why those who do god do good faithful citizensjonathan bi - PDF document

Why those who do God, do goodƒŽFAITHFUL CITIZENSJonathan Birdwell Religiosity has always been closely associated withconservatism: the Church of England is sometimes describedRepublican party and the religious right have becomeincreasingly interdependent, but a similar trend has notoccurred on this side of the Atlantic. This report, based onoriginal analysis of the Citizenship Survey and the EuropeanValues Survey, investigates the different relationship betweenreligion and politics in the UK and Europe.The report presents two key findings. First, religiouspeople are more active citizens … they volunteer more, donate Faithful Citizens|Jonathan Birdwell · Mark Littler ISBN 978-1-909037-05-2 Faithful citizens cover 6/4/12 2:29 PM Page 1 This project was supported by the Bill Hill Trust Faithful citizens cover 6/4/12 2:29 PM Page 2 Demos is a think-tank focused on power andtraditional, ivory tower model of policymaking by giving a voice to people andour research, including them in citizens juries,deliberative workshops, focus groups andethnographic research. Through our highquality and socially responsible research,Demos has established itself as the leadingindependent think-tank in British politics.In 2012, our work is focused on fourprogrammes: Family and Society; PublicServices and Welfare; Violence and Extremism;our research programes, Demos has politicalprojects focused on the burning issues inProgressive Conservatism Project, the Centrefor London at Demos and Demos Collections,bringing together topical essays by leadingOur work is driven by the goal of a societypopulated by free, capable, secure andpowerful citizens. Find out more atwww.demos.co.uk. © Demos. Some rights reserved Magdalen House, 136 Tooley Street,London, SE1 2TU, UKSeries design by modernactivityTypeset by Chat Noir Design, CharenteSet in Gotham Rounded Cover paper: Flora GardeniaText paper: Munken Premium White FAITHFUL CITIZENSJonathan Birdwell Open access. Some rights reserved. circulation of our work as widely as possible while retainingthe copyright. 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To find out more go towww.creativecommons.org Acknowledgements7The Demos Inquiry into Faith, Community Foreword1Background: are faithful citizens better citizens?2Findings: faith and civic engagement in 3Conclusion and implicationsNotes99References105 AcknowledgementsThis research would not be possible without the generoussupport of the Bill Hill Trust, for which we are very grateful. Itwould also not be possible without the efforts of the Rt HonStephen Timms MP and former Demos Director Kitty Ussher. Inparticular, we would like to thank Stephen for all of hisleadership of the Advisory Committee, support and feedback onthe research and this report.We would like to extend our sincere gratitude to all of theAdvisory Committee members for attending project meetingsand providing invaluable feedback on the research and thisreport at various stages.At Demos, we would like to thank Jane Ashford-Thom andSusanna Pettigrew for all their research support. We would alsolike to thank Max Wind-Cowie and Claudia Wood for theirhelpful comments on earlier drafts of the report. Finally, we arevery grateful to Beatrice Karol Burks and Ralph Scott for theirhelp and patience in seeing the report through publication.As always, all errors and omissions remain our own.Jonathan Birdwell The Demos Inquiry intoFaith, Community and This report is part of a larger project led by Stephen Timms MP and Demos exploring the role of faith in UK society andpolitics. It is the first in a series of three reports that will bereleased in 2012.This report explores the connection between faith and civicand political engagement in the UK. The second report, due tobe released in June 2012, will examine the role of faith groups indelivering public services. The third and final report, forth-coming in summer 2012, will consider the role of faith in politics.In order to advise on the direction and content of theresearch we have convened an advisory committee of faith leaders,academics and politicians who are knowledgeable about theissues covered by our research. This advisory committee is chairedby Stephen Timms MP and includes the following members: ·Stephen Timms MP (chair)·Akeela Ahmed (Muslim Youth Helpline)·Rosie Bairwal (Catholic Association for Racial Justice)·Hazel Blears MP (Labour MP, Salford)·Steve Bonnick·Sir Trevor Chinn·Alison Coutts (Bill Hill Trust)·Unmesh Desai (Labour Councillor, Newham)·Mustafa Field (Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board,·Andy Flanagan (Christian Socialist Movement)·Lord Maurice Glasman (Labour Peer, Stoke Newington andStamford Hill)·James Kidner (The Coexist Foundation)·Siobhan McAndrew (University of Manchester, British Religionin Numbers programme) ·Mark Oliver (youth worker)·Jasbir Panesar (University of East London)·Vikas Pota (Sewa Day)·Nick Spencer (Theos)·Rev Lucy Winkett (vicar, St James Piccadilly) The Demos Inquiry into Faith, Community and Society ForewordRt Hon Stephen Timms MP 11 Imagination and generosity rooted in religious faith are a keysource for the values the Labour party exists to promote and theaspirations it seeks to realise. However, the relationship betweenthe party on the one hand, and churches and faith groups on theother, has not always been easy or comfortable. The researchdescribed in this report highlights the potential for building amuch better relationship in the future.It underlines how important it is for the party to engagewith faith groups. A large reservoir of potential support forLabours aims is to be found among those who describethemselves as religious, and among the smaller group whobelong to a church or other religious organisation. Faithfulcitizens are more active in their communities than the average,and more active politically. Far from the Conservative party atprayer, on a number of key issues they are likely to offer supportfor progressive political positions.According to the latest wave of the European Values Study,over half the UK population describes itself as religious … 52 percent. This may appear surprising. Ever since the 1950s, therehave been frequent reports that the number attending religiousworship is falling. Religious faith has been widely assumed to bethe preoccupation of a small minority. This research suggestsThe Richard Dawkins Foundation has argued that thisfigure overstates the importance of religion, because, eventhough many people describe themselves as religious, most donot in fact exhibit much orthodox belief. But it would be amistake to conclude that religious faith is unimportant forpolitics in contemporary Britain. Political discourse rooted infaith continues to matter a great deal. Many peoples thinkingabout right and wrong, and about the kind of society they want to live in, is deeply influenced by religious faith and valuesFrom Labours standpoint, Demos has identified aparticularly interesting, large group within those who describethemselves as religious: people who take the view that there is atleast some basic truth in religions other than their own. Theseaccount for 42 per cent of the UK population, as suggested bythe European Values Study. They have a high propensity tovolunteer for progressive causes, and a high level of interest inpolitics.To look at the data in a different way, a much smallergroup, 13 per cent of the UK population, say they belong to areligious organisation. (It is worth noting that this proportion ishigher in the UK than in many other European countries … only4 per cent in France and Spain and 8 per cent in Germany saythey belong to a religious organisation.) Demos has found thatthis group does not fit the conservative Christian stereotypefamiliar from commentary about the USA. The context andhistory in the UK has been very different. Most people whobelong to a religious organisation in the UK place themselves onthe left of the political spectrum. They are more likely than theto work voluntarily to promote womens rights, human rightsand international development. They are also rather more likelythan the rest of the population to be very interested in politics.The progressive cause is often cast as being in oppositionto the religious one. This report, as well as recent campaigns likeMake Poverty History and Stop the Traffik, shows that, in fact,in many areas they agree. Where the progressive and thereligious seem to be at odds, the differences need to be exploredwithin a creative and respectful relationship, recognising thatthere is a shared commitment to the common good.Demos findings underline the extent to which Labour canlook for support among the faith communities, and expect tofind activists willing to work for its cause. It has happenedbefore. The churches were crucial in Labours foundation andearly growth. Virtually the whole of the first parliamentaryLabour party came into politics through church activities. Before Foreword the Second World War, the Anglican political philosopherRichard Tawney was Labours key ideologist.John Smiths Tawney lecture for the Christian SocialistMovement, published in 1993 as Reclaiming the ground, set outto renew Labours engagement with the churches.on that, Tony Blairs success in 1997 in winning support amongthe churches made a big contribution to Labours electorallandslide. In government, Labour delivered for church-inspiredcampaigns like Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History.In working now to renew its policies after its electiondefeat, and to formulate a compelling new programme to presentto the electorate, Labour can draw new energy and inspirationfrom engaging with faith groups. It needs their help indeveloping policies on the basis of the values that the partyshares with them, and then in building support for thosepolicies. The Demos work highlights the scale of the potential.And faith group members will be key in any future,election-winning, progressive coalition. Recently, theConservative party has courted church members vigorously toreclaim ground which it lost in 1997. For example, it has workedhard to build support among the black-led churches. Forelectoral purposes, it ruthlessly exploited unease in the faithcommunities about parts of the Equality Act 2010. Those effortshelped it achieve the largest share of the vote in the 2010 generalelection. In Labour, we shouldnt let that happen again.Communities like the one I represent are characterised byhigh levels of participation in different faith groups. Far fromleading to fragmentation, the values those diverse groups shareprovide a firm foundation for working together. A high level offaith group membership builds a sense of belonging to the widercommunity. It promotes cohesion rather than division.Faith communities build among their members key values… responsibility, patience, compassion, solidarity and honesty.Those values underpin many of the most hopeful developmentsin Britains communities. They help build character traits inyoung people that enable them to succeed in education and inthe world of work. Faith groups and faith-based organisationsare providing activities for young people, tackling unemployment, counselling on indebtedness, and supporting thehomeless and those seeking asylum. Those values are also thefoundation of the Labour movement, and they can helpreconnect people with politics.The Demos research shows the potential support forLabour among people of faith. They can make a hugecontribution to Labours values, to its policy rethinking and itsorganisational renewal. It is now for the party to mobilise tomake that potential a reality. Foreword Summary People of faith are likely to be a vital base of support for anyfuture election-winning progressive coalition. Our researchsuggests that religious citizens in the UK are more likely to becivically engaged and politically active than their non-religiouscounterparts. They are also more likely to hold progressivepolitical values on a number of important political and economicquestions at the heart of twenty-first-century policy. Despite thetrend of decreasing religiosity in the UK, religion remainsimportant to a broad range of active and engaged citizens … andso it must to politicians.Research has been produced in recent years exploring therelationship between religion and civic activism. Much of itposits a correlation between the two phenomena, with religiouspractice correlated with higher levels of volunteering andparticipation in civic society. Faithful citizens, it is argued, arebetter, more active citizens, volunteering more of their time thanothers to improve their communities.However, most of this research has focused on the USA.Given the USAs distinct social, political and religious context,these findings cannot be assumed to apply in the UK. Freshempirical research is necessary to determine whether there is arelationship between faith and civic engagement in the UK. Thisreport aims to accomplish this.It is also commonly assumed that religious groups andindividuals tend to be more active in support of conservativecauses, for example, being against homosexuality and abortion.This report explores the link between religion and moreprogressive modes of social and civic activism, includinginvolvement with womens rights groups, internationaldevelopment and trade unions. It also tests the relationshipbetween religion and progressive values through an examination of religious adherents attitudes to immigration, equality andother issues relevant to twenty-first-century political debates.Research findingsThe findings presented in this report are based on analysisthe European Values Study (EVS).Over the years, the Citizenship Survey has providedevidence of there being a correlation between religion, civicengagement and a sense of belonging in the UK. Based onprevious analyses, as well as original analysis conducted byDemos using the latest 2010/11 wave of the Citizenship Survey, Summary ·Religious people in the UK are more likely than non-religiouspeople to volunteer regularly in their local community, to feel agreater sense of belonging to their local community and Britain,and to have higher levels of trust in other people and socialinstitutions. They are also more likely to feel they can influencedecisions locally and nationally.