Hacking Blind Andrea Bittau Adam Belay Ali Mashtizadeh David Mazi eres Dan Boneh Stanford University Abstract We show that it is possible to write remote stack buffer overow exploits without possessin - PDF document
Hacking Blind Andrea Bittau Adam Belay Ali Mashtizadeh David Mazi eres Dan Boneh Stanford University Abstract We show that it is possible to write remote stack buffer overow exploits without possessin - Description
This makes it possible to hack proprietary closedbinary services or opensource servers manually compiled and installed from source where the binary remains unknown to the attacker Tra ditional techniques are usually paired against a particular binar ID: 5079 Download Pdf
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astackvulnerabilityandonemayspeculatethatitisbeingusedbyaproprietaryservice.3)Hackinganopen-sourceserverforwhichthebinaryisunknown.Thisappliestomanuallycompiledinstal-lationsorsource-baseddistributionssuchasGentoo.Weevaluateallthreescenarios.Ideally,fortherstsce-nariowewouldtestourtechniquesagainstproductionservicesforwhichweholdnoinformationaboutthesoftware,butweareconstrainedforobviouslegalreasons.Tosimulatesuchascenario,wetestedagainstatoyproprietaryserviceacolleagueofourswroteforwhichwehadnoinformationaboutsource,binary,orfunctionality.Forthesecondscenario,wetargetarealvulnerabilityintheyaSSLlibrary[3].ThislibrarywasusedbyMySQLinpastandweusethatasthehostapplication.Forthethirdscenario,wetargetarecent(2013)vulnerabilityinnginx[2]andwriteagenericexploitthatdoesnotdependonaparticularbinary.Thisisparticularlyusefulastheexploitwillworkonanydistributionandvulnerablenginxversionwithoutrequiringanattackertowriteaspecicexploitforeachdistributionandversioncombination(asisdonetoday).Weimplementedanewsecuritytool,Braille,thatmakesBROPattackshighlyautomated.Braillecanyieldashellonavulnerableserverinapproximately4,000requests,aprocessthatcompletesinunder20minutesand,insomesituations,injustafewminutes.AnattackerneedonlyprovideafunctionthatconstructsarequestofaminimumlengthtocrashtheserverandappendastringprovidedbyBraille.Thefunctionmustalsoreturnasinglebitbasedonwhethertheservercrashesornot.Ourcontributionsare:1)AtechniquetodefeatASLRonservers(generalizedstackreading).2)AtechniquetoremotelyndROPgadgets(BROP)sothatsoftwarecanbeattackedwhenthebinaryisunknown.3)Braille:atoolthatautomaticallyconstructsanexploitgiveninputonhowtotriggerastackoverowonaserver.4)Therst(toourknowledge)publicexploitforng-inx'srecentvulnerability,thatisgeneric,64-bit,anddefeats(full/PIE)ASLR,canariesandNX.5)SuggestionsfordefendingagainstBROPattacks.Insummary,ASLRmustbeappliedtoallexecutablesegments(PIE)andre-randomizationmustoccuraftereachcrash(atoddswithfork-onlyservers).Holdingthebinaryfromtheattackerorpurposefullyalteringitmaynotbeaneffectivesecuritycountermeasure.II.BRIEFHISTORYOFBUFFEROVERFLOWSBufferoverowsareaclassicvulnerabilitywithalonghistoryofexploits[4].Conceptually,theyarerelativelyeasytoattack.Forinstance,avulnerableprogrammightreaddatafromthenetworkintoabuffer.Then,assumingtheprogramlackssufcientboundscheckstolimitthesizeoftheincomingdata,anattackercouldoverwritememorybeyondtheendofthebuffer.Asaresult,criticalcontrol-owstate,suchasreturnaddressesorfunctionpointers,couldbemanipulated.Stackbufferoverowstendtobeespeciallydangerousbecausereturnaddressesareimplicitlynearbyinmemoryduetofunctioncallingconventions.However,attacksthattargetbuffersontheheaparealsoviable[5].Intheearlydaysofstackbufferoverows,itwascommonforanattackertoincludemaliciouscodeaspartofthepayloadusedtooverowthebuffer.Asaresult,theattackercouldsimplysetthereturnaddresstoaknownlocationonthestackandexecutetheinstructionsthatwereprovidedinthebuffer.Such“codeinjection”attacksarenolongerpossibleoncontemporarymachinesbecausemodernprocessorsandoperatingsystemsnowhavetheabilitytomarkdatamemorypagesasnon-executable(e.g.,NXonx86).Asaresult,ifanattackertriestoruncodeonthestack,itwouldonlycauseanexception.Aninnovativetechnique,knownasreturn-orientedpro-gramming(ROP)[1],wasdevelopedtodefeatdefensesbasedonnon-executablememory.Itworksbylinkingtogethershortcodesnippetsalreadypresentintheprogram'saddressspace.Suchcodesnippets,calledgadgets,canbecombinedtoformarbitrarycomputation.Asaresult,attackerscanuseROPtogaincontrolofprogramswithoutanydependenceoncodeinjection.SimplervariationsofROParesometimespossible.Forexample,withreturn-to-libcattacks,ahigh-levellibraryfunctioncanbeusedasthereturnaddress.Inparticular,thesystem()functionisusefulforattackersbecauseitcanrunarbitraryshellcodewithonlyasingleargument[6].Theseattackswereveryeffectiveon32-bitsystemswhereargumentswerepassedonthestack,alreadyundercontroloftheattacker.On64-bitsystems,argumentsarepassedinregisters,soadditionalgadgetsareneededtopopulateregisters.Addressspacelayoutrandomization(ASLR)[7],[8]wasintroducedasanadditionaldefenseagainstbufferoverowattacks.Itworksbyrandomizingthelocationofcodeanddatamemorysegmentsintheprocessaddressspace.Inmanyim-plementationscodesegmentrandomizationisonlyappliedtolibraries,butfulladdressspacerandomizationisalsopossible.ASLRcreatesamajorchallengeforattackersbecauseitmakestheaddresslocationsofcode(oreventhestack)impossibletopredictinadvance.Unfortunately,on32-bitplatforms,ASLRisconstrainedbythenumberofavailablebits(usually16)forrandomization.Asaresult,brute-forceattackscanbequiteeffective[9].However,on64-bitplatformstherearetypicallytoomanyrandombitsforbrute-forcingtobefeasible.Insuchcases,ASLRcanstillbecircumvented,butonlywhencombinedwithavulnerabilitythatleaksinformationabouttheaddressspacelayout,suchasaformatstring[10].InadditiontothelargeraddressspaceforASLRandtheneedtolocateadditionalgadgetstollargumentregisters,64-bitsystemspresentathirdcomplicationforattackers.Becausethearchitecturelimitsvirtualaddressesto48-bits,user-levelmemorypointersarerequiredtocontainzero-valuedbytes.Thesezeroscauseearlyterminationofoverowsrelyingonstringoperationssuchasstrcpy().Canaries[11]areanothercommondefenseagainstbufferoverowattacks.Canariescannotpreventbufferoverows,buttheycandetectthemretroactivelyandterminatetheprogrambeforeanattackercaninuencecontrolow.Forexample,withstackcanaries,asecretvaluethatwasdeterminedinadvanceisplacedjustbeforeeachsavedframepointerandreturnaddress.Then,whenafunctionreturns,thesecret