The letters during the course of 1648 indicate a particular preoccupat - PDF document

The letters during the course of 1648 indicate a particular preoccupation withIsaiah,chapters 8 and 9,and show Cromwell searching for guidance from Godas to how to proceed.He was clear from the beginning of 1648 that Charlesshould be brought to trial;by the autumn of that year he apparently believedthat the King deserved to die;but he remained uncertain as to when andhow this would be achieved,and he almost certainly did not want to see themonarchy itself abolished.His initial preference was probably for Charles toabdicate in favour of one of his sons,and for a new paper constitution to bebrought in prior to the KingÕs trial.PrideÕs Purge threw him off balance,andin an attempt to restore his preferred sequence of events,Cromwell wasforced to accept the Ôcruel necessityÕ of bringing the King to trial and execu-tion sooner than he had envisaged.The importance of this essay lies in its very close reading of CromwellÕsletters and speeches during the 15 months prior to the Regicide,its judicioussifting of other contemporary evidence,and its very precise analysis ofCromwellÕs motives and attitudes.The authors demonstrate that Cromwellwas simultaneously Ôa bitter opponent of Charles.a reluctant regicide,and aÞrm monarchistÕ.This provides a far subtler and more nuanced account thanearlier treatments of the subject as well as a penetrating reconstruction ofCromwellÕs mind during the late 1640s. JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER Oliver Cromwell,the Regicide John Morrill and Philip BakerIn the middle ofthe night following Charles IÕs execution, Oliver Cromwellstood over the cofÞn, peering down at the body to which the severed headhad been surgically reattached, and is reported to have muttered the wordsÔcruel necessityÕ.Whether or not this report Ð from a very distraught andhighly partial observer, with an uncertain oral history before it was writtendown Ð is true, these words are, we shall suggest, precisely the words thatwould have been passing through his mind. Cromwell was, we shall argue,at once a bitter opponent ofCharles,a reluctant regicide, and a Þrm monar-chist. To understand how this can be so, and how he attempted to squarecircles in his own mind and in the making ofpublic policy, we need to lookwith renewed care at his recorded words and actions over a period ofsome15 months from the time ofthe Putney Debates to the Þnal show trial.This paper argues that Oliver Cromwell Ôfell out ofloveÕ with Charles Ino later than 1 November 1647 but that it took him a lot longer to decidequite how and when he was to be removed from power and to decide whatthe implications ofCharlesÕ deposition and/or execution were for the futureofthe monarchy. In doing so, it takes sides in perhaps the greatest singlecontention in modern scholarship about Cromwell. It does not question, butrather embraces, the near consensus that has acquitted him ofthe chargesofhypocrisy, double-dealing and a craving for power levelled against him by almost all his contemporaries. His sincerity and his deep religious faithare now widely accepted. There may have been a strong capacity for self-deception in his make-up, but not a calculating policy ofdeceiving others.However, this paper does come up against a more sharply divided modernhistoriography about his actions and motives from the autumn of1647 to1 January 1649 than for any other period in his career.1This essay is based on extensive discussion between the two authors. It was fully writtenby John Morrill on the basis ofthese discussions and then subjected to revision and redraftafter further debate between the authors.2The words were later recalled by the Earl ofSouthampton and are printed in Joseph Spence,(London, 1820), p. 275. See the full text and context in R. S. Paul, The Lord Protector:Religion and Politics in the Life ofOliver Cromwell (London, Lutterworth Press, 1955), p. 195. The interpretative difÞculties are concentrated into that 15-monthperiod. All students ofthese events agree that Cromwell was at the least and probably driving force sustaining the trial and execution ofCharlesI throughout January 1649.The evidence for this is plentiful but all ofitunreliableCromwell himselffalls silent as far as the historical record is con-cerned.In the weeks following PrideÕs Purge, only one letter ofhis has sur-vived, a request on 18 December 1648 written to the master and fellows ofTrinity Hall that they allocate a room in DoctorsÕ Commons to IsaacIndeed, between the act ofregicide and CromwellÕs departurefor Ireland in August 1649, in essence we only have letters relating to themarriage ofhis son Richard to Dorothy Maijor or routine military memo-randa. We have to rely on what others report about him, or what they laterrecalled. So nothing is certain. It might be fruitful to wonder about this; butfor the present we do not wish to disturb the existing consensus. His namedoes stand out on the death warrant. It would seem that he was a deter-mined king-killer in January 1649.There is an equal consensus that Cromwell had never voiced any thoughtofputting an end to Charles IÕs rule before October 1647. We can see noreason to doubt CromwellÕs commitment to monarchy in some form beforethat date, and no evidence to suggest that he may have had regicide on hisBut historians do not agree at all about CromwellÕs intentions in theintervening period. On one wing are those like Charles Firth, David Underdown, Blair Worden and Barry Cowardwho see him as a reluctantregicide, as a very late convert. They rely principally on his recorded words at Putney, on a speech in the Commons at the passage ofthe Vote ofNo Addresses (on 3 January 1648), on a sequence ofletters to RobertHammond throughout the year 1648, on royalist newsletters, and aboveall on his actions in the three weeks that followed his return to London on6 December and ended with his meetings with those lawyers who had takentheir seats in the Rump Ð especially the Tweedledum and Tweedledee ofcommonwealth jurisprudence, Whitlocke and Widdrington; and they paint JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER3A cross-section ofrecent writing can be found below, note 6.4There is probably no great signiÞcance in this. It is probably a function ofthe fact that hehad now returned to London and was in daily oral communication with all the principals withwhom he had been in regular contact by letter over previous months (Lenthall, Fairfax, St John,Hammond, etc.).The Letters and Speeches ofOliver Cromwell, ed. T. Carlyle, rev. S. C. Lomas (3 vols., London,1904), I, letter lxxxvi. For its signiÞcance see p. 35.6C. H. Firth, Oliver Cromwell and the Rule ofthe Puritans in England(Oxford, OUP, 1900), pp. 156, 168, 172Ð80, 185, 206Ð12; D. E. Underdown, PrideÕs Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution(Oxford, OUP, 1971), pp. 76Ð89, 119, 167Ð8, 183Ð5; A. B. Worden, The Rump Parliament 1648Ð1653(Cambridge, CUP, 1974), pp. 47Ð9, 67Ð9, 77, 179Ð81; B. Coward,Cromwell(London, Longman, 1991), pp. 58Ð68. a picture ofa man desperate not to fall into a republican abyss, to moveevery which way to pressurize Charles into accepting the armyÕs bottomline. On the other side are historians such as Veronica Wedgwood, IanGentles, Peter Gaunt and Robert Paul,who interpret some ofthe samematerial (especially the letters to Hammond and