·Religious people are more likely than non-religious people toengage in volunteering in their local community, and to takedecision-making roles in committees and through localleadership forums, such as being a councillor, school governor or·Religious people who said that their religion was very importantto their sense of identity were more likely than those who said itwas not important to their identity to be civically engaged and to To supplement the analyses using the Citizenship Survey,we conducted an original analysis of the latest wave of the EVS.We selected eight western European countries to comprise awestern European sample, and used this western Europeanaverage to make comparisons with the UK. Our findings aretherefore presented for western Europe as a whole as well as theUK in particular. We ran two analyses based on three separate religiousindicators from the EVS survey. We then examined how civicengagement, political activism and political values vary acrossdifferent religious types.Belonging to a religious organisationFor the first analysis, we divided respondents who said that they belonged to a church or religious organisation from those who did not. More than one in ten (13 per cent) of Britonsfrom the EVS sample reported belonging to a church orreligious organisation, which is just above the average of 12 percent across our European sample as a whole. This grouprepresents the more active religious practitioners rather thancitizens who would affiliate themselves with a religion orreligious heritage.We found that those who belonged to a religiousorganisation both in the UK and across Europe were more likelyto be civically engaged, to be politically active and to prioritisesocial democratic values on a range of indicators. While ouranalysis cannot demonstrate causation … in other words, thatbeing religious someone to be more engaged … thecorrelation between the two phenomena is itself of interest.Across our western European sample, those belonging to areligious organisation were more likely to volunteer for or be ·political parties·local community action·development and human rights issues·environmental issues·womens issues·youth work Those who belonged to a religious organisation were alsomore likely than those who did not to say that they are veryinterested in politics, to have signed a petition and participated In the UK, while the numbers are too small in someinstances to draw conclusions (for example with regard tovolunteering for trade unions or political parties), those whobelonged to a religious organisation were similarly more likelythan non-religious respondents to volunteer for local communitywomens issues and the environment. While there was nodifference between categories in the percentage of respondentswho had joined a boycott, signed a petition or said they werevery interested in politics, those who belonged to a religiousorganisation in the UK were more likely to have attended aWe also analysed responses to a range of value-basedquestions that often serve to distinguish the political left fromthe right in Europe. We found that those who belonged to areligious organisation in the UK were: ·more likely to place themselves on the left side of the politicalspectrum·more likely to value equality over freedom·less likely to have a negative association towards living next door·slightly more likely to say that those on benefits should have totake a job (rather than be able to refuse)Exclusivists, pluralists and secularsFor the second analysis, we divided respondents on the basis oftheir response to two questions, from which we produced threecategories of respondents: religious exclusivists, religiouspluralists and non-religious seculars. A full explanation of thesecategories and the methodology we used, including the totalnumbers for each group in each country, is provided in theappendices. In short: ·Exclusivists self-identified as religious and believed that thereis only one true religion. ·Pluralists self-identified as religious and believed that there isone true religion, but other religions have some basic truths, orthat no one religion has a monopoly on the truth.·Seculars did not identify as religious. 19 We distinguished respondents in this way to investigatehow respondents views towards other religions impact on civicengagement norms and social capital.Across Europe, 63 per cent of respondents self-identified asreligious, with 13 per cent in the exclusivist category and 50 percent in the pluralist category. In the UK, 52 per cent identifiedthemselves as religious, with 10 per cent in the exclusivistcategory and 42 per cent in the pluralist category. Thus, thisgroup is much larger than the previous (those who belong to areligious organisation) and includes both active and non-activepractitioners of religion.Across western Europe, religious pluralists are the mostlikely group to volunteer on issues such as womens rights andyouth work. In the UK, pluralists were the most likely group torights, and the environment. UK pluralists were also the mostlikely group to have signed a petition and participated in aWe also found that in the UK: ·Pluralists were the group most likely to say they are veryinterested in politics.·A majority of both exclusivists and pluralists placed themselveson the left side of the political spectrum.·Pluralists were the most likely to express a positive associationtowards immigrants and foreign workers, and the most likelygroup to prioritise equality over freedom (although this latter·Exclusivists were the most likely group to prioritise equalisingincomes over providing work incentives. social democratic political causes should be able to find supportin faith communities, along with greater stocks of enthusiasmand greater willingness to participate and be involved. Too often,political parties on the left view faith groups … and those of faithin general … with suspicion, characterising them as inherentlyto reconnect faith groups with mainstream politics by taking amore positive view of the role of religion in British society. Ourresearch provides further support for those who argue that thisengagement could go further, and we argue that faith groups canplay an important role in setting and upholding a progressivepolicy agenda. We recommend the following: ·Progressive politicians in the UK should seek to work with faithgroups on the issues where our research suggests they areparticularly interested and engaged, for example immigration,womens rights, international development, the environment and·Although religious people may be more likely to volunteer, theyare less likely to have meaningful interactions with people fromdifferent backgrounds to their own. Efforts to encourage greatermixing between people from different backgrounds in pursuit ofcommon goals should be highlighted and championed bypoliticians.·This report provides additional support for the Demosrecommendation made in A Place for Pride of replacing thecurrent pen-and-paper UK citizenship test with a requirement tocomplete at least 16 hours of local volunteering. Background: are faithfulcitizens better citizens? In the USA, God is alive and well. At no time is this moreobvious than at election time. And while Republicans are more likely to invoke God and religion (and appeal to religious evangelicals), the obligation to faith extends across the political aisle.In the UK, things are clearly very different. The popularexample of Alastair Campbells quip to then Prime MinisterTony Blair (we dont do God) highlights that faith is not wornso publicly among politicians in the UK. Yet, it is still veryimportant to many both personally and politically, and just as inthe USA, this extends to politicians of all political persuasions.Despite the common perception that religion is more commonlyfound on the Conservative side of the Commons benches, it isimportant to remember that a number of those on the politicalleft first gained experience of public service through churchesand faith groups like the Christian Socialist Movement.However, analyses of national survey data highlight thesignificant differences between Britons and Americans when itcomes to religion. In American Grace, Harvard social scientistRobert Putnam and Notre Dame political scientist DavidCampbell highlight the findings of their Faith Matters surveys,conducted in 2006 and 2007, which represent a rich source ofdata on religion, politics and society. Their findings suggest thatUS citizens who are religious are more likely to volunteer in theirlocal community, give to charity, be more compassionate and bemore politically active and involved. However, greater numbersof religious people in the USA are more fervent, active and literalin their beliefs than in the UK. For example, over half of Britons(54 per cent) report never praying compared with just 18 per centof Americans. Moreover, a third of Americans believe scripture isthe actual word of God compared with just 9 per cent of Britons, and Americans are almost twice as likely to attend weeklyreligious services.In this report we ask if the link between religious and civicengagement that exists in the USA also exists in the UK, bearingin mind the different religious landscape in the USA and greaterreligiosity of Americans compared with Britons. This chapterbriefly highlights why this question is important and summarisessome of the academic research that explores the relationshipbetween being religious and being a good citizen.The rise and fall of religion in 21st-century UKBritons in general are becoming less and less religious.According to the 28th report of the British Social Attitudes Survey50 per cent of Britons do not regard themselves as belonging toany religion. This compares with 31 per cent who claimed to haveno religion in 1983.According to the 2001 UK Census, justunder a quarter of Britons (23.2 per cent) either claimed to haveno religion or failed to answer the question. While a fullerreflection of the state of British religiosity will be available, whenthe results of the 2011 Census are published, in the meantime itsuffices to say that the active practice of religion continues todecline, with responses from younger Britons suggesting asignificant generational shift. According to the 2009 Social Attitudes Survey, nearly two-thirds (64 per cent) of 18…24-year-old Britons report not belonging to a religion,comparedwith 28 per cent of Britons aged 65 and older.While it is truethat individuals may tend to become more religious the morethey age, Putnam and Campbells research confirms that agenerational change is also afoot in the USA … which, given it is starting from a position of greater religiosity, can allow us toassume that the same is probably occurring in And yet, despite religions apparent decline, its visibility inthe media and public discourse remains high. Part of this isperhaps due to its seemingly inexorable decline; however, nosingle event did more to bring religion to the forefront of publiclife than the attacks of September 11, 2001. In the wake of these Background: are faithful citizens better citizens? engendered) the debate about the incompatibility of Islam withWestern societies came to dominate the airwaves andnewspapers. At the same time, more Western Muslims(particularly younger generations) began to identify and practisetheir religion in more visible ways … driven by the attacks onIslam that followed 9/11 and the War against Terror, as well asbroader generational adjustment to historical immigration (forexample, research suggests that second and third generationimmigrants, standing at a crossroads between their parentsculture and that of their adopted country, increasingly looked toMany Britons continue to see faith as a moral refuge fromcapitalist democracies. The arguments of Richard Dawkins andChristopher Hitchens only seemed to retrench peoples religiousviews, with many recoiling at the perceived arrogance anddogmatism of this so-called militant atheism. The debate aboutthe necessity of religions moral underpinning of societyThe continuing importance of religion to UKDespite its decline, religion remains important to a smaller butactive subset of citizens, so politicians of all parties need to becomfortable engaging with faith groups, not just as voters butalso as community organisations helping to achieve sociallybeneficial outcomes.Following the attacks of 7 July 2005, Prime Minister TonyBlair convened leaders from all faiths to unite and counter therising tide of religious extremism and terrorism. Interfaithdialogue organisations across