Why democracy struggles Thailands elite coup culture ICHOLAS ARRELLY Since the revolution - PDF document

This article was downloaded by: [Australian National University], [Nicholas Farrelly]On: 01 December 2013, At: 17:29Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Australian Journal of InternationalAffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20 Why democracy struggles: Thailand'selite coup cultureNicholas FarrellyPublished online: 20 May 2013. To cite this article: Nicholas Farrelly (2013) Why democracy struggles: Thailand'selite coup culture , Australian Journal of International Affairs, 67:3, 281-296, DOI:10.1080/10357718.2013.788123 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.788123 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. 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Whydemocracystruggles:Thailand’selitecoupSincetherevolutionof1932thatendedabsolutemonarchy,Thailandhasexperiencedsporadicmilitaryinterventions,with19coupsandcoupattemptsoverthosedecades.Thisarticleexplainsthesemilitaryinterven-tionsbyemphasisingtheculturalaspectsofThaicoup-makingattheelitelevel.Concretely,thearticleshowsthatepisodicmilitaryinterventionismsupportedbysignificantandpersistentmilitaryinfluenceinpoliticsisnowpartofadistinctiveelitecoupculture.Incontrasttootherso-called‘coup-prone’states,Thailandhaslargelyaccommodatedmilitaryinterventionism,especiallybyacceptingthedefenceofthemonarchyasajustificationfortopplingelectedgovernments.Thailand’sreluctancetoredemocratise,andthehaphazardnessoftheresultinginstitutionalconfigurations,suggeststhatThailand’seliteand,tosomeextent,thepublicaswellhavedeeplyinternalisedtheultimateacceptabilityofcoups.ThetestofthisarrangementmaycomewiththeendofKingBhumibolAdulyadej’sreignandthepotentialrealignmentofmilitaryinfluenceinThaisociety.coups;democratisation;ThailandCoupsd’etatareapuzzlinglypersistentfeatureofThaipolitics.Itisonlynaturalthattheyhavebeensubjectedtoconcertedscholarlyattention.Formanyanalysts,Thailand’s19modernmilitarycoupsandattemptedcoupsdistinguishitselitepoliticalculturefromthoseofotherso-called‘coup-prone’TheseanalystsalsousuallysuggestthatThaicoupsaremerelyonepartofamuchbroaderrepertoireofnon-electoral,non-parliamentaryandnon-transparentpolitics.Generationsofscholarshavegrappledwithaspectsofthisconvolutedhistory,mostcommonlyintheimmediateaftermathofthemostrecentmilitarycoup.ItislessusualtoreflectontheoverallpatternofmilitaryinterventionisminanefforttocreategeneralisableinsightaboutelitepoliticsinThailand.Inordertoredressthisanalyticalimbalance,IarguethatThailandhasfailedtoconsolidateademocraticcultureamongitselitesthatwouldmakecoupsinconceivable.Instead,episodicmilitaryinterventionismsupportedby *NicholasFarrellyisaResearchFellowattheSchoolofInternational,PoliticalandStrategicStudies,CollegeofAsiaandthePacific,AustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra,andco-founderofNewMandala,awebsiteonmainlandSouth-EastAsia.&#xNich;&#xolas;&#x.Far;&#xrell;&#xy@an;&#xu.ed;&#xu.au;&#x-17.;ကAustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs,Vol.67,No.3,281296,http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.788123 2013AustralianInstituteofInternationalAffairs persistentmilitaryinfluenceinpoliticsisnowpartofadistinctiveThaicoupculturethathasbeenreproducedovermanydecades.ThatcoupculturecouldbeconsideredThailandsmostimportantcontribu-tiontocomparativedebatesonmilitaryinterventioninpolitics.Indeed,manyscholarshavesoughttocontextualiseitsrelevantbaebthaicharacteristics(forexample,Nakharin,1990;Supaluck,1994).ThetypicalaccountofcouppoliticsinThailandexplicateshistoricalconditionswhilekeepingasteadyfocusonanyupheavalsofrecentmemory,andonthepersonalitiesinvolved.ThechallengepresentedbythisliteratureistodiscerntheelementsoftheThaistorythataredistinctiveenoughtosupportrobustanalysis,especiallywhenconsideredincomparativeperspective.Ifweexamineitsprocessesofmilitaryconsolidationandpost-coupdemocratisationalongsidecountrieslikeBurma,Fiji,IndonesiaandPapuaNewGuinea,thereareclearindicationsthatThailandisanextremecase.Indeed,Fijiistheonlyoneofthesecountriesthatisregularlyidentifiedwithacoupculture(McCarthy2011).ButThailandswingsfarmorewildlyfrommilitarymeddlingtodemocraticreignitionthantheseothercountries,andhabituallyforgetshistoryasquicklyasexpediencerequires.Thailandisfurtherdistinguishedbytherobustinterplayofmilitaryandcivilianpolitics,bycompetingalliancesofeconomicandbureaucraticelites,andbytheappetiteofthearmyleadershipforrepeatedeffortstoconsolidatecontrol.ThisinterventionistpatternhasbeenreinforcedbythespecialstatusofKingBhumibolAdulyadejandtheroyalfamily,whohavebeen)bythearmyatalmostanycost.Defendingthe)ofthemonarchy,whichisofficiallyconsideredthepinnacleofThailandssacredandsecularlife,istheprimaryrequirementofnationalsecurity.Thiswasthecorejustificationforthe2006couplaunchedagainstthedemocraticallyelectedgovernmentofPrimeMinisterThaksinShinawatra.Thatcouphasseenthemobilisationofre-energisedroyalismandthecreationofmassmovements(oftendescribedinshorthandasYellowShirtsRedShirts)thatarepartofanewterrainofsocialconflict.Inthisrecentperiod,thesloganWelovetheraoraknailuang)hasbecometheconvenientumbrellafororganisingpoliticalsentimentsaroundthemonarchy,especiallywheremilitaryinterven-tionismhasthepotentialtoraisetroublingquestionsaboutelitemotivations.ThisarticleonthedynamicsofThailandscoupculturebeginsbyintroducingthelonghistoryofthecountryscoups.Thefocusisoncoupssince1932,whenaneliteuprisingoverthrewtheabsolutemonarchy.Somecoupsthosein1991and2006aregivenspecialattention.Subsequently,thesecondsectionanalysestherelationshipbetweenrecenteffortsofredemocratisationandthespectreofmilitaryinterventionism.Mostimportantly,thesectiondemonstratesthatmanyleadingfiguresinThaisociety,includingmembersoftheinterlockingroyal,corporate,bureaucraticandmilitaryelites,arereluctanttoconsistentlyembracedemocraticprocesses.Initsthirdpart,thearticleoffersfourinterrelatedpropositionsforexplainingthecountryselitecoupculture.NicholasFarrelly Thesehighlightthedefenceofthemonarchy,notionsoftoleranceinThaisociety,relationsbetweeneconomicelites,andtheunwaveringsupportofkeyinternationalallies,mostparticularlytheUSA.Whilethefocusofthisarticleisrelativelycontemporary,thefourexplanatorypropositionscanperhapsbeconsideredwithamuchlongerhistoryofpalaceandmilitarytiesinmind.Beforethetwentiethcentury,Siamselitepoliticswasfoundedonthesynergyofroyalandmartialaffairs;itisnocoincidencethatoneofthemostcommonlyusedwordsforthekingreferstothathistory.Intheeliteculturethathasevolved,whatcouldbemorenaturalthananarmydefendingitsgreatroyalwarriorThelonghistoryofcoupsAnalysingthehistoricalcontextofThailandselitecoupcultureiscomplicatedbytheabsenceofclearlinearpatternsthatcausechangesinnationalgovernment.AsClarkD.Neherpointsout,casesofpoliticalsuccessioninThailanddonotappeartoberesponsestoeconomicdownturnsorspecificthreatstothenationssecurity.Instead,Neher(1992,585)argues,achangeinThaigovernmentisbestviewedasanunpatterned,adhoceventdependentonchangingallegiancesandpoweradvantagesheldbyvariouselitegroups,suchaspoliticians,bureaucrats,capitalistbusinessleaders,andmilitaryofficersUnderstandably,thislackofanycoherentpatternhasfrustratedgenerationsofscholarshopingtounderstandthenatureofcouppoliticsinThailand.Instead,however,ofseekingtodetermineconsistencyinthepracticeofmilitaryinterventionism,IproposeanadvancementofNeherssuggestionthatrandomnatureofthesuccessionchangeshasmadeitimpossibletopredictwhencoupswilltakeplaceandwithwhatresults(ibid.).WritingintheimmediateaftermathoftheFebruary23,1991coup,hesuggeststhatnotonlydidThaiandWesternscholarsfailtopredictthemilitarycoupbuttheyhadassertedtheconventionalwisdomthatcoupswereananachronisticpartofthespast,nolongerpertinenttothedemocratickingdomTheculturalbasesforquestioningthissupposedanachronism,especiallyatanelitelevel,motivatethisarticlesconsiderationofcoupsovertime.Thailandpersistent,ifsporadic,militaryinterventionismhelpstoshowthatevenunpatterned,adhocevent[s]arefusedtoculturalpracticesandexpectationsthat,whiletheydoshiftovertime,offerafoundationforrigorousandhistoricallygroundedanalysis(Charnvit2004).InSiam,thefirstmodernefforttolaunchacoupoccurredin1912,onlytwoyearsafterthedeathofKingChulalongkorn.Theattemptedrebellion,likemanythatweretofollowit,wascatalysedbyfactionalismamongfeudinggroupsofsecurityofficials.In1911,thenewking,Vajiravudh,hadestablishedaparamilitaryorganisationmilitiacalledtheWildTigerCorps.AccordingtoVella(1978,45):Themembersofthecoupgroupof1912wereextremelyWhydemocracystruggles jealousoftheWildTigers.TheTigers,firstofall,wereobviouslyveryclosetotheKingsheart.Terwiel(2005,237)makesthepointthat:amongthemilitaryinparticulartherewasresentmentofthekingsmanifestpreoccupationwiththequasimilitaryWildTigers.Vella(1978,47,54,57,54)describesthe1912incidentasancoupbyveryyoungofficers,inwhich[t]hemotivesoftheleadersshowedthespreadofWesternpoliticalideas,includingtheideaofnationalism,amongtheThaipeople.Indeed,thatnationaliststrainwastheprimaryinspirationoftherebelsallofthemjuniorwhotookgreatrisksinanefforttousurpthepalacespower.Whileitprovedunsuccessful,the1912rebellionwasapreludetotheoverthrowoftheabsolutemonarchyin1932.Batson(1984,236)suggeststhat[t]heearlymonthsof1932[therewere]recurrentrumoursandspeculationofimpendingpoliticalchangesinSiam.Crucially,andinanotherelementthathasremainedconsistentovertime,[t]heactivitiesoftheplottershadbeenlimitedtoBangkok,astheyhadcorrectlyjudgedthatinsecuringcontrolofthecapitalandtheacquiescenceofthekingtherewouldbenooppositiontothenewregimesextendingitsauthorityoverthewholekingdom(Batson1984,239).AccordingtoThawatt(1962,21atthetimewhentherevolutionariessetouttoprepareanddevelopabroadstrategyfortherevolution,theywerecomposedof114men,whowerefurtherdividedintotwoarmyfactionsnavyfactionandacivilianfaction.Thawattexplainsthatthedifferencebetween1912and1932wasthatthecoupleadersin1932,allofwhomwerecolonels,werenotonlycolourfulpersonalitiesbuthadtheprestigeofoutstandingeducationalbackgroundsandhighmilitarypositions(27).Hecallsthisanelitetype(28)organisation.ItisrelevantthateliteinterestsandcompetitionhavesimilarlycatalysedeverysubsequentcouporcoupFortodaysanalyst,theoutcomesofthe1932revolutioncanbebrieflydescribedintwokeysways.First,thecoupof1932washailedthroughouttheworldasthemostpeacefulandbloodlessofrevolutions(Thawatt1962,42).Conyers-Keynes(1950,246)arguesthatincontrasttotheexperiencesofcivilwarinEnglandandlaterinAmericawemaysuggestthattheSiamesegottheirwayfarmorehumanelybythearrangementofaperfectlybloodlesscoupd.Therelativelypassiveacceptanceoftheconstitutionaltransfor-mationandthedemotionofroyalauthoritysetapatternwhichhasbeenfollowedinmost,butnotall,oftheupheavalsthatfollowed.Onoccasionswhenmoresignificantbloodshedhasoccurredduringacoup,oritsaftermath,thedetailstendtobelost,overtime,inthegeneralblurofsubsequentpoliticalactivity.Second,[w]iththeendoftheabsolutemonarchyin1932,thosewhohadheldhighpositionsintheoldregimeweresuddenlyandNicholasFarrelly unexpectedlyfacedwithacompletelynewsituation,andthesubsequentpathsofthekingandhiscircleweremanyandvaried(Batson1984,253).Suchinterruptionsandsubsequentdeviationsofotherwisesmoothlivesandcareersbymilitaryinterventionscancontinuetoreverberate,eventothisday(Chaloeylakana1988).Thelonglistofmilitaryinterventionsthatfollowedtheeventsof1932hasmeantoscillationsbetweenmilitarydominanceandmoredemocraticmoments,althougheventhosemoredemocraticperiodsarenotdivorcedfrommilitaryinfluence.AfterWorldWarIIaperiodwhenThailandwasoccupiedbyJapaneseforcesandgrappledwitharangeofunenviablesecurityandpoliticalitfacedanewlyuncertainfuture,andlookedtotheUSAforeconomicbackingandinternationallegitimacy.InJune1946,theyoungKingBhumibolascendedthethroneafterthedeathofhisbrother,KingAnandaMahidol.Evenaftermorethan65years,KingAnandasdeathisstillwidelydescribedas,withspeculationthatregicide,suicideoraccidentwastoblame.AfterKingBhumiboltookthethrone,itwasnotlongbeforeThailandwasunderthefirmcontrolofmilitarydictatorship.InhisstudyoftherelationsbetweenThailandandtheUSA,Fineman(1997,12)suggeststhat:ThereturntopowerofThailandswartimestrongman,FieldMarshallPlaekPhibun-songkhram,inacoupoverthrowingtheelectedgovernmentinNovember1947couldnothavemoreexasperatedtheUnitedStates.Ultimately,however,USsupportswungbehindhim.Indeed,PickerellandMoore(1957,92)statedthat:Since1948theGovernmenthasbeeninthehandsofagroupknownlooselyastheCoupPartyleadersoftheNovember8,1947coupdtatwhichin1948restoredPibul[Phibun]asPremier.Later,AmericanpressurecontinuallypushedPhibunandtheCoupGroupintorepressingleftistsmoreharshlythantheywouldhaveiflefttothemselves(Fineman1997,260).Whileinternationalpressureshavealwaysbeenimportant,itisapparentthatdomesticfactors,especiallyastheyinfluencetheelite,aremoreoftentheprimarydriversofmilitaryintervention.Writingaboutalaterperiod,Morellarguesthat:Theactualcausesofthe[November17,1971]couplayinThailandfactionalpolitics,thelegislativethreattobureaucraticprivilege,andpressurefromyoungermilitaryofficerstodoawaywiththetrappingsofdemocracytoprotecttheirownpoliticalpowerbase(Morell1972,156).Forthecoupof1976,Girling(1977,387)suggeststhatnottomentionthetraditionalistelite,approvedofthecoup.Hegoesontoarguethat:thepopularpropensitytoshort-termcomparisons(beforeandafterOctober1976),thebeliefinfirmauthority,theeasyidentificationofdemocracywithdisorderandviolence,andindeedanattitudeoflivingfromdaytoday,arestillprevalent(Girling1977,387)andhelpexplainpopularWhydemocracystruggles acquiescencetothemilitaryoverthrowofademocraticgovernment.Atthesametime,however,analystssuchasElliott(1978,5)identifiedthereactionarynatureofthe1976coup


