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"Plu-thermal" Deadlocked "Plu-thermal" Deadlocked "Plu-thermal" Deadlocked Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant Under Construction F or What ?? TEPCO Fukushima I Site TEPCO Fukushima II Site TEPCO Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Site Hamaoka T okai I I Ikata Sendai Genkai Shimane Tsurug a Shika T akahama Ohi Mihama Nuke Info Tokyo IndustrialSafetyAgency(NISA)announcedvoluntaryinspectionreportsandconcealeditformanyyears. TEPCOadmittedthestatedfactsatthepressconferencelaterinthesameday. Accordingtotheagency,TEPCOhasfalsifiedtheinspectionrecordsandattemptedtohidecracksinreactorvesselshroudsin13TEPCO,includingFukushima(6reactors),FukushimaII(4reactors),andKashiwazaki-Kariwa(7reactors). However,theagencymaintainedthatthereshouldbenoproblemregardingthesafetyofthenuclearpower Ironically, agency was based on TEPCO’s calculation.The TEPCO’s wrongdoings were exposed asresultofwhistle-blowingbyformerengineeratGeneralElectricInternationalInc.(GEII)ininformationgiventothethenMin istryofInternationalEconomyandIndustry(MITI)(theformerbodyoftheMinistryofEconomy,TradeandIndustry,METI)onJuly tip-offsinspectionrecordsregardingcracksinsteamdryer,workforthecracksbytheeditingofvideo tapes. This insider’s information was never takenseriouslybythethenMITI(afterJanu ary2001,theNISAtookoveradministrative “We - er and we didn’t know whether we had the right toinvestigatethecase,”saidtheagencyafter trary,itwasfoundlaterthattheMETIleaked the whistle-blower’s name to TEPCO, which clearlysuggeststheMinistryfailedtosupportthepersonwhoblewthewhistleoncorporatecorruption. WhileTEPCOhadnottakenany appropriate measures against the insider’s tip-offs,conjunctionwithGEIIonMay2002toinves tigatethecase,suspectingthattheremightbecompany. Itoffalsification,whichwererelatedtodam ageinmanypartsofthereactorpressureves selsuchshroud,accesscover,feedwaterspurger,on-coremonitor publishedinterimreportsonSeptember13and17respectively,whichaddressedthe29 cracksdetectedinthecoreshroud,accordingtothereport,theyhadbeenalreadyfoundatthecracksinthemiddlepartoftheshroudatFukushimaUnit-2in1994werereportedofficiallyasthefirstcase. Themagnitudeofbefargreaterandmoreseriousthantheonesannouncedbytheofficialreport. Ithasalsoclaimthatnocrackswerefoundinthecore ItisreportedthatcrackswerefoundinthecoreshroudsofFukushimaIIUnit2,3,andandKashiwazaki-Kariwa,and3,whichiscomposedoftheanti-stresscollisioncrackmaterial(SUS316L)after10yearsoftheir OnSeptember20,otherdamagecover-ups in TEPCO’s eight nuclear reactors, as well as OnagawaUnit-1ofTohokuElectricPowerCompanyandHamaokaUnit-1ofChubuElectricPowerCompany. Inaddition,othercracksinthecoreshroudwerefoundatOna Tsuruga(JapanAtomicPowerCo.,Ltd),andShimane cover-upsshowedthescandalwasnotmerely TEPCO’s particular problem but involved most of the nation’s electric companies. Electric sificationsduringvoluntaryinspection. Therecover-upsanddatafalsificationsaround1994whenelectriccompanieshadstartedshorteningthefromthe“success”experienceintheU.S. Inthesameperiod,similarcrackswerefoundinthecoreshroudofBWRsinmanycountries Nuke Info Tokyo Sep/Oct 3 Taiwan,Germany,whichhavebecomeseriousissues alsofoundinsomeofthereactorsinJapan,electriccompaniesonlypartiallyannounced