Williams v The State, ___ - PowerPoint Presentation

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Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

Defendant was convicted, following a bench trial in the trial court, of driving under the influence of drugs (DUI) and failure to maintain lane. He appealed

.

In general, searches are of two types: those conducted with a search warrant or those undertaken without one, and searches conducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

A well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement in the context of a state-administered blood test is the presence of exigent circumstances.

In the context of a blood draw on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a valid consent to a search eliminates the need for either probable cause or a search warrant.

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

Natural

metabolization

of alcohol in a person's bloodstream does not per se constitute an exigency justifying an exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in driving under the influence (

DUI

) cases; overruling

Strong v. State

, 231 Ga. 514, 202 SE2d

428

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

Mere compliance with statutory

implied

consent

requirements for state-administered blood test following arrest for driving under the influence of drugs (

DUI

) did not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary,

consent

on part of suspect so as to fall within exception to constitutional mandate of search warrant.

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

When relying on the

consent

exception to the warrant requirement for state-administered blood testing, the state has the burden of proving that the accused acted freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

As noted, it is uncontroverted that Williams submitted to the blood test after the police officer read him the implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over. However, in

Cooper v. State,

supra, this Court plainly distinguished compliance with the implied consent statute from the constitutional question of whether a suspect gave

actual consent

for the state-administered testing. We emphasized such remaining question in regard to the validity of the consent, confirming that “[w]hen relying on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden of proving that the accused acted freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.”

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

And, it can certainly be argued that the need for the State to demonstrate

actual consent

for the purpose of exception to the warrant requirement and its constitutional implications is reinforced by the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in

McNeely…

The facts of

McNeely

did not lend themselves to the Supreme Court expressly addressing the issue of a suspect's consent to the testing of bodily fluids as satisfying Fourth Amendment

concerns because the defendant in that case refused to consent to a blood

test…

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

…however

, a plurality of the Court was plainly rejecting a per se rule for sustaining an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a search warrant in favor of a case-by-case assessment based on the totality of the circumstances, albeit in the narrow context of

exigency…

OCGA § 40–5–55

provides in relevant part:

(a) The State of Georgia considers that any person who drives or is in actual physical control of any moving vehicle in violation of any provision of

Code Section 40–6–391

constitutes a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and safety of the general

public….

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

Therefore, any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to

Code Section 40–6–392

, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug, if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of

Code Section

40–6–391

…

Williams v The State, ___ Ga___,March 27, 2015

In considering

Williams's

motion to suppress, the state court failed to address whether

Williams

gave

actual

consent

to the procuring and testing of his blood, which would require the determination of the voluntariness of the

consent

under the totality of the circumstances. Consequently, the judgments of the state court are vacated and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion

.

Judgments vacated and case remanded with direction.

All the Justices concur.

PAC & GOHS

First

, it is important for officers to consider what

Williams

DOES NOT

mean. Simply put,

Williams

did not : (1) invalidate Georgia’s Implied Consent

statutes

; (2) overrule any existing case law concerning Implied Consent; (3)

authorize

officers to stop giving the Implied Consent warning to DUI suspects; (4) hold that the Implied Consent notice is inherently threatening or coercive; or (5)

hold

that submission to testing after the Implied Consent warning is read cannot be “actual consent” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

PAC & GOHS

Properly understood,

Williams

simply clarified that officers in the field must do two things to obtain consent to state-administered chemical testing: (1)

observe

the requirements of the Implied Consent statute, and (2) ensure that

suspects

consenting to chemical testing do so freely, voluntarily, and without

unconstitutional

coercion. As illustrated by

several

of the cases cited by

Williams

(see

People v. Harris

, 234 Cal. App. 4th 671 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2015);

State v.

Padley

,

354 Wis.2d 545 (Wis. App. 2014);

State v. Moore

, 354 Ore. 493 (Ore. 2013); and

State v. Brooks

, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013)), this is not as difficult as it first sounds. In fact, few—if any—changes to existing law enforcement

prac-tices

are

necessary.

PAC & GOHS

However

,

Williams

DOES require

officers

to pay more attention to the

circumstances

and conditions under which a

suspect

consents to testing. This

is

because

Williams

, like other cases

involving

the Fourth Amendment, requires judges to consider the “totality of the

circumstances

” within which a DUI suspect agrees to be tested in order to determine whether they did so freely, voluntarily, and without improperly coercive police procedures. Officers who carefully in-corporate the details of those

circumstances

into their reports (and record a suspect’s consent, where possible) will put their prosecutors in the best position to establish the voluntariness of the

defendant’s

consent.

PAC & GOHS

Williams

requires trial courts to

determine

whether a suspect’s consent to chemical testing was given freely and voluntarily as required by the Fourth Amendment. This determination is made based upon “the totality of the

circumstances

,” which includes the

circumstances

under which consent was given,

the

characteristics

of the

defendant

, and the nature of the

conversation

between the suspect and officers (i.e.,

what

was said and

how

it was said).

Furthermore

, voluntary consent cannot exist where there is

coercion

by threats or by force, or where it is given only in submission to a claim of lawful authority.

PAC & GOHS

Therefore

, DUI incident reports should include detailed accounts of the events leading up to a suspect’s decision to allow state-administered chemical testing of their bodily substances. In particular,

officers

should record occurrences—regardless of how minor they might seem—that demonstrate that when

Implied

Consent was read, the suspect’s decision to consent resulted from:

PAC & GOHS

(

1) an environment that allowed free choice; (2)

the suspect’s ability to make a

meaningful

choice; (3) an exchange with police that was as polite and calm as the

situation

permitted; (4) the officer’s provision of accurate information to the suspect; and (5) the absence of improper and/or coercive police practices designed to overcome the suspect’s resistance.

Officers

who articulate such details will

allow

judges to find “actual consent.”

PAC & GOHS

Officers

should keep in mind that the decision to seek a search warrant should be based upon the evidence in the case, and not because a suspect chose not to consent. Under no circumstances should an officer use his or her ability to apply for a warrant as a means to influence a suspect’s decision.

PAC & GOHS

Finally

, law enforcement agencies should, in conjunction with their elected prosecutor, formulate a plan for those cases where a suspect’s ability to give actual consent is questionable, such as when a suspect is unconscious or does not speak English. Generally, in such cases, officers should either forego a sample, seek a warrant, or—

IN VERY RARE CASES

—consider whether

exi

-gent circumstances permit collection of a sample without a warrant.