theviciousattacksonsocialists,workersandstudentswhichprecededandaccompaniedthecoup.Clearly,suchdomesticconcernscannotbedivorcedfromtheinternationalenvironment.Flood(1976),onthispoint,hashighlightedtheformidableanti-communistcredentialsofthe1976coup-makersandtheiraffinitywiththeUSA.Morerecentcoups,bycontrast,havebeenjustifiedinthedemocracy.OnFebruary23,1991,themilitarysNationalPeaceKeepingCounciloustedtheelectedgovernmentofPrimeMinisterChatichaiChoonha-ven.AsAnanya(1992,313)writes:ItwasThailandseighteenthcoupsincetheendofabsolutemonarchyin1932,anditwasprecededbyoneoftheroundsofcouprumoursthatperiodicallycirculateinBangkok.Suchitnotesthat:Thecoup,whichendedadecade-longparliamentarydemocracy,cameasasurprisetomostpoliticians,politicalobservers,andacademiciansgrowingstrengthofparliamentarydemocracyinthepastdecadehadconvincedanumberofpeoplethatThaipoliticshadreachedalevelofsophisticationthatmadeacoupathingofthepast(Suchit1992,131).Oneofficialaccountsuggestedthattheobjective[was]strengtheningdemo-craticprocessesthrougharevisedconstitution,andthat[t]hetakeoverofadministrationwaspeacefulandwidelyendorsedbythepeopleandthemedia(OfficeofthePrimeMinister1991,139).Girling(1996,20),however,hasarguedthat:Paradoxically,the1991coup,whichdisbandedtheelectedgovernment,demonstratednottherevivalofthebureaucraticpolitybutitslastspasms.Asitturnedout,hisanalysiswassomewhatpremature,asthebureaucraticpolityhasremainedakeycomponentofthewiderlandscapeofpower.CraigReynoldsandTeam(2012),forexample,introducedthenotionoftobettercharacterisethelinksbetweenThailandsroyal,bureaucratic,military,corporateandeducationalinstitutionsovertime.Thatmodelofpoliticalorganisationwithitsmetaphorsofropes,pulls,threadsandprovidesanopportunitytoconceiveasysteminwhich,overtime,powersareentwined.Misjudgingthenatureofthoseenmeshmentsafterthe1991coup,manyanalystsonceagainincorrectlyassumedthatthearmyhadreturnedtotheandthatanothercoupwasmuchlesslikely,evenimpossible.Duringthisperiod,democraticinstitutionsespeciallythosethataccompaniedtheimplementationofthe1997constitutionbecameincreasinglyrobust.Whatmanyanalystsdidnotforesee,however,wasthattheelectoraljuggernautspearheadedbyThaksinShinawatrawouldsoquicklythreatentheinfluenceofpartsofthepalaceandthemilitary.AsPasukandBaker(2004,176)observe:Thaksinhaltedthedeclineinthepoliticalroleofthemilitary,andbuiltapersonalnetworkintothemilitaryhierarchy.ItappearslikelythatpartofNicholasFarrelly sproblemwasthathisnetworkopenlycompetedwiththemorenetworkmonarchy(McCargo2005).Forthatroyalistnetwork,oneaimofthepost-1997democraticsystemwastoguaranteesufficientspacefornon-electedauthoritiestocontinueholdingsway,andtoseeoffanyperceivedthreatstotheirstatus.SomeinthisestablishedelitemayhavebeenwillingtoacceptThaksinsaggressivemannerifhecouldbeconvincedtocontinuesupportingestablishment,andespeciallyroyal,interests.However,in2005,thedifficultyofabsorbingThaksinsambitionsintheoldsystembecameclear,andastreet-levelprotestmovementemerged.Thatmovementhelpedpavethewayforthemilitarytoyetagainseizecontrol.smostrecentcoupsawtanksandtroopsmanoeuvreontothestreetsofBangkokontheeveningofSeptember19,2006.ThiswastheculminationofmorethanayearofconcertedpressureagainsttheThaksingovernment(Ockey2007;Ukrist2008).Thaksin,atelecommunicationsbillionaireandpopulistcampaigner,had,sincehissecondelectoraltriumphinFebruary2005,alienatedlargenumbersofThaisintheeliteandamongthepoliticallyconsciousmiddleclass.InthesouthernprovincesandinBangkok,prevailingapathyaboutThaksinsruleturnedquicklytooutrightrejection.ThaksingetoutThaksinookpai)becamethechantatmass,yellow-swathedralliesinBangkok.ThePeoplesAllianceforDemocracy,anditsrabble-rousingleaderSondhiLimthongkul,constantlybellowedforThaksinsouster.Asthepoliticaltemperaturerose,speculationaboutacoupbegantocirculate.Allthesame,inacomparativeanalysispublishedshortlyafterthemilitaryintervened,Beeson(2008)describedthecoupaslargelyunexpected.Partofthereason,asCase(2009,100)explains,isthat[a]mongthenationalleaderswhohavetoweredoverThaipoliticsPhibunSongkhram,SaritThanarat,PremTinsulanond,andThaksinShinawatraonlyThaksinhasseriouslycontestedelectionsInthecontextofThaksinsrepeatedelectoralsuccesses,Hewison(2007)launchedathoroughcritiqueofthenotionthatthe2006militaryinterventioncouldbeconsideredacoup.Inthesamevein,Thitinan(2008,140)notedThebloodlesstakeoverinasingledaywoulddropThailandsFreedomHouseratingfromFreeallthewaytoNotFree.Nonetheless,ThailandcontinuedtobeconsideredakeyallyofWesterndemocraciesand,whiletherewassomeconsternationfromabroad,theoverallresponsetothecoup-makerswasmuted.Thewide-rangingsanctionsandopprobriumtargetingacountrylikeBurmawerenowheretobefound.Thaksinsbrashantics,lackofgenuinereformistcredentialsandalienationfromtheurbanmiddleclassthedemo-graphicthattendstomostconsistentlyinfluenceforeignviewsofThailandmeanthisgovernmentsdecapitationwasnotwidelymourned.Evenamonghisardentsupporters,therewasameekacceptancethatcounter-attackandprotestwouldnotbringanyimmediatebenefits.Foratime,theywerepreparedtotoleratethecoup.Initswake,smallprotests,includingoneinwhichataxirammedatank,couldnotgalvanisewiderpopularresistance.Whydemocracystruggles