Moreover,TEPCOfalsifieddatafromthecontainmentvesselleakrateinspectionscon -ductedduringperiodicalinspectionatFukushi -maIUnit-1byinjectingcompressedairintothecontainmentvesselinordertopasstheinspec tion. ThefalsificationofcontainmentvesselrevealedattheendofSeptember,onemonthaftertheTEPCOscandal,andtheTEPCOreceivedthepenaltyofsuspendingtheopera tionofUnit-1for12monthswhenitadmit tedthecamouflagewiththeinspectionreport. However,camouflagemethodduringtheinspectionshas TheVessel (RPV)’s head parts at PWRs should be another replacementsofthecoreshroudwerecarriedoutas“preventivemeasure,”whichmeanstoensurethe“healthiness”oftheshroud,at However,neverreportedtotheagencythattherewere panies(KansaiElectricPowerCo.,Shikoku11 -selhead(allofthemarePWRs)asa“preven tivemeasure”. Didthesereactorvesselheads Althougheachelectricpowercompanysubmittedtheirinterimsurveyreportsonthe scandal on November 15 according to NISA’request,thereportsonlyaddressedthehis tionsconductedmorethanyearsago,ortheexaminationrecordsbyinspectioncompanies thethenMITIhasinstructedelectriccompa niestohideaccidentreports. AlthoughNISA iceberg;oftheinjusticebytheelectriccompaniesandhasnotyetbecomefullyresolved. However,theadministrativebodysuchasNISAistry despitethefactthat“failureintheregulation” Intosimplifyperiodicalinspectionprocedures. Theagencyistryingtointroduceintonuclearsafetyregulationtheso-called"safetyallow defectsduringoperation. Theproposedmea -sureisintendedtosupplementthepresenttech isintendtocutcostsincurredbythemainte nanceofagednuclearplants,andadoptionofthestandardshoulddirectlyleadtolowerthemarginreactor. agednuclearpowerplants,moreseveresafetyregulationsshouldbeestablishedbyapplying safety. WhiletheTEPCOscandalhashadenor moussocietalimpact,localgovernmentsofelectricpowersourcearea,wheretheyhaveenergy,rageatthescandal,realizingthattheyhavebeendeceived,andtheirangeriseverstronger. PrioragreementonthePlu-thermalprogramwascancelednotonlybyFukushimanuclearpolicy,butalsobyNiigataprefecture. effectivelytoanend. Then,thereisnorationaleforthe plantfor,whichhasbeenconstructedtostart Wepower, - tion.(Chihiro 4 Nov./Dec. Nuke Info Tokyo H1 H2 H3 H4 H6a H6b H7 (H8) Shroud Head and Separaters Core Spray Pipe T op Guide Shroud Fuel Bundl e Jet Pump Jet Pump Recir Riser and Brace Area Lo wer Core Plate Coolant Fl ow Support Le gs V esse l Middle Ring Lo wer Ring Control Rod Dri v e Mechanism Housing H1, H2, H3, H4, H6a, H6b, H7, H8 are all W elded portion Inside Vi e w of Reactor Pressure V essel in Boiled Wa ter Reactor (BWR) : Core Shroud We ld Location and Name Core Shroud Design Characteristics The lesssteelcylindricalcomponentwithinthereactorpressurevessel(RPV)thatsurrounds separatoroffeedwaterandplaysanimportant geometry.As shown in figure 1’s cross-section of BWRreactordesign,thecoreshroudisver ticallyweldedtotheRPVinwhichcoolantflowsinduceddownwardonthesurfaceofshroud,thenupwardthroughthefuelassem blies. Thedownwardflowisthecoolantreturningbackfromthetur bine. Thewaterfractionissenttotherecirculationpumplocatedoutsideofthereac tor,whichhelpstofeedwaterbacktotheRPVwherethejetpumpriserpipeandthejetpumpconvertshighpressureintohighvelocityasthefluid intheannularspacebetweenwheretheyareattachedtothebuffer ThecrosssectionofBWRcoreshroud(seeFigure.1)showsthattherearetwosup