on Resorting the authority to acceptable risks and expected costs arme - PDF document

on Resorting the authority to acceptable risks and expected costs armed conflicts a for- fa~hion.~' material that will in Brian Orend, Michael Walzer (Cardiff: University Press, forthcoming). international community. This does not, that only global agencies like the United Nations to authorize execute armed rescues states that remain externally Walzer submits that the burdens permitted to course all the criteria for a have been fulfilled. The imperfection the duty intervene causes rescue, since a main temptation in favour sitting on sidelines is a that another country, regional grouping, to intervene. has recently grown more accommodating a global force, for instance United Nations' Security Council auspices, that might one responsibility for such actions. But and then changing from wherein we must on our own moral where needed, rescue people being massacred, government. And is indefensible, says, to suggest that failure to have intervened for example Tibet, or that for the sake concern for consis- we should fail to intervene everywhere else. The more appropriate is to regret and condemn mistakes--our previous ahead to rescue those who on a more reliable basis.55 this article, we have attained a fuller understanding the rules bellum which purportedly inhere our shared war convention. influential interpretation includes just cause, right intention, last resort, probability success and propor- as criteria fulfilled before a political com- resort to And while this interpretation is most readily applied to classic instances aggression and resistance, it which tion, anticipatory attacks, counter-inventions and humanitarian inter- In doing underlines the manifest relevance his the- dismiss (as outdated) his theory at Walzer himself contends: "The shift interest from aggres- self-defence to massacre and intervention . . hardly changes the necessary argument^."^^ These enduring arguments revolve around a just cause for resorting to armed force, who has Ibid., xiv. Walzer on Resorting slope to imperial aggrandizement, power meddling in vulnerable Walzer's reply such is always a risk, not one it justifies wilful a clear humanitarian emergency. Consider, as he says, that those countries that for armed humanitarian intervention not exactly been prime pieces global real estate. temptation to take another 's terri- has simply not been there. far greater than great power meddling or aggrandizement, in Walzer's judgment, is moral indif- leads to nonintervention, even in overwhelming evi- and preventable humanitarian as the haunting recent example become over this indifference that he has actually changed justice requires a humanitarian Whereas he that the goal "the in-and-out more extensive obligations designed precisely the likelihood great power meddling, called for intervenors to focus on "rescue, not rule": to get in, rescue people who need it, and get as soon as has been to make inter- as little like intervention as possible, thereby maximizing space however, Walzer believes that recent experience demonstrates make a deeper simply "in-and-out." the limits this deeper silent.53 But its content clearly postintervention assistance in reconstructing the rescue. The community is wrestling cisely this best to recon- society after the massive armed intervention the Kosovars? rehabilitation: issues that are only deserve.54 Finally, what those who object to armed intervention, even humanitarian catastrophes, on grounds that it unclear who exactly bear the duty reply: the duty to inter- humanitarian emergency is imperfect; it picks no one borne at large the Third Just and (3rd ed.; New York: 2000), For more on Rwanda, Prunier, a Genocide Columbia University Press, 54 See Orend "Terminating Wars and Establishing Global Governance," Law and Jurisprudence (1999), 253-95; and Brian Orend Social Philosophy (2000), 117-37, for more, additional sources. responds to this forceful stressing, first, that there is a difference large between violent and nonviolent that it all but constitutes a kind. For violent involves killing and being and far-reaching that protest, nonco-operation and censure. Secondly, Walzer believes that Beitz's challenge, as stated, dichotomy between individual human rights and the rights legitimate states which protection for their own effective and reliable Moreover, the individual right liberty implies some entitlement to participate a shared foreign coer- paternalistic, he to deny people those capacities for self-determination that are implied opposition and Indeed, a up being violently paternalistic. Walzer admits that self-help "stern doctrine" but nevertheless to which are most deeply international armed force for humani- only in those rare cases where there is no hope when commonplace callousness government has been replaced turn" on people, result- ensla~ement.~' those who, when confronted and genuine humanitarian emergency, reason yes, there's fire burning and firefighters are probably needed to put but it's not no claim less our firefighters. Walzer's rejoinder: "[Tlhe moral corruption that that must always What about argue against intervention, not a misplaced respect for whose it is but, rather, out conflict they know little running the risk Walzer answers: "Of complicated social, and economic would be to understand it all. But once the burning begins something less than full understanding is will to put out the and give them the support they need." Fires like the ethnic cleansing Bosnia, or mass expulsion Koso- vars from Serbia, require to "see the fires are: deliber- ately set, the work arsonists, aimed to kill, dangerous."52 What about those who absolute nonintervention, humanitarian catastrophes, on grounds 1 Walzer, "Kosovo," 1999), also Brian Orend, in Kosovo: Just Use (1999), 125-30. Walzer on Resorting to Force era1 community as band together not only for self-protection but to shape a "to express their inherited culture through worked out among themsel~es."