the country were established orbolstered, and local religious leaders were empowered asgatekeepers to their communities. One criticism levelled at theBlair Government during this time was that these relationships(particularly with the Muslim community) needed to be forgedfrom scratch because they did not exist previously. Fast-forward to 2012 and we find the CoalitionGovernment similarly dependent on the active involvement offaith groups in the implementation of policy. Some faith groupsare still very much involved in areas of countering extremism andfostering cohesion, but the current Government sees the role offaith groups and organisations as a deliverer of other services asintegral to the realisation of the vision of a Big Society. This willnot be without controversy, which is why the second phase ofthis project will look specifically at this issue.Do faithful citizens make better citizens?Sociologists and philosophers have long been interested in therole of religion in society: the identity it provides, its power toshape individual behaviour through shared moral codes, and itsrelationship with politics. While Marx famously referred to itssoporific effect on the masses, others have taken a more positiveview of its function, proclaiming it the only necessary andsufficient basis for a moral framework through whichcollaboration, mutual empathy and good relations are possible.Many argue that without religions ultimate sanction, socialmores would break down and amoral chaos would reign.Over the past two decades a substantial body of empiricalresearch has been devoted to demonstrating the connectionbetween religion and good citizenship. This has been aided bylarge scale, longitudinal surveys such as national censuses, theGeneral Social Survey in the USA, the World Values Survey andthe European Values Survey (EVS), the UK Citizenship Survey(UKCS), and more recently the US Faith Matters Survey as wellas the work of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Theseresources provide a snapshot of which religions predominate inmodern society as well as the levels and evolution of religiosityand religious practice more generally. Combining questions onreligion with background questions on gender, age, educationand income level … as well as other attitudinal and behaviouralquestions on political activism (voting, running for office,campaigning), civic engagement (giving to charity, volunteering)and moral and political values (views on homosexuality, Background: are faithful citizens better citizens? abortion, pre-marital sex, capitalism and economic inequality) …has allowed researchers to infer relationships between religiosityMost of this research demonstrates that there is acorrelation between religion and various measures associatedwith being a good and compassionate citizen. According toPutnam and Campbell, religious citizens are more generous thantheir secular counterparts with both their money and their timein volunteering (for both religious and secular causes), beingmore likely to take part in local civic and political life (throughcommunity organisations and committees) and to advocate forsocial and political reform in their local communities. Moreover,they argue that these findings hold when controlling for a rangeof other factors that might have an impact, including gender,age, education, race, location, income, home ownership, lengthof residence, marital and parental status and ideology.The point about ideology is significant. Putnam andCampbells research suggests that faithful citizens are not simplythe more visible conservative, evangelicals who are active in theircrusades against abortion and gay marriage. In fact, of thosemore likely to be active in political and social reform, the majoritydo so for liberal or progressive causes. Moreover, althoughreligiosity is correlated with being conservative, and the morereligious tend to be the most active, once levels of religiosity arecontrolled for, faithful citizens on the left are no less generousthan conservatives once their religiosity is controlled for, and inmany cases they are more generous and active (for example, theyare more likely to cooperate to solve community problems andvolunteer more to help the sick and needy).progressively active faith group is the organisation LondonCitizens … a short description of which is provided in box 1.Box 1Portrait of faithful citizens in action: London CitizensLondon Citizens is an alliance of community organisationsthat advocates for progressive and social justice causes.Founded in 1996, it is now part of a larger nationalorganisation called Citizens UK.The group primarily campaigns for progressive social issues such as a living wageand against poor working conditions.Based on the model of community organising espoused bythe legendary American organiser Saul Alinsky, Citizens UKworks through alliances of community organisations andand apply the necessary levers to ensure that change happens.In doing so, community organisers rely heavily on creating andgalvanising networks of supporting organisations, includingschools, unions, residents associations … and faith groups andinstitutions such as churches, mosques and synagogues.Their most high-profile and successful campaign was thefight to establish a London living wage of £8.30 an hour, andan outside London wage of £7.20 per hour. According to theCitizens UK website, the Living Wage campaign has won overcompanies as providers of living wages, including KPMG,Barclays and the Greater London Authority.as getting the living wage accepted as the minimum standardfor workers who will be recruited for many 2012 Olympics-related projects.Other research suggests religiously active citizens are alsomore likely to enjoy a range of pro-social benefits, ranging fromlower rates of criminality,greater levels of trust in other people,higher levels of life satisfaction, lower levels of depression andincreased life expectancy.Why are faithful citizens better citizens?While research suggests that faithful citizens tend to be moreactive, generous and engaged than other citizens, it is much lessclear why this is the case. A body of research suggests that whatmatters is not the fervency of individual belief, or particulartheological interpretations, but rather the social context andnetworks that create and reinforce expectations.Those who areinvolved in religious practice … frequently attending a religious Background: are faithful citizens better citizens? service or institution, and thus being more often around otherlike-minded religious people … appear to be more likely to bebetter citizens on the measures mentioned above.Social capital theorists of all persuasions accept that thereis a fundamental relationship between trust and civic engage-ust other people in general serves as thenecessary to facilitate interpersonal interactions.Religious groups foster norms of reciprocity, which are pre-requisites for interpersonal trust, and thus religious involvementenhances trust. In so doing it helps to provide the framework this analysis, the growing civic gap in western societies may not be due to individualistic capitalism or a growing generalapathy, but may instead be the result of declining levels ofreligious participation.However, the extent to which other scholars accept such acausal argument between religion and civic engagement variessignificantly, with many arguing that the relationship is subjectProfessor Eric Uslaner of the University of Maryland has longargued that religious adherence may, in some circumstances,decrease trust in those outside the religious groupwhile Danielsand von de Ruhr suggest that the level of religiousfundamentalism inherent in a group significantly influences itsadherents willingness to trust non-members.In other words,religious citizens may be more civically engaged, but it is only insupport of their own communities.A parallel stream of literature has sought to consider therelationship between religion and political engagement, which isdefined as membership of a political group, support of its aims,and activity on its behalf. Much research links involvement inorganised religion with social conservatism and activism on thepolitical right.Such a picture seems logical, particularly given that themoral and ideological precepts of most religions are established by texts that pre-date modernity and the coming of liberalism.Therefore religions often find themselves in opposition tosocietys changing values. On the other hand, Putnam andCampbell argue that the alignment of religions with politicalviewpoints (namely, evangelicals and right-wing Republicans) isa relatively recent phenomenon … a backlash against theperceived moral laxity of the 1960s.Indeed, despite religions adherence to fundamental corevalues that tend to be considered conservative, religion has alsobeen the impetus for revolutionary social change, including theabolition of slavery and civil rights movement.In Europe,religious groups have been among the most strident critics of the, with the leaders of many religious groups frequentlyspeaking out against government policy in defence of thesocially marginal and economically excluded.Furthermore, with the emergence of so-called newreligious movements and the importation of less morallyprescriptive Eastern religions,ideological gap between secular society and religiouscommunities can no longer be sustained. To declare religionspicture.The next chapter presents the findings from our efforts toinvestigate the relationship between religious faith and civicengagement in the UK. Based on new analysis of the UKCS aswell as the most recent wave of the EVS, we explored the role ofreligion in shaping civic and political engagement in the UK andEurope, to identify the differences between conservative andprogressive religious adherents. As we argue, despite the manydifferences between the UK and the USA, faithful citizens inboth countries appear to be better citizens. Background: are faithful citizens better citizens? Findings: faith and civic In this chapter we present findings from the UK CitizenshipSurvey and the European Values Study (EVS) on the question ofwestern Europe. Details about these surveys and our methods ofanalysis are provided in the appendices. Our findings providefurther confirmation of the view that faithful citizens appear tobe more active citizens on a number of measures involvingprogressive political values, civic engagement and politicalactivism. Faithful citizens represent a valuable source of socialand human capital for policy-makers.The UK Citizenship SurveyThe Citizenship Survey was a government-run social researchtool, produced for seven years with the final wave completed innationally representative sample of the adult population ofEngland and Wales, and comprised data from 10,000 inter-views conducted over the course of a year. Additionally, therewere 5,000 boost interviews with ethnic minorities, including3,000 with Muslim respondents.whether there is a positive link between religion and civicengagement, social capital and a sense of people belonging totheir local community.There are two key religious indicators used in theCitizenship Survey: religious affiliation (how would youdescribe your religious affiliation?) and religious practice (doyou actively practice your religion?). There are invariably morerespondents who describe themselves as having a religiousaffiliation than there are of those who actively practise their religion. According to the UK Citizenship survey, 78 per centdescribe themselves as having a religious affiliation while 37 percent describe themselves as actively practising their religion.Both measures indicate that religiosity correlates with a numberof indicators of civic engagement. For ease of reading,percentages do not accompany the findings in the body of thetext but can be located in the figures and charts. Where thefindings are not represented in the figures, percentages arementioned in the body of the text.Local influence, trust and civic engagementreligious people are more likely to feel a greater sense ofcollective efficacy and have greater stocks of social capital thannon-religious people. People who actively practised a religionwere more likely than those who reported not actively practisingtheir religion (as well as those with no religious affiliation) to feelthey could influence local decisions and national decisions. Thesuggests that religious people experience greater levels than non-religious people of bridging social capital and not justbonding social capital. In other words, these respondents hadaccess to a variety of social networks of different people anddifferent contexts, not just those of people who are identical (forexample in ethnicity or religion).Participation in civic engagement activities also tended tobe more common among those actively practising their religion(figure 1). According to the most recent analysis of the , those who actively practise their religion aswell as those who said that religion was important in shapingtheir identity were significantly more likely to participate inregular formal volunteering.Interestingly, the same was truefor young people aged between 16 and 25: young people whopractised their religion actively were more likely to participateregularly in formal volunteering.Various analyses of Citizenship Survey data also revealinteresting differences based on ethnicity. According to the most Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK recent analysis, the , people from Asianand Chinese backgrounds reported a lower level of volunteeringthan those from white backgrounds, particularly for those forrelevant in light of a recent Demos report into patriotism entitledA Place for Pride, which suggests that volunteering is related topride in ones local area, which in turn is related to greaterfeelings of national pride. The report recommends that, insteadof a UK citizenship test based on mundane and etherealknowledge of British history and culture, would-be citizenscommunity work through an accredited scheme.We will returnto this point in the final chapter of this report.Another difference important to note is that while thosefrom ethnic minority groups are less likely to participate in 50 30 60 40 20 10 tage ce ye pra elus igur Source: 2007…08 Citizenship Survey: Empowered communities regular formal volunteering overall, when they do volunteer, theyare more likely to do so through the medium of religious groups(56 per cent of ethnic minorities compared with 31 per cent ofand to do so specifically because they weremotivated by their religious belief (32 per cent ethnic minoritycompared with 15 per cent white ethnicity). Indeed, religiousinstitutions play a significant role in the process of integrationand support for newly arrived migrants … which can entailencouraging volunteering as a way to get to know people andtheir new community. Some examples of this role for religiousinstitutions will be discussed in the second phase of the DemosInquiry into Faith, Community and Society.As mentioned in the previous chapter, trust in other peopleas well as social institutions, is linked with higher levels of socialcapital and participation in volunteering. As in the USA, datafrom the UK Citizenship Survey suggest that religious peopletend to be more trusting of other people and social institutionsthan non-religious people (figure 2). People with a religiousaffiliation were more likely to say that people in general could betrusted than those with no religion. The religious practiceindicator for trust in institutions was correlated with higherlevels of trust in parliament, local councils and the police, asshown in figure 2.In addition to civic engagement and social capital, the Citizen-ship Survey aims to measure community cohesion and per-ceptions of pride and belonging to Britain as well as ones localarea. On these measures, we can also find evidence that religionis correlated with positive outcomes.Those respondents citing a religious affiliation were morelikely to feel a greater sense of belonging to theirneighbourhood, local community and Britain as a whole (figure3). They were also more likely (albeit only slightly) to have apositive view on respecting ethnic differences. People with areligion were also more likely than people with no religion toagree that their local area was cohesive. Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK Interestingly, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh people tended tohave more positive views about their local area than Christianpeople. This finding might be related to the fact that thesereligions are predominantly associated with ethnic minorities,many of whom are relatively recent immigrants and thus aremore likely to live in local areas that they strongly identify with(for example Tower Hamlets in east London).Meaningful interactionsHaving meaningful interactions with people from differentbackgrounds can (in most instances) help increase acceptance of 33 100 0 30 60 40 20 10 Yes, st st l cost Relvely pra eligious Extet to wheve othest igur Source: 2008…09 Citizenship Survey: Community cohesion topic2007…08 Citizenship Survey: Empowered communities diversity and lead to more integrated societies. However,importantly, people with no religious affiliation were more likelythan those with a religion affiliation to have regular meaningfulinteractions with people from different backgrounds (figure 3).Part of this is due to age effects: young people are more likely tomix with people from different backgrounds, and are also less Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK 100 0 30 60 40 20 10 to the to loc to s cohes B ot relus igur Source: 2008…09 Citizenship Survey: Community cohesion topic likely to be religious.This has important implications forand dialogue. It also appears to have an impact on participationin formal volunteering: according to analysis of the , mixing with people from different ethnic andreligious backgrounds in private places (such as in the home) iscorrelated with being more likely to participate in regular formalvolunteering.While not directly comparable (because of methodologicalissues), this difference appears to contrast with the Americancontext where research suggests that religious Americans aremore likely to have meaningful contact with people fromdifferent religious traditions. Putnam and Campbell suggest thatthis is the reason why religious polarisation and pluralism cancoincide with religious tolerance in the USA … throughMuslims and Hindus were less likely than Christians tohave meaningful interactions with people from different ethnicand religious backgrounds. This is perhaps not surprisingconsidering the process of immigration in any country initiallyencourages geographical segregation, and groups with thesereligions are more likely to be relatively recent immigrants.Drawing on lessons from the history of American immigrationand religion, ensuring that people have meaningful interactionswith people from different religious backgrounds is integral tofostering greater cohesion between different communities andreligions. It may also encourage more active citizenship.Involvement in local leadership and decision-makingIn addition to the above findings from previous analyses of theCitizenship Survey, we conducted original analysis to explore apossible connection between an indicator of religiosity notcovered in most previous analyses (how important is religion toyour sense of who you are?) and two further indicators of civicengagement that relate to formal involvement in local leadershipor decision-making roles. The first indicator includes volunteering as a councillor, school governor, special constableor magistrate, and the second, involvement in local decision-making groups on issues related to crime, education,regeneration and health.As can be seen in the breakdown provided in table 1, andsimilar to findings cited above, there is a relationship between apersons active religious practice and their greater involvement inlocal positions of leadership … such as being a councillor orschool governor*** … and involvement in committees or groupsengaging in decisions that affect the local area***. Those activelypractising their religion were also more likely to have recently Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK Table 1Extent of civic engagement by those practising and notpractising a religious faithReligious practiceActively Not actively practisingpractisingHave volunteered to serve as a councillor or 3%1%school governor, special constable or magistrate in the past 12 monthsHave been involved in local decision-making 12%7%groups on issues such as crime, education, regeneration or local health, among othersHave given to charity in the last 4 months79%70%Source: Demos analysis of 2010…11 Citizenship Survey Findings with a single asterisk (*) are statistically significant to the 10 percent level; findings with a double asterisk (**) are statistically significantto a 5 per cent level; and findings with a triple asterisk (***) arestatistically significant to 1 per cent. See appendix A for details. The extent to which someone feels that religion isimportant to their sense of identity does not appear to have apositive impact on their civic engagement (figure 4). In fact, thegroup whose religious identity is not very or at all important isthe most likely to volunteer as a councillor, school governor,special constable or magistrate**.Those who say religion is important to their sense ofidentity are only very slightly more likely to volunteer to take 100 0 30 60 10 Voltee col cote st 12 volve to chst 4 ove to chst 4 ce o woRels vete t to Relot vet to How the ce of ews to tes to cigur Source: Demos analysis of 2010…11 Citizenship Survey part in local decision-making compared to those who said thatreligion was not important to their sense of identity***.Moreover, while reporting that religion is important to onesidentity is associated with giving to charity via ones place ofworship***, it does not appear to have an impact on them givingIn fact, those for whom religion is notimportant (combining not important at all and not veryimportant categories) are more likely to have given to charityoverall (which may be because they are more likely to beeconomically better off).How does the UK compare with western Europeancountries?As mentioned above, we also ran a series of analyses on the EVSin order to see if the same effects as those demonstrated in theCitizenship Survey were present, but also to place the UK in abroader context with respect to the relationship between faithThis section presents the findings from these analyses. Afull description of the methodology is presented in appendix A.In order to conduct the analysis, we constructed a sampleof western European countries with broadly similar social,cultural and religious contexts, including: Austria, Belgium,France, Germany (West), Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal andSpain. We excluded northern European and eastern Europeancountries because they have well-known social and religiousdifferences (eg Scandinavian countries have higher levels of civicengagement on average, which would have skewed the results).We also excluded Switzerland as a non-EU member. Italy wasoriginally included but removed because it threw up anomalousresults. The western Europe average in the analysis below is theaverage of the percentage scores for these countries. As we donot weight the country results per population size, we are usingthe country as the unit of analysis as opposed to the individual.We took two approaches to the analysis of the data. First,we divided respondents according to whether they identified asbelonging to a church or religious organisation, or not. We then Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK compared these two different groups against a range of questionsrelated to civic and political engagement. These results arepresented first.Second, we divided respondents who self-identified asreligious (which is different from self-identifying as belonging toa religious organisation, and includes greater percentages ofrespondents) one step further, based on their responses to aquestion about their view on the truth of other religions (seeappendix A for the question and different answer options). Thuswe created three categories of respondents: 39 religious exclusivists: those who identify themselves as religiousand believe there is only one true religion and no other religionshave claims of truthreligious pluralists: those who identify themselves as religious,but believe that other religions have basic truths (even if theybelieve there is only one true religion)non-religious secularsreligious A full breakdown of the numbers in each European countryis provided in appendix B. The rationale behind this approachwas to disaggregate religious respondents according to whetherthey were more fundamentalist or liberal using a relativelystraightforward typology. It is also important to note that thismeasure has more to do with attitudes and interactions towardsother religions than it does fervency of belief: Religious pluralistsare not necessarily less religious than exclusivists.One final point: we do not distinguish respondents by thereligion they adhere to and thus our sample includes all religions(Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist). It is worth bearing inmind that Christianity continues to represent an overwhelmingproportion of religious respondents in western Europe.Our findings suggest that belonging to a religiousorganisation and being a religious pluralist are positivelycorrelated with being civically and politically engaged across therange of indicators. However, perhaps surprisingly, religiousexclusivists are also likely to hold progressive political views. Belonging to a religious organisationOur results further strengthen the argument that faithful citizensare more politically active, engaged and likely to volunteer.Moreover, they suggest that what is important is not fervency ofbelief or theological interpretation, but rather being embeddedin religious communities. We must stress, however, that ourfindings do not prove causation between these phenomena: inother words, it is not clear that it is religion itself that someone to be more active civically, as religion could be servingas a proxy for other significant factors … such as age, income andlocation. Nevertheless, the existence of a consistent correlationbetween religion and civic engagement is significant on its own.charts below, but note those that achieved a certain significancelevel in the text and endnotes. Details of this are included in theappendix.Across our European sample we found those belonging to areligious organisation are more likely to volunteer for: Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK ·political parties*·local community action**·development and human rights issues*·environmental issues*·youth work**·womens issues* In the UK, while the numbers are too small in someinstances to draw conclusions, religious respondents weresimilarly more likely to volunteer for local community action***,womens issues*** and the environment*** (figure 5).Perhaps worryingly, on all the measures of civicengagement tested we can see that the UK scores for bothreligious and non-religious respondents tend to be lower thanthe averages of our European sample. This would suggest thatthe emphasis on encouraging more active citizenship and engagement should remain a priority for the UK Government.One notable exception is youth work, where UK religiousrespondents are much more likely than their Europeannon-religious respondents are just as likely as European non-religious respondents. 