepeaceovertureslargelyinemotionalterms,andheldlogicallyirreconcilableviewsaboutthemotivationsbehindthepeaceover-tures.Theseobservationsareconsistentwithourhonortheory.Yetseveralplausiblecounter-argumentsarepossible,includingtheremainingtwojus-tiÞcationsadvancedbytheEntente:thatGermanyhaduniquecommitmentproblems(regardingBelgium)andanypeaceoverturewoulddispropor-tionatelybeneÞtGermany.Thesecounterargumentsoverlapwithrationalistexplanationsofwarandsoweaddressthemhere.GermanCommitmentProblemsThereÞrstexiststheassertionthatbecauseGermanyandAustria-Hungaryviolatedtheircommitmentsin1914,theycouldnotbetrustedtorespectasettlement.Amajorproblemunderminesthisview:Belgium,whichhadthemosttolosefromfutureGermannoncomplianceandaggression,didnotseemtoquestionGermanyÕscredibility,asevidencedbythefactthatBritishandFrenchleadersworriedBelgiummightmakeaseparatepeace.Attheinter-alliedconferenceheldinlateDecember,theFrenchandtheBritishexchangedviewsonBelgium.TheFrenchministerofÞnancelamentedthattheÒBelgianGovernmenthadalreadyshownaperiloustendencytomakeaspecialcaseofBelgium.ÓSpeakingforFrenchPrimeMinisterAristideBriand,aFrenchdiplomatnotedthat:ÒThebestargumentthattheAllieshad[withtheUnitedStates]wasBelgium;butifBelgiumwereallowedtosaythatshewasavictim,notabelligerentinthewaythattherestoftheAllieswere...andthatallsheaskedshewastoberestoredtothepositionwhichshehadundeservedlylostÑthiswouldbeexactlytheendatwhichtheGermanswereTheironyisthatBelgiumhaditsowncommitmentproblemthatvexedtheEntente,therebycomplicatingtheviewthatGermancommitmentproblemsregardingBelgiumdrovethewar.Prussianmilitarism,andtheGermanregimethatpromotedit,wasan-otherallegedcommitmentproblem.ToavoidÞghtingthesamewarinthefuture,thecurrentonecouldnotenduntilPrussianmilitarismwasÒbrokenbeyondallrepair.ÓNotwithstandingtheÒsuicidefromfearofdeathÓlogic,byadoptingthedestructionoftheGermanregimeasawaraim,theEntentewascommittedtoabrute-forceobjectiveandwasthereforeresponsiblefortheabsenceofabargainingspace.Still,bruteforcegoalscanberational, QuotesonBelgiumfromCAB28/2/59,BNA.TheBritishalsosawthepropagandavalueofBelgium,butwerenotopposedtoseparaterepliesperse.CAB23/1/18,BNA.Fest,ÒBritishWarAims,Ó290.GermanauthoritiesrecognizedthisproblemwiththeEntenteÕsdiplomacy.InApril1916,Bethmann-HollwegsaidthatGermanywouldnotentertainpeacenegotiationsuntiltheBritishrepu-diatedcallsfortheÒutterdestructionofPrussianmilitarism.ÓAmbassadorinGermanytoLansing,5AprilFRUS1916,Supplement,23. A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerasintheSecondWorldWar.TheproblemwithrejectingtheGermanpeaceofferonthebasisofPrussianmilitarismwasthatstrongindicationsappearedthatthewarwasbeginningtospurliberalizationwithinGermansociety.MassmobilizationwasstartingtohavethesameeffectonGermanythatitwashavingonBritainandFrance.Aswaswelldocumentedinthepressanddiplomaticcables,amoderatecoalition,includingmembersoftheelite,wascoalescingaroundaneuOrientierung.BelievingthatpostwarGermansocietycouldnotreturntoprewarnorms,itcalledforelectoralreform,in-cludingdiscardingthethree-classvotingsystem;redistrictingtoshiftpowertowardsurbanareas;bettertreatmentforethnicminoritieslivingwithintheGermanEmpire;moreeducationforpoorerclasses;andaparliamentarygovernmentwithachancellorresponsibletotheReichstag.Thus,bypro-longingthewartheEntentemanagedtoundercuttheverygoaltheyweretryingtoachievebyforceofarmsalone.TheEntentecouldhavetailoreditsresponsetotheGermannotetoexploittheseemergingcleavagesinGermansociety.Instead,itsresponsehelpeddelegitimizetheGermanpaciÞstmovementandenhancethepo-liticalpositionoftheGermanmilitaryestablishmentattheexpenseofthecivilianauthorities.ChancellorTheoboldvonBethmann-HollwegcouldnotrepudiatetheGermanmilitaryÕsinsistenceonpursuingaU-boatwar.ThoughcriticalofGermanyÕsdiplomacyinDecember1916,historianKentForsterac-knowledgesÒthegeneraltemperofpublicopinionaftertheEntenterejectionofthepeaceofferwouldhavemadeanyattemptbytheChancellortodefythedecisionoftheSupremeCommandmorethanhazardous.ÓTheEn-tenteÕsresponsetoWilsonÕsoverturefurtherunderminedGermancivilianleadersbydeclaringpeacecouldonlyfollowvictory.IncompatibleWarAimsandNonexistentBargainingSpaceHewStrachanechoestheEntenteÕsclaimthatitwasimpossibletonegotiatebasedontheDecember1916statusquo.TheCentralPowerseffectivelyoccupiedeverythingtheEntentewanted.Therefore,littleopportunityexistedfortheEntentetobargainforanyofitscoregoals.Fortheirpart,BritishandFrenchleadersechoedthislogic,insistingthattheGermanofferwasbasedonawarmapthatwouldbeneÞttheCentralPowersalone.YetagaintheEntentecouldnotclaimtoknowwhattheCentralPowerswerewillingtocompromiseinanegotiation. MemCon,17October1916,ibid.,61Ð64.KentForster,TheFailuresofPeace:TheSearchforaNegotiatedPeaceduringtheFirstWorldWar(Washington,DC:AmericanCouncilonPublicAffairs,1941),58Ð59.TextofAlliedReplytotheCentralPowerstoDiscussPeace,ConversationoftheAmbassadorinGreatBritainandSecretaryofState,29December1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,123Ð24. RageofHonorGermanyhadachievedamajorshareofitsstrategicobjectivesbytheendof1916.Itmadeterritorialgainsincentral-easternEuropeattheex-penseofaseverelyweakenedRussia.IffearsofastrongerRussiapromptedGermanytoinitiatepreventivewar,thensuchconcernsshouldhavebythenwaned.Indeed,GermanyÕseasternwaraimssawconsiderableexpansion.Inthewest,onemajormodiÞcationdiscussedconcernedguaranteesoverBelgium;iftheseguaranteesprovedinadequate,thenGermanywouldseektoannexLiegeanditssurroundingareas.WithitspositionsigniÞcantlystrongerintheeast,GermanywasnowabletoreduceitsdemandsintheDiplomaticcablessuggestthattheCentralPowerswerewillingtoagreetofarmoreoftheEntenteÕsdemandsthanthepopularnarrativesug-gests.SuchconcessionsincludedevacuatingBelgiumandNorthernFrance,restoringSerbiatoitsprewarborders,andformingapeaceleague.Further-more,theCentralPowerswereopentodiscussingItalyandAlsace-Lorraineonceanarmisticewasinplace.WehaveshownthattheEntenteÕswaraimsgrewin1916despiteun-favorablebattleÞeldoutcomes.Yetthewaraimsofallthebelligerentsex-pandedlessontheWesternFrontandmoreontheEasternandSoutheasternFronts.AlthoughtheWesternFrontwasthemostimportantfront,thepara-doxisthatwargoalsoftencenteredontheeast.Accordingly,abargainingrangeamongstthebelligerentsexisted.TheGermansandtheRussianscouldhavestruckabargainontheEasternFront,andtheGermansandtheEn-tentecouldhavenegotiatedguaranteesrespectingterritorialsovereigntyinWesternEurope.TheaimswerenotasirreconcilableasStrachanargues,somethingthattheEntentealsofailedtorecognizeatthetime.OtherRationalistExplanationsThosereasonsforrejectingthepeaceoffersthataccordmostcloselywithra-tionalistexplanationsdonotwithstandscrutiny.However,atleasttwootherpotentialrationalistexplanationsfortheEntenteÕsbehaviorarepossible.U.S.IOneintuitiveexplanationisthattheEntenteanticipatedanAmericaninter-vention.SuchachangewouldhaveÑanddidÑtipthebalancedecisivelyin