Disagreements Daniel Cohnitz Teresa Marques Received - PDF document

Disagreements DanielCohnitz € TeresaMarques Received:3February2013/Accepted:3February2013  SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2013 Abstract Thisspecialissueof Erkenntnis isdevotedtothevarietiesofdis- agreementthatariseindifferentareasofdiscourse,andtheconsequencesweshould drawfromthesedisagreements,eitherconcerningthesubjectmatterandits objectivity,orconcerningourownviewsaboutthissubjectmatterifwelearn,for example,thatanepistemicpeerdisagreeswithourview.Inthisintroductionwe sketchthebackgroundtotherecentphilosophicaldiscussionsofthesequestions, andthelocationoccupiedthereinbythearticlesinthiscollection. Peopleagreeanddisagreeaboutalotofthings:whathappensaroundthem,whattodo, mattersoftaste,and,moregenerally,worldviews,values,policies,theories, philosophies,etc.Somedisagreementsappeartobe‘‘faultless’’—nopartyinsucha disputeneedbemistaken.Otherdisagreements,seemtobe‘‘merelyverbal’’,and perhapsnotevendisagreementsatall.Inbothcases,philosophershavearguedthatthis diagnosisshouldleadtodeationismaboutthesubject-matteroftheinitial(apparent) disagreement.Ifdisagreementsaboutacertainsubjectmatterarefaultless,thenthere arenoobjectivetruthsaboutthatsubjectmatter;ifdisagreementsaboutacertain subjectmatteraremerelyverbal,thentheyconcernapseudo-problem.Stillsomeother disagreementsdonotseemtoinvolvewhatpeopleexplicitlybelieveorthinkabout something,butratherwhattheyaredisposedtodo. Thisspecialissueof Erkenntnis isdevotedtothevarietiesofdisagreementthat ariseindifferentareasofdiscourse,andtheconsequencesweshoulddrawfrom thesedisagreements,eitherconcerningthesubjectmatteranditsobjectivity,or D.Cohnitz( & ) Tartu,Estonia e-mail:cohnitz@ut.ee T.Marques Lisbon,Portugal 123 Erkenn DOI10.1007/s10670-013-9442-7 perhapsconcerningourownviewsaboutthissubjectmatterifwelearn,forexample,thatanepistemicpeerdisagreeswithourview.Wewillsketchthebackgroundoftherecentphilosophicaldiscussionsofthesequestions,andthelocationsoccupiedthereinbythearticlesinthiscollection.1MerelyVerbalDisagreementsBeforeinvestigatingtheimplicationsofpersistentdisagreement,onemightrstwanttoconsiderwhetherthereareperhapsdifferenttypesofdisagreements(thatmightimplydifferentconsequences).Aswenotedabovealready,theEnglishword‘disagreement’seemstoapplytoawidervarietyofthings.Two(ormore)personsmightbesaidto‘‘disagree’’becausetheyareengagedinadispute,onevigorouslydenyingandcriticizingtheviewsoftheother.Andthismighthappenevenifbothhavemutuallycompatiblebeliefsaboutthesubjectmatteroftheirdispute.Perhapstheydonotrecognizethattheirbeliefsareactuallycompatible,orperhapstheyarenotaimingtoassessthecompatibilityoftheirbeliefs(maybetheywanttomovetheothertoadoptcertainvaluesorrecognizecertainstandards).Ontheotherhand,twopersonsmightalsobesaidtobedisagreeingwithoutengaginginanykindofdispute,i.e.withouteverexchangingwords,reasonsorrhetoric.Perhapsoneorbotharealreadydead,ordonotnoticethedisagreement,ordonotcare.Butiftheirbeliefsorstatementsareinsomesense‘‘incompatible’’,itseemscorrecttodescribethemtobeindisagreement.Onemighttrytointroducesomeclaricationbydistinguishingbetween‘‘genuinedisagreements’’and‘‘merelyapparentdisagreements’’.Aswewillseeshortly,itwillbenotoriouslyhardtodecideforcertainkindsofdisagreementsinwhichcategorytheyshouldgo.Arelativelyunproblematiccandidate—inthisrespect—seemstobethephenomenonof‘‘merelyverbaldisagreements’’.Thebelittling‘merely’alreadyindicatesthatthesearen’tsupposedtobe‘‘real’’or‘‘genuine’’disagreements.ConsiderWilliamJames’sfamousexample:SOMEYEARSAGO,beingwithacampingpartyinthemountains,Ireturnedfromasolitaryrambletondeveryoneengagedinaferociousmetaphysicaldispute.Thecorpusofthedisputewasasquirrel—alivesquirrelsupposedtobeclingingtoonesideofatree-trunk;whileoveragainstthetree’soppositesideahumanbeingwasimaginedtostand.Thishumanwitnesstriestogetsightofthesquirrelbymovingrapidlyroundthetree,butnomatterhowfasthegoes,thesquirrelmovesasfastintheoppositedirection,andalwayskeepsthetreebetweenhimselfandtheman,sothatneveraglimpseofhimiscaught.Theresultantmetaphysicalproblemnowisthis:Doesthemangoroundthesquirrelornot?Hegoesroundthetree,sureenough,andthesquirrelisonthetree;butdoeshegoroundthesquirrel?Intheunlimitedleisureofthewilderness,discussionhadbeenwornthreadbare.Everyonehadtakensides,andwasobstinate;andthenumbersonbothsideswereeven.(James1904:31)AsJamesexplains,thedisagreementiswhollyterminological.Thecorrectanswerdependsonhowyouunderstand‘goround’.Ifyoumeanbyitthatthemanisat D.Cohnitz,T.Marques somepointNorth,East,South,andWestofthesquirrel,hegoesaroundit.Ifyoumeanthatheisatsomepointinfront,tothesideandatthebackofthesquirrel,hedoesnotgoaroundit.Oncethesetwonotionsof‘goround’havebeendistinguished,thedisagreementdisappears.Everyoneinthecampingpartycanagreeonallthefactsconcerningthemanandthesquirrel.Understandingwhendisagreementsaremerelyverbalisofpotentialmetaphilosophicalimportance,aswewillseebelow.Atleastprimafacie,amerelyverbaldisagreementderivesfromsomecommunicativemishaporotherandsobetraysnothingsubstantialordeepaboutthesubjectmatterofthedisagreement.Ifwehadinourpossessionasharpconceptofmerelyverbaldisagreementsthatwouldhelpustodetectthemwithgreaterperspicuity,wecouldreducetheriskofentanglementinpseudo-problemsthatslowourprogresstowardunderstandingthephenomenon.In‘‘MerelyVerbalDisputes’’,CarrieJenkinsdiscussesrecentmetaphilosophicalattemptstoclarifythenotionofamerelyverbaldispute.Jenkinsidentiesthreeaspectsofmerelyverbaldisputesthatareusedintheliteraturetoprovidenecessaryandsufcientconditionsforadisputetocountasmerelyverbal.Oneistheideathatthepartiesinamerelyverbaldisputedonotactuallydisagreeaboutthefactsofthematter.Thesecondideaisthatthepartiestothedisputedonotrecognizethis,andactuallyendupinthedisputebecauseofadisagreementaboutlanguage.Ofcourse,therecanbealsonon-verbaldisagreementsaboutlanguage.Butwhatisspecictomerelyverbaldisputesisthattheyappeartobedisputesaboutsomethingotherthantheportionoflanguagethatisactuallyresponsibleforthem.Athirdaspectconcernsthegeneralresolvabilityofmerelyverbaldisputesifthepartieswouldadoptaneutralterminology.Jenkinsarguesthatthisaspect,whichissometimesusedtodiagnoseadisputeasmerelyverbal,isnotanecessarycondition.Thisisbecausesometimesdisputantsdonothavetherequiredalternativevocabularyavailabletoavoidambiguity.Norisitsufcient.Thedisputantmightbeirrationalandnotwillingtoresolvetheissuebymovingtothealternativevocabularyevenifitwereavailabletothem.Jenkinssuggeststhatthemostpromisingcharacterizationof‘merelyverbaldispute’isMVD:PartiesAandBarehavingamerelyverbaldisputeifftheyareengagedinasincereprimafaciedisputeD,butdonotdisagreeoverthesubjectmatter(s)ofD,andmerelypresenttheappearanceofdoingsoowingtotheirdivergentusesofsomerelevantportionoflanguage.AsJenkinsargues,though,whatcountsasa‘‘merelyverbaldispute’’isdependentonthecontextofutterance.Butlikewise(andinthesameway)whatshouldbeconsideredasthesubjectmatterofagivendisputeisalsodependentonthecontextofutterance.2Can(MerelyVerbal)DisagreementsJustifyDeßationism?Aswesaidabove,itistemptingtothinkthatonceadisputeisdiagnosedasmerelyverbal,thiswillleadimmediatelytodeationistconsequences.Afterall,ifadisputeismerelyverbal,thenthedisputewaspointless—iftheparticipantsinthedispute