How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called explication Strawson objected that explication changes the subje ID: 86251
Download Pdf The PPT/PDF document "Patrick Maher Explication Defended Abstr..." is the property of its rightful owner. Permission is granted to download and print the materials on this web site for personal, non-commercial use only, and to display it on your personal computer provided you do not modify the materials and that you retain all copyright notices contained in the materials. By downloading content from our website, you accept the terms of this agreement.
2PatrickMaherQuine[11,x53]endorsedessentiallythesamemethodology.Theterm\ex-plication"issometimesusedinadi erentorlooserway,butIwilluseittomeanthemethodologydescribedbyCarnap.Strawson[13]claimedthatexplicationisnotrelevanttotheoriginalphilosophicalproblem,itmerelychangesthequestion.InSection2Iconsiderthisobjection,andCarnap'sreplytoit;IshowthatCarnap'sresponsewasinadequateandIgiveabetterresponse.Recently,Boniolo[1]hasarguedthatinformalanalysisisbetterthanex-plicationbecauseexplicationinvolvesgivingdenitionsthatmaybewrong.InSection3Ishowthatexplicationneednotinvolvegivingdenitionsand,whenitdoes,thedenitionscannotbewrong.AnotherrecentcriticofexplicationisEagle[5].Heclaimedthatthemethodologyofexplicationisincompletebecausethereneedsinadditiontobea\conceptualclarication"oftheexplicatum.InSection4Ishowthatthereisnoroomforfurther\conceptualclarication"ofanexplica-tum.EaglealsocriticizedCarnapforsuggestingthatexplicationmakestheexplicandumof\nofurtherimportance,"butinSection5IshowthatthiswasnotCarnap'sview.Iconcludethatexplicationisanappropriatemethodologyforformalphilosophy,includingformalepistemology.2.StrawsononrelevanceStrawson,inhisdiscussionofCarnap'smethodofexplication,said:Itseemsprimafacieevidentthattoo erformalexplanationsofkeytermsofscientictheoriestoonewhoseeksphilosophicalilluminationofessentialconceptsofnon-scienticdiscourse,istodosomethingutterlyirrelevant|isasheermisunderstanding,likeo eringatext-bookonphysiologytosomeonewhosays(withasigh)thathewishedheunderstoodtheworkingsofthehumanheart.[13,p.505]Carnaprepliedthatexplicationcansolvephilosophicalproblemsarisinginordinarylanguagebecauseitgivesusimprovednewconceptsthatcanservethesamepurposesastheordinaryconceptsthatcreatedthepuzzles;theproblemsaresolvedbyusingthenewlanguageinsteadofordinarylanguageintheproblematiccontexts.Carnapgavethefollowinganalogy:Anaturallanguageislikeacrude,primitivepocketknife,veryusefulforahundreddi erentpurposes.Butforcertainspecicpurposes,specialtoolsaremoreecient,e.g.,chisels,cuttingmachines,and 4PatrickMaherminewhetherornotS0istrue.Thisdoesnotbyitselfsolvetheoriginalproblem|thatisStrawson'spoint|butitcangreatlyassistinsolvingtheproblem,inthreeways.(1)TheattempttoformulateS0oftenshowsthattheoriginalsentenceSwasambiguousorincompleteandneedstobestatedmorecarefully.(2)IftheexplicataappearinginS0areknowntocorrespondwelltotheirexplicandainothercases,thatisareasontothinkthattheywillcorrespondwellinthiscasetoo,andhencetothinkthatthetruthvalueofSwillbethesameasthatofS0.(3)WecantranslatetheproofordisproofofS0intoaparallelargumentaboutthecorrespondingexplicandaandseeifthisseemstobesound;ifso,weobtainadirectargumentfororagainstS.Intheseways,explicationcanprovideinsightsandlinesofargumentthatwemaynotdiscoverifwereasononlyintermsofthevagueexplicanda.Hereisanillustrationofthesepoints.Nicod[9,p.189]claimedthatalawoftheform\AllFareG"ismademoreprobablebyevidencethatsomethingisbothFandG.Supposeourproblemistodeterminewhetherthisiscorrect.FollowingNicod,letususetheterm\conrms"tomean\raisestheprobabilityof;"thusourproblembecomeswhetheralawoftheform\AllFareG"isconrmedbyevidencethatsomethingisbothFandG.IfweattempttoexplicatetheconceptofconrmationwesoonrealizethatwhetherornotevidenceEconrmshypothesisHdependsnotonlyonEandHbutalsoonthebackgroundevidence,somethingthatNicodneglectedtospecify.Ifwespecifythatweareinterestedinthecasewherethereisnobackgroundevidence,thenNicod'sclaimbecomes:N.Alawoftheform\AllFareG"isconrmedbyevidencethatsomethingisbothFandG,givennobackgroundevidence.Hempel[7]arguedthatNistrueandGood[6]arguedthatitisfalse.In[8]IappliedthemethodofexplicationtoN;IdenedanexplicatumCforconrmation(p.71),formulatedananalogofNusingC|letuscallthisN0|andprovedthatN0isfalse(p.77).ThisdoesnotbyitselfshowthatNisfalse.However,IhadarguedthatCcorrespondswellwiththeconceptofconrmationinothercases,whichisaprimafaciereasontothinkthatthereiscorrespondenceheretoo,andhencethatNisalsofalse.Furthermore,Ishowed(p.78)thattheproofthatN0isfalsemakesintuitivesensewhentranslatedbackintoqualitativeexplicandumterms.ThusthemethodofexplicationprovidesuswithagoodargumentthattheordinarylanguagehypothesisNisfalse.StrawsonseemstoconcedethatexplicationcanbeusefulinsomethinglikethewaysIhaveindicated.Hewrote: 6PatrickMahergivinganexplicitdenition,thenboththedeniensandthedenienduminthedenitionexpresstheexplicatum,whiletheexplicandumdoesnotoccur"[2,p.3].Forexample,Carnap'sexplicandumin[2]wasaconceptofordinarylanguagethathecalled\degreeofconrmation"and\probability1"(p.25);hisexplicatumwasafunctionthathecalledc(p.562).Carnapspeciedcbygivingadenitionthatspecieditsvaluesforallpossiblearguments;thisisastipulativedenitionthatspecieswhatismeantby\c."Carnaptriedtoclarifyhisexplicandumbutdidnottrytodeneit.Sowhenexplicationisdonebygivingadenition,thedenitionisstipulative|itspecieswhattheexplicatumis|andconsequentlythereisnopossibilityofthedenitionbeingwrong.Therefore,thephilosopherwhoexplicatesbygivingadenitionrunsno\riskofbelievingthathisdeni-tionsarerightwhentheymayinfactbewrong,"contrarytowhatBonioloasserts.AlthoughexplicationscannotfailinthewayBoniolosupposes,theycanfailinotherways,ofcourse.Apurportedexplicationsometimesfailsbe-causetheexplicatorhasfailedtodistinguishdi erentconceptsthatmightbeintendedastheexplicandum.Itmayalsofailbecausetheexplicatumdi ersfromtheexplicanduminwaysthatpreventtheformerbeingusedinplaceofthelatter.However,nothinginthemethodofexplicationprecludescriticalconsiderationoftheseissues;infact,therearemanycriticaldiscus-sionsofjusttheseissuesinCarnap'sownwork.HenceBonioloismistakeninthinkingthatthemethodofexplicationisinimicaltotherecognitionoferrors.4.EagleonconceptualclaricationTheotherrecentcriticofexplicationisEagle,whowrites:Carnap[1950]hasalongdiscussionofwhathecalls\explication"ofapre-theoreticalconceptintermsofascienticallypreciseconcept.Hegivesanumberofcriteria:thattheproposedexplicatum(i)besucientlysimilartotheoriginalconcepttoberecognizablyanex-plicationofit;(ii)bemoreexactorprecise,andhaveclearcriteriaforapplication;(iii)playauniedandusefulroleinthescienticecon-omy(sothatitisnotjustgerrymanderedandaccidental);and(iv)beenmeshedinconceptualschemessimplerthananyotherputativeex-plicationthatalsomeetscriteria(i){(iii).Thesearegoodconstraintstokeepinmind.However,thismodelisaltogethertoocompressed;foritpresumesthatwehaveanindependentlygoodanalysisofthe 