those after the battle ofPreston) differently; who place less reliance on royalist newsletters astainted by too much wishful-thinking; who rely more on tantalizing armydocuments and memoirs, which are often graphic but always tainted withthe wisdom ofhindsight; and who rummage around more in the events ofthe weeks immediately after the Putney debates. The resulting narrativesees Cromwell as steeling himselfmuch earlier for a confrontation withCharles, and as someone willing to look at a variety ofmeans ofachievingthat end. For these scholars, CromwellÕs manoeuvres after PrideÕs Purgewere intended not to prevent a trial but to ensure that it had the widest pos-sible support and the best possible outcome. In the middle, inscrutable as hecan be, stands the towering Þgure ofSamuel Rawson Gardiner, reviewingthe evidence with a care others have eschewed and with much still to teachus Ð and sitting inscrutably on the fence.We believe that it is possible to get closer to the truth; and we hope todemonstrate this by a more careful discrimination between several ques-tions. We want to distinguish much more clearly between CromwellÕs atti-tude to Charles himselfand his attitude to monarchy; and to assess his viewofthe role ofthat king and ofthe monarchy itselfin the settlement ofthenation.We want to focus most sharply on his own words, to subject themto a keener biblical hermeneutic than hitherto and to interrogate othersources as and when that process requires it.We are assisted by the fact that for the period from the meeting oftheGeneral Council ofthe army in Putney Church in late October 1647 to thepurge ofthe parliament on 6 December 1648 we do possess plenty ofCromwellÕs own words. We have 43 ofhis letters, several ofthem more than1000 words long and many ofthem to close friends, what we can take tobe fairly full transcripts of28 speeches and signiÞcant interventions dur-ing the recorded parts ofthe Putney debates, again several ofthem meatyand substantial contributions ofseveral hundred words each. In addition,we have less full summaries ofseveral speeches made in the House ofCommons and written down by others. No similar period gives us such abalanced blend ofCromwellÕs public and private utterance. However,beyond that we enter a quagmire offragmentary material, all ofa treach- OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAH7C. V. Wedgwood, The Trial ofCharles I(London, Collins, 1964), pp. 25Ð6, 321, 77Ð80, 232The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland 1645Ð1653Blackwell, 1992), pp. 283Ð307; P. Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell(Oxford, Blackwell, 1996), pp.85Ð91; Paul, Lord Protector, pp. 158Ð60, 168Ð9, 175Ð6, 183Ð4.8Gardiner, Civil War, IV, pp. 27, 31, 56Ð9, 175Ð6, 191Ð2, 232Ð9, 281Ð97. erous kind, too much ofit subject to much wisdom ofhindsight, and muchelse to deeply partisan perspective. Although so much ofthis contextualmaterial contradicts other evidence, most historians (Gardiner apart) havechosen to decide what is reliable and what is not on more or less grounds. This more than anything else explains the quite sharp range ofinterpretations ofCromwellÕs part in events. We wish to suggest that acloser attention to his own words and tighter comparison ofthe contextualmaterial can yield a projection ofCromwellÕs ideas and intentions that ismore convincing than any previous account.Most ofthe letters from 1647Ð8 investigated for this paper containretrievable quotations or paraphrases from books Cromwell had read. Wecan see he had read 34 books Ð 21 ofthem from the Old Testament and There is not a shred ofevidence from this period thatCromwell read anything other than the Bible. His political theory derivedexclusively from his understanding ofGodÕs willingness to work with andthrough a variety offorms as recorded in the Old Testament. The nearesthe ever came to a historical disquisition on the basis ofgovernment was atPutney:[Consider the case ofthe Jews]. They were Þrst [divided into] familieswhere they lived, and had heads offamilies [to govern them], and theywere [next] under Judges, and [then] they were under Kinges. When theycame to desire a Kinge, they had a kinge; Þrst elective and secondly bysuccession. In all these kinds ofgovernment they were happy and con-tented. Ifyou make the best ofit, ifyou would change the government to the best ofit, it is but a moral thing. It is but as Paul says [Philippians3.8] Ôdross and dung in comparison ofChrist.ÕNowhere does Cromwell draw in any comparable way on classical ormodern historical reading or knowledge. Ifwe are to understandCromwellÕs ruminations about what was possible and what was right to bedone about the king in 1647Ð49 we must follow him through the Bible andthe Bible alone.The story begins at Putney, and Ð from CromwellÕs point ofview Ð it beginswith the very last and longest ofhis 28 contributions. We need to begin by revisiting the conclusions ofa separate joint paper published recently JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKERThe Clarke Papers: selections from the papers ofWilliam Clarke, ed. C. H. Firth, Camden Society,new series, vols. 49, 54, 61, 62 (1891Ð1901), I, pp. 369Ð70. The Case ofthe Armie Truly RestatedIn that paper we First, that the franchise debate at Putney was important because ofitslater resonance not because it changed anything at the time or helps usto understand the dynamics ofpolitics in the later 1640s or the failure ofthe Putney Debates and the subsequent political recriminations. After thefury ofthe debate on 29 October, agreement was reached by all presentÐ from Ireton on one wing to Rainsborough on the other Ð on a revisionofthe franchise, an agreement that was subsequently put out ofmind by all present. Secondly, there was a running skirmish throughout thedebates at Putney between the proponents ofthe Case ofthe Armie the proponents ofthe Agreement ofthe People. The latter is far from a digestofthe former and is not penned by the same hands, the work ofSexby and the Agreement ofWildman. This debate, we suggest,split ofÞcer from ofÞcer and adjutator from adjutator. Thirdly, the onlyÔLevellersÕ present at Putney were those spotted by historians. There were men present associated with the name Leveller. Sexby, we haveshown, was never a Leveller, and Wildman and Pettus were welcomed atPutney as men associated with the radicalisation ofLondon politics notas the soulmates ofLilburne and Overton. Fourthly, the issue that reallydivided the General Council, and which led to its collapse amongst bitterrecriminations ofbad faith on all sides was not the franchise or even thedetail ofthe Agreement; it was the AgreementÕs eloquent silence Ð thefuture role ofthe monarchy. It was bitter disagreements about that whichcaused Clarke to stop reporting; that caused Ireton to storm out on 5November ofall days; and which dominates the subsequent recrimina-tion. And again it was an issue that split the senior ofÞcers amongst them-selves, the ofÞcer-adjutators and soldier-adjutators amongst themselvesand the new agents amongst themselves.Three issues relating to the kingship came up at Putney. The Þrst was theallegation in The Case that the grandees had entered into a personal treatywith the king that would lead to the betrayal ofthe cause for which the soldiers had fought and many ofthem died. To this Ireton and Cromwellrobustly replied that everything they had done