FortheviewthatarisingRussiamotivatedGermanytolaunchpreventivewar,seeCopeland,TheOriginsofMajorWar.GoemansreferstoaNovember1916telegraphenumeratingGermanwaraimstoshowthattheyexpandedthroughout1916.Goemans,WarandPunishment,102.MemCon,19November1916,FRUS1916,Supplement,61Ð64. A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekertheEntenteÕsfavor.Yetthisexplanationsuffersfromhindsightbias.ablearchivalrecordsdonotsupporttheideathatBritishleadersrejectedtheGermanofferbecausetheybelievedtheUnitedStateswouldsooninter-vene.AlthoughtheUnitedStateseventuallyenteredthewarinApril1917,itsinterventionhardlyseemedinevitabletoBritishleadersinDecember1916.GermanyÕsunrestrictedsubmarinecampaignremainedonlyathreat.ArthurZimmermandidnotdispatchhisinfamoustelegramuntilmid-January1917.AndaseriesofcablesfromtheBritishambassadortotheUnitedStatesmadeclearthatthepoliticalenvironmentwasdecidedlyworkingagainstBritishinterests.PresidentWilsonwasreelectedonawaveofisolationistsentiment.CongresswasunderRepublicancontrol,andseniorCongressionalleaders,includingtheSpeakeroftheHouse,werevehementlyanti-British.nessinterestswereirritatedwiththeblockade.ManyordinaryAmericanseithersupportedGermanyorbegrudgedBritainforsupportingtheSouthduringtheCivilWaranditspoliciestowardsIrelandandGreece.Infact,British-Americanrelationsreachedanadirinlate1916.FarfromcountingonAmericansupport,BritishleaderswereworriedthattheUnitedStatesmightuseitspowertoimposeanendtothewar.TheFederalRe-serveBoardÕsdecisiontodiscourageAmericanbanksfromloaningmoneytoBritainshockedtheBritishandsuggestedthatsuchascenariomightbelikely.Inmid-November,astudybytheCommitteeonImperialDe-fenseidentiÞedtheneedtoÒdiminishdependenceoftheAlliesuponthe[UnitedStates]ÓasoneofBritainÕsthreemosturgentchallenges.AForeignOfÞcestudyconcludedthatBritainmightneedtorevisititsavowedpolicynottoengageinpeacenegotiationsiftheUnitedStatesweretowithholdAnothercounterargumentisthatBritishleaderscouldnotbroachpeacebecauseofconcernsoverthepublicÕsresponseafteryearsofintenseanti-Germanpropaganda.However,thiscounterargumentpresumesthatBritishleaderswereobjectivebutwereledstraybyahotheadedpublic.WefoundnoevidencethatBritishdecisionmakersfelthamstrungbya OntheUSintervention,seeGalenJackson,ÒTheOffshoreBalancingThesisReconsidered:Real-ism,theBalanceofPowerinEurope,andAmericaÕsDecisionforWarin1917,ÓSecurityStudies21,no.3(July2012):455Ð89.TheBritishambassadortotheUnitedStatesreferredtotheSpeakerasÒamostdeterminedandinveterateenemyofEngland.ÓCAB37/160/18,BNA.CAB37/159/18,BNA;CAB37/159/18,BNA.AstheBritishambassadortoRussiainformedtheBritishForeignOfÞcefollowingaconversationwithhisAmericancounterpart,ÒHisExcellencysaidthatwhattheUnitedStateswereafraidofwaswarwithGermanyandnottheAllies.