portringstructures(topguidesupportringaroundH2andH3weldedportionandcoresupportringaroundH6aandH6bweldedportion). Thewith talgeometryoffuelassembliesarefixedand,therefore,theflowofcoolingwaterismain - tained. What would happen if the core shroud Someofthecracksinthecoreshroudare allyobservedontheshroudbodynearthe RPV. sonablypossibletohypothesizethesituation Mechanism of Core Shroud and its function H1 H2 H3 H4 H6a H6b H7 (H8) Shroud Head and Separaters Core Spray Pipe T op Guide Shroud Fuel Bundl e Jet Pump Jet Pump Recir Riser and Brace Area Lo wer Core Plate Coolant Fl ow Support Le gs V esse l Middle Ring Lo wer Ring Control Rod Dri v e Mechanism Housing H1, H2, H3, H4, H6a, H6b, H7, H8 are all W elded portion Inside Vi e w of Reactor Pressure V essel in Boiled Wa ter Reactor (BWR) : Core Shroud We ld Location and Name Figure 1. Inside view of reactor pressure vessel in Boiling Water Reactor (BWR); Core shroud weld location and name TheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)pointsoutintheirreportthatcracksthatcompletelypenetratedtheshroudaffect tion,whichcouldleadtodisruptionofthecoordinationofpoweroutputandthewater significantproblemsconcerningsafetycouldmainsteampipeorrecirculationpipe,which Therehaveneverbeenanysafetyinspec assumingcracksinthecoreshroud. Itisnotcouldpreciselypredicttheconsequenceofanaccidentresultingfromsignificantcoolant AccordingtotheNRCreport,thefuelrod water, reactor. Evenifthecoreshroudisingood water,couldultimatelyleadtocoremeltdown,prob ablythemostcatastrophicaccidentthatcould U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission.1996. “StatusReport:IntergranularStressCorrosionCrackingofBWRCoreShroudsandOtherInternalComponents.”DivisionofEngineer ing,OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation. Washington,ManypressreleasesconcerningtheTEPCO - ing NISA’s homepage: http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/index.htm Nuke Info Tokyo Nov./Dec. 5 H1 H2 H3 H4 H6a H6b H7a H7b H1 H2 H3 H4 H6a H6b H7a H7b H1 H2 H3 H4 H6a H6b H7a H7b H1 H2 H3 H4 H6a H6b H7a H7b Approximately 15m H1 H2 H3 H4 H6 a H6 b H7 H1 H2 H3 H4 H6 a H6 b H7 Fukushima I-2 (SUS304: Before Replacement) Outside Surface A sign of cracks were found in shroud support Inside Surface Fukushima I-3 (SUS304: Before Replacement) Approximately 15m Outside Surfac e Inside Surfac e Fukushima II-3 (SUS316) Approximately 18m Outside Surface Inside Surface Figure 2. Cracks in core shroud at Fukushima I-2, I-3, and II-3 Nuke Info Tokyo Sep./Oct. 11 NEWS WATCH Prefectural Governments of Niigata and Fukushima Completely Retract their Prior Consent to the Plu-Thermal Pro - InresponsetotherevelationofTokyoElec - tric Power Co.’s series of nuclear reactor damage cover-upsandfalsereports,theprefecturalgov ernmentsofbothNiigataandFukushima,wheretheuseofMOXfuelinthermalreactors(the InofKariwavillagewasholding“dialoguemeet outcomeoftheplebiscite,whichtookplaceineffectivevoteswereagainsttheprogram. OnAugust29, the last day of the “dialogue,” TEPCO’s dishonest 11Village lowedsuit. OnSeptember12thegovernorofNiigataPrefecture,theMayorofKashiwazakiCityandtheheadofKariwaVillagemetandagreedtoretracttheirpriorconsent,andeachof InFukushima,onSeptember2,thecouncilislocated,unanimouslydecidedtoretracttheirpriorconsent. OnSeptemberthemayorsofagreedtofreezethePlu-thermalprogram. AtthepressconferenceheldonSeptember19,thegovernoroftheprefectureexpressedhisregret,sayingthatthepriorconsentwasmistakeandthat“hisfeelingofregretwasstrongerthanthatofNiigata.” OnSeptember26heofficiallyannounced“thecompleteretractionofthepro gram”attheprefecturalcouncilmeeting. The11 requesting,“nottoimplementthePlu-thermal -tion Even with the Unscheduled Suspension of Reactor Operations, There is Still a Plen - Coupledwiththeoperationstoppagefor odicalinspections,allfourofChubuElectric Power Co.’s reactors and 9 of Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s 17 reactors had their operations sus tionthenecessityofrelyingonnuclearpower. Duetoexcesscapacity,inthelastseveralyearsanincreasingnumberofthermalpowerstationshavebeendiscontinuedorhadtheiroperation Energyconsidersthatifsomeofthesuspendedwinter, Thefactthatmorethanfivereactorswereforcedtobesuspendedduetothefraudrevela instabilityofnuclearpowerasanenergysupplysource. Withnuclearpowerplants,thesituation mayhavetobestoppedallatonce,ithasbeenenergy lineorchangesinvoltageandfrequencycaused too,nuclearpowerisunreliable. Inadditionto energypower.” Nov./Dec. Nuke Info Tokyo A New Plan to Separate NISA from Nuclear Promotion Administration TheNuclearandIndustrialSafetyAgency(NISA),whichisinchargeofsafetyregulationsnuclear-related organizationaffiliatedtotheAgencyofNaturalResourcesandEnergy(ANRE),anextra-ministerialbureauoftheMinistryofEconomy,TradeandIndustry chargeadministration.BeforethegovernmentministriesandagencieswerereorganizedinJanuary2001,therewereseveralsectionswithinANREwhichwereinchargeofnuclearpromotionandregula tions.Someofthosesectionsinchargeofregu lationswereputintoNISAasan“independent”organization. However, ANISAfromMETIandtransferittotheCabinetOffice. ThestrongestadvocateoftheplanisMorioKimura,thegovernorofAomoriPrefec ture. Attheconsultationmeetingwiththegov policy,onOctober10,thegovernormaderequestfortheindependenceofNISA,statingthatitwas sayingthatifthegovernmentdoesnotmeetthe prefecture’s expectation, it might refuse to accept thatspentfuelbetransportedtotheRokkashoreprocessingplant,presentlyunderconstruction, office, The Fukushima Energy Policy Review OnEnergy icyReviewCommittee,aninternalorganizationbythegovernorofFukushimaPrefecture(thereport.” Thecommitteewassetuptofacilitate the region’s autonomous development without aremovingthroughtheirenergypolicieslikebulldozer. thethemesofthecommittee,widerangeofwhichinclude:1)anidealapproachforscience,century,energypolicy,4)regionaldevelopment. Thecommitteehasthemes. Elevenofthemeetingswereheldwith Energy The report questions the promoters’ rationale power,thepolicyofreprocessingspentfueltouseplu tonium,sincethisdoesnothelpsaveresourcesbutincreasesexcessplutonium. Basedonthesepolicy,”“thoroughlyimplementfreeaccesstoinforma tionandhavepeopleparticipateinpolicydeci policy.” OnthechairpersonsoftheAtomicEnergyCommis meetingthegovernorstronglyassertedthatthepolicy,plan,shouldbereviewedfromthebeginning. METIexpressedreluctanceattheseparationof -pect SUBSCRIPTION Nuke Info Tokyoisbi-monthlynewsletterthataimstoprovideforeignfriendswithup-to-dateinformationon officeofficeHANGENPATU-NEWS. order. Wenewslettersnewsletter. Citizens' Nuclear Information CenterTokyoJAPANTel:cnic-jp@po.iijnet.or.jp