was rooted in the expresswill ofthe General Council, and it was the agents who were at fault forseeking to undermine army unity. This issue was tersely discussed at theoutset oftwo daysÕ debates, but in essence the agents withdrew the charge;and the grandees having protested their innocence dropped their com-plaint. The other debates related to the future settlement. Whether newarrangements for the making and administration oflaw, for civil govern-ment and for securing religious liberty for all sincere protestants were driven OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAH10Morrill and Baker, ÔThe Case ofthe Armie Truly RestatedÕ in M. Mendle, ed., The Putney(Cambridge, CUP, 2001). through the existing parliament or formed into a paper constitutionapproved by the people at large, there remained the question as to whetherthe king would have any role in that settlement, and ifso, at what point hewould be consulted or invited to consent to it. Was there to be any futurepersonal treaty with the king and ifso with whom? And behind that lay afurther question: whether king, that is King Charles I, should be so con-sulted and invited; or whether king should be so consulted and invited.Hard things were said about Charles I at Putney; and Sexby for one spokeagainst monarchy itself.Captain Bishop and Colonel Harrison both calledCharles Ôa man ofbloudÕ,and Cromwell for one assumed that Harrisonwas calling for the kingÕs death, as we shall see.Personal animus against Charles was present from the beginning ofthedebates, with Sexby, in the Þrst substantive contribution on the Þrst day,saying that Ôwe have labourÕd to please a Kinge, and I thinke, except we goeabout to cutt all our throats wee shall not please himÕ.Several speakersmade clear their desire to ensure the outright abolition ofthe negative voiceÐ something which had been a steady demand since the summer of1646ofthose soon to be called Levellers.However, the Case ofthe Armie had called for a settlement ofthe peopleÕs rights and freedoms before therewas any consideration ofthose ofthe king. It had not called for the aboli-tion ofmonarchy.In the words ofWilliam Allen: the had allowedkings to be set up Ôas farre as may bee consistent with, and nott prejudiciallto the liberties ofthe Kingedomehich I thinke hee may and itt is notour judgement onely, butt ofthose set forth in the Case ofthe ArmyÕ.we read the silence ofthe Agreement ofthe People in the light ofWildmanÕsA Cal to all the soldiers ofthe Armie of29 October (which we can presumemost ofthose present would have done), we would reach the same conclu-sion. For in Wildman exhibited an extreme hostility to Charles,demanded his impeachment and recommended that only a free parliament(in other words, one elected within a free constitution) should reach a JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER, I, p. 377., I, pp. 383, 417. For the signiÞcance ofthis phrase, see P. Crawford, ÔÒCharles Stuart.That Man ofBloodÓÕ, Journal ofBritish Studies, XVI (1977), pp. 41Ð61., I, p. 417 and below, p. 25., I, pp. 227Ð8.15See the comments ofCaptain Allen (, I, p. 367), Col. Hewson (, I, p. 390) and ColonelTitchborne (, I, pp. 396, 405) and ofthe civilians Pettus (, I, pp. 351Ð2) and Wildman, I, p. 386). Appearing in July 1646, The Remonstrance ofMany Thousand Citizenswas theÞrst ÔLevellerÕ pamphlet to manifest hostility to monarchy and the negative voice ofthe king:see D. M. Wolfe, ed., Leveller Manifestoes ofthe Puritan Revolution(New York, Humanities Press,1967), pp. 109Ð15.16Ibid., p. 214. See also Morrill and Baker, ÔCase ofthe Armie Truly RestatedÕ., I, p. 377. settlement with the king.Ifmonarchy were to be restored it would be bya free people conferring it onto a supplicant king Ð and not necessarilyCharles I. This was a line ofargument to which Wildman persisted in hisheated exchanges with Ireton on 1 November,where he concluded quitebaldly that his argument was not about the survival ofmonarchy but aboutthe need to call this king to account and to prevent future abuse ofroyalpower: ÔI onely afÞrme that [our settlement] doth afÞrme the KingeÕs andLordsÕ interest surer than before.ÕSuch a programme was close to that previously articulated by some future Leveller leaders, by some ofÞcers andby some agents; but it was incompatible with what Lilburne had beenurging most recently in print and in private, and with what many ofÞcersÐ Rainsboroughas much as Ireton Ð and some adjutators had been saying.It split the General Council vertically and not horizontally.Beyond that, as the rhetorical temperature rose on 1 November, somepeople went further than they had previously. Thus Sexby asserted that Ôweeare going to sett uppe the power ofKinges, some part ofitt, which God willdestroy; and which will bee butt as a burthensome stone that whosoevershall fall upon itt, will destroy himÕ.But even this is compatible with a pro-gramme ofextreme hostility to Charles and a delay in offering any role tosome future monarch until every other aspect ofthe settlement was inplace.This, then, is the context for CromwellÕs three major interventions in thedebate on 1 November.The sequence is important. He began by arguingthat this was not the time or the place for the army to decide on a negativevoice in the king or in the Lords. That belonged either to a parliament chas-tened and made wiser by the armyÕs remonstrations or it belonged to a par-liament elected under new and better electoral rules.In a part ofthespeech apparently not recorded by Clarke but quoted directly by ColonelGoffe, he added that the General Council must beware ofÔa lying spiritt inthe mouth ofAhabÕs Prophets. Hee speakes falselie to us in the name oftheLord.ÕGoffe rebuked Cromwell for cherry-picking the offerings ofcom-rades from the Friday prayer meeting. Cromwell, clearly stung and hurt, OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAH18[John Wildman?] A Cal to all the Souldiers ofthe Armie([29 Oct.] 1647, E412/10), pp. 2,3, 5, 6, 8 [all second pagination]., I, pp. 386Ð94., I, p. 377.21ÔMr Rainsborough tooke occasion to take notice as ifwhat Mr Allen spoke did reßect uponhimselfor some other there, as ifthey were against the name ofKinge and LordsÕ: , I, p.22Ibid.23For his views on kingship on the opening day see summary in Firth, Oliver Cromwell, pp., I, pp. 368Ð71., I, p. 374. responded by twice acknowledging his hastiness in running to judgement.Following AllenÕs call for all to keep an open mind on the kingÕs future, andSexbyÕs meditation on the words ofJeremiah: Ôwe Þnd in the worde ofGod:ÒI would heal Babylon but shee would not be healedÓ. I thinke that wee havegone about to heale Babylon when shee would notÕ,Cromwell returns toGoffeÕs rebuke and pleads for caution against the too-ready appropriation ofOld Testament typologies. But he then goes into a dramatic and clearlyextempore meditation on the series oftestimonies given forth as a result ofthe day ofprayer.Truly wee have heard many speaking to us; and I cannott butt thinke that in many ofthose thinges hath spoken to us...I butt that wee all speake to the same end, and the mistakes are onely inthe way. The end is to deliver this nation from oppression and slavery, toaccomplish that worke that God hath carried on in us...We agree thusfarre.He then makes a crucial admission: Ôwee all apprehend danger from person ofthe kingeÕ.For several minutes he labours that point, reiteratingthat