Instead,inafamiliarpost-couppattern,thenewmilitaryleadershipmovedquicklytoassurethepublicthatanewconstitution,andnewelections,wouldnotbefaraway.Evenifitharbouredinitialhopesofkeepingcontrol,thecoupgroupsoonrealisedthatmanagingtheaffairsofasophisticatedtwenty-first-centurysocietyrequiresskillandexperience.Bureaucratsandotherssympa-thetictothetopplingofThaksinwereconscriptedtofillkeygovernmentpositionsandtopresentasomewhatdemilitarisedfacetothepublic.GeneralSurayudChulanont,oneofthekingstrustedprivycouncillors,wasdraftedtotheprimeministershiphenevershowedclearsignsthatheenjoyedthislate-careerobligation.WhenforcesalliedtodeposedPrimeMinisterThaksinconvincinglywontheelectionofDecember23,2007,itwasapparentthattheThaipeoplehadresoundinglyrejectedthecoup,thenewconstitutionandtheanti-Thaksinpurge.AsThitinan(2008,151)concluded:TheestablishmentcoalitionthatengineeredThaksinspoliticaldecapitationneedstoacceptthatnotallofwhathestoodforwaswrongReluctantandinconsistentredemocratisationAfterthat2007electionvictory,however,royalist,militaryandmiddle-classcirclessustainedtheirreluctancetoacceptThaksinortheoutcomeoftheelection.Withnoconsensusaboutappropriatemechanismsformanagingpoliticalconflict,theyearsthatfollowedwereamongthemostturbulentandviolentinThaihistory.In2008,PasukandBaker(2008,18)suggestedthat[t]alkofanothercoup[had]becomeconstant.Bytheendofthatyear,twoprimeministerscloselyassociatedwithThaksinhadbeenfelled,andAbhisitVejjajivahadbeeninstalledinthepremiership.AstheleaderoftheDemocratwhichhadlongstruggledtodeliverstrongelectionresultsowedhisrisetothetopofgovernmentinnosmallparttoanaudaciousYellowShirtsiegeatBangkoksinternationalairportinNovember2008.Duringtheiroccupationofthestrategictransporthub,anti-governmentprotestorshadshownthefragilityofpro-Thaksinrulewhenitcouldnotrelyonmilitarysupport.Onceittookpower,Abhisitsgovernmentunsurprisinglyfaredbetterintermsofthebackingofthearmy,butstillfacedmajorpro-ThaksinuprisingsinApril2009andthen,moreviolently,inAprilandMay2010.InAprilandMay2010,theAbhisitgovernmentwasconfrontedbyespeciallylargeprotestsincentralBangkok.Theseculminatedin91deathsandhundredsofinjuriesduringpitchedbattlesbetweengovernmenttroopsandtheprotestors.Thegovernmentcouldhavefaltered,butwithstrongandpublicsupportfromthemilitaryandmonarchy,therewasneveranyseriousdoubtthatitwouldsurvivethestormofdiscontent.TherealchallengeforAbhisitandforthesupportersofthe2006coupwasthattheirclaimstodemocraticidealsrequiredanothertestattheballotbox.Forthiselectionbattle,Thaksinintroducedhisyoungestsister,YingluckNicholasFarrelly Shinawatra,intothefray.Apoliticalnovice,shehadclearlyinheritedsomeofthefamilysnousandcampaigningstyle.InJuly2011,thePheuaThaiparty,withYingluckatthehelmandThaksincallingtheshotsfromexile,routedtheAbhisitgovernment.Afterthisoverwhelmingvictory,itwasspectacularlyapparentthatthearmedforceshighcommandhadfailedinthewakeofthe2006couptolegitimisethemselvesinthefaceofutterlyconsistentsupportforThaksin.SomeseniormilitaryleadershavenowreluctantlyacquiescedtotheoverallpoliticalagendarepresentedbyThaksin.SincetheelectionoftheYingluckgovernment,amodicumofdetentehasemergedamongtheduellingfactions(Farrelly2012).Butwhateverthesubstanceoftheseunderstandings,thereiseverpresentdangerthatanothercoupwillobliteraterecentandincompleteeffortstoreignitedemocratictendencies.Inordertoexplainthereluctanceofseniorfigurestoconsistentlyembracedemocraticinstitutions,itisworthconsideringthemoregeneralcharacterofThaidemocracy,inwhicheliteprerogativestendtodominateandthereishabitualdisregardforalternativeviews.Inthiscontext,Hewison(2010)pointstoaprocessofconservativedemocratisation,whileConnors(2008)analysesthewebsofpoliticalinfluencethathavemadetheboundariesbetweendemocraticandnon-democraticpoliticshardtodiscern.Heproposesthatconteststodecidetheofpoliticalinteractionhavecontinuedtodisrupteffortstostrengthendemocraticinstitutions.Walker(2008,2012),bycontrast,hashighlightedtheimportanceofaruralconstitution,throughwhichpoliticalpeasantsengagewiththepoliticalsystem.Theirprioritiesarebasedonpatronageandaccess,withanemphasisontheirlivelihoodsandeligibilityforgovernmentsupport.Thaksin,inWalkersargument,hasbeenmostadeptatfulfillingtheneedsoftheruralvoter.Nishizakis(2011,236)focusonthedetailsofprovincialpoliticalleadershipinSuphanburiisalsoinclinedtochallengesimpledescriptionsofdemocraticandnon-democraticpolitics.Forhim,ruralsupportforpoliticianslikeThaksinshouldnotbeframedintermsofabarbarouslysimplisticandcondescendinganalysiswhichruralvotersareconsideredandurbanelites,suchasseniormilitaryleaders,claimtobemorePutsimply,thebehaviourofseniormembersofThailandsarmedforces,atrepeatedintervalsovermanyyears,suggestsengrainedanxietyaboutthequalityandpowerofdemocraticinstitutions,andparticularlytheelectedpoliticianswhocontrolthem.Democraticinstinctshavejoustedwiththemilitaryseffortstomaintainbureaucraticandroyalistinfluences,withsporadicmilitaryinterventionsreassertingthelegitimacyofthecoupinthefaceofelectoralmandates.BeforeafailedcoupattemptinSeptember1985,forinstance,instance,governmenthadbeentryingtomovebeyondtheimageofanationwherepoliticaldifferencesaresettledbymilitaryinterventionratherthanelections(Quinn-Judge1985).GeneralPremTinsulanondaledthegovernmentwhichstareddownthatparticularcoupattemptinthenameofdefendingamorereformistpolity.Afterretiringfromthepremiership,however,PrembecametheWhydemocracystruggles