PPT-Sandboxing

Untrusted JavaScript John Mitchell Stanford Outline Web security Bad sites with bad content Good sites with bad content JavaScript Sandboxing Relation to practice Facebook FBJS Yahoo . mitedu Petr Marchenko University College London pmarchenkocsuclacuk Ulfar Erlingsson Elijah Taylor Brad Chen Derek L Schuff David Sehr Cliff L Bif64258e Bennet Yee Google Inc ulfar elijahtaylor bradchen dschu64256 sehr cbi64260e bsy googlecom Abstrac How to get the Root in Rootless by PWN24K. What is Rootless?. Sources within Apple are particularly enthusiastic about a new security system called Rootless, which is being described internally as a “huge,” kernel-level feature for both OS X and . Sandboxing . Untrusted. JavaScript . John Mitchell. Stanford. 2. 3. 4. Outline. Web security. Bad sites with bad content. Good sites with bad content. JavaScript Sandboxing. Impact on practice. Facebook. Technical Brief 2 The implementation of sandboxing provides the �nal step in closing the security gaps on stealthy attacks. By running the suspicious �le in a fully established v Tyler . Moore. CS 7403. University of Tulsa. Principle of Least Privilege. “Every program and every privileged user of the system should operate using the least amount of privilege necessary to complete the job.”. Michael Backes. ♢. , Sven Bugiel. ♦. , . Christian Hammer. ♦. , . Oliver Schranz. ♦. , . Philipp von Styp-Rekowsky. ♦. ♢. CISPA, Saarland University & MPI-SWS . ♦. CISPA. , Saarland University . Sandboxing . Untrusted. JavaScript . John Mitchell. Stanford. 2. 3. 4. Outline. Web security. Bad sites with bad content. Good sites with bad content. JavaScript Sandboxing. Impact on practice. Facebook. Sandboxing . Untrusted. JavaScript . John Mitchell. Stanford. 2. 3. 4. Outline. Web security. Bad sites with bad content. Good sites with bad content. JavaScript Sandboxing. Impact on practice. Facebook.