there is a problem with Charles himselfÐ Ô[I] my selfdo concurreÕ withthose who held that Ôthere can bee noe safetie in a consistencie with theperson ofthe Kinge or the Lords, or their having the least interest in thepublique affaires ofthe KingedomeÕ. But he argues that this does not meanthat ÔGod will destroy these persons [ie kings in general] or that powerÕ. Fur-thermore, God has clearly shown that they must not Ôsett uppeÕ or Ôpreserve[kings]Õ where it threatens the public interest. But God has not yet madeplain, he says, whether it would be hazardous to the public interest to Ôgoeabout to destroy or take awayÕ king and Lords or whether it would be moreHis plea is not to rush to judgement on thisissue. The Council must not assume that even ifGod wills it, they are facto the self-appointed instruments ofGodÕs will:[let] those to whome this is not made cleare, though they do but thinkeitt probable that God will destroy them, yett lett them make this rule tothemselves, though God have a purpose to destroy them, and though Ishould Þnde a desire to destroy them...Therefore let those that are ofthat minde waite uppon God for such a way when the thinge maye beedone without sin and without scandall too. JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER, I, pp. 376Ð8., I, p. 379 [emphasis added]., I, pp. 382, 380., I, p. 382. It is our contention that this gives us the key to CromwellÕs politics overthe next 15 months: an ever-greater conviction that God intended CharlesI to be struck down, and a continuing uncertainty about when and howthat would be done and about the extent ofhis and the armyÕs agency. Thisanger against a king who was duplicitous and who willed the nation backinto blood, the principal author and progenitor ofthe second civil war, canbe seen to mount steadily; and CromwellÕs public and private letters are achronicle ofhis introspective search for the connection between GodÕsactions in the history ofHis Þrst chosen people, the people ofIsrael, and ofHis new chosen people, the people ofEngland. In a sense GoffeÕs rebuke atPutney took 15 months to reach fruition.After 1 November, the generals reinforced the news blackout over events atPutney. The newspapers carried no reports, and Clarke and his team ofstenographers laid down their quills. Fragmentary notes in his paperssuggest that the mood got uglier by the day, but that the divisions remainedvertical and not horizontal.The debates seem to have been about whetherthe army should precipitate an immediate crisis by a confrontation with theparliament and king, or proceed more slowly, and this division underlay thebitter disputes about the nature ofthe rendezvous Fairfax had called, andwhether the army as a whole would adopt the Agreement or the more orderlyprocess laid out in what became the Remonstrance. issued on 11 November by some Ð but not all Ð ofthe new agents, Iretonstormed out ofthe General Council, not to return, on 5 November when avote was taken to send a letter to the Speaker declaring it was the armyÕsdesire that no further propositions should be sent to the king.SigniÞcantly,although parliamentary duties may have kept Cromwell away on 5 and 6November,Cromwell remained active in the Council; and he was certainlypresent on 11 November, when Harrison called the king Ôa Man ofBloodÕand demanded that Ôthey were to prosecute himÕ. Cromwell responded byreminding him that as in the case ofDavidÕs refusal to try Joab for theslaying ofAbner, there were pragmatic circumstances in which murder wasnot to be punished. The pragmatic circumstance was that Ôthe sons ofZeruiah were too hard for himÕ.Zeruiah was DavidÕs sister, and Joab wasjust one ofher many sons. Cromwell is saying that JoabÕs brothers were OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAH30Morrill and Baker, ÔCase ofthe Armie Truly RestatedÕ.31A. S. P. Woodhouse, (London, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1938), pp. 452Ð4.For the vote itself, see: , I, pp. 440Ð1., I, p. 440 discusses his absence on 5 and 6 November., I, p. 417. too powerful for him to proceed against Joab. Joab/Charles was guilty ofmurder; realpolitikalone prevented his trial. It is worth speculating Ð we cando no more Ð who was who in CromwellÕs application ofthis biblicalpassage. The difÞculty ofdoing so does not detract from the shock. Thereason for not proceeding against Charles was not that it would be unjustbut they could not (yet) get away with it.Cromwell crossed some sort ofRubicon on 1 November, and events quicklystrengthened his resolve. The next three weeks saw the kingÕs escape fromHampton Court; the news reaching Cromwell from a variety ofsources thatCharles had initialled a treaty with the anti-Solemn Leaguers in Scotlandfollowed fast on its heels, but Ð in the view ofa number ofobservers fromacross the political spectrum Ð he was most affected by reading interceptedcorrespondence between the king and the queen which rejoiced in the waythe army grandees were being bamboozled.Wedo not have to believe themelodramatic tale ofthe letter containing CharlesÕ plan to doublecross thearmy allegedly cut from a saddle-bag in the Blue Boar in Holborn byCromwell and Ireton dressed as troopers, although GardinerÕs careful analy-sis ofits basis in fact is more impressive than the breezy dismissal ofmostmodern scholars.Certainly something as signiÞcant as this is needed toexplain IretonÕs dramatic volte-face between 5 and 21 November.Perhapsthe most important supplementary testimony comes in Sir John BerkeleyÕsaccount ofhis encounter with Cromwell and Ireton on 28 November 1647when Berkeley presented himselfat Windsor with letters from the king. Hefound an army council meeting in progress: he records that ÔI lookÕd uponCromwell and Ireton and the rest ofmy acquaintance. Who saluted me verycoldly, and had their countenance very changed towards me.Õ Berkeley was JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER34Robert Ashton, Counter Revolution: the Second Civil War and its Origins (New Haven, YaleUniversity Press, 1994), pp. 30Ð6; Austin Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen: the General Councilofthe Army and its Debates 1647Ð1648(Oxford, OUP, 1987), pp. 268Ð76; Gardiner, Civil WarIV, pp. 27Ð31.35See Gardiner, Civil War, IV, pp. 27Ð31, and especially pp. 27n.3, 28n.2. A strong piece ofsupporting evidence is the postscript in IretonÕs letter to Hammond on 21 November whichspeaks ofCromwell being gone from headquarters up to London Ôon scout I know not whereÕ(ibid., p. 27). On the other hand, Patrick Little who has recently completed a thesis on the Boylefamily and the politics ofBritain and Ireland, tells us that the source ofthe story Ð OrreryÕssecretary Morrice recording a conversation he had with Orrery about a conversation Orreryhad with Cromwell Ð is not to be trusted. So we will not pursue it.36Ofcourse, the escape ofthe king and the immediate panic that he might have ßed to theScots (as the prioritizing ofletters to Lambert in the North suggest) may be sufÞcient reason.This was the view ofthe bilious Robert Huntingdon in his unreliable Sundry ReasonsE458/3), p. 11; see the comments ofGardiner, Civil War, IV, pp. 26Ð7 and 26n.2. then told by an unnamed ofÞcer that at the afternoon meeting ofthecouncil, Ireton and Cromwell had called for the king to be transferred as aclose prisoner to London Ôand then br[ought] to a tryalÕ; and that none