Kevin L Cope and James D Morrow University of Michigan Multilateral Negotiations Much of international law is created through multilateral treaties that aspire to universality Human rights International humanitarian law ID: 1029341
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1. A Spatial Model of Multilateral NegotiationsKevin L. Cope and James D. MorrowUniversity of Michigan
2. Multilateral NegotiationsMuch of international law is created through multilateral treaties that aspire to universality:Human rightsInternational humanitarian lawTradeMuch progress has been made in studying the effects of these treaties, but we know little systematically about the negotiations that create these treaties.2/12
3. Characteristics of multilateral bargainingConsensus required.States select into international law through treaty ratification.Multiple issues to bargain overCould drop/ignore some parties with following consequences...Excluded party could add value to the agreement.The broader/deeper tradeoff3/12
4. Spatial Model of NegotiationsSpatial models allow us to analyze how actors with different positions reconcile their differences to produce a common outcome.ElectionsLegislaturesBilateral negotiationsCore concepts:Issues modeled spatiallyIdeal points for each actorDeclining utility moving away from ideal point4/12
5. The GameActors: M States, D-Drafting committeeN-dimensional issue spacePreferences: D: Ideal point at the originStates: ideal points xiValue for the treaty depends on how many states ratify. Each state has weight wi with 5/12
6. For D, payoff is For i ϵ M, value ViIN if i ratifies, value ViOUT if i does not, with Δi = ViIN – ViOUT.Values vary with nature of good produced by treaty and expressive value for ratification.i’s payoff is 6/12
7. Time Line of Game:D proposes treaty x.All i simultaneously ratify x or not. Payoffs are received.7/12
8. Characterizing the EquilibriumFor K M, define i ϵ M to be favorable under K if and unfavorable under K otherwise.Coalition K is feasible if all i ϵ K are favorable under K and all i ∉ K are unfavorable.Coalition K is the base coalition if it is feasible and is a maximum over all feasible K. 8/12
9. Let i be unfavorable under the base coalition. Define Choose treaty t ϵ {Ωi,0} to maximize uD(t).Equilibrium: D proposes t. i ratifies if ui(t) ≥ 0. 9/12
10. Here are three actors:Each has ideal point and indifference curve for what treaties it will accept.B is favorable and forms the base coalition.A and C are unfavorable under base coalition.10/12
11. Treaty will be whichever of {0,ΩA,ΩC,ΩAC} maximizes uD(t).11/12
12. What is to Be Done?Finalize proofs.Use the model to drive the estimation procedure.Rome Conference is test data.Much of the data is missing compared to votes and decisions.Apply procedure to analyze other treaties, particularly human rights treaties.Substantive questions:Do conference rules matter?Variation across treatiesThe logic of exclusion and its effect on resulting treaties12/12
13. Extra Slides
14. The Rome StatuteThe Rome Statute of 1998 constituted the International Criminal Court and gave it power to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity.Final conference held in Rome during June-July 1998 with 160 states represented.Plenary sessions collected comments on draft treaty leading to revisions by the Drafting Committee.Final vote followed by ratification afterwards.14/12
15. ICC created after 60 states ratified the Rome Statute.124 states are parties to the ICC now.15/12
16. Estimating Ideal PointsWe use the negotiating record published by the UN as data course to estimate state ideal points.Each comment by a state was coded asCritical of the proposed languageSupportive of the proposed languageNo opinion218 issues were coded; some articles present multiple issues.16/12
17. We adapt techniques used for legislatures and courts to estimate ideal points from votes and decisions (Poole and Rosenthal, Martin and Quinn, Voeten).Bayesian spatial modeling based on item-response theory.135 states expressed at least one view during negotiations.Of 29,430 (= 135*218) potential state views , 4364 expressed, most critical.We recover one dimension from the procedure.17/12
18. Procedure gives distributions for the estimate of each state’s position.18/12
19. Estimated ideal point predicts ratification of the treaty afterwards.Ratified in blueNot ratified in red19/12