In this paper Ill argue that fallibilism and the standard view of epistemic possibility entail a conjunction that Ill call the abom inable conjunction then Ill spend the rest of the paper showing that the conjunction is in fact abominable The upshot ID: 34128
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Forexample,supposeIknowthatHarryisazebra,andsupposeIamsucientlyintelligenttoseeitasobviousthatHarryisazebraentailsHarryisnotacleverly-disguisedmule.Inthiscase,itisnotepistemicallypossibleformethatHarryisacleverly-disguisedmule,sincewhatIknowobviouslyentailsitsnegation.So,itisfalsethat:IknowHarryisazebrabutitis(epistemically)possible(forme)thatHarryisacleverlydisguisedmule.Fallibilism,asIamdeningithere,isaviewaboutknowledge:someonecanknowsomepropositionseventhoughshehasachanceofbeingwrong.(Fallibilism)Possibly,forsomeS,therearesomepropositionsthatSknowsandthathaveachanceofbeingfalse.3Fallibilism'snegationisinfallibilism.Infallibilismistheviewthatforallpropo-sitionsthatSknows,thosepropositionsdon'thaveanychanceofbeingfalse.Thatis,theprobabilityofthepropositiononS'sevidenceis1.4So,fallibilismistheviewthatsomepropositionsthatSknowshaveaprobabilitylessthan1onS'sevidence.5`Probability'intheaboveparagraphisepistemic.Forexample,supposeafairD20hasbeenrolledandhaslandedon3,andsupposeyouarecertainthattheD20willlandonanumber,butyouhavenoevidenceastowhichone.Thelogical/physicalprobabilityithasnotlandedon3is0,buttheepistemicprobabilityforyouthatithasnotlandedon3is.95.`Chance'intheaboveparagraphisalsoepistemic.Fromtheaboveexample,there'sanepistemicchanceforyouthattheD20hasnotlandedon3,butthereisnological/physicalchancethattheD20hasnotlandedon3.I'llbeassumingfallibilisminthispaper,butitshouldbeundeniablethatIknowsomepropositionsforwhichthere'sachancethatI'mwrong.Thechancemaybeminuteandnotworthconsidering,butIhavebeenwrongbefore,andneithermyfacultiesnormynoeticstructureareperfect.SoitisveryplausiblethatIknowsomepropositionsthatIhaveachanceofbeingwrongabout.6Here'stheabominableconjunction: 3ThisdenitionfollowsDodd(2011)andAnderson(2013).Ihavenotdened`fallibilism'asStanley(2005,127)does(\Fallibilismisthedoctrinethatsomeonecanknowp,eventhoughtheirevidenceforpislogicallyconsistentwiththetruthofnot-p.")forthisreason:ifStanley'sdenitioniscorrect,theniffallibilismistrue,noonecanknowapropositionthatisbasedonanecessarytruthasevidence.Ofcourse,mathematiciansknowpropositionsbasedonnecessarytruthsthatarepartoftheirevidence.Toavoidtheseproblems,I'veadoptedtheabovedenition.NotethatthedenitionI'veadoptedisequivalenttoDougherty's(2011,142)fallibilismaboutknowledge(FK*)givenhisviewofepistemicpossibilityinDoughertyandRysiew(2009),(2011).4Thisdenitionalequivalencemakesmydenitionof`fallibilism'equivalenttoDodd's(2011,1).5Theevidencecanbetotalorpartial.Myargumentwillworkequallyaswellinbothcases.6Here'sanotherconsiderationinfavoroffallibilism:ifE=Kisfalse,thenegationofsomepropositionsSknowsarecompatiblewithS'sevidence,inwhichcasetheprobabilityofsomeof2 therewillbesomeforwhomtheabominableconjunctionisnotobviouslyfalse,soI'llgiveargumentsbelow.First,ifthere'sachancethatapropositionistrueforsomeone,theepistemicprobabilityofthatpropositionisgreaterthan0.Iftheprobabilityofapropositionisgreaterthan0,thenthatpropositionisincludedintherelevantprobabilityspace.However,onlypossibilitiesareincludedinprobabilityspaces.Inshort,ifthere'sachancethatp,thenpisapossibleoutcome.So,ifapropositionisimpossible,itisnotincludedintherelevantprobabilityspace,andifit'snotincludedintheprobabilityspace,itdoesn'thaveachanceofbeingtrue.So,it'salwaysfalsethatthere'sachancethatpandpisimpossible.Thepremiseinneedofdefendingisthatonlypossibilitiesareincludedinprob-abilityspaces.Toargueforthispremise,Doddgivesananalogybetweenepistemicandphysicalpossibilityandprobability.Here'sDodd:Saythat,giventhedistributionofairmoleculesinmyoce,thephysicallawsassignanon-zeroprobabilitytotheevent(E)oftheairmoleculesallmovingtotherighthandcornerofmyoceinthenextveseconds.Inotherwords,thephysicalprobabilityofEisnon-zero.Thenit'sphysicallypossiblethatEwillhappen.Itdoesn'tmatterthattheprobabilityofEisvery,verysmall.Makeitaslowasyoulike,aslongasit'sgreaterthanzero,Emighthappen.Likewise,iftheprobabilityofpisgreaterthanzero(epistemicallyspeaking),thenit'spossiblethatp(epistemicallyspeaking).Insloganform,ifsomethinghassomeprobabilityofbeingtrue,itmightbetrue.(Dodd2011,4)Afallibilistproponentofthestandardviewmightobjectthatepistemicpos-sibilitiesaresignicantlydi erentthanotherkindsofprobabilitiessuchthatanepistemicallyimpossiblepropositionhasanepistemicchanceofbeingtruebutaphysicallyimpossiblepropositiondoesnothaveaphysicalchanceofbeingtrue.Inreply,if`possibility'meanssomethingmuchdi erentwhenitreferstoanepistemicpossibilitythanitmeanswhenitreferstoadi erentkindofpossibility,arguably`might'meanssomethingmuchdi erentwhenitreferstoanepistemicmightthanitmeanswhenitreferstoadi erentkindofmight.Ifthat'strue,proponentsofthestandardviewofepistemicpossibilityhavelostmuchofthetractiontheymighthavegainedbytreatingcommonsenseusesoftheepistemic`might'and`possible'asevidencefortheirview.Asitis,thepragmaticappropriatenessofusingtheepistemic`might'and`possible'makeupaconsiderableportionofargumentsforthestandardviewofepistemicpossibility.8 8See,e.g.Lewis(1996),Hawthorne(2004),Stanley(2005),Dodd(2008),Dodd(2011),Fantl4 Infact,tomyearsatleast,instancesoftheabominableconjunctionsoundfarworsethanCKAsdo.Hereisanutteranceofaninstanceoftheabominablecon-junctionandaCKAsidebyside:\There'sachancetheforkinfrontofmeisplastic,butthat'simpossible."\Iknowtheforkinfrontofmeismetal,butit'spossibleit'splastic."Itseemstomethatintherstquote,byutteringthesecondconjunct,I'mtakingbackwhatIexpressedbytherstconjunct,andinthesecondquotebyutteringthesecondconjunctI'mmerelyaddingthatmyknowledgeisfallible:it's(epistemically)possiblethatI'mwrong.However,evenif,inthesecondquote,IseemtobetakingbackwhatIsaidintherstconjunctbyutteringthesecond,proponentsofthestandardviewdonothaveauniquemad-soundingutterancetowieldagainsttheiropponents.Theiropponentsarenowarmedwithatuquoque:utterancesoftheabominableconjunction.Infact,theopponentsofthestandardviewhaveanadvantage:they'vedevelopedwarrantedassertabilitymaneuvers(WAMs)toexplaintheinfelicityofCKAs.AWAMisawayofshowingwhyanassertioncanseemfalseeventhoughitistrue:theassertionispragmaticallyinappropriateinmostordinarycircumstancesinwhichit'sasserted.PatrickRysiew(2001)andTrentDougherty(2009),(2011)and(ms)haveprovidedWAMsforCKAs,butproponentsofthestandardviewhavenotyeto eredaWAMforutterancesoftheabominableconjunction.Inshort,theabominableconjunctionsoundsbad,andproponentsofthestandardviewusuallyarguethatthefactthatCKAssoundbadworksagainstopponentsofthestandardview.Instancesoftheabominableconjunctionsoundworse,though,andevenifyouthinktheydon't,someofthesameconsiderationsthatproponentsofthestandardviewthinkworkforthemalsoworkagainstthem.ReferencesAnderson,C.2013.Fallibilismandthe exibilityofepistemicmodals.PhilosophicalStudies:1{10.Benbaji,H.2009.Onthepragmaticexplanationofconcessiveknowledgeattributions.SouthernJournalofPhilosophy47:3:447{454.Comesana,J.andH.Kantin.2010.Isevidenceknowledge?PhilosophyandPhe-nomenologicalResearch20:2:447{454.6