12 10 4 8 2 Locl coDeveloth wos to rgani to rgani to rgani to rgani Extet to wh to rganiipate weste coigur Source: Demos analysis of the EVS, 4th wave, 2008 Across western Europe, those who belong to religiousorganisations were more politically active, though in someinstances the difference is small (figure 6). Religious respondents were more likely to say that they are very interestedin politics***, to have signed a petition, and participated in aIn the UK, there were no differences between the religiousand unreligious in joining a boycott, signing a petition or beingvery interested in politics. However, religious respondents weremore likely than non-religious respondents to have attended alawful demonstration***, as seen in figure 6. Compared with theEuropean averages, we can see that Britons in general (bothreligious and non-religious) were more likely to join boycotts Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK 80 30 60 40 20 10 oycotteste to rgani to rgani to rgani to rgani Extet to wh to rganive este weste coigur Source: Demos analysis of the EVS, 4th wave, 2008 and sign petitions, but less keen on demonstrations and lesslikely to be very interested in politics (particularly so for UKreligious respondents). 100 0 30 60 40 20 10 t to lve ext to immigranty ovece theselves ol ove stte t coe oveves to wo to rgani to rgani to rgani to rgani The socews of to rgani weste coigur Source: Demos analysis of the EVS, 4th wave, 2008 Political valuesAdditionally, we analysed responses to a range of value-basedquestions that tap into the heart of the left…right political divide.The results were mixed. On many questions, the overall majorityof respondents sided with what might be thought of as theconservative side of the argument. For example, this was truewhen respondents were asked questions around forcing someoneon benefits to take a job, or whether they emphasised individualresponsibility versus state responsibility.However, our findings do not suggest that there is a biastowards conservative causes among religious respondents. In Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK 7 6 5 3 4 2 1 LocDeveloExclsts Exclsts, UK urasts urasts, UK ulars lars, UK Extet of exclsts, urasts westeigur Source: Demos analysis of the EVS, 4th wave fact, the opposite seems to be true. As seen in figure 7, religiousrespondents in our western Europe sample were equally as likelyto identify themselves as left wing as right wing (49 per cent ofreligious respondents put themselves on the left side of thepolitical spectrum)**. In the UK, religious respondents wereeven more likely to describe themselves as left wing, with 55 perAcross our western Europe sample, those respondents whobelong to a religious organisation appeared to be more likely tovalue equality over freedom compared with those who do notbelong to a religious organisation (though we note that thesefindings did not achieve statistical significance). Interestingly,UK respondents were more freedom-loving than equality-lovingwhen it comes to the average scores of their European peers: 80 30 60 40 20 10 esteoycottExte of exclsts, urasts weste coigurExclsts Exclsts, UK urasts urasts, UK Seculars ulars, UK Source: Demos analysis of the EVS, 4th wave Belgium, France and Portugal were the only countries whereboth religious and non-religious respondents were more likely tovalue equality over freedom.In the UK, those belonging to a religious organisation wereless likely to have a negative association towards living next doorto immigrants or foreign workers: 11 per cent of religious Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK F 0 30 60 40 20 10 tageAB t to lve ext to immigrance theselves ol ove stte t coe oveves to woExclsts Exclsts, UK urasts urasts, UK Seculars ulars, UK The vews of exclsts, urasts oessve weste igure 10 Source: Demos analysis of the EVS, 4th wave respondents reported not wanting immigrants as neighbourscompared with 16 per cent of non-religious respondents.On the other political values we explored, the relationshipbetween a person belonging to a religious organisation and theirprioritising social democratic values was less clear. For example,across our western Europe sample and in the UK, thosebelonging to a religious organisation were more likely to say thatthose on benefits should have to take a job if offered rather thanbe able to refuse it*. Moreover, both western Europe and UKreligious and non-religious respondents were equally likely toreport that competition was good rather than harmful*, and tostress individual responsibility over state responsibility.Interestingly, it is worth noting that despite valuingequality over freedom, religious respondents are less keen onExclusivists, pluralists and secularsOn most measures, across both our European sample and in theUK, pluralists were the most likely group to volunteer and beIn our western Europe sample of countries, religious pluralistswere the most likely group by a slight margin to volunteer onissues such as womens rights** and youth work* (on the othermeasures of civic engagement our findings were not statisticallysignificant, though they are included in figure 8 and in the tablesin appendix B).In the UK the same was true with respect to these twoenvironment** (see figure 8). Again, we can see that UKrespondents (particularly religious pluralists) are much morecounterparts in our European sample. Across our European sample, we find that seculars are the groupmost likely to have joined a boycott***, signed a petition*** ormost likely group and exclusivists the least likely group.The UK context presents a different picture. In the UK,pluralists are the most likely group to have signed a petition***and to have joined a demonstration***. Again, UK respondentsof all three groups are more likely than our average Europeanrespondents to join boycotts and sign petitions (figure 9).In the UK, pluralists were the group most likely to say thatthey were very interested in politics***.Political valuesIn both Europe and the UK, seculars are the group most likelyto identify as left wing. However, in the UK, its notable that amajority of both exclusivists and pluralists consider themselvesto be on the left or centre left side of the political spectrum***(see figure 10).The only measure on which pluralists were most likely tobe progressive related to immigration. Across Europe,exclusivists were most likely to neighbours followed by seculars and pluralists**. The same istrue in the UK** (figure 10). Our analysis also found a smalleffect relating to equality versus freedom, whereby pluralistswere most likely to prioritise equality … however, this finding didnot achieve statistical significance below 10 per cent.Perhaps surprisingly, exclusivists were the group mostlikely to prioritise traditionally considered progressiveviewpoints on the following issues: Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK Individuals should provide for themselves and not rely on the stateWith the exception of Spain, in all countries a large majoritybelieve that emphasis should be placed on individuals beingresponsible for providing for themselves (rather than rely on thestate). The UK is second only to Germany in its belief that theindividual is most responsible, though we note that the findingsfor the UK on this question did not meet our threshold for statistical significance. Nevertheless, across western Europe, wefind that exclusivists are the group most likely to prioritise stateresponsibility over individual responsibility**, which wouldtraditionally be considered a progressive political position.: Across Europe, exclusivists weremore likely than pluralists to take the traditionally left-wingposition that competition is harmful**.Incomes should be equalised rather than people be given work: Across western Europe and the UK, exclusivists are Finally, on the question of whether those on benefitsshould have to take a job or should be able to refuse a job, it iseven less straightforward to draw conclusions. Exclusivists arethe most likely group to think they should have to take a jobacross Europe, while pluralists are the most likely group in theUK. Therefore both religious groups are more inclined to take athey are going with the grain of society, not against it: a clearmajority in almost every country believes that someone onbenefits should have to take a job if offered one, and the UK ismore right wing on this issue than the European average, asillustrated in figure 10. 3 This report should underline the extent to which campaignersfor progressive political causes should be able to find supportenthusiasm to get involved. Those citizens who are more activein their faith communities showed greater activism as generalreligious person (and not necessarily an active practitioner) also appeared to more be civically engaged on a range ofmeasures compared with seculars. Our findings also confirmprior research and contradict the common assumption thatreligious citizens are more inclined towards conservative causesthan non-religious citizens.Labour, have sought to reconnect faith groups and the left byemphasising the important role that faith groups play in theirlocal communities and society more generally. London Citizens,the group profiled in the first chapter of this report, has shownthe effectiveness of mobilising faith groups in pursuit of pro-gressive policy ends … for example, their most notable campaignWe refrain from making detailed policy recommendationsresearch in the sections below.Galvanising faithful citizens on progressive issuesProgressive politicians in the UK should seek to work with faithgroups on the issues where our research suggests they arewomens rights, international development, the environment andyouth work. Our second report will highlight some specific organisations working on these issues. It also applies to makingan argument for the value of equality … an issue that has becomepertinent in light of increasing social inequality highlighted bythe Occupy Movement (and their contrasting of the richest 1 percent and the remaining 99 per cent). Of course, this does notmean that every religious organisation is going to be supportiveof movements like Occupy. But to assume that religiousinstitutions are inherently conservative is simply wrong.Religious figures have always intervened to pass commentand judgement on current political debates, often siding with theprogressive argument. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Drthe August 2011 riots, poverty and equality, and welfare reform.A few weeks before this report went to print, a coalition ofbishops in the House of Lords joined forces to defeat theGovernments welfare reform legislation … citing concern over itsimpact on those in poverty, particularly children.Importantly, our research suggests that in many instancespluralists and exclusivists are more inclined towards progressivepolicy positions than seculars. Politicians on the left should bemindful that pluralists are more likely to be amenable onquestions regarding equality and immigration. However, theyshould also realise that exclusivists are inclined towards tradi-tionally left-wing positions on issues such as welfare provision(state vs individual responsibility and those on benefits should be allowed to refuse a job rather than be forced to takeone) and income redistribution (prioritising equalising incomes over providing incentives to work). It should not be assumed that religious citizens … whether pluralist or exclusivist … are conservative in their political outlook. They can serve as useful allies in the fight for progressive and socialdemocratic policies.Encouraging meaningful interactionsAs noted from the UK Citizenship Survey, while religious peoplemay be more likely to volunteer, they are less likely to havemeaningful interactions with people from different backgrounds Conclusion and implications to their own. This is worrying from the standpoint of communitycohesion and interfaith understanding.Clearly, the more you get to know people who may bedifferent from you, the more you begin to see them as fellowhuman beings, and less as stereotypes or misconceptionsperpetuated by media and popular culture. This has been citedas the reason for increasing acceptance of homosexuality insociety, as well as religious tolerance and pluralism that exists inthe USA.The fact that religious people are less likely to havemeaningful interactions is something politicians should take noteof. Efforts to encourage greater mixing between people fromdifferent backgrounds … both in everyday spaces and throughinitiatives such as the