CHRISTMAS DAY 2009:
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CHRISTMAS DAY 2009:

IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREW. Presented by: PHILIP BAUM. WATS/SCSI, ORLANDO: 28 APRIL 2010. WHICH WERE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS POST-9/11?. DEC 2001: RICHARD REID . (FAIL/AIRCREW). NOV 2002: ARKIA . (LUCK).

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CHRISTMAS DAY 2009:




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Presentation on theme: "CHRISTMAS DAY 2009:"— Presentation transcript:

Slide1

CHRISTMAS DAY 2009:

IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREW

Presented by: PHILIP BAUM

WATS/SCSI, ORLANDO: 28 APRIL 2010

Slide2

WHICH WERE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS POST-9/11?

DEC 2001: RICHARD REID

(FAIL/AIRCREW)

NOV 2002: ARKIA

(LUCK)

MAY 2003: DAVID MARK ROBINSON

(AIRCREW)

AUG 2004: DOMODEDOVO BOMBINGS

(FAIL)

SEP 2004: KATO AIR

(AIRCREW)

OCT 2006: TIRANA HIJACK

(AIRCREW)

JUN 2007: GLASGOW AIRPORT

(FAIL/LUCK)

FEB 2008: EAGLE AIR

(AIRCREW)

MAR 2008: CHINA SOUTHERN

(AIRCREW)

SEP 2009: AEROMEXICO

(FAIL/AIRCREW)

DEC 2009: ABDULMUTALLAB

(FAIL/AIRCREW)

FEB 2010: AUSTIN

(FAIL)

Slide3

SCREENING METHODOLOGIES

DESPITE THIS…

COMPARE THE HUGE EXPENDITURE IN SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES

vs.

INVESTMENT IN AIRCREW TRAINING

Slide4

SCREENING METHODOLOGIES

PROBLEM

PROBLEM→SOLUTION

PROBLEM →METHOD →SOLUTION

Slide5

SCREENING METHODOLOGIES

SOLUTION FAILS?

YOU DIDN’T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM

YOU MISUSED THE METHOD

YOU USED THE WRONG METHOD

YOU USED THE WRONG PEOPLE TO USE THE METHOD

Slide6

25 DECEMBER 2009

A “SYSTEMIC FAILURE”…

TO IDENTIFY THE LIKES OF ABDULMUTALLAB

WE DIDN’T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM

WE USED THE WRONG METHOD

= POOR RISK MANAGEMENT

Slide7

REACTIVE SECURITY

UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALLAB → - BODY SCANNERS - INFLIGHT RESTRICTIONS - BLACKLISTING CERTAIN COUNTRIES

Slide8

FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As a start, each individual selected for special screening should be screened for explosives. [emphasis added] (p. 393)

Slide9

METAL DETECTION vs. WHOLE BODY IMAGING

COST:

AMD: between $5,000 and $20,000

Millimetre Wave: around $150,000

Backscatter X-ray: between $100k and $200k

Transmission: $200,000

THROUGHPUT RATE:

AMD: max. 500 pax per hour (no baggage)

MMV/Backscatter: approx. 200 per hour

Transmission: 150 per hour

Slide10

CHECKPOINT COST

TO PROCESS 10,000 PAX PER HOUR

AMD:

requires 20 systems, using average equipment

COST: $220,000

In comparison:

MMV/Backscatter:

requires 50 systems @ cost of $7,500,000

TRANSMISSION:

requires 67 systems @ cost of approx. $15,000,000

Slide11

BODY SCANNING: BACKSCATTER X-RAY

Slide12

BODY SCANNING: BACKSCATTER X-RAY

Slide13

BODY SCANNING: MILLIMETRE WAVE

Slide14

BODY SCANNING: TRANSMISSION X-RAY

Slide15

RADIATION COMPARISON

GROUND LEVEL:

2.4mSv per annum background radiation

FLIGHT:

Depends upon altitude and latitude; higher at higher altitudes and closer to the Poles.

Concorde, 12-15 µ

Sv

(

microsieverts

) p/h;

Long haul aircraft, 5 µ

Sv

(

microsieverts

) p/h;

Short haul aircraft, 1-3 µ

Sv

p/h (BA)

Slide16

RADIATION COMPARISON

LIMITS:

20mSv per annum (on average) for Aircrew

1mSv per annum for general public =

200 hours flying per year on subsonic trans-equatorial routes.

AS&E (backscatter) reports 0.09

μSv

per scan; the dose for a six hour flight is 200 to 400 times larger at 20

μSv

.

1 x SOTER RS (transmission) scan is less than 3

μSv

. This is approximately equivalent to a one hour subsonic flight at 10,000 m.

Slide17

TRANSMISSION X-RAY COMPARISON

According to a Radiation Metrology Report published in the United Kingdom by the Health Protection Agency’s Radiation Protection Division

Assuming 1

Conpass

LD scan = approximately 0.25

μSv

 

0.25

μSv

= 30 minutes of exposure to naturally occurring background radiation in Cornwall in the UK or Denver, Colorado in the USA = I

Conpass

LD scan

 

0.25

μSv

= 4g of Brazil nuts ~ consumption of one Brazil nut = 1

Conpass

LD scan

 

5

μSv

single dental X-ray = 20

Conpass

LD scans

Slide18

BE VERY AFRAID!!!

