dictatorial regime and its future Amb T TERADA 1 The Death of Kim Jong Il on December 17 2011 2 Top In this image from KRT television Kim Jong Un walks next to his father Kim Jong Ils ID: 746021
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Slide1
North Korea: Kim Jong Un’s dictatorial regime and its future
Amb. T. TERADA
1Slide2
The Death of Kim Jong Il on December 17, 2011
2Slide3
Top: In this image from KRT television,
Kim Jong Un
walks next to his father Kim
Jong Il's
hearse along with seven core officials during the funeral procession in Pyongyang on Wednesday. /AFP-Yonhap; Bottom: From 1 to 8, Kim
Jong Un, Jang Sung Taek, Kim Ki-nam, Choe Tae-bok, Ri Yong-ho, Kim Yong-chun, Kim Jong-gak, and U Dong-chuk
The ‘Gang of 7’ behind Kim
Jong Un
3Slide4
Source: Market Watchhttp://blogs.marketwatch.com/themargin/2014/10/06/one-image-that-shows-why-we-need-north-koreas-kim-jong-un-in-power/
4
North Korean Leader Kim Jong
Un’s
family tree
Assassinated
in Malaysia
on 13 February 2017Slide5
5
Execution
of Kim Jong Un’s uncle, Jang
Sung
Taek
(December 2013)Slide6
・
Nuclear Policy and Launching of Missiles
Kim Jong Un is determined to make his country a serious nuclear power in line with his publicly pronounced policy of pursuing nuclear weapons advancement and economic growth at the same time. Nuclear weapons are central to his regime’s identity and survival.
The Characteristics of Kim Jong Un’s dictatorial Government
13 April 2012
North Korea fails to launch a “satellite” to mark the birthday of Kim Il Sung. It was a long-range missile test that North Korea had agreed to suspend in return for food aid in accordance
with 29 February 2012 US-DPRK agreement.
12 December 2012
North Korea test-flies a long-range
ballistic missile.
12 February 2013
North Korea carries out its third
nuclear test
.
6 January 2016
North Korea conducts its fourth nuclear
test, which it claims was a hydrogen bomb.
7
February 2016
North Korea test-flies a long-range ballistic missile dressed up as a rocket carrying a satellite into space.
9 September 2016
North Korea carries out its fifth
nuclear test.12 February 2017North Korea test-flies an intermediate range ballistic missile
6Slide7
7Slide8
8Slide9
Source: The News Tribe
http://www.thenewstribe.com/2012/10/09/n-korea-says-missiles-can-strike-us-mainland/
9
North Korea’s missilesSlide10
North
Korean
Missiles: Estimated
Maximum
Range
Source: Wikipediahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Korean_crisis
10Slide11
11
August 24, 2016
launching of
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
Source:https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/n-korea-submarine-missiles-not-ready-until-2018-experts/ar-BBw6O8o
Slide12
12
15 July 2012
Army head
Ri Yong Ho is removed from senior posts in the ruling party.
13 December 2013
Jang Sung Taek, uncle and political guardian to Kim Jong Un, executed immediately after the verdict on 8 December.
Kim Jong Un aims at consolidating an authoritarian power by purging key persons belonging to the “Gang of 7” as well as other political opponents.
Kim Jong Un governs the nation despotically on the basis of
party politics
similar to those of his grandfather Kim Il Sun’s times, completely dissimilar from his late father Kim Jon Il’s “
Military First Policy
.”
The
7th
Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea convened in May
2016
The
13th Supreme People's Assembly was held in June 2016
Internal PoliticsSlide13
13
The 7
th
Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea
(May, 2016)
The 7
th
Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held on May 6-9, 2016 for the first time in 36 years, which reaffirmed the WPK’s control of the Korean People’s Army and officially appointed
Kim Jong Un Chairman of the WPK
.Slide14
14
The 13
th
Supreme People’s Assembly
(June, 2016)
Kim
Jong Un was
appointed
chairman
of the State Affairs
Commission
,
a new body
replacing the Nation Defense Commission,
in
the
fourth session of the 13th Supreme People’s
Assembly,
held
on
June 29, 2016.Slide15
Abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea
15
1-3 December 1999
Murayama delegation visits the DPRK and calls
for negotiations to normalize relations.
⇒
Three rounds of normalization talks were held
in 2000
but failed to produce concrete results.
17 September 2002
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visits Pyongyang and signs Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration
.
15 October 2002
In response to a request by the Japanese Government, the five abduction victims returned to Japan.