Three Faiths Forum… should behighlighted and championed by politicians. However, researchof a common goal, for example a local community issue thataffects every member of every community. These types ofinteractions are more important and effective than consciousinterfaith mixing, whereby the stated goal is to interact withpeople from different backgrounds.Moreover, as argued in the Demos pamphlet Pride, having a strong religious or ethnic identity is actuallypositively correlated with having a strong sense of national prideCommon discourse around patriotism assumesthat strong ethnic or religious identities compete with a sense ofBritishness, but Demos research suggests that they are mutuallyreinforcing. Interfaith initiatives like the Three Faiths Forum canhelp to bolster someones religious identity, while at the sametime encouraging them to mix with young people from differentfaiths … and thus by extension, bolster national pride andFaithful volunteersFinally, this report provides additional support for the Demosrecommendation in A Place for Pride of replacing the current pen-and-paper UK citizenship test with a requirement instead to complete at least 16 hours of local volunteering. As we saw fromthe Citizenship Survey, people from ethnic minoritybackgrounds, especially those who dont speak English well, areless likely to engage in formal volunteering. A new society can beRequiring newly arrived immigrants to engage in localvolunteering can be an effective way of encouraging them to getto know aspects of their local community they wouldnt naturallywell as confidence and a sense of local pride and cohesion. Placesof worship and faith groups can act as effective places forsupporting and integrating new immigrants, and as suggested bythe Citizenship Survey, ethnic minorities are more likely tovolunteer because of their religion and through the medium offaith groups. A citizenship test that encourages this can help toensure that new immigrants become active UK citizens with astrong sense of British pride.In sum, progressive politicians must consider faith groupsas an essential part of their vision of a good society becausemany are already there, volunteering for their local communityand taking part in political activism to make society and theirlocal community better. Conclusion and implications Appendix A Methodology The original research presented in this report is based on DemosEuropean Values Study (EVS). We identified these two data setsas the best for our purposes of investigating the relationshipbetween religion and civic and political engagement in the UK,and western Europe.For this paper we conducted bivariate analyses toinvestigate how religiosity affected civic engagement, politicalactivism and political values. This allowed us to highlightinteresting relationships between these indicators, although itdid not allow us to draw firm conclusions in respect of causation.shortcoming of all single-point survey analysis. As such, whilethe relationships identified in this paper may well be causal, forour purposes it suffices to show that an association exists.The UK Citizenship SurveyThe UK Citizenship Survey was a government-run socialresearch tool, produced for seven years with the final wavecompleted in 2010/11. The survey drew on a nationallyrepresentative sample of the adult population of England andWales, and included data from in excess of 10,000 interviewsconducted over the course of a year. Additionally, there were5,000 boost interviews with ethnic minorities, including 3,000with Muslim respondents.The anonymised data are publiclyavailable from the UK Data ArchiveSocial Data Service,while quarterly statistical releases usingthe data are available through the website of the Department forCommunities and Local Government.In this report we analysed the most relevant findingsregarding faith and civic engagement from previous in-depth reports based on older iterations of the Citizenship Survey …Additionally, we supplemented these findings by conductingoriginal analysis on the 2010/11 wave of the survey to explorerelationships not discussed by previous analyses.The Citizenship Survey questions pertaining to religion ·What is your religion even if you are not currently practising?·Do you consider that you are actively practising your religion?·How important is your religion to your sense of who you are? However, for the additional analysis that we conducted onthe latest 2010/11 wave of the survey we focused on the religious, asking respondents how important theirreligion was to their sense of identity. We used this variable to research relationships with the following questions about GGroupcharity in any of the ways shown on this card or through anyother method:·overall?·in a collection at your place of worship?CivAct1: In the last 12 months, have you been (a) a localcouncillor, (b) a school governor, (c) a volunteer specialCivAct2: In the last 12 months, have you been involved in a groupmaking decisions on (a) local health services, (b) regeneratingthe local area, (c) tackling local crime problems, (d) tenantsgroups, (e) local education services, (f) local services for youngpeople, (g) any other services in the local community? We undertook bivariate analyses using the responses tothese questions to determine if any relationships existed betweena persons religion and their level of charitable giving or The European Values StudyThe EVS is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal surveythat was started in 1981 as a research project investigating howEuropeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics andsociety. It claims to be the most comprehensive research projecton human values in Europe.We analysed the latest wave of thesurvey (2008), which covered over 70,000 people across 47European countries and regions. The EVS is also the source of alarger, global survey known as the World Values Survey, whosenetwork of social scientists has carried out nationallyrepresentative surveys of over 97 societies constituting 90 percent of the worlds population.Like the Citizenship Survey, the EVS includes a range ofquestions on faith, religious practice, and civic or politicalengagement. Our analysis focused on two primary religiousindicators, derived from the responses to the questions: ·Do you belong to a religious organisation or church?·Independently of whether you go to church or not, do youconsider yourself a religious person? We also employed another religious indicator, which isdiscussed below.For our first analysis, we compared the first religious indica-tor (identifying those who said they belonged to a religiousorganisation or church versus those who did not) to a range ofitems relating to respondents level of civic engagement, theirextent of political activism, and their political and moral values. Itis worth noting that there is a potentially problematic issue withwording for this question: some respondents … particularly thoseinto belonging to a mosque, temple or synagogue. Nonetheless,we chose this indicator over that of attendance at a religiousinstitution, which does not take into account the variance inpractice habits and traditions between different religions, partic-ularly in respect of frequency of attendance at a place of worship(e.g. actively practicing Muslims may attend mosque more fre-quently on average … through prayer five times a day … than activeChristian practitioners attend church, or Hindus attend temple). For the second analysis, we took those who has answeredyes to the second religious indicator … whether they considerthemselves a religious person … and further sub-divided themdepending on their views about the extent to which there is only one true religion. In the EVS, respondents were asked tochoose the statement that best described their view from the There is only one true religion.Although there is only one true religion, other religions havesome basic truths as well.All religions have some basic truths: there is no one true religion.None of the great religions have any truths to offer. Respondents who described themselves as religious and didnot agree that other religions have some truths (those whoanswered 1 to the above) were classified as religious exclusivists.Those who describe themselves as religious but were willing toadmit that no one religion has a monopoly on the truth (thosewho answered 2 or 3 to the above) are classified as religiouspluralists. Those who did not consider themselves religious areclassified as seculars. We stress that these terms are indicative,and do not mean to imply that exclusivists are more fervent intheir beliefs or traditional in their views. In fact, it is perfectlypossible that a pluralist is very passionate and fervent in theirbeliefs, and would still describe him or herself as traditional.We use this second analysis as a means of furtherdisaggregating religious respondents according to their outlook.Creating a more sophisticated index of religiosity would be ofinterest in future research, but for our purposes the use of athreefold typology to distinguish the religious from theunreligious and the religious by outlook was sufficient.Pan-western European samplingAs mentioned above, the EVS covers up to 47 Europeancountries. For this project, we selected nine western Europeancountries in order to construct a pan-western European sample. The countries selected comprise Austria, Belgium, France,Germany (West), Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and theUK. We originally included Denmark and Italy but the findingson those two countries were consistently anomalous and so wedecided to exclude them. We decided to exclude EasternEuropean and Northern European countries based on well-known differences of social and religious context. For example,research consistently shows significantly higher levels of civicengagement among Scandinavian countries, which would haveskewed our results. We also excluded Switzerland because ofsurvey is provided in three languages) and because it is not amember of the European Union.We conducted bivariate analyses employing religiousindicators alongside indicators of civic engagement, politicalactivism and political values for each country, before averagingthe country-specific percentages to produce a single westernEuropean mean score. This approach employs the country as theWe treated those crossing the 10 per cent threshold asstatistically significant reportable results. This threshold waschosen as a commonly employed standard in policy research andapplied social psychology. As the existing literature gave us astrong indication as to the directionality of the relationshipbetween religion and civic and political engagement, we feltjustified in halving significance scores to reflect the one-tailednature of our hypotheses.Full information on each analysis,including standard deviations and Chi-square test p-valuesignificance scores for each country on each question, areprovided in tables in appendix B. Appendix B Results tables Breakdown for the EVS survey Table 2organisation, by country and whether or not they belong toa religious organisationBelong to a % of totalDo not Totalreligious belong to aorganisationreligious organisationAustria200131,2961,496Belgium9461,4121,506France6041,4381,498Germany (West)16981,9032,072Ireland17031380550Netherlands522341,0211,543Portugal8451,4531,537Spain6641,4281,494UK205131,3531,558Western Europe 1,5701211,68413,254Note: Respondents were asked Do you belong to a church or religiousorganisation? (Q5aB). 