Disagreements wouldjustsortouttheirusageoflanguage,therewouldn’tbeasubstantialissueleftfordiscussion.AsBrendanBalcerakJacksonnotes,logicalpositivistsaswellassomemodern-daymeta-ontologistsagreethatdiagnosingadisputeasmerelyverbal,orthepartiesinthedisputeastalkingpasteachother,shouldleadtodeationism.However,inhis‘‘VerbalDisputesandSubstantiveness’’,BalcerakJacksonarguesthatmerelydiagnosingadisputeashavingthekindofpragmaticdefectwhichleadsthepartiestotalkpasteachotherdoesnotbyitselfshowthatthequestionunderdisputeisnotsubstantive.Inordertoderivedeationistconsequencesthemeta-ontologistwouldneedtoendorseadditionalassumptions(forexample,abouttheanalyticityortruth-by-denitionofcertainsentencesinthedispute),whichshouldseemunattractiveforpost-positivistmeta-ontologists.Ofcourse,thepracticingmetaphysiciansshouldbetroubledwhenlearningthattheyhavebeenmerelytalkingpasteachother.But,asBalcerakJacksonargues,theyaren’tdisagreeingaboutultimatelyinsubstantialmatters,contrarytothelogicalpositivistanalysis.Onthatanalysis,thedisputantswouldmerelybeobjectingtotheconstitutivemeaningpostulatesoftheiropponent’sconceptualframeworks.FolkeTersman’s‘‘Disagreement:EthicsandElsewhere’’alsodiscusseswhetherdeationistconsequencesfollowifacertaintypeofdisagreementisdetected.Insteadofverbaldisputes,Tersmanfocusesonpersistentdisagreementsaboutmoralmatters.Canthemoralanti-realistarguefromthepresenceofwidespreaddisagreementaboutmoralmatterstotheconclusionthattherearenoobjectivefactsinthemoraldomain?Oneworryisthatsuchanargumentwouldovergenerate:ifthepresenceofdisagreementsshouldleadtomoralanti-realism,weshouldalsobeanti-realistsaboutotherareasthatexhibitthesamekindsofdisagreements,suchasepistemologyandmeta-ethics.However,anti-realisminthosedomainswouldseemtounderminethemoralanti-realist’scase.SheseemslikelytoencountertroublewhenshetriestoclaimcoherentlythatherconclusionisobjectivelyTersmanarguesforaconditionalverdictonthematter.Ifthedisagreementswendinsciencedonotimplydeationistconsequences(becauseinthescienceswendmeansfortherationalresolutionofdisagreements),thenthedisagreementswendinepistemologyandmeta-ethicsshouldn’timplysuchconsequenceseither.Thisisbothbecausetheresolvabilityofepistemologicaldisagreementsexplainstheresolvabilityofscienticdisagreementsandbecauseexistingmeta-ethicaldis-agreementsmoreplausiblyderivefromanignoranceofempiricalfactthandomanyethicaldisagreements.3FaultlessDisagreementsTherearealsopersistentdisagreementsinotherareas;forinstanceinaesthetics,mattersoftaste,orabouthumour.Andthereisafurtheraspectofmanydisagreementsintheseareas.Itseemsthat,inahighnumberofcases,itislegitimateforpeopletoholdtheirposition,notmerelybecausetheyarenotblameworthy,butbecausetheyarenotwrong.Persistentdisagreementsmaybeasignofalackofobjectivityinanareaofdiscourse—i.e.thattruthinthatareaismind-dependent.Butwherefaultlessness D.Cohnitz,T.Marques exists,itcanbeentakenasasignoflackofuniversality—i.e.,thatdifferent,apparentlyincompatible,viewsareequallytrue.DavidHume,discussingstandardsoftaste,expressesthiselegantly:Onthecontrary,athousanddifferentsentiments,excitedbythesameobject,areallright:Becausenosentimentrepresentswhatisreallyintheobject.Itonlymarksacertainconformityorrelationbetweentheobjectandtheorgansorfacultiesofthemind;andifthatconformitydidnotreallyexist,thesentimentcouldneverpossiblyhavebeing.Beautyisnoqualityinthingsthemselves:Itexistsmerelyinthemindwhichcontemplatesthem;andeachmindperceivesadifferentbeauty.Onepersonmayevenperceivedeformity,whereanotherissensibleofbeauty;andeveryindividualoughttoacquiesceinhisownsentiment,withoutpretendingtoregulatethoseofothers.Toseekintherealbeauty,orrealdeformity,isasfruitlessanenquiry,astopretendtoascertaintherealsweetorrealbitter.Accordingtothedispositionoftheorgans,thesameobjectmaybebothsweetandbitter;andtheproverbhasjustlydeterminedittobefruitlesstodisputeconcerningtastes.(Hume1757:268-9)Dispositionalaccountsofthepropertiesexpressedbypredicatesofpersonaltasteelaboratethemind-dependenceofthepropertiesatstake.Contextualismcanrenderacoherentsemanticexplanationfortheexpressionofthe‘‘thousanddifferentsentimentsexcitedbythesameobject’’andoffaultlessness.Apredicatelike‘istasty’,utteredincontext,expressespropertiessuchastastyfortheperceiversrelevantincontextCundertheperceptualcircumstancesrelevantinC,orsimplytastyforthestandardrelevantinC.Differentsubjectscanthusbothspeaktrulyiftheydon’tsharethesamestandard.So,contextualismcanexplainfaultlessness.Butcanitexplainthedisagreement?Themainobjectionraisedagainstcontextualismisthatitlosesdisagreementatthecostofexplainingfaultlessness.Twopeopledonotdisagreeifonesays‘Saraisshort’andtheothersays‘Saraisnotshort’,invirtueofonemeaning‘shortforavolleyballplayer’andtheothermeaning‘shortforaBrazilian’.Likewise,twopeoplecannotdisagreewhenonesays‘haggisistasty’andtheothersays‘haggisisnottasty’,andtheymeandifferentthingsby‘tasty’.AndyEgan’s‘‘There’sSomethingFunnyaboutComedy:ACaseStudyinFaultlessDisagreement’’illustratesthisdebatewiththecaseofcomedy,offeringarelativistaccountthataimstosecurefaultlessdisagreements.Heraisesobjectionsagainstcontextualismsimilartothosesketchedabove.Eganfurtherdiscussessomealternativeexplanationsthatcontextualistshaveputforwardtoaccountfortheimpressionofdisagreementthatremains,insistingthatthoseexplanationscanhandleintra-conversationaldisagreements,butnotextra-conversationaldisagree-ments,norcasesof‘‘disagreementinthought’’wherespeakersdonotverbalizetheiropinionsatall.Egan’salternativeistoadoptaLewisianconceptionofcontents:theobjectsofbeliefarenotpossibleworldpropositions,butdesepropositions.Apredicatelikeisfunnyistobeanalyzedasadispositionalproperty(somevariationofsomebodyinwhomxisdisposedtocauseRincircumstancesC).Thispreservesthe Disagreements dispositionalanalysisthatcontextualismtriedtocapture.ButifLewis’scentredpropositionaccountiscorrect,thensomeonewhothinksisfunnyself-attributesthepropertybeingdisposedtohavearesponseRtoxincircumstancesC.Eganthenarguesthatthedeseaccountcanunderwritefourdifferentthings:disagreementinthought,faultlessnessinthought,disagreementincommunication,andfaultlessnessincommunication.Faultlessnessinthoughtispreservedbecauseeachpersonis(presumably)rightintheself-ascriptionmade.Disagreementinthoughtoughttobepreservedtoo:IfIself-ascribethepropertybeingdisposedtolaughatSteveCarellIcannotalsoconsistentlyself-ascribethepropertybeingdisposednottolaughatSteveCarell(orsomethinglikeit).Thetwopropertiesareincompatibleandsonoonecanconsistentlyself-attributeboth.Thesubjectiveincompatibilitywouldyielddisagreement.Aproblemforthedeseaccounthereistoexplainwhydisagreementoccursaboutsomedeseproperties,butnotall(notabouthavingburningpantsbeingJohnMalkovitch).Adifferentissueconcernsthecommunicationofdesecontents.Theaccountofcommunication/assertionthatEganfavoursisStalnaker’s:treatthesemanticcontentofadeclarativesentenceincontextasitsuptakeconditionsforassertionsofAsentencelike‘‘SteveCarellisfunny’’hasthecontent(let’sassume)beingdisposedtolaughatSteveCarell,andanassertionofthatsentencerequiresthattheaudienceaccept(self-attribute)itscontent.Again,notdesepropositionswillworklikethisincommunication.Thispredictsdisagreementinconversationbutitisnotclearthatitpredictsfaultlessness—eachassertionisadefectiveconversationalmovewhentheinterlocutordiffersindispositions.Egan’saimistoshowhowatheorythatwillunderwritethepossibilityoffaultlessdisagreementcanproceed.MaxKolbel’spaper,‘‘AgreementandCommunication’’,showshowtheissuesrelatedtothepossibilityoffaultlessdisagreementsarecentraltotheoriesonthecontentofspeechactsandmentalstates,andhencetounderstandingcommuni-cationandagreement.Heconsiderstwopossiblenotionsofagreement:agreementincontent(whentwopeoplehavebeliefs,ormakeassertions,withthesamecontent),andnormativeagreement(whentwobeliefs,orassertions,aresuchthatifoneiscorrectsoistheother).Whetherornotagreementincontentcoincideswithnormativeagreementwilldependontheparticulartheoryofcontentthatonechooses.Astraightsemantictheorywouldbeonewherethefactsaboutnormativeagreementanddisagreementamongstbeliefsandassertionssuperveneonfactsaboutthecontentsofthosebeliefsandassertions.Onastraighttheory,ifitiscorrect‘‘forsomeoneatsometimetobelievesuchacontent,thenitiscorrectforanyoneatanytimetobelieveit.’’AsKolbelargues,desebeliefsandassertionsprovideamotivationtodepartfromstraightsemantics,asdothosecentraltothediscussionaboutfaultlessdisagreement;forinstancebeliefsandassertionsaboutwhatisepistemicallypossible.Desecontentsforceustosaythateithersomecontentsarenotportable,orthatonlyaportablecounterpartofthemisportable.Hesuggeststwoalternativemodelsofcommunicationtoreplacethesimplepicture.Accordingtothelatter,communicationconsistsinthetransferenceofportablecontents(theStalnakerianconceptionofcommunicationendorsedbyEgan—seeabove—countsasasimplepicture).ThetwoalternativesKolbelproposesarethelocalportabilitymodelandthesurrogatecontentmodel.Ontherstmodel,contentsareportable 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relativetoaclassoflocations,andonthesecond,whatisportableisthesurrogatecontentofthenon-portabledesecontent.TeresaMarques’spaper,‘‘DoxasticDisagreement’’,focusesonwhatEgancalled‘‘disagreementinthought’’.Itcomparesthesuccessofrelativistsolutionstocontextualistonesinofferinganexplanationoffaultlessdoxasticdisagreement.Sheproposesadescriptionofdoxasticdisagreementwheretherelevantattitudesareacceptancestatesandthecontentscentredpropositions.ButMarquesarguesthattheconditionfortheincompatibilityofattitudesofferedbysomerelativistsisunacceptable.Forinstance,Eganreliesonasubjectivenotionofrationality—whetheritwouldberationalforasubjecttoself-ascribetwodistinctproperties.Marquesarguesthatthisconditionovergenerates,andthatinitsplaceweshouldadoptaninter-subjectivenotionofincompatibility:ifonesubject’sattitudeiscorrect,thenanothersubject’sattitudecannotbecorrect.ThiscorrespondstothenormativenotionsofagreementanddisagreementdescribedbyKolbel.Onthenotionofdoxasticdisagreementproposed,relativistsfacethesamelimitationsascontextualists:faultlessnessisaccommodatedatthecostoflosingdisagreement.Now,thenotionofinter-subjectiveincompatibilitypresupposesanabsoluteconceptionofcorrectness,whichcanbequestioned.AuthorslikeMacFarlane,ms)havesuggestedthattherearenotonlydifferentformsofdisagreementbutalsothatinsomecasescorrectnessisnotabsolute,butrelative.Theverysameattitude(dependingonthetypeofcontentthatattitudehas)canbecorrectasassessedfromonecontextbutincorrectasassessedfromanother.Wherethisisso,relativistscanclaimtosecurenotonlyfaultlessnessbutalsodisagreement(inasense).Marquesargues,however,thattheresultingconceptionturnsdisagreementsintoultimatelypointlessconicts,andisthusanunreasonablenotion.Marquesconcludesbysuggestingthatthekindofdisagreementthatexistsintheallegedcasesoffaultlessdisagreementarenotdoxasticdisagreementsatall.Whatwouldthenneedtobeexplorediswhetherthesourceofdisagreementistheconictofnon-doxasticattitudes.TornnHuvenes’spaper,‘‘DisagreementwithoutError’’developsthisidea.Hearguesthatwecanmakesenseoffaultlessdisagreementwithoutbeingcommittedtoanyformofrelativismabouttruth.Hesuggeststhatdisagreementsresultsimplyfromconictingattitudes,andthattheattitudesatstakecanbedoxasticornot(whereasMarquescontemplatesthepossibilityoftherebeingdifferentdisagreement,doxasticandnon-doxastic).Thedisagreementatstakecanthusresultfromtheconictofnon-doxasticattitudeslikepreferencesordesires.Acaseofconictofnon-doxasticattitudeswouldbeonewhereonepartyapprovesofsomethinganotherpartydoesnotapprove.Huvenesclaimsthatthisaccountavoidssomeofthedilemmasthatrelativistaccountsoffaultlessdisagreementsface:thatoncetruthisrelativizedtoperspectives,disagreementislost;andthatitishardtoreconciletherelativistaccountoffaultlessdisagreementwithplausibleassumptionsabouttheconnectionbetweenthenotionsoftruthandoferror,byallowingbizarreascriptionslike‘whatyouaresayingisfalse,butyouarenotmakinganymistake’.Huvenes’spositiveproposalisthatweshouldexplainthedisagreementthatresultsfromtheconictofnon-doxasticattitudeswithoutattributingtoeitherpartyinthedisputeanyerror,i.e.,falsebeliefs.Hedrawstwolessons.Therstisthatwe Disagreements shouldn’tconfuseargumentsagainstrelativistaccountsoffaultlessdisagreementwithargumentsagainstfaultlessdisagreement.Thelattercanexistevenifrelativistaccountsfaceproblems.Thesecondisthatweshouldn’tassumethatfaultlessdisagreementsrequirearelativistaccountoftruth.4PeerDisagreementsLearningthatsomebodydisagreeswithyoumightsometimesbeimportant.Perhapsyourinterlocutorisrightandyouhavebeenwrongallalong.Thesignicanceofsuchadisagreementseemsespeciallystrongincaseyoundoutthatyourviewsareindisagreementwiththeviewsofsomeonethatyoutaketobeequallywellinformedandequallyassmartasyouare.Butwhatistherationalthingtodoinsuchacase?Shoulditloweryourcondenceinyourownview?Shouldyouperhapssuspendjudgmentonthematteraltogether,giventhatyourepistemicequalisdisagreeingwithyou?Let’sassumethatpeerdisagreementsshouldhaverevisionaryconsequences:ifyoulearnthatyouandyourepistemicpeerdisagreeaboutwhether,theneachshouldreviseherownbeliefaboutwhether.AdamCartershowsinhis‘‘Disagreement,RelativismandDoxasticRevision’’,thatsuchaprinciplepresup-posesarelatedprincipleaboutrecognisedepistemicpeerhood,EP:(EP)Ifarerecognisedepistemicpeersvis-a-vis,thenrationalityrequiresthatthink,beforedisagreeingabout,thateachotherisequallylikelytoberightaboutwhetherItalsoseemsthatifyoucandisagreeaboutsomething,thenyoucandisagreeaboutitwithsomeoneyoushouldrecognize,priortothedisagreement,asyourepistemicpeer.This,Carterargues,hasimportantconsequencesfortherelativistapproachtofaultlessdisagreementsasdiscussedintheprevioussection.Rememberthattherelativistobjectstothecontextualistanalysisoffaultlessnessonthegroundthatthecontextualistlosesarobustsenseinwhichfaultlessdisagreementsarereallydisagreements.Therelativist’sownanalysisisthensupposedto‘‘save’’thedisagreement.However,ifthat’srightanddisagreementsaresuchthattheycanalwaysobtainwithrecognisedepistemicpeersandhaverevisionaryconsequences,thenitseemsthattherelativistmustbeabletomakesenseof(EP)forfaultlessdisagreements,too.Carterarguesthoughthattherelativistcannotdothat.Imightrecogniseyouasmyepistemicpeer.But,ontherelativistaccount,thatdoesn’tmeanthatIthinkyouandIareequallylikelygettingthingsright.Thisisbecausetheequalityofourevidentialsituationdoesn’tentailanequalityofstandards,andfortherelativistthelatterisjustasimportantforgettingthingsright.Butthen,itseems,therelativists’‘‘disagreements’’can’tplaythesocialepistemologicalroleplayedbygenuinedisagreements.Sothetruth-relativisthasalsofailedto‘‘save’’thedisagreementinfaultlessdisagreements.Butletuscomebacktotheissueofwhetheritisrationaltoreviseyourviewsinthelightofpeerdisagreement,andifso,whyandhowitis.Letusrstconsideryoushouldreviseyouropinion.Itseemsclearthatnotallcasesofpeer D.Cohnitz,T.Marques disagreementshouldleadyoutoreviseyourviews.LetuslookatanexamplethatKatiaVavovadiscussesinher‘‘Condence,Evidence,andDisagreement’’:Foryearsnow,youhavebeenmeetingsixfriendsfordinnereveryfortnight.Youalwayssplitthecheckevenly,tipping18%androundingeachperson’ssharetothenearestdollar.ThetaskofguringouthowmucheachpersonowesalwaysfallsonyouandSmith.(You’rethelightdrinkersinthegroup.)Uponreceivingthecheck,youbothdotherequisitecalculationsinyourhead.Mostofthetimeyouagree.Intheinstanceswhenyouhavedisagreed,youhavecheckedwithacalculatorandhavebeenrightequallyoften.Tonightyourunthenumbersandbecomequitecondentthateachshareis$43.ButthenSmithannouncesthatsheisquitecondentthateachshareis$44.Neitherofyouhashadmorewineorcoffee,andyoudonotfeel(nordoesSmithappear)especiallytiredorespeciallyperky.Thisisacaseinwhichitmightwellbereasonabletoreviseatleastthedegreeofcondencewithwhichyoubelievethateachshareis$43.Nowconsiderthecase‘‘CrazyMath’’whichisliketheonejustdescribed,exceptthatSmithsaysthatyourshareis$385.Thisshouldgiveyounoreasonwhatsoevertoreviseyouropinion.Thetwocasesseemtosuggestthathowyoushouldreviseyouropiniondependsonyourrationalcondenceinyouropinion.Ifitisveryhigh,youshouldsticktoyourgunsandnotrevise.Ifyourrationalcondenceinyouropinionislow,however,youshouldreconsider.Sinceyourcondenceishighthatyourshareissomewherearound$43ratherthansomewherearound$385,youcanignoreSmith’sopinioninthe‘‘CrazyMath’’example.Sinceyourcondenceofbeingrightinthe‘‘Math’’exampleispresumablylower,thisshouldaccountforthedifferencebetweenthetwocases.Surprisingly,asVavovashows,suchaprincipleisfalse.Itisnotgenerallythecasethatpeerdisagreementshouldleadustorevisionincasesoflowcondence,butshouldbeignoredincasesofhighcondence.Onthecontrary,theveryfactorsthataccountforlowcondenceinouropinionswillalsomakedisagreementlesssignicant.It’sinthehardcases,inwhichwenditdifculttoformanopinion,thatweprobablyhavealreadycheckedourthinkingandthusdonotneedtoreviseanyfurtherwhenwelearnaboutdisagreeingpeers.Peerdisagreement,ontheotherhand,canbemostsignicantincasesinwhichwearehighlycondentinourviews.Letusnallyturntothequestion:shouldwereviseourviewsatallinthelightofpeerdisagreement?Underwhatconditionsshouldlearningthatapeerisdisagreeingwithyouaboutwhetherleadyou(andalso,eventually,yourpeer)tosuspendjudgmentaboutwhether?Iftheepistemicsituationofyouandyourpeeris,asfarasyoucantell,perfectlysymmetric,butyouneverthelessarriveatopposingjudgmentsaboutwhether,itseemsyoushouldmoveyourbeliefsinthedirectionofyourpeer’s.Atleast,asisarguedbyJeroendeRidderinhis‘‘WhyOnlyExternalistsCanBeSteadfast’’,thisshouldholdunderthefollowingtwoconditions:youndyourselfinthehighlyidealizedepistemicsituationinwhichyouhavenoaccesstoaninternalsymmetrybreakeryouareaninternalistaboutepistemic TheexampleisoriginallyfromChristensen Disagreements justication.Ifwetakethenotionofepistemicpeerhoodseriously,theconditionsonepistemicpeerhoodshouldbythemselvesexcludetheavailabilityofsymmetrybreakers,i.e.theavailabilityofreasonsforthinkingthatyourepistemicpositionisafterallbetterthanthatofyourpeer,andthatthereforeitisrationaltosticktoyourjudgment.Insuchcases,deRidderargues,internalistsdonothavetheresourcestojustifyasteadfastposition.Externalists,ontheotherhand,mayhavesuchfurtherresources.Theymight,forexample,pointtothefactthattheoneofthetwopeerswhohasevaluatedherevidenceforwhethercorrectlyisinthestrongerepistemicposition.Butthenitisrationalforhertosticktohergunseveninthelightoftheinternalappearanceofperfectepistemicsymmetry.AsdeRidderpointsout,however,thescenarioofanidealpeerdisagreement,whichwouldexcludetheavailabilityofanyinternalsymmetrybreakers,ishighlyarticial.Becausesuchcasesareatbestapproximatelyrealizedinreal-lifedisagreements,itmightalsobethatinternalistscaninallrealdisagreementsjustifyasteadfastresponse.AcknowledgmentsTheideaforthisspecialissueoriginatedataworkshopDisagreementsthattookplaceinTartuonAugust28,2011,astherstworkshopoftheEUROCORESproject‘‘CommunicationinContext:SharedUnderstandinginaComplexWorld’’.Someofthepapersinthisissuewerepresentedatthisworkshop,othersweresubmittedinresponsetoacallforpapersthatwepublishedaftertheworkshop.Wereceivedasurprisingamountofsubmissionsinresponsetoourcall,whichindicatesthatthisiscurrentlyaveryhottopicinphilosophyoflanguage,meta-ethics,meta-ontologyandepistemology.Wewouldliketothankallauthorsfortheirsubmissions.Becauseofthemanysubmissionsreceived,weareindebtedtoalargenumberofrefereesthathelpedusreviewallthesubmissionsquickly.SpecialthankstoGunnarBjornsson,AlexanderDavies,ManuelGarca-Carpintero,JussiHaukioja,Soggqvist,JohnPerry,BryanPickel,FolkeTersman,andMoritzSchultzfortheirhelpandadvice,andtoHannesLeitgebforsupportingthepublicationofthisspecialissuein.OureditorialworkonthisissuewassupportedbyEstonianScienceFoundationGrantsSFLFI11085EandSF0180110s08;byPortugueseScienceFoundationGrantsEuroUnders/0001/2010andPTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010;bySpanishGrantsFFI2010-16049andCSD2009-00056andbytheAGAURoftheGeneralitatdeCatalunyaGrant2009SGR-1077.ReferencesChristensen,D.(2007).Epistemologyofdisagreement:Thegoodnews.PhilosophicalReview,116Hume,D.(1757).Ofthestandardoftaste.InT.H.Green&T.H.Grose(Eds.),Essaysmoral,politicalandliterarybyDavidHume(Vol.1,pp.266–284),reprintofthenewedition1882(1964ScientiaVerlagAalen).James,W.(1904).Pragmatism:Anewnameforsomeoldwaysofthinking.FiliquarianPublishing,LLC.,MacFarlane,J.(2007).Relativismanddisagreement.PhilosophicalStudies,132(1),17–31.MacFarlane,J.(ms).Assessmentsensitivity:Relativetruthanditsapplications.(Accessedon-lineathttp://johnmacfarlane.net/books.htmlonAugust2012). www.cccom.ut.eeformoreinformationonthisproject. D.Cohnitz,T.Marques