Slide19

BODY SCANNING?

IF NOT FOR ALL…

THEN FOR WHO?

Slide20

WHAT IS PROFILING?

A RISK ANALYSIS OF

PASSENGERS

& SITUATIONS

THROUGH A REASONED APPROACH TO SCREENING

PERFORMED BY A

TRAINED STREETWISE WORKFORCE

Slide21

DISTURBING FACT

Every day, immigration and customs officials around the world identify people carrying out illegal acts…AFTER they have got off an aircraft.

If we can identify people at that stage, why can’t we do it before they board?

Slide22

DRUG TRAFFICKERS

Slide23

CONCEALEMENT EXERCISE:JULY 2009

PROJECT MANAGEMENT:

- Green Light Ltd., London, UK

SCREENING TECHNOLOGY:

- OD Security, The Netherlands

SCREENING PROPS:

- Finnish Security Projects, Helsinki

-

Quelltex

Ltd., UK

Slide24

SAUDI SUICIDE BOMBER:27TH AUGUST 2009

Abdullah Hassan al-

AseeriAssassination attempt on a Saudi Prince during RamadanFlown in to attend meeting with PrinceFully searchedInternal device detonated by mobile phone

Slide25

WHAT IS PASSENGER PROFILING?

APPEARANCE & BEHAVIOUR+PASSPORT+ITINERARY+INTELLIGENCE

+

+

+

Slide26

WHAT IS PROFILING?

WE ARE BASELINING...

...and the move towards centralised screening is an impediment to our ability to profile effectively.

Slide27

OBJECTIONS

DISCRIMINATORY

Solution: Training

SLOW

Solution: It’s not! It’s quicker!

INVASION OF PRIVACY

Solution: A necessary evil, just like traffic wardens!

IMPERSONATORS

Solution: Far easier to plan to circumvent current checkpoint than pretend to be ‘normal’

Slide28

OBJECTIONS

BUT THE REAL HURDLE TO OVERCOME IS THE REGULATOR...

A REGULATORY NIGHTMARE

Slide29

XMAS DAY 2009:BASIC PROFILING

PAID CASH

TICKET BOUGHT IN GHANA; JOURNEY STARTED IN NIGERIA

ALTERED TICKET ONCE PURCHASED

VISA ISSUED IN UK; UK NOT ON ITINERARY

NO LUGGAGE

PREVIOUS TRAVEL TO YEMEN

Slide30

XMAS DAY 2009:WHAT WENT WRONG?

INTELLIGENCE KNOWN…NOT SUFFICIENTLY ANALYSED

FAMILY CUT-OFF (AND FATHERS REPORT)… NOT LINKED TO TRAVEL HISTORY

OLD VISA IN PLACE…NOT REVOKED

SCREENERS DON’T HAVE ACCESS TO PAX DATA

US AGENTS ON GROUND IN AMSTERDAM… NEVER EVEN SPOKE WITH PASSENGER

SCHEDULED FOR INTERVIEW IN DETROIT

Slide31

BOTTOM LINE:IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREW

WILL BE LEFT TO RESPOND TO NEXT ATTACK AS GROUND APPROACH FAILS AGAIN

MORE FRUSTRATED PASSENGERS GOING THROUGH “SILLY SECURITY”

GREATER PROPENSITY FOR AIR RAGE

GREATER FOR PROPENSITY FOR OTHER PASSENGERS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR

OWN HANDS…AND PARANOID AIRCREW!

AIRCREW BEING REPEATEDLY BODY SCANNED

Slide32

BOTTOM LINE:WHAT DO WE NEED TO DO?

PROVIDE BETTER TRAINING

ALERT CREW TO LATEST THREATS/DEVICES

VALUE THEIR OPINION & ENCOURAGE A REPORTING CULTURE

REMEMBER IT WILL BE DIFFERENT NEXT TIME

Slide33

ANNEX 6: DOC 9811GUIDANCE NOTES: CHEM/BIO

“…distinction between the handling of an IED and a chemical/biological weapon.”

“…familiarise crew members with such weaponry.”

“Unexpected exposure to an activated chemical/biological weapon within the confines of an aircraft cabin will require quick

identification,clear

thinking and swift response.” Is this possible without training?

Slide34

ANNEX 6: DOC 9811 2.6.21GUIDANCE NOTES: CHEM/BIO

“Perhaps the most important single factor in assuring a successful outcome to a CBW incident is for each crew member to consider in advance how he or she would deal with a genuine CHEM/BIO threat in the airplane.”

Slide35

JUST TO MAKE IT CLEAR...

PROFILING WOULD HAVE IDENTIFIED THIS PASSENGER…BUT NOT ON GROUNDS OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, OR COLOUR OF SKIN

NIGERIANS (AND OTHER COUNTRIES) SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE FOR SCREENING BECAUSE OF THEIR PASSPORT

…RICHARD REID WAS BRITISH…SO PERHAPS I SHOULD BE SCRENED SPECIALLY!

Slide36

CHRISTMAS DAY 2009:

IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRCREW

Presented by: PHILIP BAUM

WATS/SCSI, ORLANDO: 28 APRIL 2010

Slide37

PHILIP BAUM

MANAGING DIRECTOR,

GREEN LIGHT LTD.

Editor@avsec.com