61 Table 3Number of respondents who were exclusivist, pluralist orsecular, by countryExclusivistPluralistSecularTotalAustriaCount1257915181,434% 8.755.236.1100.0BelgiumCount827826311,495% 5.552.342.2100.0FranceCount815598441,484% 5.537.756.9100.0Germany (West)Count126432435993%12.743.543.8100.0IrelandCount188472302962% 19.549.131.4100.0NetherlandsCount1408475371,524% 9.255.635.2100.0PortugalCount4687982571,523% 30.752.416.9100.0SpainCount3254916441,460% 22.333.644.1100.0UKCount1978389521,987% 9.942.247.9100.0Western Europe average (incl. UK)Count2,1227,9055,73815,765% 13.550.136.4100.0 Country scores for EVS analysesVolunteering to work for a trade unionTable 4aNumber of respondents who have volunteered to workfor a trade union, by country and whether or not theybelong to a religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria322420.369Belgium332320.1355France242220.116Germany (West)3270.80.044Ireland36520.0685Netherlands2042730.040Portugal8123320.000Spain00110.80.242Western Europe 420.127averageStandard 41deviation (SD)UK3110.10.0005 63 Table 4bNumber of respondents who have volunteered to workfor a trade union, by country and whether they areexclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria10.7182820.197Belgium331011320.122France111221110.1905Germany 10.751410.4425(West)Ireland2444220.347Netherlands10.72432030.124Portugal621821750.0175Spain10.310.2910.029Western 2220.1835averageSD111UK0030.410.10.151 Volunteering to work for a political partyTable 5aNumber of respondents who have volunteered to workfor a political party, by country and whether or not theybelong to a religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria1262820.001Belgium442220.028France35130.90.0005Germany (West)32910.0905Ireland613630.0015Netherlands2351720.000Portugal13192110.000Spain001810.1845Western Europe average720.0385SD61UK20.870.50.2505 65 Table 5bNumber of respondents who have volunteered to workfor a political party, by country and whether they areexclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria322531220.3135Belgium001421220.2015France0092710.1025Germany 10.761510.408Ireland81576330.011Netherlands322131730.454Portugal20.61621230.0225Spain4130.61120.1595Western 3220.209averageSD521UK2130.550.60.211 Table 6aNumber of respondents who have volunteered to takepart in local community action, by country and whetheror not they belong to a religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria74100.80.0005Belgium12132110.000France472820.0045Germany (West)10.820.20.1345Ireland9181150.0005Netherlands3882730.000Portugal17253020.000Spain2350.40.0005Western Europe 1020.0175averageSD82UK1561510.000 67 Table 6bNumber of respondents who have volunteered to takepart in local community action, by country and whetherthey are exclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria4311110.20.0055Belgium00243910.0235France111431720.319Germany 10.720.5000.1405(West)Ireland121413770.0245Netherlands643852130.215Portugal822531230.4015Spain10.340.820.30.188Western 2420.1645averageSD142UK5318380.90.0035 Volunteering to work on development and human rights issuesTable 7aNumber of respondents who have volunteered to workon development and human rights issues, by country andwhether or not they belong to a religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria63100.80.002Belgium661610.000France59120.80.000Germany (West)10.870.80.4945Ireland12310.332Netherlands4082520.000Portugal13191410.000Spain69100.70.000Western Europe 710.1035averageSD60UK11470.50.000 69 Table 7bNumber of respondents who have volunteered to workon development and human rights issues, by country andwhether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria10.891710.4225Belgium00162610.066France0010270.80.0635Germany 3220.520.50.0405(West)Ireland1211220.414Netherlands963951730.0285Portugal72111820.2425Spain416140.60.207Western 2210.1855averageSD211UK2110250.60.065 Volunteering to work on environmental issuesTable 8aNumber of respondents who have volunteered to workon environmental issues, by country and whether or notthey belong to a religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria953120.0405Belgium662320.0005France351510.002Germany (West)10.81310.278Ireland511520.003Netherlands2765350.286Portugal10142420.000Spain0090.60.2635Western Europe 620.109averageSD51UK942210.009 71 Table 8bNumber of respondents who have volunteered to workon environmental issues, by country and whether theyare exclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria10.82941120.0415Belgium001521320.186France00711010.3035Germany 2141820.2585(West)Ireland3688330.16Netherlands434862740.0755Portugal521821030.279Spain10.320.460.90.2305Western 2320.192averageSD231UK001731620.05 Volunteering to take part in youth workTable 9aNumber of respondents who have volunteered to takepart in youth work, by country and whether or not theybelong to a religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria1161810.000Belgium9106340.0125France12100.70.174Germany (West)862630.021Ireland613940.009Netherlands63135850.000Portugal12173220.000Spain12100.70.211Western Europe 930.0535averageSD62UK28114230.000 73 Table 9bNumber of respondents who have volunteered to takepart in youth work, by country and whether they areexclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria3222340.80.0205Belgium004462850.0285France116140.50.1635Germany 54195720.0275(West)Ireland481211660.2125Netherlands16117192750.0005Portugal722331340.2715Spain0030.6710.091Western 4530.102averageSD442UK643962530.003 Volunteering to take part in womens issuesTable 10aNumber of participants who have volunteered to takepart in womens issues, by country and whether or notthey belong to a religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria1582320.000Belgium221910.267France2430.20.000Germany (West)432020.2535Ireland511310.0005Netherlands2451110.000Portugal11161910.000Spain23110.80.024Western Europe 710.068averageSD51UK10490.60.000 75 Table 10bNumber of respondents who have volunteered to takepart in womens issues, by country and whether they areexclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria75253610.0055Belgium1116240.60.047France1140.7000.011Germany 43143510.052(West)Ireland12109220.0155Netherlands641721020.0805Portugal411621130.1275Spain318220.30.023Western 2310.0455averageSD231UK10.714240.50.003 Joining boycottsTable 11aNumber of respondents who have joined a boycott, bycountry and whether or not they belong to a religiousorganisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria241310990.015Belgium1718138100.0055France1018226160.179Germany (West)1412112130.099Ireland151038100.0005Netherlands4510137130.0025Portugal579260.025Spain249880.235Western Europe 12110.07averageSD53UK4514205140.169 77 Table 11bNumber of respondents who have joined a boycott, bycountry and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist orExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria6568953110.000Belgium3375974120.000France456312163190.000Germany 75431171180.000(West)Ireland64471134110.000Netherlands86811188150.000Portugal835472980.000Spain11417471120.000Western49130.000averageSD134UK9510327141290.001 Table 12aNumber of respondents who have signed a petition, bycountry and whether or not they belong to a religiousorganisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria11961587470.0005Belgium6266828590.159France4580970670.0205Germany (West)8368489550.002Ireland8456208550.044Netherlands24953562530.307Portugal1725395270.381Spain3964509400.001Western Europe 698574,548500.115averageSD1612UK21263959630.000 79 Table 12bNumber of respondents who have signed a petition, bycountry and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist orExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria463841654219450.000Belgium262944256416680.000France384935566610700.000Germany 584524460228560.000(West)Ireland644125058167550.000Netherlands553939752345580.000Portugal521622027129350.000Spain772917240292470.000Western416322,496512,406560.000averageSD101212UK824651668602610.000 Participating in lawful demonstrationsTable 13aNumber of respondents who have participated in a lawfuldemonstration, by country and whether or not theybelong to a religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria3518195160.279Belgium3638398280.054France3257651450.0725Germany (West)2924230260.3Ireland211456150.1685Netherlands8017255240.0005Portugal914216150.037Spain3048521380.0835Western Europeaverage29260.1245SD1711UK6620204140.0065 81 Table 13bNumber of respondents who have participated in a lawfuldemonstration, by country and whether they areexclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria10810714104210.000Belgium91021727205340.000France151922342437510.000Germany 13109761130320.000(West)Ireland128801946150.000Netherlands12916622155260.000Portugal3091131476210.000Spain602115835318490.000Western 1229310.000averageSD51613UK201112617130130.002 Being interested in politicsTable 14aNumber of respondents who are very interested inpolitics, by country and whether or not they belong to areligious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria5226250190.024Belgium23249870.000France1119176120.008Germany (West)3527204220.0765Ireland24163390.000Netherlands6614186170.0195Portugal7108660.01Spain6910880.036Western Europe 224181,141120.022averageSD76UK4112165110.000 83 Table 14bNumber of respondents who are very interested inpolitics, by country and whether they are exclusivist,pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria191517522104200.000Belgium557194570.000France10136312112130.000Germany 3123982394220.000(West)Ireland221352122680.002Netherlands9611415125210.000Portugal1555162770.000Spain13427671110.000Western 124965113604140.000averageSD776UK17991129190.000 Having a negative association towards immigrantsTable 15aNumber of respondents who would not want to haveimmigrants or migrant workers as neighbours, by countryand whether or not they belong to a religiousorganisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria3116304240.0065Belgium449270.189France126140.185Germany (West)667190.161Ireland131145120.3695Netherlands6714146140.4545Portugal91311080.049Spain356140.456Western Europe 9100.234averageSD57UK3611246160.009 85 Table 15bNumber of respondents who would not want to haveimmigrants or migrant workers as neighbours, by countryand whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustria342713618155310.000Belgium9105473350.113France14182042730.000Germany 21162572980.0015(West)Ireland3626391132110.000Netherlands23171191665110.0125Portugal22746647130.000Spain2791632030.000Western 169110.016averageSD769UK362010013165170.013 Comparing value placed on freedom and equalityTable 16aWhether respondents place more value on freedom or onequality, by country and whether or not they belong to areligious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-a religious totalbelong tototalsquareorganisationa religious test organisationp-valueAustriaFreedom11158612490.0105Equality693649640BelgiumFreedom3841615440.3915Equality535774953FranceFreedom2036590410.3055Equality336081357Germany Freedom5544506580.0035(West)Equality534331135IrelandFreedom5541190550.0065Equality695113640NetherlandsFreedom2425170767Equality2294833432PortugalFreedom1523547390.019Equality436673452SpainFreedom2641713520.059Equality335260744Western Equality52440.0091Europe Freedom4251averageSD1110UKFreedom18257866580.0255Equality1314153436 87 Table 16bWhether respondents place more value on freedom or onequality, by country and whether they are exclusivist,pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustriaFreedom604837850245500.000Equality50403364417235BelgiumFreedom475232742275450.172Equality41454365632052FranceFreedom314122943344400.4285Equality43572995649858Germany Freedom826322055228560.279(West)Equality42321493715037IrelandFreedom845920150132480.132Equality51361734312545NetherlandsFreedom725246260399660.008Equality65472943819633PortugalFreedom125412643415944Equality154514545815343SpainFreedom1434923451344530.374Equality134462074528644Western Freedom 5148500.174Europe averageaverageEquality 444743averageSD989UKFreedom996042557564590.3865Equality60362873834436 Table 17aNumber of respondents who put themselves on thecentre left or left side of the political spectrum, bycountry and whether or not they belong to a religiousorganisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria9560723670.007Belgium4854879660.01France2954899680.004Germany (West)4440504640.000Ireland3024120430.000Netherlands19243566570.000Portugal1943739700.000Spain3870920760.136Western Europe 495495,350640.0195averageSD1410UK15655751620.0125 89 Table 17bNumber of respondents who put themselves on the centreleft or left side of the political spectrum, by country andwhether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustriaLeft515744065299700.000Right38432323513130BelgiumLeft566945261412700.000Right25312903917430FranceLeft436627555602750.000Right22342264520425Germany Left413722061252680.000(West)Right70631393911932IrelandLeft403414142108490.000Right78661925811451NetherlandsLeft504036050336590.000Right76603655023541PortugalLeft1486539368203750.002Right8035186326725SpainLeft1345529373507870.000Right10945107277813Western Left563532,574592,719690.0005Europe Right498471,737411,12231averageSD141010UKLeft785634856499650.001Right61442764426935 Believing in individual rather than state responsibilityTable 18aNumber of respondents who believe that people shouldtake individual responsibility and not rely on the state, bycountry and whether or not they belong to a religiousorganisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria14874929730.028Belgium5861880630.451France4684970680.056Germany (West)10882744820.41Ireland10769280730.002Netherlands27056695660.0005Portugal42661,054730.152Spain3149700520.227Western Europe 810686,252690.148averageSD129UK278811,232800.005 91 Table 18bNumber of respondents who believe that people should takeindividual responsibility and not rely on the state, by countryand whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustriaIndividual866656973377750.000State44342132712725BelgiumIndividual515647860406660.0005State40443134020634FranceIndividual466138672576670.003State30391492828833Germany Individual1168833881331790.0005(West)State161281198921IrelandIndividual1217332273235740.008State4527117278326NetherlandsIndividual705149364383630.027State68492813622137PortugalIndividual200636107626673State11537190249827SpainIndividual1485224855322500.223State138482034532750WesternIndividual838643,444692,896680.033EuropeState496361,547311,43932averageSD1299UKIndividual1457862981790790.107State40221451920821 Believing someone on benefits should be forced to take a job ifTable 19aNumber of respondents who believe someone onbenefits should be forced to take a job if offered one, bycountry and whether or not they belong to a religiousorganisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria15175935730.2265Belgium7074978690.192France4073703490.0025Germany (West)9674704780.17Ireland11376234630.000Netherlands32368741700.184Portugal4668785550.0595Spain4877767560.002Western Europe 887735,847640.1045averageSD410UK257761,120730.0005 93 Table 19bNumber of respondents who believe someone on benefitsshould be forced to take a job if offered one, by country andwhether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustriaTake997659375348680.000Refuse32241932516332BelgiumTake707454869427700.1085Refuse24262413118630FranceTake445830457391450.007Refuse32422304347355Germany