22 May 2004
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi makes his second visit to Pyongyang for the purpose of requesting
Kim Jong Il to repatriate the family members of the five abductees.Slide16
Kim Jong Un Government’sengagement with Japan
(1)
In the early part of the year 2014,
Kim Jong Un
reached out to Japan with an offer to reopen its investigation into the fate of Japanese citizens in his country, in an apparent attempt to break out of international isolation.
Following the agreement reached in May 2014, Kim Jong Un Government announced in July the constitution of an Investigating Commission, headed by So Tae Ha, Vice-Director of State Security Department, whose task is to investigate the following:
①the 12 Japanese identified by the Government of Japan as abductees ②the hundreds of Japanese missing persons cases identified by the Japanese National Police Agency as potential cases of North Korean abduction
③
the fate of those Japanese who had accompanied their spouses to the North
④
the remains of the Japanese who died on the Korean Peninsula
during
WWⅡ
.
16Slide17
Kim Jong Un Government’sengagement with Japan
(2)
In a violent reaction to the Japanese Government’s decision adopted on 10 February 2016 to impose additional sanctions against North Korea as a result of its fourth nuclear test and ballistic missile launch,
North Korea announced in February 12 a complete discontinuance of investigation of Japanese citizens in the country and dismantlement of the Investigating Commission
.
17
So Tae Ha
Vice-Director
of
State Security DepartmentSlide18
Kim Jong Un Government’s interactions with major powers (1)
United States
North Korea’s non-compliance with
29 February 2012 agreement
resulted in interruption of a dialogue, further exacerbated by Pyongyang’s cyber attack against Sony Pictures in December 2014. The Obama administration was adhered to its “
strategic patience policy.” Due to this avowed policy, there was no dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang while the Obama administration was in power.China
Sino-North Korean relation, once described as being as close as lips and teeth, has cooled of late as a consequence of nuclear tests and execution of pro-China broker, Jang Sung Taek.“China is not happy about North Korea’s brinkmanship or nuclear weapons program, but for Beijing denuclearization is a rather secondary concern. It has to worry, above all, about maintaining the status quo and limiting U.S. influence in the region
.” (NK News June 8
th
2016 by Andrei Lankov)
18Slide19
Kim Jong Un Government’s interactions with major powers (2)
South Korea
Inter-Korean relation continues to be plagued by a cycle of resumption of dialogue and its abrupt interruption due to the North’s arbitrary decisions. A fourth nuclear test in January followed by a long-range ballistic missile launch in February prompted the Government of South Korea to shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex and to stiffen its posture towards North Korea. Inter-Korean relation is now at danger point.
Russia
Pyongyang is now finding a strategic interest in forging a closer relationship with Moscow, in order to counterbalance a chilly relation with Beijing and reap economic benefits from Russia. The visit to Moscow in November 2014 by Kim Jong Un’s special envoy, Choe Ryong Hae, Korean Workers’ Party Secretary, opened a new chapter in Russo-North Korean relation. Although Russia wants to be a player in Northeast Asia, having both strategic and economic motivations, its straitened finances will not permit Moscow to answer Pyongyang’s high expectations of economic aid on behalf of Beijing.
19Slide20
20
Remarks on North Korea’s Future (1)
“Making predictions about North Korea is difficult, especially those about their future.”
(Prof. Victor Cha: ‘
The Impossible State
’ published in 2012)“The Contours of a Future: What Might Happen to North Korea in the Next Two Decades” (Prof. Andrei Lankov: ‘The Real North Korea’ published in 2013)
There are four likely scenarios that might bring an end to the North Korean regime.The first scenario: An attempt at reforms.
The second scenario
: Outbreak of serious factional infighting within the top leadership.
The third scenario
: A spontaneous outbreak of popular discontent.
⇒
A “Pyongyang Spring”
The fourth scenario
: A contagion of some unrest in China. Slide21
21
Remarks on North Korea’s Future (2)
Excerpt from the editorial of ‘The economist’ May 28
th
2016
“Perhaps dissent over Mr Kim’s rule among the North Korean elite will lead to a palace coup. A successor might be ready for an Iran-type deal to boost his standing both at home and abroad. That is a possibility, but Mr Kim has so far shown himself able to crush any challengers to his dominance.
The last hope is that tougher sanctions will contribute to the collapse of the regime
—which, in turn, could lead to reunification with the South and denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. That would be the best outcome, but it is also the one that carries the most danger. Moreover, it is precisely the situation China seeks to avoid
.”Slide22
22
Thank you for your attention.