beallowed to speak to himÕ [i.e. negotiate with him] upon pain ofdeathÕ.All this hangs together. A whole variety ofseparate and differently prob-lematic sources see a transformation in Cromwell in the weekend of19Ð21November and the days that follow. Perhaps it was the escape ofthe king;but most ofthese accounts attribute it to the content ofintercepted lettersthat revealed the kingÕs initialled agreement with the Scots and intentionto string the army along as far as maybe.IfCromwell had had a regicidalepiphany at Putney, it became much Þrmer within the month.Reliable material becomes very sparse for the next few months. We canbe sure that Cromwell spoke strongly in favour ofthe Vote ofNo Addresseson 3 January 1648, and in that speech and in the Þrst ofa vital sequenceofletters to Colonel Robert Hammond (a distant relation by marriage andthe kingÕs gaoler) a hardening ofattitudes is clear. CromwellÕs words asrecorded by John Boys in his diary on 3 January are therefore important.They seem to represent very clearly his conversion to the trial ofthe kingbut not to republicanism. Supporting the Vote ofNo Addresses, he said thatthey Ôshould not any longer expect safety and government from an obsti-nate man whose heart God had hardenedÕ. This can only mean the end ofCharles I. But it is perfectly compatible with his further statement that Ôwedeclared our intentions for Monarchy unless necessity enforce an altera-tionÕ. Some historians, including Barry Coward and David Underdown,interpret ÔnecessityÕ here in a secular sense Ð Ôthe dictates ofpolitical realityÕas Coward glosses it Ð while others, including Gaunt, gloss it in a religioussense Ð until God reveals it to be his will.The latter is clearly the correctreading, as the incessant linkage ofthe words ÔprovidenceÕ and ÔnecessityÕthroughout 1648 and the speeches ofthe 1650s demonstrates.Further-more, CromwellÕs reference in his letter to Hammond (written late on theevening ofthe same day) that the kingÕs ßight and subsequent develop-ments represented Ôa mighty providence to this poor kingdom and to us allÕgives a rather chilling menace to his concluding words: Ôwe shall (I hope) OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAHThe Memoirs ofSir John Berkeley(1699), pp. 70Ð4.38Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, pp. 305Ð6.39D. E. Underdown, ÔThe Parliamentary Diary ofJohn Boys, 1647Ð8Õ, Bulletin ofthe Institute ofHistorical Research, XXXIX (1966), pp. 156Ð7, 145Ð6.40Coward, Cromwell, p. 58; Underdown, PrideÕs Purge, pp. 88Ð9; Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell, pp.41A. B. Worden, ÔProvidence and Politics in Cromwellian EnglandÕ, Past and Present(1985), pp. 55Ð99. See also CromwellÕs charge to the Nominated Assembly in 1653 that theirauthority came to them Ôby the way ofnecessity, by the way ofthe wise Providence ofGod, II, p. 290), and his linking ofprovidence and necessity (in having destroyed the nameand title ofking in 1649) when he declined the kingship in 1657 (ibid., III, pp. 56, 58, 70). instantly go upon the business in relation to [the king], tending to preventdangerÕ and his request that Hammond Ôsearch outÕ any ÔjugglingÕ by theking.There is tantalizing but unreliable evidence that Cromwell was seriouslyconsidering, in late January 1648, direct negotiation with the Prince ofWales which could have led to CharlesÕ abdication or deposition. It consistsprincipally ofa letter ofintelligence ofthe variably reliable Roman agent inLondon, written on 17 January, which names Cromwell and St John as themen behind the initiative.But it is supported by a report home by theFrench ambassador Grignon.He wrote on 31 January that there was aplan by people he does not name to send the Earl ofDenbigh to France withletters for the Prince ofWales, but that Denbigh was reluctant to go; andthis in turn is conÞrmed by a letter in the Hamilton papers (and Hamiltonwas DenbighÕs brother-in-law), dated 1 February, that Ôthe Earl ofDenbighis to go over with some overtures to her Majesty and the PrinceÕ.It maybe signiÞcant for what was to happen at the end ofthe year that the personwho was supposed to raise the matter with the Prince was the Earl ofAs the year wears on there is stronger evidence ofCromwellÕsinvolvement in plans to depose Charles in favour Þrst ofJames Duke ofYorkand then ofHenry Duke ofGloucester. All this represents something morepersuasive than the oft-quoted and more tainted evidence ofthe Ludlowmanuscript that at that time Cromwell refused to join Ludlow in condemn-ing monarchy, or to afÞrm it (the quotation is too well known and too unre-liable to be repeated here).In essence, there were lots ofinsubstantial straws blowing around in thewind, and they were all blowing in the same direction. Cromwell was exploring all kinds ofways ofmoving to a reckoning with Charles I, but hadyet to satisfy himselfofthe natural justice ofany ofthem. He then set offon campaign, and was too preoccupied with the hydra with its variety ofcavalier and Presbyterian heads to formulate any immediate practical solu-tion. But his letters leave us in no doubt that his mind was as full ofIsaiahas it was ofthe sound ofmusket and cannon. JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER, I, pp. 289Ð91 and top p. 290. Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell, p. 90 makes more senseofthe events of3 January than any other recent historian.43Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 56, n.4.44Ibid., p. 57, n.1.45All the evidence is presented and weighed by Gardiner, Civil War, V, pp. 56Ð7 and p. 56,n.4, and evidence that St John Ôhath made Cromwell his bedfellowÕ is in p. 57, n.1.46See the discussion ofthis in John AdamsonÕs essay below, pp. 36Ð70 [in the original publication].The Memoirs ofEdmund Ludlow, ed. C. H. Firth (2 vols, Oxford, OUP, 1894), I, pp. 184Ð6.For three slightly contrasting commentaries on this meeting see: S. R. Gardiner, Oliver Cromwell(1900), p. 133; Firth, Oliver Cromwell and the Rule ofthe Puritans, p. 185; and Coward,Cromwell, p. 59. The sweep ofCromwellÕs writings throughout 1648 suggests a man whofeels guided by God and clear ofthe end though not quite ofthe means. Henever again discussed the king except as someone who had put himselfoutside the protection ofGodÕs people. For the whole of1648 CromwellÕsconcern was not whether to remove the king but when and how.In the late spring, he set offon campaign Þrst in South Wales, then tohead offthe Scottish invasion, then to pursue the retreating Scots almostto the gates ofEdinburgh, and Þnally to mop up royalist resistance in thenorth. At every stage he wrote letters which have survived, several ofthempublic or semi-public letters to Speaker Lenthall or General Fairfax, othersprivate and confessional, as to St John, Wharton and Hammond.public rhetoric consistently calls for (and all must include the king asprincipal author) responsible for the new war to be called to account fortheir treason and sacrilege; his private rhetoric adds to that a continuousengagement with the scripture and with very speciÞc texts as he sought todiscern the will ofGod for himselfand for His people.It is, ofcourse, the case that the army council committed itselfto the trial ofthe king at the conclusion ofthe three-day prayer meeting at theend ofApril. Or so William Allen maintained in a pamphlet written inBut we should not use this, as some have, as evidence ofCromwellÕsmay be recalling things accurately; Cromwell may well havebeen present for part ofthe meeting.Even ifboth are true, it does notfollow that this directly informed CromwellÕs thinking. Allen alleged that atWindsor Charles Stuart was branded Ôa man ofbloodÕ who should atone forhis shedding ofinnocent blood in accordance with the requirements oftheBook ofNumbers [35 v.33]: ÔSo ye shall not deÞle the land wherein you are:for blood it deÞleth the land; and the land cannot be cleansed ofthe bloodthat is shed therein, but by the blood ofhim that shed it.