versionoftheattackthatreliesneitherontheBROPgad-getnorthePLT.TheattackndsallthegadgetslistedinSectionVIII-A,namelytheregisterpopsandsyscall.Theattackoutlineis:1)Findallpopx;retgadgets.2)Findasyscallgadget.3)Identifythepopgadgetspreviouslyfound.Theattackerstartsbyndingastopgadgetandallpopx;retinstructions.Thedifcultyisnowinidentifyingthepopinstructionsandndingasyscallgadget.Theideaistoidentifythepopinstructionsbasedonsystemcallbehavioraftertweakingsystemcallarguments,inasimilarwayastohowstrcmpwasfoundintheoptimizedattack.Thereisabootstrapproblem,however,becausetondsyscallonemustcontrolthesystemcallnumber(rax),soonemusthaveaprioriidentiedpoprax;ret.Thesolutionistochainallpopinstructionsfoundbytheattacker,poppingthedesiredsystemcallnumber,andoneofthemwilllikelyberax.Thesystemcalltouseispause()whichtakesnoargumentsandsoignoresallotherregisters.Italsostopsprogramexecutionuntilasignalisraisedandsoitactsasastopgadget,makingitidentiable.Theattackercannowappendtheprobeaddressforsyscalltothepopchaintondasystemcallgadget.Onceanaddressthatmakestheprogrampauseisfound,theattackercaneliminatethepopsonebyonetondwhichonecontrolsrax.Atthispointtheattackerhastheaddressofasyscallgadgetandapoprax;retgadget.Theattackeralsoholdsalistofunidentiedpops.Theseareidentiedbyusingthefollowingsystemcalls:1)Firstargument(poprdi):nanosleep(len,rem).Thiswillcauseasleepoflennanoseconds(nocrash).remispopulatedifthesleepisinter-rupted,anditcanbeaninvalidaddressasitischeckedonlyafterthesleep.2)Secondargument(poprsi):kill(pid,sig).Ifsigiszero,nosignalissent,otherwiseoneissent(causingacrash).Thepidneednotbeknown:itcanbezerowhichsendsthesignaltoalltheprocessesintheprocessgroup.Toverifywhetherthesignalissent,theattackercanopenmultipleconnections(goingtodifferentworkerprocesses)toseeifthoseconnectionsarekilledornot.3)Thirdargument(poprdx):clock_nano-sleep(clock,flags,len,rem).Similartonanosleepbuttakestwoadditionalarguments,makingthethirdargumentcontrolthesleeplength.Onecannowcallwriteandcontinuetheattackbydumpingthe.textsegmentandndingmoregadgets.Whilethisattackismoregeneral,itismorecomplextoperformbecauseitrequirestwoscansofthe.textsegment:onetondalistofpopgadgets,andonetondasyscallgadget.Asignicantoptimizationisthatallpoprax;retgad-getswefoundweremisalignedparsesofaddrsp,0x58;ret.Thisinformationcanbeusedtoclassifypopraxgadgetsindependentlyofsyscallgadgetsandsignicantlyspeeduptheattack—onenolongerneedstoscantheentire.textsegmenttwice.Onecanscanfortheaddrsp,0x58gadgetbysettingupthestackwith11trapsfollowedbythestopgadget.Toverifythegadget,theattackerjumpstothemisalignedparsethatyieldspoprax,verifyingthatonlyonewordispopped,whichcanbedonebysettingupthestackwithasingletrapfollowedbythestopgadget.J.Otherlow-leveldetailsInthissectionwelistanumberofnotsoobviouslow-levelattackdetails,manyofwhichaddedtotheattack'sstability.a)Stackreadingwithzeros:Wefoundthataneffectivewaytostackreadisplacingzerosinwordslikethesavedframepointer.Itislikelytondaninstructionpointerthatdoesnotcrashtheprogramregardlessoftheframepointer.Italsomakesstackreadingmorerobustwhendifferentworkerprocessesarebeingused,eachwithaslightlydifferentframepointer.Itmaybeimpossibletonishreadingapartiallyreadframepointerwhenbeingsenttoadifferentworkerprocesssinceallvalueswillcauseacrash.Forcingazerowordinthiscasewilleliminatethisproblem.b)Furtherstrcmpverication:Tofurtherverifystrcmp,werunitagainstthelastbyteofthevsyscallpage,whichismappedatastaticlocation.strcmpwillterminatepriortoreachingtheendofvsyscall,notcausingacrash.Mostotherfunctionsinsteadwillattempttoreadpastthevsyscallpagecausingacrash.Thiswillprunefunctionsthatdonotnormallycrashwhensuppliedtworeadablearguments.c)Dealingwithsmallbuffers:SometimesattackersmustminimizethelengthofROPchainsandbeabletoexploitsmallbuffers.Thissituationoccurs,forexample,duetoshortreadsorhavingtokeepsomememoryintact(e.g.,nottouchingacanary),whichlimitsthelengthoftheoverowandthebufferspaceavailable.TheyaSSL+MySQLexploitrequiresthisoptimizationinordertoavoidcorruptingacanary.ThisisachecklistforconductingBROPwithshortROPchainsofatmost8words(64bytes):FindactualPLTentriesbasedontheiraddress,notbasedontheirpushnumberandslowpath.ThiswillmakePLTinvocationashorterROPchain.DumpthebinarywithaminimalROPchain:strcmpaddresstodump,donotsetrsiagain(alreadysetforstrcmp),andcallwrite.Ifzeroisread,thedumpedaddresscontainedazero.Otherwiseasmallamountofthebinary(uptoazero)willberead.Continuethisuntilapoprdxisfound.Afterthatusepoprdxtocontrolthelengthratherthanstrcmp(shorterROPchain).Createtheshellcodeenvironmentinmultiplestages:oneconnectiontoduptheattacker'ssocket,onetoread“/bin/sh”intomemory,andonetoexecve.Alltheseconnections(apartfromexecve)mustterminatetheROPchainwithastopgadgettopreventacrashsincetheworkerprocessisbeingpreparedincrementally.d)Dealingwithfewevent-basedworkers:Therearesit-uationswhereanapplicationisconguredwithveryfewevent-basedworkerswhichcanallbecomeunresponsiveduringthe TABLEIII.BROPGADGETFREQUENCY. Binary BROPcount expectedscanlength(density) proprietaryservice 194 154 MySQL 639 501 nginx 130 566 Apache 65 860 OpenSSH 78 972 Figure15.Attackcomplexityfornginx.Thenumberofrequestsneededforeachphaseareshown.Broadlyspeaking,theattack'scomplexityissplitinfourparts:stackreading,ndingthePLT,ndingtheBROPgadget,anddumpingthebinarytonishtheattack.ThedatashowsthenumberofBROPgadgetspresent,andtheirdensity::textsize 7BROPcount(recallthat7bytescanbeskippedperprobeduetothesizeofthegadget).TheBROPgadgetsappearsverypopularandcanbefoundinunder1,000addressprobes.Notethatinpracticemorerequestswillneededtoverifythegadgetandweedoutfalsepositives.AftertheBROPgadgetisfound,ndingwritetakesonlyafewadditionalrequests,andcanusuallybefoundinapproximately2,000requeststotal.Atthispointtheattackisalmostcomplete.Onemaychoosetomanuallywriteveryspecicpartsofthebinarytominimizethenumberofrequestsbasedontheinformationlearned.Otherwise,ourBrailletoolstartsdumpingthebinaryfromitsstart,untiltheentiresymboltableisdumpedsothatashellcodecanbeconstructed.Theattacktypicallycompleteswithin500additionalrequests(about2,500total).InthecaseofyaSSL,ittookmanymorerequeststodumpthebinarybecausethebufferbeingoverowedwasveryshortandsoBraillewaslimitedinhowlongtheROPchaincouldbe.Braillewasforcedtodumpthebinaryinsmallchunkstondapoprdx;ret(araregadget)beforetherestofthebinarycouldbedownloadedinlargerchunks.Figure15showsthecomplexityoftheattackfornginx.Theattack'soverheadcanbesplitintofourparts:stackreading(35%),ndingthePLT(29%),ndingtheBROPgadget(20%)andnishingoff(16%).Notethatifcanariesarenotused(orcanbebypassed,likeinyaSSL)andthePIEagisnotused(thedefault)thenstackreadingcanbeavoidedaltogether.FindingthePLTlargelydependsonthesizeoftheexecutableandhowmanyPLTentriesareskippedduringascan.TheBROPgadgetscanwilldependonitsfrequency,aspreviouslymentioned.Theattackcancompletewithin20minutes.MySQLtookalongtimebecauseittookawhileforittorestartaftereachcrash.nginxwasfastest(onlyoneminute)becauseanon-timebasedstopgadgetwasused.AnHTTPkeep-aliveconnectionwasusedandsoaftertheexploitrequest,anormalrequestwassenttocheckiftheconnectionwasstillalive.Intheproprietaryservercaseinstead,atimeouthadtobeusedtodetermineiftheserverwasstillalivewhichmadetheattackslower.Theattackclearlyisnoisybutwearguethatifitexecutesfastenough,theattackermaybeabletoperformwhateveractivityheneedstodobeforegettingcaught.nginxforexamplelogseachcrash,inaleownedbyroot.Theserverrunsasnobodysotheattackerwouldnotbeabletoerasethelogs.Wenotice,however,thattheworkerprocesseskeepledescriptorstothelogsopen,makingitpossibletowriteashellcodetocallftruncatetoerasetracesoftheattack.B.StabilityThethreeserversuseworkerprocessesverydifferently,exercisingBROPindifferentways.InallcasestheBROPattackwasreliableandcompletedunassistedwithouthangingorcausingdenial-of-service.MySQLis(typically)singleprocess,multi-threaded.Onacrash,ascript(mysqld safe)reexecutestheserver.TheBROPattackworksunderthedefaultconguration(noPIE,butcanaries)despitethere-executionbecausethecanaryisneverhitthankstohowthebugisbeingexercised.IfcompiledwiththePIEag,theattackwouldnotworkasonecouldn'treada(changing)returnaddressfromthestacktodefeatASLR.Thisdoesnotapplytonginxandthetoyproprietaryservicewhereduetotheirforkingnature,theattackwouldsucceedevenwhenPIEisused.nginxhasmultipleworkerprocessesandhasasingle-threaded,event-basedarchitecture.Mostdistributionscong-urefourworkerprocessesbydefault.Thismakesitatrickyscenariobecauseaninniteloopbasedstopgadgetwouldhogtheworkercompletely,andonegetsonlyfourshotsbydefault.Thestopgadgetherewasreturningtoahigherstackframe,whichavoidedanyblocking.Withaspecializedexploit,weareabletoexploitnginxevenwhenconguredtouseasingleworker.Theproprietaryserverforkedonceperconnection.Thismakestheattackveryreliableasthereisavirtuallyinnitenumberofworkerprocessesavailable.Wedidnotknowaprioriaboutthedetailsoftheserverbutitcontainedafewuniquethings.Thestackoverowwasonestackframeabovetheactualbugastherewasafunctionthatwrappedthereadsystemcall.Theserveralsocontainedasingleloop,dependentonavariableusedtoexittheloopwhenshuttingtheservicedown.Thiscreatedtheadditionalchallengethattheloopwasnoteasilyusableasaninniteloopgadget.ThestopgadgetsforyaSSL+MySQL,nginxandthepro-prietaryserverrespectivelywere:futex,returningtoahighercallframe,andsleep.TheyaSSL+MySQLscenarioofferedaverysmalloverowbufferandshowsthatBROPcanworkevenwithsmallbuffers(64bytesaresufcient).ThekeytothesuccessandstabilityoftheBROPattackisthattheattackerneedstoscanforasingleitematanygiven TABLEIV.CODEDIVERSITYWHENTHESAMEVERSIONOFNGINX(1.4.0)ISCOMPILEDWITHDIFFERENTDEBIANLINUXVERSIONS. TextSize TextStart #ofGadgets Squeeze 0x5fc58 0x4031e0 206 Wheezy 0x61f0c 0x4032f0 255 Jessie(testing) 0x5fbd2 0x402ee0 323 C.Client-sidevs.server-sideItmaybepossibletolaunchaBROP-likeattackonclients.BrowserslikeChrome,forexample,launchpluginsinaseparateprocessforrobustness.JavaScriptcanbeusedtocreatemultiplevulnerablepluginobjects,attemptanexploit,anddetectwhethertheyhavecrashedornotwithoutuserinteraction.Wenote,however,thatthereistypicallylowerhangingfruitontheclient-side.HavingtheexecutionpowerofJavaScriptavailablecanoffermoresignalingmechanismstotheattackercomparedtoacoarse-grainedcrash/no-crashasusedinserver-sideBROP.Aninterestingdistinctionbetweenclient-sideandserver-sideisthatoftenclient-sideattacksarelesstargeted.Forexample,anattackermaywanttoownanygivennumberofclientstostealinformationorconstructabotnet.Thismakesexploitsforoldertargetswithfewerprotections(e.g.,WindowsXP)stillvaluable,astherestillarepeoplerunningthosecongurations.Server-sideattacksinsteadareoftentargetedasonewantstoattackaparticularsite.Relyingon32-bittargetsorspecicbinaryinstallations,orsimplymovingontothenextvictimmaynotbeanoption.ThismakesBROPveryvaluableontheserver-sideasitgivesanattackeralargerhammerwhenneeded.D.VarianceinbinariesCounterintuitively,closed-sourcesystems(thoughopen-binary)makewritingexploitssimpler.ManyexploitsthattargetWindowsareveryrobustastheybuildROPchainsonDLLsthatseldomchange,andsoonlyafewversionsexist.Inanopen-sourcesetting,therearemultiplebinaryvariantsandtheattackermustbuildadifferentROPchainforeach.TableIVshowsthesizeandstartaddressofdifferentdistributionsoftheexactsamenginxversion.Asweseethereisalotofvariabilitybasedonthebuildenvironment,theversionofthelibrariesitwaslinkedagainst,andthecompilerversion,eventhoughthesameLinuxdistributionwasbeingused.EvenasinglebytedifferenceoroffsetwilldefeatastaticallyprecomputedROPchain.Worsefortheattacker,asystemmaybemanuallycompiledbytheenduser,makingitimpossiblefortheattackertobuildaROPchainofineasthebinaryisunknown.InsuchcasesBROPisanecessity.Evenifaserverusesaprecompiledbinary,itcanbedifculttodeterminewhichparticularoneisbeingused:remoteOSngerprintingrevealsanapproximatekernelversion,notadistribution.BROPinfactcanbeusedtongerprintdistributionsandapplications(e.g.,basedonwhethercanariesarepresent,vsyscallbehavior,etc.).E.RemotefuzztestingTheBROPattackcouldbeapowerfultoolforhackingproprietaryclosed-binaryserviceswhencoupledwitharemotefuzztester.Wenotethatintwooftheexampleapplicationswetargeted,theoverowoccurredbecausealengthwasspeciedinthepacketbutalargervaluewassent.Itcertainlyispossibletowriteafuzztesterthathasknowledgeaboutaprotocolandattemptstooverowbysupplyingincorrectlengths[17].Interestingly,prettymuchthesamechunkedencodingvulnerabilitythatappearedinnginxhasalreadyappearedinApacheinthepast[18].Itmaybepossibletowritefuzztestersforparticularprotocolconditionsthatareknowntobehardtoimplementcorrectly,orthathavebeenknowntobeexploitedinthepast.XIII.BROPPREVENTIONThefollowingisadiscussionofdefensemechanismsthatwillpreventtheBROPattack,includingtwoprecautionswesuggestserverdevelopersuse.ThereisalotofpriorresearchinROPattackdefensemechanisms,andmanyofthosetechniquesareapplicabletodefendingagainstBROP.Thus,thislistisbynomeanscomprehensive.A.RerandomizationThemostbasicprotectionagainsttheBROPattackistorerandomizecanariesandASLRasoftenaspossible.Theseprotectionmechanismsareeffective,butserverdevelopersunderminethembynotrerandomizingwhenworkerprocessescrash.Thesimplestmethodistoforkandexectheprocessonacrashorspawn,whichrerandomizesboththecanaryandASLR.Itisimportantthatanychildprocessesforkedarerandomizedindependentlysothatanyinformationlearnedfromonechildcannotbeusedagainstanotherone.Therehasbeenresearchonrerandomizingbinariesatruntime.OnesuchtechniqueisworkbyGiuffridaetal.thatusesamodiedcompilertomigratetherunningstatebetweentwoinstances(withadifferentASLRrandomization)[19].Wealsoprototypedare-randomizationtechniquethatmovesabinary'stextsegmenttoanewlocationusingmmap/munmap,andusesapagefaulthandlertodeterminewhetherpointersshouldberewrittenastheyarefaultedon.Anevensimplerimprovementwedevelopedistoreran-domizethecanaryonaper-userorper-requestbasis.Wesuggestserverswriteanewcanarybeforeenteringaper-requestfunction.Onthereturnthroughthatfunctiontheoldcanaryshouldberestoredsothatexecutioncancontinuenormally.Whilethisprotectsagainstthebugsinnginxandourproprietaryserver,theparticularattackagainstyaSSLcanavoidthecanaryentirely.B.SleeponcrashSystemslikeNetBSD'ssegvguard[20]andgrsec'sdeter_bruteforceforLinux[21]proposedelayingaforkafterasegmentationfault.Thistechniquecanslowdownattackssuchthatanadministratorcannoticesomethingiswrongandaddresstheproblem.Thedownsideofthisapproachisthatbugsnowcanbecomeeasydenialofserviceattacks.Itisalsounclearwhatagoodvalueforthedelayis.grsecproposesa30seconddelay.Whilethisissufcientformostsetups,overnightattacksonasmallsitemightgounnoticed:ouroptimizedBROPattackfornginxcancompletein1,000requests,makingtheattacktimeroughly8hours. todefendagainstourattack,wesuggestthatsystemsshouldrerandomizeASLRandcanariesafteranycrash,andthatnolibraryorexecutableshouldbeexemptfromASLR.Brailleisavailableat:http://www.scs.stanford.edu/brop/.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSWethankouranonymousreviewersandEladEfratfortheirfeedback.WealsothankMarkHandleyandBradKarpwhohelpedshapeearlyversionsofthiswork.EricSmithsuggestedusingout-of-orderTCPsegmentsinsteadofIPfragmentation.ThisworkwasfundedbyDARPACRASHandagiftfromGoogle.REFERENCES[1]R.Roemer,E.Buchanan,H.Shacham,andS.Savage,“Return-orientedprogramming:Systems,languages,andapplications,”ACMTrans.Inf.Syst.Secur.,vol.15,no.1,pp.2:1–2:34,Mar.2012.[Online].Available:http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2133375.2133377[2]mitre.Cve-2013-2028.[Online].Available:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-2028[3]——.Cve-2008-0226.[Online].Available:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0226[4]A.One,“SmashingTheStackForFunAndProt,”Phrack,vol.7,no.49,Nov.1996.[Online].Available:http://phrack.com/issues.html?issue=49&id=14#article[5]M.Kaempf.Vudomalloctricksbymaxx.[Online].Available:http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=57&id=8&mode=txt[6]S.Designer.Gettingaroundnon-executablestack(andx).[Online].Available:http://seclists.org/bugtraq/1997/Aug/63[7]P.Team.Paxaddressspacelayoutrandomization(aslr).[Online].Available:http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/aslr.txt[8]S.Bhatkar,D.C.DuVarney,andR.Sekar,“Addressobfuscation:anefcientapproachtocombataboardrangeofmemoryerrorexploits,”inProceedingsofthe12thconferenceonUSENIXSecuritySymposium-Volume12,ser.SSYM'03.Berkeley,CA,USA:USENIXAssociation,2003,pp.8–8.[Online].Available:http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1251353.1251361[9]H.Shacham,M.Page,B.Pfaff,E.-J.Goh,N.Modadugu,andD.Boneh,“Ontheeffectivenessofaddress-spacerandomization,”inProceedingsofthe11thACMconferenceonComputerandcommunicationssecurity,ser.CCS'04.NewYork,NY,USA:ACM,2004,pp.298–307.[Online].Available:http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1030083.1030124[10]geraandriq.Advancesinformatstringexploitation.[Online].Available:http://www.phrack.org/archives/59/p59 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