ÓFO317/3075,BNA.CAB24/2/46,BNA.ThisobservationsuggestsagainthatBritainsubordinatedpolicytowarÞghting.CAB37/161/38, RageofHonorvindictivepublic.Tothecontrary,theyvoicedconcernoverthegrowthofpaciÞstmovementsinBritain.Moreover,growingtensionsinIrelandsug-gestlatentpopulardemandforcurtailingthewareffort.NordidweÞndevidenceofleadersbeingfearfulofdampeningtheresolveofanalreadywar-wearypublicbyenteringintopeacenegotiationsthatmightfail.Infact,leadersoftheworldÕsmostmaturedemocracyhardlyseemedtocarehowvoterswouldjudgeachancetoendhistoryÕsbloodiestwartodate.SUMMARYANDIMPLICATIONSOFOURSTUDYThispaperadvancesanewtheoryofhowhonorconsiderationsaffectwar,testingitagainsttheDecember1916peaceovertures.Weconcludeherebyrecapitulatingourargument,discussingitsimplicationsforFirstWorldWarhistoriography,highlightingitsimportancetointernationalrelationstheory,andhighlightingitslimitationsanddirectionsforfutureresearch.Toreview,ourtheorypredictsthathonor-basedconsiderationscancauseactorstoescalatemorequickly,Þghtmoreintensely,andde-escalatemoreslowlythanrationalisttheorieswouldexpect.Warsinwhichhonorconcernsdominateexhibitthesecharacteristicsbecausetheneedtorestorehonordistortshowactorsprocessinformationandadjusttheirstrategies.HonorexertsthisinßuencebecauseitcanbeintegraltoanactorÕsself-identity.LosinghonormeanslosingtheabilitytodeÞneandunderstandoneself.ViolencecanintensifywhenanoffendingpartyrefusestoapologizeforimpugninganotherÕshonororwhentheoffendedpartyfailstoimposeanacceptablepunishmentinretaliation.Althoughitishardtoknowwhattypesofdisputeswilltriggerhonorconsiderationsexante,sincehonorcanoperatealongsideorsubordinatetorationalinterests,wepredictthatcon-ßictsbetweenrisingandstatusquopowersandÞghtsoverterritoryaremostlikelytomakehonorconsiderationssalient.Finally,becausehonoriszerosum,warsinwhichhonorconsiderationstrumpallotherinterestsarelikelytoendinonlyoneoftwoways:thesuccessfulimpositionofpunishmenttoredressthebesmirchedhonorortheinabilityofatleastonesidetocontinueOurtheoryilluminateswhyBritainbypassedanimportantopportunitytonegotiateanendtotheFirstWorldWarinDecember1916.Germanychal-lengedBritishhonorandidentitybyviolatingBelgianterritory.Withnoapol-ogyforthcoming,Britishleadersescalated.Bylate1916,theyheldlogicallyirreconcilableviewsregardingtheCentralPowers,willfullychoseinefÞcientstrategiestoachievetheirdesiredends,andfailedtomodulatetheirwaraimsinaccordancewithbattleÞeldinformation.Drivingthesepathologieswasastrongemotionalundercurrentcenteredonstatusandrevenge.WealsoÞnd CAB37/159/12,BNA. A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerthattraditionalaccountsonwhatforestalledtheendoftheFirstWorldWarhaveimportantshortcomings.ThereasoninganddiplomaticexchangesofEntentepoliticiansdidnotinvolvethosecommitmentproblemsthatratio-nalistaccountsemphasizetoexplainthewarÕsduration.WeareconÞdentthatwehaveexhaustedtheavailabletop-levelarchivaldocumentstocastdoubtontheseexplanationsanddemonstratethevalidityofourown.Still,weadmitthatwehavenosmokinggunevidenceandacknowledgehowarchivaldocumentsmaynotcapturewhatleaderssaidorthoughtbehindcloseddoors.ImplicationsforFirstWorldWarHistoriographyIfcorrect,thenouranalysissuggeststhattheBritishbearmoreresponsibilityfortheFirstWorldWarlastingaslongasitdidthantheconventionalwisdomadmits.TheBritishdenouncedthepeaceovertureinthenameofdestroyingPrussianmilitarism.Bydoingso,theyinadvertentlystrengthenedPrussianmilitarismbyundercuttingpaciÞstsentimentinGermanyandstrengtheningthedecisionmakingroleoftheGermanmilitary.Consequently,Germancivil-ianleaderscouldnotasktheirmilitarycounterpartstopostponeunrestrictedsubmarinewarfare.Theresultsarewellknown:Germanyescalateditsmil-itaryeffortbylaunchingtheunrestrictedsubmarinecampaign;theUnitedStatesrespondedbydeclaringwaronGermanyasanassociatedpower;theEntentereneweditsoffensives,includingtheprolongedandhorriÞcBattleofPasschendaele;andthewarprogressedwithlittlemeaningfulchangeontheWesternFrontuntiltheHundredDaysOffensivethatbeganinAugust1918.WhenthewarÞnallyendedwiththeNovember11Armistice,overninemillioncombatantshadbeenkilledandfourempireshadcollapsed.TheBritishEmpireremainedbutitsÞnancialpowerwasseverelyweakened.Francealsofacedeconomicdevastation.ExpostinefÞciencyunderstatesthehavocwreakedbytheFirstWorldWar.Yetonepuzzleremains:whydidGermanydecideagainstnegotiatinganendtothewarafterRussiaÕsexit?ItcouldhaveusedtheTreatyofBrest-LitovskinearlyMarch1918toappeasedomesticoppositionandseekageneralpeace.Instead,Germanylaunchedaspringoffensiveshortlythere-OuranalysismakessenseofGermanyÕsdecision.ThefailureoftheoverturesclariÞedtheEntentepositionalltoowell.SpeciÞcally,theBritishresponsetothepeaceoverturesinDecember1916ledtheGermanstoconcludethatBritainwasmoreinterestedinÞghtingtotheÞnishratherthanreachingsomepeacefulsettlement.Accordingly,bylate1917German Goemans,ÒH-DiploRoundtableReviewofDanReiterÕsHowWarsEnd,Ó14.OwnStory,1:368. RageofHonorleadersmayhavereasonedthatitwouldbefutiletoseekageneralpeaceaftertheTreatyofBrest-Litovsk.AnimatedbyhonorconsiderationsandtheneedtocrushPrussianmilitarism,Britishleaderscreatedanintractablecommitmentproblem.ByplainlyadvocatingregimechangeinGermany,themembersoftheEntentecouldnotcrediblyassureGermanythattheywouldrespectitspoliticalsystem.Thus,GermanyÕsspringoffensivesmayhavebeendesignedtodemonstrateitsdeterminationtocontinueÞghtingandinducetheBritishtoamorepragmaticassessmentofthewar.Despitethetacticalsuccessesofthisoffensive,theresultwasstrategicfailureamidheavycasualtiesandill-advisedterritorialgains.TheSpringOffensiveexhaustedGermanyandallowedtheEntentetoÞnallywinthewar.WhatendedtheconßictwaslessabargainedoutcomeasitwasthedevastatingattritionofGermanyÕsmilitary.TheBritishwerefortunatethattheydidnothavetoresolvetheirowncommitmentproblem.ImplicationsforInternationalRelationsTheoryOurargumentregardinghonorhasbroadersigniÞcanceforinternationalrelationstheory.First,thepsychologicalbiasesthatinduceleaderstostartwarsmightnotattenuateoverthecourseoftheconßict.Rather,perceptionsofstatusandumbragecouldencouragethemtoratchetuptheirwareffortandÞghtlongerandharderthanrationalistexplanationswouldpredict.Indeed,thedynamicsweexploredinthispapercanbefoundinotherhistoricalcases.RichardNedLebowdescribeshowhonor-basedcustomscanlimitviolence,buthisexamplesshowhowoftenstrugglesforhonorcandegenerateintoparoxysmsofviolenceaswell.RichardNixoncampaignedforthepresidencycallingforapeacewithhonorinhisdesiretowithdrawU.S.troopsfromVietnam.OnceinofÞce,heinsteadescalatedandexpandedthatconßictwithincursionsintoCambodiaandLaosandamassivebombingcampaignoverNorthVietnam.HonorconsiderationsmayhaveplayedaroleinprolongingU.S.effortstodisengagefromtheKoreanWar,Iraq,andAfghanistanaswell.Second,weshowhowpreventivewarsfoughtbetweenrisingstatesanddominantstatesanddisputesoverterritorybecomeunlimited.Honorconsiderationscanleaddominantstatestoresponddisproportionatelytotheaggressivenessoftherisingstateforfearthatitsgeneralcommitmentsareatstake.Theinabilitytopunishtherisingstatesatisfactorilymightre-versepreferenceswherebythedominantstateiswillingtoriskitsownsurvivaljusttopreserveitsreputation.Ifso,thenourtheoryhighlightsanimportant,yetunderexplored,sourceofconßictescalationinEastAsia.Inthatregionweseepowertransitionandterritorialdisputesbothatplay. CulturalTheory A.LanoszkaandM.A.HunzekerOurtheorysuggeststhatadisputebetweenJapanandarisingChinaovertheirsovereigntyclaimsintheEastChinaSeacouldproduceaquickes-calationintoviolencethatisdisproportionatetothematerialinterestsinFinally,weanalyzehowself-imageconcernscanseverelydistortfor-eignpolicy.Honorconsiderationsstillexist,butmodernityÕsrationalistlan-guageobscuresthemwithtermslikecredibility.Honorencompassessuchconcepts,butsuppliesthemwithanemotionalmeaningforoneÕsself-identity.Itisthusunsurprisingthatweobserveleaderscaringabouttheirowncredibilityandreputationwhiledismissingthoseofothers.Fordeci-sionmakers,theseattributesmaymatterlessforinterstatesignalingthanforpreservingtheirconceptionofboththemselvesandthegovernmentstheyDirectionsforFutureResearchOurargumentadmittedlyhasimportantlimitations,butthesegapsprovideopportunitiesfortheorizingandresearch.First,wehavenotidentiÞedthefullrangeofissueslikelytotriggerhonorconsiderations.Doingsowouldbeusefultoscholarsandpolicymakersalike.Preemptivestrikesbyrisingpowersagainststatusquopowersinadditiontoterritorialseizuresarehighlylikelytoprovokehonorconsiderations.Afterall,bothtypesofdisputesaffectnationalidentity.Still,itremainsuncertainwhetherotherconßictsgeneratesimilardynamics.Second,howdoeshonorinteractwithrationalandmaterialinterests?Ourtheorydoesnotpredictthathonor,onceinvoked,willalwaystrumpmaterialandrationalpursuits.Inmostinstances,rationalgoalsshoulddom-inatehonorconsiderations,althoughDarylPressÕsworkcautionsusthatcredibilityconcernsonlyappearrational.Alternatively,thetwomechanismscouldoperateequally.Ineithercase,scholarsshouldexaminehowthesemechanismsinteracttodeterminetheconditionsunderwhichhonortrumpsrationalistinterest,andviceversa.Finally,futureresearchshouldinvestigatethemicrofoundationsofhonor.Wetookourunitofanalysistobethepartofgovernmentthatexertsultimateauthorityoverforeignpolicy.However,wesidesteppedthequestionastowhetherdecisionmakersareactingtodefendtheirownhonororonbehalfofthehonorofthenationalpopulation.Yetanotherpossibilityisthattheseelitesmistakenlyseetheirownpersonalhonorandnationalhonoraslinked.Scholarsshoulddeterminehowconcernsofhonoroperateinthemindsofdecisionmakersaswellastheirimpacton CalculatingCredibility RageofHonorTheauthorsthankDaleCopeland,TimothyCrawford,EdwardErickson,AaronFriedberg,EugeneGholz,KristenHarkness,JackLevy,JuliaMacdon-ald,MichaelMcKoy,PaulMiles,PaulPoast,andthreeanonymousreviewersandtheeditorsatSecurityStudiesforconstructivecommentsandcriticism.OurarchivalresearchwasmadepossiblethroughagenerousgrantfromtheBradleyFoundationandsupportfromtheStantonFoundation.