Õ The army com-mitted itselfto putting the king on trial as soon as it was in a position to doso.The application ofthis text to that man ofblood Charles Stuart sus-tained many in the months that followed. But Cromwell himselfneverendorsed it; nor did he ever cite from the Book ofNumbers before, duringor for eight years after 1648.His own thinking followed a different course. After each ofthe majorepisodes in the second war, unlike any ofthose in the Þrst, the leaders were OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAH, I, pp. 350Ð1, 353Ð4, 393Ð400.49W. Allen, A Faithfull Memorial Somers Tracts(16 vols, 1748Ð52), VI, pp. 500Ð1.50Gentles, New Model Army, pp. 245Ð6; Gaunt, Cromwell, pp. 92Ð3.51Allen, Faithfull Memorial, pp. 500Ð1. At a less-well-remembered prayer meeting also atWindsor on 26 November this commitment was renewed: Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 235. put on trial Ð either before a court martial or by reference to the High CourtofJustice.The Þrst war had been a struggle between two parties whobelieved that they were Þghting GodÕs cause. God had shown which side hewas on from the moment ofthe formation ofthe New Model. Anyoneseeking to overturn Ôso many evidences ofa divine providence going alongwere in effect committing sacrilege,seeking to overturn the judgement ofGod. It was Ôthe repetition ofthe sameoffence against all the witnesses that God hath borneÕ. But, in addition, Ôthisis a more prodigious treason than any that hath been perfected before;because the former quarrel was that Englishmen might rule over oneanother, this is to vassalize us to a foreign nationÕ.written from Yorkshire to Robert Jenner and John Ashe on 20 November,the very day that the armyÕs Remonstrance was being presented to parlia-ment. That theme ofthe wickedness ofthe king in seeking foreign arms andgiving undertakings to foreigners, starting with the Scots, was at the heartofthe indictment ofCharles in that Remonstrance and it was to reappear inthe charge against him two months later.The clearest statement that thetime had come for Charles to account for his crimes came in the coda toCromwellÕs long letter to Lenthall describing his victory over Hamilton atPreston on 20 August:Sir, this is nothing but the hand ofGod...You should take courage to dothe work ofthe Lord in fulÞlling the ends ofyour magistracy, in seekingthe peace and welfare ofthe people ofthis land, that all who live quietlyand peaceably may have countenance from you, and they that are implaca-ble and will not leave troubling the land may speedily be destroyed out oftheThis cannot but be a reference to the king himself. We might note, however,that the phrase Ôdestroyed out ofthe landÕ, for all its rhetorical strength,leaves open the possibility ofexile rather than execution. A similar unam-biguous ifoblique reference to the king is to be found in a letter written to JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER52Gardiner, Civil War, IV, pp. 202Ð6; S. R. Gardiner, History ofthe Commonwealth and Protectorate(4 vols, London, Longman, 1903), I, pp. 10Ð11, 41; Ashton, Counter Revolutionpp. 421Ð2; Gentles, New Model Army, pp. 255Ð7.53Cromwell to Lenthall, announcing the fall ofPembroke, 11 July 1648 (, I, pp.324Ð5). Cromwell had the three principals ofthe South Wales revolt Ð Laugharne, Powell andPoyer Ð tried and convicted. They were sent up to London to draw lots as to which ofthem wasto be shot. Poyer (literally) drew the short straw and was executed by Þring squad in the PiazzaofCovent Garden., I, p. 387 (cf. the comments ofFirth, Oliver Cromwell, p. 206).55This is a point which is made all the clearer by the evidence ofAnglo-Scottish dislikes presented in David ScottÕs paper below, pp. 138Ð60 [in the original publication]., I, pp. 333Ð4 (emphasis added). Fairfax which endorsed a petition from the ofÞcers ofthe regiments in thenorth, itselfsupporting the RemonstranceI Þnd...in [all the ofÞcers] avery great zeal to have impartial justice done upon offenders; and I dofrom my heart concur with them.ÕSuch language, sustained over six consecutive months, for judgement onthe authors ofthe war clearly extended to the king himself. The ques-tions were when and how, not whether he should be tried and by implica-tion deposed or executed. Cromwell spoke ofprovidence throughout his life,but never with the persistence or conÞdence of1648. Letter after letterspeak ofprovidence and (connected to it) ofnecessity as linked aspects ofGodÕs immanence and engagement with the affairs ofmen.And provi-dence is more and more invoked as the guarantor ofaction against the king.Such were his musings on public events. But throughout the months ofcampaigning he was also clearly studying the Bible and looking for personalmeaning in it. When we Þrst planned this paper we thought we had identi-Þed a simple and powerful biblical parallel that guided Cromwell throughthe year. On four occasions in 1648 Cromwell makes references to the storyofGideon and we became convinced that he had come to see himselfasredivivusIndeed his account ofthe battle ofPreston written theday after the battle and sent to Speaker Lenthall, reads less like otheraccounts ofthe battle than it does ofthe biblical account ofGideonÕs defeatofthe Midianites at Ain Harod.Let us recall the story ofGideon. He was called from the plough to leadthe army ofIsrael. He winnowed the army, reducing it to a small, compactforce made ofIsraelÕs russet-coated captains, and he destroyed the Midianites and harried their ßeeing army for 200 miles as Cromwell didafter Preston. He then executed the kings ofthe Midianites, denying themquarter because they had shed innocent blood on Mount Tabor. He refusedto take the crown himselfand returned, loaded with honours, to his farm.It is not surprising that Cromwell found this a powerful story and suitableto his condition in 1648. And he drew powerfully on it, nowhere more thanin an extraordinary outburst to Fairfax in the middle ofa letter full ofnitty-gritty military matters as he swept through South Wales in June 1648:I pray God teach this nation...what the mind ofGod may be in all this,and what our duty is. Surely it is not that the poor godly people ofthisKingdom should still be the objects ofwrath and anger, nor that our God OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAH, I, p. 391 (emphasis added).58See John Morrill, ÔKing Killing no MurderÕ, Cromwelliana(1998), pp. 12Ð22, an early andmuch cruder version ofthis paper, but with a fuller analysis ofthe 1648 letters (printed as anappendix to the article in ibid., pp. 22Ð38).59Ibid., I, pp. 331Ð45. would have our necks under a yoke ofbondage; for these things that havelately come to pass have been the wonderful works ofGod; breaking therod ofthe oppressor, as in the day ofMidian, not with garments muchrolled in blood but by the terror ofthe Lord.This passage draws on Galatians, Acts and 2 Corinthians, but the centralimage with its reference to the breaking ofthe Midianites is from Isaiah,and actually that turns out to be the crucial point. For CromwellÕs allusionsto Gideon are all passing ones; there is no sustained meditation on his story.On the other hand he spent much time and space in several letters inextended meditation on Isaiah chapters 8 and 9. Indeed he wrote to OliverSt John on 1 September 1648, a week after the battle ofPreston, telling himthat Ôthis scripture hath been ofgreat stay with me, Isaiah eighth, 10. 11.14. Read the whole chapter.ÕThat chapter and the next tell how most ofthe people have missed out on righteousness and that those who follow theidolatrous leaders ofJudah and Israel will be destroyed. SoAssociate yourselves, o ye people, and ye shall be broken in pieces...girdyourselves and you shall be broken in pieces...And I will wait upon theLord, that hideth his face from the house ofJacob, and I will look for him,Behold I and the children whom the Lord has given me are for signs andwonders in Israel.Cromwell was working out his own destiny in relation to GodÕs plan, andGod was no democrat. He had worked through a godly remnant in the daysofIsaiah and he could and would do so again.In November Cromwell wrote two letters to Hammond.We do not havetime here to demonstrate the many misunderstandings ofthe letter ofthe6th such as UnderdownÕs claim that it represents CromwellÕs willingness toacquiesce in a settlement between parliament and the king ÔifCharlesaccepted a permanent Presbyterian settlementÕ.For Cromwell makes itclear that such an agreement could be approved ofonly ifone followedÔcarnal reasoningsÕ Ð human expediency rather than divine imperatives.Instead we rely on GentlesÕ better reading ofthis letter: Ôpeace is only good JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER, I, p. 321., I, p. 350., I, pp. 393Ð400; and III, pp. 389Ð92., II, pp. 49Ð50, with a commentary by Firth and an attribution to Cromwell. This attri-bution is probable but not quite as secure as Firth maintains. Why was Clarke (in London) inpossession ofa letter ofsuch a private nature written by a senior ofÞcer stationed in Yorkshireto a colonel stationed on the Isle ofWight? Could the letter have been by another senior ofÞcerwho had been in Scotland with Cromwell? This is the only letter ofCromwellÕs for this periodwithout any biblical allusions in it. when we receive it from out ofour fatherÕs hands...War is good when weare led by our Father.ÕAnd peace with this king was not at GodÕs hand.Less enigmatic and more powerful was the follow-up letter Cromwellwrote on 25 November. It is a plea to Hammond to see how a critical massofevidence points to GodÕs manifest will being encapsulated in what thearmy proposes in the RemonstranceSeek to know the mind ofGod in all that chain ofProvidence, wherebyGod hath brought thee thither, and that person to thee...and then tellme whether there be not some glorious and high meaning in all this,above what thou hast yet attained.Nowhere was the clustering ofbiblical gobbets more dense than in thisletter. The opening paragraphs alone Ð some 700 words Ð contain 24 cita-with especial focus on the Epistle ofJames[ch. 1 vv 2Ð6] with its exhortation to Christians Ôto ask in faith, nothingwavering. For he that wavereth is like a wave ofthe sea driven with the windand tossedÕ and from Romans 8, with its great cry that, freed from the law,the true Christian must look beyond present deprivations to the presence ofthe Holy Spirit. So Cromwell is pleading with Hammond to trust in provi-dential reason and not in worldly, ßeshly reasoning. By the time he wrotethat letter Cromwell had seen the army Remonstrance approved by the armycouncil on the 16th and presented to the parliament on the 20th and heknew that Hammond would have seen it. The letter is in fact beggingHammond to go along with the Remonstrance. Thus he told Hammond thatwhile Ôwe could perhaps have wished the stay ofit till after the treatyÕ, inthe end could the people ofGod expect any good from Ôthis man againstwhom the Lord hath witnessedÕ? The Remonstrance ously that Ôthe King should be brought to Justice, as the Capital cause ofSpace precludes any further exegesis. We hope that ifour analysis ofthedevelopment ofCromwellÕs thinking up to 25 November is convincing, thenit provides the safe guide through the treacherous and incomplete shards ofevidence for the month ofDecember. It means that we can agree whole- OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAH65Gentles, New Model Army, p. 283., I, pp. 393Ð403.67As identiÞed by Paul, Lord Protector, appendix V, p. 406, nn.1Ð9, p. 407, nn.1Ð11.A Remonstrance ofhis Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax...and ofthe General Council ofOfÞcers([16 Nov.] 1648, E473/11), reprinted in The Parliamentary or Constitutional History ofEngland(24 vols., 1761Ð3), XVIII, pp. 161Ð238. heartedly with but recontextualize Ian GentlesÕ reading (itselfpre-echoedin the work ofVeronica Wedgwood and Robert Paul).The key to understanding CromwellÕs actions over the seven weeks separating his return to London and the kingÕs execution is to keep several questions separate. Did Cromwell want to see the king put on trial?Yes.Did he know what form the trial should take? Yes and it was not the wayit actually happened. Did he want Charles to cease to be king? Yes, either deposition or abdication. Did he want to see the king dead? Yes and no Ð yes inthat he deserved it, no in that it might shipwreck the very civil and religious liberties it was intended to safeguard. Did he want to see monarchy abolished?Almost certainly not. And underlying all his hesitancy was a dread that ifthe army pushed heedless on to regicide and a king-less commonwealth, the sons ofZeruiah would be too strong for him.Let us remember that on 7 December, as Cromwell took his seat in par-liament, the position was as follows. Even the purged Rump ofthe House ofCommons had refused to take any action to reverse the decisions that hadprovoked PrideÕs Purge until Fairfax answered their demand for the releaseofthe imprisoned members; the House ofLords was totally opposed to thePurge. The Presbyterian clergy were gargling in preparation for thunderousdenunciations from their pulpits.The Levellers were utterly opposed totrial ofthe king by parliament.Lord General Fairfax was utterly opposedto the kingÕs trial and as recently as 16 November all but six ofthe armycouncil had voted that ifthe king agreed to the ÔfundamentalsÕ they wouldadd to the Newport articles that he should be reinstated. His rejection ofthese terms outright had swung the majority behind the demands oftheRemonstrance for his trial, but the army remained unpredictable. Cromwellwas well aware that this was not an irrevocable conversion to regicide,rather it was evidence ofvolatility. Let us not forget that as late as 21December 1648 the army council voted by a simple majority against thekingÕs execution and even on 25 December, it voted by 6: 1 that ifthe kingaccepted the terms put to him by Denbigh his life should be spared. Anunco-operative parliament, a divided and volatile army, a resentful, hostileand hungry populace, all ofScotland and 90 per cent ofIreland in thehands ofmen implacably opposed to the kingÕs trial and deposition, and twoofCharlesÕ nephews