8PatrickMaherunderwhatconditionsasentencelike\p(h;e)=r"istrue.ThusCarnap'sspecicationofthefunctionc,whichwashisexplicatumforprobability1,doesnotsaymerelythatcsatisesthemathematicallawsofprobability;Carnapxedcuniquelybyspecifyingallitsvalues.Anditwouldmakenosensetotrytogivea\conceptualclarication"ofc;thefunctionisjustwhatitisdenedtobe.Eagle'ssecondexampleconcernsKripkesemanticsformodallogic.Eaglethinksthatthissemanticsprovidesanexplicationthatrequires\philosoph-icalattention."ButKripkesemanticsformodallogicalsofailstomeetCarnap'scriterionofhaving\explicitrulesforitsuse;"itdoesnotcontainrulesthatdeterminewhichclaimsaboutpossibleworldsaretrue.Andifwehadsuchrules,therewouldbenoroomforfurther\conceptualclarication."SoEagle'sbeliefthatexplicatarequire\conceptualclarication"restsonamisunderstandingoftheconceptofanexplicatum.Whenweunder-standtheconceptcorrectly,wecanseethatthereisnoroomforfurther\conceptualclarication"ofanexplicatum.EaglepresentshimselfasbeingmoredemandingthanCarnap,requiringnotjustthatanexplicatumbespeciedbutalsothatitbegivena\concep-tualclarication"or\philosophicalinterpretation."ItisuncleartomewhatEaglemeansbythelatterphrases,butfromhisexamplesIgatherthathedoesnotrequiretheformulationofexplicitrulesfortheuseoftheconcept.Carnap,ontheotherhand,requiresthatanexplicatumbegivenbystatingsuchrules.SoitisreallyCarnap,notEagle,whohasthehigherstandardofwhatphilosophicalanalysisrequires.5.EagleoneliminationAfterthepassagejustdiscussed,Eaglemakesanothercriticismofexplica-tion.Hesaysofthismethod:Italsosuggeststhattheexplicatumreplaceoreliminatetheexplican-dum;andthatsatisfyingtheseconstraintsisenoughtoshowthattheinitialconcepthasnofurtherimportance.Butclearlytherelationbetweenthescienticandpre-scienticconceptsisnotsoone-sided;afterall,thefolkaretheoneswhoacceptthescientictheories,andifthetheorydisagreestoomuchwiththeirordinaryusage,itsim-plywon'tgetaccepted.Itakethiskindofapproachtophilosophicalanalysistobepragmatistinsomebroadsense;itemphasizesthecon-ceptualneedsoftheusersofscientictheoriesinunderstandingtheaimsandcontentofthosetheories.(pp.372f.) 10PatrickMaherApre-scienticconceptCisclariedin[Carnap's]senseifitisforcertainpurposesreplaced(orsupplantedorsucceeded)byaconceptC0whichisunlikeCinbeingbothexactandfruitful.([13],p.504,emphasesinoriginal)Sinceanexplicatumisonlyintendedtoreplacetheexplicandumincertaincontextsandforcertainpurposes,explicationdoesnotaimtomaketheexplicandum\ofnofurtherimportance."6.ConclusionInthispaperIhaveexaminedfourobjectionstothemethodologyofexpli-cationandarguedthatnoneofthemiscorrect.InthiswayIhavedefendedtheviewthatexplicationisanappropriatemethodologyfordoingformalphilosophy.Inadditiontodefendingexplication,thisdiscussionhasalsoservedtoclarifywhatexplicationisandhowitworks.Acknowledgments.ThankstoGiovanniBoniolo,AntonyEagle,andBran- denFitelsonforcomments.References[1]Boniolo,Giovanni,`Kant'sexplicationandcarnap'sexplication:TheReddeRa-tionem',InternationalPhilosophicalQuarterly,43(2003),3,289{298.[2]Carnap,Rudolf,LogicalFoundationsofProbability,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,1950.Secondedition1962.[3]Carnap,Rudolf,`Themethodologicalcharacteroftheoreticalconcepts',MinnesotaStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience,1(1956),38{76.[4]Carnap,Rudolf,`Repliesandsystematicexpositions',inSchilpp[12],pp.859{1013.[5]Eagle,Antony,`Twenty-oneargumentsagainstpropensityanalysesofprobability',Erkenntnis,60(2004),371{416.[6]Good,I.J.,`Thewhiteshoequaherringispink',BritishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience,19(1968),156{157.[7]Hempel,CarlG.,`Studiesinthelogicofconrmation',Mind,54(1945),1{26and97{121.ReprintedwithsomechangesinAspectsofScienticExplanation,CarlG.Hempel.NewYork:TheFreePress,1965.[8]Maher,Patrick,`Probabilitycapturesthelogicofscienticconrmation',inChristopherR.Hitchcock,(ed.),ContemporaryDebatesinPhilosophyofScience,Blackwell,Oxford,2004,pp.69{93.[9]Nicod,Jean,LeProblemeLogiquedel'Induction,Alcan,Paris,1923.PagereferencesaretotheEnglishtranslationin[10].