Michael Lacewing enquiriesalevelphilosophycouk Michael Lacewing Metaethics What is morality philosophical speaking Can ethical claims be objectively true or false Are moral properties part of reality ID: 657723
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Metaethics and applied ethics
Michael Lacewingenquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk
© Michael LacewingSlide2
Metaethics
What is morality, philosophical speaking?
Can ethical claims be objectively true or false?
Are moral properties part of reality?
What difference do metaethical theories make when discussing applied ethical questions, e.g. whether stealing is wrong, whether we should ever lie?
© Michael LacewingSlide3
Moral realism
Moral properties are real, so there is a true answer to questions in applied ethicsE.g.
i
t is objectively true or false that stealing (or stealing on a particular occasion) is right or not
Moral realism doesn’t tell us what property wrongness isE.g. it doesn’t say whether wrongness is about happiness or about
universalising
maxims or…
© Michael LacewingSlide4
Moral realism
Moral non-naturalism: moral properties are not natural propertiesIt doesn’t say which non-natural properties they are, e.g. whether good is a non-natural property possessed by happiness or the will that only wills
universalisable
maxims or certain character traits…Moral naturalism: moral properties are natural properties
This rejects Kantian ethics, since whether a maxim can be
universalised
cannot be answer empirically, but only by a priori reason
But it doesn’t say which natural properties moral properties are
So: moral realism makes little difference to answering questions in applied ethics
© Michael LacewingSlide5
Non-cognitivism
Emotivism, prescriptivism: moral judgments, e.g. ‘stealing is wrong’, are neither true nor false
Does this mean that there are ‘no right answers’ in applied ethics?
Non-cognitivists reject subjectivism and nihilism
If asked ‘Is stealing wrong?’, to say ‘Some people think it is and some think it isn’t, and that’s all that can be said’ is to fail to answer the question!To answer ‘Is stealing wrong?’, you must express
your
emotion or prescription
According to non-cognitivism, if you hold a viewpoint on a question in ethics, you should express it and defend it
© Michael LacewingSlide6
Error theory
Error theory: moral judgments express beliefs about mind-independent moral properties, but there are no such properties, so all moral judgments are false
‘Stealing is wrong’ is false; ‘Stealing is not wrong’ is false
This undermines applied ethics
Error theory is not subjectivismTo discuss questions in applied ethics meaningfully, we first need to change the meaning of moral language
© Michael Lacewing