Take1219232278301720.000(West)Refuse118912211628IrelandTake1056527764203650.000Refuse57351543610835NetherlandsTake946753569415690.328Refuse46332383118931PortugalTake2427754067218600.000Refuse72232653314340SpainTake1796329364317480.000Refuse106371623633852WesternTake954713,412682,620620.0555EuropeRefuse380291,574321,71638averageSD11710UKTake1347358877711710.0795Refuse49271792328429 Believing competition is good vs harmfulTable 20aNumber of respondents who think competition is good vsharmful, by country and whether or not they belong to areligious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria15679995790.2975Belgium7782989710.2555France4275926650.0295Germany (West)11388791880.0045Ireland11678274750.023Netherlands35475808770.1115Portugal43641,112780.023Spain3763872650.0665Western Europe 938766,767750.1015averageSD98UK288851,298850.065 95 Table 20bNumber of respondents who think competition is good vsharmful, by country and whether they are exclusivist,pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustriaGood947362981382770.000Harmful34271481911723BelgiumGood616958074419690.181Harmful27312082618831FranceGood456037871535620.0325Harmful30401522932638Germany Good1229236388358860.3345(West)Harmful10851125714IrelandGood1157434480239770.009Harmful412688207023NetherlandsGood987058276460770.035Harmful42301792414123PortugalGood2498061377275760.001Harmful6320181238624SpainGood1856831671391600.0025Harmful88321302925940Western Good969733,805773,059730.0745Europe Harmful335271,137231,24427averageSD1069UKGood1478264684840840.113Harmful32181231615516 Appendix B Results tables Prioritising equality over work incentivesTable 21aNumber of respondents who prioritise equality over workincentives, by country and whether or not they belong toa religious organisationBelong to % of Do not % of Chi-squarea religious totalbelong tototaltest organisationa religious p-valueorganisationAustria163831,051830.364Belgium3437688490.0835France2444802560.313Germany (West)8769673740.016Ireland7852199530.3645Netherlands20342426400.016Portugal3449792550.144Spain3962805590.4725Western Europe662555,436590.2215averageSD1514UK18355819540.07 97 Table 21bNumber of respondents who prioritise equality over workincentives, by country and whether they are exclusivist,pluralist or secularExclusivist% ofPluralist% of Secular% of Chi-totaltotaltotalsquaretest p-valueAustriaEquality1058563081428850.000Incentives1815146197315BelgiumEquality535934644316520.007Incentives37414445629648FranceEquality374928754499580.142Incentives38512474636442Germany Equality1138728068311750.000(West)Incentives17131333210425IrelandEquality845524958172550.029Incentives70451834214145NetherlandsEquality674730039246410.086Incentives75534716135559PortugalEquality1795643254203560.000Incentives138443734615844SpainEquality1635825457407620.029Incentives118421954325038Western Equality801622,778572,582600.0365Europe Incentives511382,192431,74140averageSD151314UKEquality1096137049570580.018Incentives71393915141542 Notes J Smith, Reclaiming the ground, Tawney lecture, 20 Mar 1993.It is also important to clarify that this group includes those whoare formal members of a religious institution, as opposed tothose who actively practise their religion but would not describethemselves as belonging to a specific institution or organisation.Thus, we are talking about a small portion of British society anda minority proportion of British citizens who would describethemselves as religious or of a religious tradition.M Wind-Cowie and T Gregory, A Place for PrideR Putnam and D Campbell, American Grace: How religion divides, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.British Social Attitudes 28, 28th report, London: NationalCentre for Social Research, 2011.O Roy, Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah, New York:Columbia University Press, 2004.R Briggs, C Fieschi, and H Lownsbrough, Putnam and Campbell, American GraceSee www.citizensuk.org/ (accessed 8 Feb 2012). See www.citizensuk.org/campaigns/living-wage-campaign/(accessed 7 Feb 2012).M Littler, Re-examining religion and crime: a study of theimpact of religious practice on adolescent criminality in theP Fagan, Why Religion Matters Even More: The impact of religiouspractice on social stability, Washington DC: Heritage Foundation,M Regnerus, Religion and positive adolescent outcomes: areview of research and theory, Review of Religious ResearchRE Lang, What is social capital and why is it important topublic policy?, Housing Policy DebateR Putnam, The strange disappearance of civic America,American ProspectEM Uslaner, Producing and consuming trust, Political ScienceQuarterlyJP Daniels and M von de Ruhr, Trust in others: does religionmatter?, Marquette University, 2009, http://ideas.repec.org/p/mrq/wpaper/0902.html (accessed 8 Feb 2012).G Fields, T Sheyda and D Simmons, Conservative religion andConservative politics: examining how conservative faith impactsand influences political ideology, UNC Working Paper,University of North Carolina, 2011.GT Marx, Religion, American Sociological Review D Boffey, Archbishop Rowan Williams backs revolt againstcoalitions welfare cuts, Guardianwww.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/nov/19/archbishop-rowan-williams-welfare-reforms (accessed 19 Mar 2012). R Rhodes, The Challenge of the Cults and New Religions2010…11 Citizenship Survey: Technicalreport, London: Dept for Communities and Local Government,2010, www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1992889.pdf (accessed 8 Feb 2012).DCLG, 2007…08 Citizenship Survey: Empowered communities topicreport, London: Dept for Communities and Local Government,2009, www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1345295.pdf (accessed 8 Feb 2012).DCLG, Community Action in England: A report on the 2009…10, London: Dept for Communities and LocalGovernment, 2011.DCLG, 2008…09 Citizenship Survey: Volunteering and charitablegiving topic report, London: Dept for Communities and LocalGovernment, 2010, www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/citizenshipsurvey200809volunteer (accessed8 Feb 2012).Wind-Cowie and Gregory, A Place for PrideDCLG, 2008…09 Citizenship Survey: Volunteering and charitablegiving topic reportDCLG, report, London: Dept for Communities and Local Government,2010, www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/ citizenshipsurvey200809cohesion (accessed 8 Feb2012) and DCLG, 2007…08 Citizenship Survey: Empoweredcommunities topic reportDCLG, report DCLG, 2009-10 Citizenship Survey: Community spirit topic reportLondon: Dept for Communities and Local Government, 2011,www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/citizenshipsurvey200910spirit (accessed 8 Feb 2012)DCLG, Community Action in EnglandPutnam and Campbell, American GraceDCLG, 2008…09 Citizenship Survey: Volunteering and charitablegiving topic reportPutnam and Campbell, American GraceThese latter two findings are slightly above the threshold forstatistical significance at 11 per cent and 12 per cent respectively,but we report them anyway with this caveat.Putnam and Campbell, American GraceSee www.threefaithsforum.org.uk (accessed 8 Feb 2012).Our Shared Future,Final report from the Commission on Integration and Cohesionhttp://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/Default.aspx?recordId=18 (accessed 19March 2012).Wind-Cowie and Gregory, A Place for Pride 2010…11 Citizenship Survey: TechnicalreportUK Data Archive, www.data-archive.ac.uk/ (accessed 8 FebSee www.esds.ac.uk/Lucene/Search.aspx (accessed 8 Feb 2012).See www.communities.gov.uk (accessed 8 Feb 2012).See www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ (accessed 8 Feb 2012).See www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_110 (accessed 8 Feb 2012).C Feinstein and M Thomas, Cambridge University Press, 2002.As noted in appendix A, the Chi-square test p-value scoresreported in these tables have been halved to reflect the one-tailednature of our hypothesis. In other words, the strong indicationfrom previous research on a link between religious and civicengagement indicators allows us to be more confident about thefindings and thus to halve the significance scores. 103 References Boffey D, Archbishop Rowan Williams backs revolt againstcoalitions welfare cuts, Guardianwww.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/nov/19/archbishop-rowan-williams-welfare-reforms (accessed 19 Mar 2012).Briggs R, Fieschi C and Lownsbrough H, Our Shared Future,Final report from the Commission on Integration and Cohesionhttp://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/Default.aspx?recordId=18 (accessed 19March 2012).Daniels JP and von de Ruhr M, Trust in others: does religionmatter?, Marquette University, 2009, http://ideas.repec.org/p/mrq/wpaper/0902.html (accessed 8 Feb 2012).DCLG, 2007…08 Citizenship Survey: Empowered communities topicreport, London: Dept for Communities and Local Government,2009, www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1345295.pdf (accessed 8 Feb 2012).DCLG, report, London: Dept for Communities and Local Government,2010, www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/ citizenshipsurvey200809cohesion (accessed 8 Feb2012) and DCLG, 2007…08 Citizenship Survey: Empoweredcommunities topic report DCLG, 2008…09 Citizenship Survey: Volunteering and charitablegiving topic report, London: Dept for Communities and LocalGovernment, 2010, www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/citizenshipsurvey200809volunteer (accessed8 Feb 2012).DCLG, 2009…10 Citizenship Survey: Community spirit topic reportLondon: Dept for Communities and Local Government, 2011,www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/citizenshipsurvey200910spirit (accessed 8 Feb 2012)DCLG, Community Action in England: A report on the 2009…10, London: Dept for Communities and LocalGovernment, 2011.Fagan P, Why Religion Matters Even More: The impact of religiouspractice on social stability, Washington DC: Heritage Foundation,Feinstein C and Thomas M, Cambridge University Press, 2002.Fields G, Sheyda T and Simmons D, Conservative religion andConservative politics: examining how conservative faith impactsand influences political ideology, UNC Working Paper,University of North Carolina, 2011.2010…11 Citizenship Survey: Technicalreport, London: Dept for Communities and Local Government,2010, www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1992889.pdf (accessed 8 Feb 2012).Lang RE, What is social capital and why is it important topublic policy?, Housing Policy Debate References Littler M, Re-examining religion and crime: a study of theimpact of religious practice on adolescent criminality in theMarx GT, Religion, American Sociological Review British Social Attitudes 28, London: National Centre forSocial Research, 2011.Putnam R, The strange disappearance of civic America,American ProspectPutnam R and Campbell D, American Grace: How religion divides, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.Regnerus M, Religion and positive adolescent outcomes: areview of research and theory, Review of Religious ResearchRhodes R, The Challenge of the Cults and New ReligionsGlobalized Islam: The search for a new ummah, New York:Columbia University Press, 2004.Smith J, Reclaiming the ground, Tawney lecture, 20 Mar 1993.Uslaner EM, Producing and consuming trust, Political ScienceQuarterlyWind-Cowie M and Gregory T, A Place for Pride Demos … Licence to PublishThe work (as defined below) is provided under the terms of this licence (licence). 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There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect tothe Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions thatmay appear in any communication from You. This Licence may not be modified without the This project was supported by the Bill Hill Trust Faithful citizens cover 6/4/12 2:29 PM Page 2 Why those who do God, do goodƒŽFAITHFUL CITIZENSJonathan Birdwell Religiosity has always been closely associated withconservatism: the Church of England is sometimes describedRepublican party and the religious right have becomeincreasingly interdependent, but a similar trend has notoccurred on this side of the Atlantic. This report, based onoriginal analysis of the Citizenship Survey and the EuropeanValues Survey, investigates the different relationship betweenreligion and politics in the UK and Europe.The report presents two key findings. First, religiouspeople are more active citizens … they volunteer more, donatemore to charity and are more likely to campaign on politicalissues. Second, and more counter-intuitively, religious peopleare more likely to be politically progressive. They put agreater value on equality than the non-religious, are morelikely to be welcoming of immigrants as neighbours andwhen asked are more likely to put themselves on the left ofthe political spectrum.Faithful Citizensrecommends thatprogressive politicians should work with faith groups onissues which they are particularly engaged, includingimmigration, womens rights, international development, theenvironment and youth work. Faith group members, thereport argues, will be key to any future, election-winning,progressive coalition.Jonathan Birdwell is Head of the Citizens Programme atDemos. Mark Littler is a Demos Associate. Faithful Citizens|Jonathan Birdwell · Mark Littler ISBN 978-1-909037-05-2 Faithful citizens cover 6/4/12 2:29 PM Page 1