chairmanofKingBhumibolsprivycounciland,in2006,wascloselyassociatedwiththecoup-makinggroup.Thispersonalhistorysuggeststhatcommitmentstodemocratisationarefickleandlargelydeterminedbyindividualpositioning.Democracyindoubt:explanatorypropositionsshaphazardhistoryofmilitaryinterventionismandincompleteredemocratisationrequiresanefforttoprovideclearexplanations.Separatelyorincombination,theseexplanationsarebestunderstoodagainsttheback-groundofthedestabilisingthrustofReynoldsandTeams(2012)itschallengetosimplisticcorrelationsbetweeninstitutionsandoutcomes.Thusmyfirstmainexplanatorypropositionrelatestopersistentuneaseaboutthreatstothemonarchy,whichhasbeenregularlyusedtojustifymilitaryinterventionsinwaysthatareculturallypotent.ThecoupofSeptember2006wasthelatesttorelyonthiselitejustificationforoverthrowinganelectedgovernment.Asthesymbolicheartofthenation,theinstitutionoftheandparticularlyKingBhumibolcanbemobilisedforpoliticalpurposes.Throughoutthetwentiethcentury,boldassertionsofmilitaryfealtybecamepartofthesymbiosisbetweenpalaceandarmyinterests.Theirmutualpurposes,andhabitualwarinessofpotentiallydisloyalelementsinThaisociety,fertilisedacloseintimacybetweentheroyalfamilyandmilitaryleaders.KingBhumibolhaspepperedhisinnercirclewithmilitaryleaders,includingfigureswhohavebeenactiveincouppolitics,suchasGeneralPrem.Hewison(2008)explainsthelinksbetweenthesymbolicandpracticaldefenceofthemonarchythroughthemobilisationofunrivalleddiscursiveresources,especiallyinthecontextofthe2006coup.Whenexplicitlyanti-monarchysentimentshaveemerged,astheydidduringthecommunistinsurgencyofthe1970s,andmorerecentlyduringRedShirtprotestsinAprilMay2010,themilitaryhasrequiredevenlessjustificationforitsdefenceoftheroyals.Second,Thaidecision-makershaveremainedrelativelytolerantofmilitary.Themilitaryhasnotfacedthelevelofresistancethathasbeensowidelyreportedinotherplaces,includingneighbouringBurma.Again,thiscanbepartlyexplainedbythecloselinksbetweenthemilitaryandthemonarchy.Theauraofroyalbenevolenceandpowerhasoftenbeentransferredtothemilitaryasithassoughttopresentitselfasthelinchpinforguaranteeingthesecurityofsocietyanditskeyinstitutions.Nonetheless,thepost-2006effortstocriminalisecriticalcommentsonthegovernanceofThaisociety,andespeciallythepoliticalroleoftheroyalfamily,havedentedtheimpressionofrelaxedattitudes(Streckfuss2011).But,overall,ithasoftenhelpedthemilitary,especiallysincethe1990s,thatithasbeenabletopositionitsinterventionsasinnature.relationsamongeconomiceliteshaveremainedacrucialelementofthecultureofmilitaryinterventionism.TherecalibrationofeconomicpowerisNicholasFarrelly analmostinevitablepost-coupoutcome,goingrightbackto1932.Someearlyepisodesofmilitaryinterventionsawthelarge-scaleredistributionofassetsandcommercialinfluence.Morerecentlysuchasin1991and2006coupshavebeenjustifiedbytheneedtounderminedominanteconomicplayers(PasukandBaker2008).Attacksonthewealthaccumulatedbyelectedpoliticians,oftendescribedeuphemisticallyaspidbokati),havegivenextraimpetustotherectitudeofmilitarycoups.InthecaseofThaksin,histelecommunicationsaproductofshrewdmanipulationofgovernmentcontractsandwasanobvioustarget.Givenwidespreadsuspicionsaboutsmassivewealth,thegovernmentdidnotevenfeeltheneedtoofferadetailedexplanationwhenitfrozebillionsofdollarsofhisassets(PoliticalDesk2007).Thaksincontinuestofighttoclearhisnameofwhathedescribesaspoliticallymotivatedcorruptioncharges.Fourth,Thailandhasreceivedsustainedinternationalsupport,mostnotablyfromtheUSA.SinceWorldWarII,theUSAhasbecometheprimarysecurityandpoliticalguarantorfortheThaistate.AndersonandMendiones(1985)callthisperiodThailandAmericanera.Morespecifically,theUSAandotherforeigngovernmentshaveplayedkeyrolesinthelegitimationandfortificationoftheroyalfamilyanditsmilitarybackers.Attimesespeciallyfromthe1950stothe1980sresourcesfromWesterncountrieswereinstrumentalineffortstobuttresstheseinstitutions(Ruth2011).InternationaldisquietaboutThailandcoupshasthususuallybeenmuted.ThiscanbefurtherexplainedbyjudgementsmadeatthehighestlevelsofinternationalpoliticsabouttheimportanceofasecureThailand.Duringthecoldwar,theUSAcouldnotaffordtoseeThailandtocommunistadvancesandinfiltration.Morerecently,theneedtosafeguardinternationaltradeandtransportationagainstterrorismandotherthreatshasensuredthatThailandisfullyentangledintheWesternsecurityorbit.Regularexchangesofmilitarypersonnel,themostpublicofwhichoccurundertheannualbanneroftheCobraGoldmilitaryexercises,meanthatThaimilitaryleadersareveryfamiliarwiththeirWesterncounterparts.Atthesametime,Thailandhasawell-resourcedandeffectiveforeignservice.ItiswidelyconsideredasuccessfulagentfortheThainationalinterest,andspecificallyforthedefenceofthemonarchy.Importantly,ithasalsobeeneffectiveinexplainingThailandsoccasionalcoupstoWesterncapitals.Giventhesefourexplanatorypropositions,Thailandmaystruggletocultivateanelitepoliticalculturewherecoupswouldbeunacceptable.Atthisstage,coupsclearlystillplayamajorroleinThaimainstreampolitics.Episodicredemocratisationhasnotledtothefinalconsolidationofademocraticsystem,andwarinessaboutelectoraloutcomesremainsverystrong,especiallyamongthosewiththepoliticalandmaterielcapabilitiestolaunchcoups.Itis,afterall,seniormilitaryleaders,andspecificallythetoparmygenerals,whoneedtobeconvincedthatdirectpoliticalinterventionsdonotservetheirpurposes.Eachyear,Thailandtendstoexperienceatleastoneperiodoffrenziedcoupspeculation.Inapatternthatgoesbackmanydecades,thestandardresponseWhydemocracystruggles seesmilitaryofficerspublicisetheirdenials,whicharechoreographedtoleavescepticalmindsguessing.Underthesecircumstances,thelikelihoodofanothercoupmaydiminishincertainperiodsbutisunlikelytodisappearcompletely.Givenitsglobalisedeconomyandcentralitytointernationalnetworks,Thailandwouldstruggleifitlurchedintoaperiodoflong-termauthoritarianismsuchasBurmadidfrom1962to2010.ThegeopoliticalconditionswhichmadeitpossibleinthetwentiethcenturytosustainlongperiodsofmilitaryrulewheresupportfromtheUSA,ortheSovietUnionand/orChina,waslikelytofollowappearnowtohavefaded.Militarydictatorship,especiallyiftherewasnoprospectofanearlyreturntocivilianrule,wouldcomewithsignificantconsequences.EvenAbhisitVejjajiva(2007),amanwhobenefiteddirectlyfromthe2006coupandfrommilitarymeddlingin2008,acknowledgedtheriskofinternationalsanctionsandrelatedopprobrium.Nonetheless,Thailandselitecoupculturecontinuestoproducehighlevelsofpoliticaluncertainty.Fewwouldhaveeverguessedthatwithinfiveyearsofthe2006militaryintervention,aShinawatrawouldbebackinThailandsprimeministerialsuite,andthatshewouldbenamedYingluck.GiventhepotentialforevengreaterturbulenceinThaisociety,andtheimplicationsofthedefenceofthemonarchyoutlinedinthisarticle,itwouldbeimprudenttobetthatthe2006coupwasThailandsfinalexperienceofmilitaryintervention.Acrossverydifferenthistoricalperiods,thecouphasremainedanattractiveoptionforpalaceandmilitaryfigureshopingtopreservetheirentitlementsandinterests.SoisthiswhyThaidemocracyappearstostruggle?Theanswerisnestedinthepeculiar,evenadhoc,arrangementsofelitecultureandpoliticsthathavebeenconsolidatedduringthetwentieth,andnowthetwenty-first,century.Certainlythereareothercountries,includingnearneighbourslikeBurmaandIndonesia,wherecoupshaveoccurredatimportantjuncturesoftheirdevelopmentasnationstates.Theinfluenceofthearmedforcesinthosetwocountrieshasalsoremainedstrong.ButThailandselitecoupcultureisdifferent.Thepersistenceofcoup-making,longafterdemocraticinstitutionswereassumedtoberobust,indicatesthatsomeofthefundamentalstructuresofThaipoliticallifehavenotbeenshiftedbyburgeoningdemocraticinstincts.Instead,inmuchthewaythatReynoldsandTeam(2012)outlinedtheentwinementofpoliticalinfluencesintheirmodeloftheThai,thereisconstantjockeyingandrearrange-ment,allwithinasystemwherecircumscriptions,atdifferentlevels,arewellunderstood.Tothisend,theargumentofthisarticleisthatthepersistenceofmilitaryinterventionisminThaisocietyisexplainedbythelinksbetweenthearmyandthepalace,bytherelativetoleranceofThaidecision-makersforcoups,byrelationsamongeconomicelitesandbytheconsistentsupportthatallNicholasFarrelly evenmilitarygovernmentshavereceivedfromforeignpart-ners.Inthiscontext,theroleoftheUSAasakeyeconomic,politicalandmilitarybackeroftheThaisystemcannotbeexaggerated.TheacquiescenceofUSgovernmentstotheinterventionismoftheThaiarmedforces,includingin2006,hasensuredthatanystigmaassociatedwithmilitarygovernmentneveroverwhelmedinternationalacceptance.ItisthisinternationalacceptanceofthemilitarysinvolvementinThaipoliticsthatwarrantsseriousquestioning.Clearly,thisacceptanceistheproductoflong-termanddoggedeffortstopresentThailandasapeacefulandprogressivesocietyevenwhileremnantsofauthoritarianism,whetherdrivenbythepalaceorthearmy,stillprovidecertainadvantages.Itisthereliabilityofthissystem,notwithstandingitssusceptibilitytowildfluctuationsinpoliticalcontrol,whichhasensuredthatinternationalactorsaccedetothevicissitudesoftheelitecoupculture.Insomeforeigncapitals,sporadicembarrassmentinresponsetoyetanothermilitaryinterventionmightbeconsideredasmallpriceforthefriendship,accessandtoleranceprovidedbyThaimilitaryandpalaceauthorities.ForcountriessuchastheUSA,therecordshowsthatacoupisinsufficientjustificationforabandoningThailandsroyalandmilitarypowerbrokers.Post-coupgrumbleshave,intheyearssince2006,beenreplacedbymuchdeeperanxietiesaboutthefutureoftheThaipolityonceKingBhumibolisnolongeronthethrone.Theprevailingcoupcultureislargelyaproductofhisreignandthedeliberatesymbiosisthathasdrawnmilitaryleadersintohiscircle.Itisunclearwhetheranyfuturemonarchcouldsoconsistentlyrelyonthemilitarytosupportroyalinterestsalongsideitsown.ThefinalphaseofKingsreignhasthusledsomeThaistoaskuncomfortablequestionsabouttherolesofthepalaceandthemilitaryinpolitics.Intheuncertainperiodahead,thelonghistoryofcoupswillcontinuetoshapeThailandspoliticalcultureandthebehaviourofitseliteactors.Atmomentswhendemocraticinstitutionsareputunderpressure,thereisachancethatnewcompromisescouldemerge,andrespectforelectoralmandatesmightfollow.ThealternativeisthattheThaimilitary,andperhapsthepalace,mayneverbepreparedtoacceptanydiminishedstatus.Theriskofsmallerbudgets,politicalmarginalisationandlessprestigecouldprovetoomuchtobear.Thatcouldmeancontinuedjustificationforoccasionalcoupsandthatnewgenerationswillbecomeacculturatedtomilitaryinterventionisminasystemwhereelitedecision-makershaveonlyhaphazardlyembracedthedemocraticideal.1.Iamverygratefultothejournalsanonymousreviewer,whoprovidedthoughtfuladviceontheargumentofthispiece.2.Coupsaresopersistentthatthephenomenonofcoup-makingstretchesacrossperiodswhenthecountrywasknownbyadifferentname.ItwasSiamuntil1939,andformallyknownbyWhydemocracystruggles thatnameonceagainfrom1945to1949.Inrecognitionofthelong-term,sometimesinterchangeableandcontinuinguseofbothThaiandSiambyThaispeakers,thisarticleusesthehistoricallyappropriatetermforeachperiod.3.Thenumberof)and)inThailandtwentieth-andtwenty-Þrst-centuryhistoryissomewhatcontested,although19isnowthewidelyreportedconsensus(Farrelly2011).4.Therearesomeexceptions.IntheSeptember1985coupattempt,fourpeople,includingtwoforeignjournalists,werekilled(Cummings-Bruce1985).ButaccordingtoChalidaporn(1991,166):ÔThiswasquiteunusualforthenormallybloodlesscoupsinthehistoryofThaipoliticsÕ.5.Yellow(KingBhumibolÕsÔbirthcolourÕ)isnowmostcloselyassociatedwithanti-Thaksinprotests.Itisworthnotingthatduring2005andmostof2006,thecolourwasusedtomarkthecelebrationsforthesixtiethanniversaryofKingBhumibolÕscoronation.Atthistime,PrimeMinisterThaksinregularlyworeaÔyellowshirtÕ,eventhoughafterthecouphehasbeenalignedwiththeoppositecamp,theÔredsÕ.Abhisit,Vejjajiva.2007.KanmuangThailangrattaprahanthangokchakwikritkonchaklapmaepaimaithung[Thaipoliticsafterthecoup:pathwaysfromcrisisbeforetheybecomeimpossible].Bangkok:KhoKitDuayTon.Ananya,Bhuchongkul.1992.ÔÔThailand1991:TheReturnoftheMilitary.ÕÕSoutheastAsian:313Anderson,Benedict,andRuchiraMendiones.1985.IntheMirror:LiteratureandPoliticsinSiamintheAmericanEra.Ithaca,NY:SoutheastAsiaProgram,CornellUniversity.Batson,BenjaminA.1984.TheEndoftheAbsoluteMonarchyinSiam.Singapore:OxfordUniversityPress.Beeson,Mark.2008.ÔÔCivilMilitaryRelationsinIndonesiaandthePhilippines:WilltheThaiCoupProveContagious?ÕÕArmedForcesandSociety34(3):474Case,William.2009.ÔÔThaiElections2005:NorthernGainsandSouthernExceptionalism.ÕÕInsThailand:PopulismandPolarisation,editedbyJohnFunston,100127.Bangkok:InstituteofSecurityandInternationalStudies,ChulalongkornUniversity.Chalidaporn,Songsamphan.1991.ÔÔSupernaturalProphecyinThaiPolitics:TheRoleofaSpiritualCulturalElementinCoupDecisions.ÕÕPhDdiss.,ClaremontGraduateSchool.Chaloeylakana,Wongtrangan.1988.ÔÔThaiEliteStruggleinthe1932Revolution.ÕÕPhDdiss.,JohnsHopkinsUniversity.Charnvit,Kasetsiri.2004.Patiwat2475[1932revolution].Bangkok:SocialScienceandHumanitiesTextbookFoundation.Connors,MichaelK.2008.ÔÔThailandFourElectionsandaCoup.ÕÕAustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs62(4):478Conyers-Keynes,Stephen.1950.AWhiteManinThailand.London:RobertHale.Cummings-Bruce,Nicholas.1985.ÔÔThailandCrushesCoupPlotters.ÕÕ,September10.Elliott,DavidL.1978.Thailand:TheOriginsofMilitaryRule.London:ZedPress.Farrelly,Nicholas.2011.ÔÔCountingThailandÕsCoups.ÕÕNewMandala,March8.http://Farrelly,Nicholas.2012.ÔÔAnalysingThailandÕsDetente.ÕÕNewMandala,May16.http://Fineman,Daniel.1997.ASpecialRelationship:TheUnitedStatesandMilitaryGovernmentinThailand,1947.Honolulu:UniversityofHawaiiPress.Flood,E.Thadeus.1976.TheUnitedStatesandtheMilitaryCoupinThailand:ABackground.Berkeley:IndochinaResourceCenter.NicholasFarrelly 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