ruling France and the Netherlands Ð all this must havemade DavidÕs problems with the sons ofZeruiah look small beer indeed. Nowonder Cromwell urged caution in moving to the desired end JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER69Wedgwood, Trial ofCharles I, pp. 25Ð31; Paul, Lord Protector, pp. 183Ð4; Gentles, NewModel Army, pp. 297Ð314.70See the argument and evidence presented below by Elliot Vernon, pp. 202Ð24 [in the original publication].71As demonstrated by Andrew Sharp in his essay below, see pp. 181Ð201 [in the originalpublication]. We have no shred ofevidence from CromwellÕs own lips or pen that hewas keen to prevent the trial ofthe king, or that he doubted that the kingdeserved death, or that he believed he should remain on the throne. Indeedevery piece ofsurviving strictly contemporary evidence Ð newspapers fromacross the spectrum, secret royalist intelligence reports, and German,French and Italian ambassadorial reportssupport the following claimsabout his behaviour in December 1648.1Cromwell attempted to bring back anyone willing to accept the new situ-ation created by the purge (to ßatter and tame some ofZeruiahÕs sons).2He pushed on with a new paper constitution that might be brought in3He attempted a private negotiation with Hamilton on 14/15 December.4He simultaneously worked to transfer the king to the custody ofhis mostbitter and determined enemies, especially Thomas Harrison who haddemanded his death as early as 11 November 1647.5He demonstrated a preference for the trial to be deferred until introduction ofthe new constitution and the holding offresh electionson the new more equitable system and until the trial ofthe otherincendiaries who had shed innocent blood in the second civil war (trialswhich would demonstrate the depths ofthe kingÕs duplicity).We can go a step further. In January 1648, Cromwell had tried to persuadeDenbigh to travel to France in order to persuade the Prince ofWales toaccept the throne upon his fatherÕs deposition.The army Remonstrance November 1648 demanded that the Prince ofWales and the Duke ofYorksurrender themselves for trial or stand debarred from the throne; which (inthe absence ofany statement in the Remonstrance against monarchy) wouldmake Gloucester the heir to the throne. Cromwell was close to Isaac Dorislaus and wrote in December 1648 to the master ofTrinity Hall askinghim to use his position as master ofDoctorsÕ Commons to provide rooms forIt was Dorislaus who co-authored the charges against the king, charges which speciÞcally indicted the Princes Charles and James butnot Henry in their fatherÕs treasons.It was Denbigh who was sent to see Hamilton and the king at Windsor on 27 December with a secret offer which seems likely to have included an offer to the king: abdicate infavour ofHenry and your life will be spared; refuse and you will die and thedestruction ofyour House and ofmonarchy will be laid at your door. OLIVERCROMWELLTHEREGICIDEANDTHESONSOFZERUIAH72All this material is discussed by Gardiner, Civil War, IV, pp. 276Ð92.73Above, p. 28., I, pp. 403Ð4.75Gardiner, , p. 373. This is certainly the view ofthe French ambassador in his report on 21December, and he was more precise and accurate than most in his report-ing throughout that month.Our argument is then that by 25 November Cromwell was resolved to seeto the abolition ofmonarchy. As the phrase in that letter to Hammond (Ôwecould perhaps have wished the stay ofit until after the treatyÕ)makesclear, Cromwell still preferred a different sequence ofevents: a breaking-offofthe treaty; the purge or dissolution ofparliament; an interim council onthe model ofthe Scottish Commission ofEstates; a high court or a com-oyer terminer consisting ofLords, Commons and militarymen; a trial ofmajor royalist incendiaries culminating in the king; a con-viction and then an ultimatum Ð abdicate in favour ofyour son and live, orrefuse to abdicate and die. Prudence made him linger over the Þrst; justicealways pointed to the second. His return to London was timed to assist thatprocess. He Ð like everyone else Ð was thrown offbalance by the events of5 and 6 December. Now the issue was whether to wait until the originalsequence was re-established or whether to proceed straight to a trial. Iretonwas drawn more to the latter, Cromwell to the former. Eventually, after thefailure ofthe Denbigh mission, Cromwell fell into line. WhitelockeÕs teasingtestimony that Cromwell invited Widdrington and himselfto a meeting thatpresupposed the removal ofCharles I, but for Ôsettling the Kingdom by Parliament, and not to leave all to the SwordÕ is perhaps the clincher.The delays had little to do with cold feet over Charles. They represented thehesitations ofa man who had a master plan at the end ofNovember andwas trying to work out howhe could restore an orderly sequence to events in the wake ofthe unplanned purge of6 December. But eventstook on a momentum oftheir own, and Cromwell found that a ßash ßood required him to shoot the rapids in a raging torrent. When he muttered Ôcruel necessityÕ over the corpse ofCharles I, perhaps it was areßection on the fact that it was not just the king who had experienced theharshness ofdivine decrees. As Cromwell said his prayers on 31 January1649, perhaps he prayed: Ôhelp me against the sons ofZeruiah who areeverywhere.ÕOr to put it another way: Ôhelp us in this time ofcruel necessity.Õ JOHNMORRILLANDPHILIPBAKER76Gardiner, Civil War, IV, p. 282., III, pp. 389Ð92.The Diary ofBulstrode Whitelocke, 1605Ð1675, ed. Ruth Spalding (Oxford, OUP, 1990),pp. 226Ð7. See the important gloss on this by Wedgwood, Trial, pp. 78Ð80. Oliver Cromwell,the RegicideJohn Morrill and Philip BakerOriginally appeared as John Morrill and Philip Baker,ÔOliverCromwell,the Regicide and the Sons of ZeruiahÕ,in Jason PeaceyThe Regicides and the Execution of Charles I.Copyright 2001 JohnMorrill and Philip Baker.Published by Palgrave,Basingstoke.EditorÕs IntroductionHistorians have long debated CromwellÕs attitudes towards the execution ofCharles I and his role in bringing it about.Some have argued that he was alate and reluctant convert to the cause of regicide,while others have sug-was then trying to secure as much support for this course as possible.Morrilland Baker engage with this debate by arguing that it is essential to distinguishbetween CromwellÕs attitudes towards Charles I and his attitudes towardsmonarchy.They suggest that the evidence of CromwellÕs contributions to thePutney Debates reveals that by 1 November 1647 at the latest he had cometo acknowledge the severe problems posed by Charles I personally,but thathe believed GodÕs views on the future of monarchy were not yet apparent.Furthermore,his reference to the Ôsons of ZeruiahÕ (11 November 1647) indicates that he felt that the army could not get away with killing the kingat that stage.Morrill and Baker argue that the key to CromwellÕs behaviourfrom November 1647 to January 1649 lay in the combination of a growingconviction that Charles should be brought to trial Ð and possibly even executed Ð with a continuing uncertainty over when,how and by whom thisThe essay draws out the ways in which Biblical language and allusions sat-urated CromwellÕs 43 letters and 28 speeches that survive from this period.These drew on 21 Old Testament books and 13 New Testament books,butthey contain no evidence at all that he had read anything other than the Bible.