~~ is, an individual] cannot be is not true," Walzer, "that intervention is justified whenever revolution is; revolutionary activity an exer- in self-determination, while foreign interference denies to a peo- ple those political capacities that only such exercise only those "terrible human rights "make talk . . seem cynical and which justify armed humanitarian intervention a foreign extreme cases, is precisely the incapacity tion that in, and rightly so. domestic citizenry is not only desperate but international armed rescue. Walzer actually believes that such tory, whereas intervention in a secessionist struggle, or a civil is merely permissible. This sense avers that: "People who initiate massacres lose their right to partici- the normal . . . domestic self-government. military defeat is morally necessary."49 Walzer's critics argue that himself may be a kind cynicism with regard to human rights violations. For human rights constitute the moral basis it that rights violations munal self-determination? must we attend only the most horrific obvious cases massacre, cases which there the need to intervene? responds, intriguingly, urging that out all attempts to exercise foreign influence in which violates human he does such cases, is war.50 But Beitz wonders Walzer can tolerate nonviolent interference with these countries and violent interference. What is the difference opposed to admitted difference Beitz's flesh out tension in Walzer's work the explicit grounding his just war theory rights protec- tion, and an implicit that, when push comes to shove, the communal prerogatives enjoy pride Walzer, "Standing," 21 steps gingerly around this topic at "Standing," See also "Communal," 389. against another state. Moreover, such intervention is animated and political ideals which thus raise the global stage. Treat your people the we think should, or else feel our armed humanitarian intervention which Walzer accepts is intervention designed to rescue citizens a state from "acts that shock moral conscience is willing to counte- nance armed humanitarian intervention only where the state in widespread human rights violations. He is keen to stress the degree to which the human rights violations must be "massive" and "terrible," such as "massacre and ground armed intervention power.46 East Pakistan the early 1970s, Vietnam in in the mid 1970s and the former the 1990s. Walzer has his stress the magni- of rights violations that must be present justify intervention. Charles Beitz, and Gerald Doppelt have gested that regimes fail to respect human rights, yet their citizenry, have lost their legiti- those monstrous Pol Pot's should foreign states which themselves respect human rights be barred principle from intervening illegitimate regimes? such regimes stand as much coercive correction utterly beyond the pale?47 Walzer offers a manifold response. First, his own conception human rights, have seen, is minimalist and thin, focused basic claims life and liberty which with universal prohibi- and enslavement. might argue of government actually count rights violations. that Beitz, Doppelt and -like well, under Walzer's not qualify as human rights violators at all. Walzer's preferred response, however, is to insist the principle self-determination. Faced with what we might call "run-of-the-mill" government hostility human rights claims, citizens take it upon themselves begin the kind and struggle needed to win such freedoms and bene- Self-help is the order This coheres with Walzer's gen- principle" because both Beitz and Doppelt agree that such intervention might be ruled out on grounds that it fails proportionality test. and C. Beitz, "Noninterven- and Communal (1980), 385-91. Walzer on Resorting rather to genuine self-determination. the imbalance injected the local vention, and then let local a rather precious and one recalls own skepticism ability to measure accurately such practical terms, is an army to difference between when has merely offset the existing foreign interference and when it has actually tipped the scales its own mining "genuine" self-determination at the Though he offers no clear answer to this important that counter-intervention on behalf a legitimate regime, one that possesses the required "fit" between governors and governed, and which has passed the self-help test.43 is under this rubric that Walzer the US intervention American intervention Vietnam was frequently justified, the time, as counter-interven- tion Vietnam to offset the prior (largely covert) intervention communist North Vietnam. Walzer not deny that the North was weakening the regime his con- tention is that, event, the the time the intervened. Not only did the regime pledge to participate 1956,44 enough to undermine its people. There were, for separate administrations the govern- the South reality induced not merely covert tinkering North but, moreover, its own lack "[Tlhe regime on the U.S. [was] damning evidence against . . . government that receives nomic and technical military supply, strategic and and is still unable reduce its subjects to obedience, is clearly gitimate government." And counter-intervention gitimate government not counter-intervention at all. It is aggressive civil war, and thus unjust.45 third and canonical account jus ad bellum concerns humanitarian intervention, such occurred in Kosovo Humanitarian intervention seems, at first, aggression-based paradigm, since armed intrusion has not committed aggression Ibid., 96-100; and Walzer, "Standing," 210-25. pledged to the 1954 Geneva which was a peace treaty ending the the Vietnam between the and the French-sponsored South. See Regan, Cases, 136-50. 45 Walzer, Wars, 99. loosening the conception Walzer himself stresses that anticipatory attack can only the attacker to prove, with evidence, that the three general criteria really hold in its case.39 the impression that Walzer is far too partial, in his just war judgments, those communities he is personally connected to, like the and Israel, noted that, for him, the armed in Vietnam was unjust.40 Indeed, the entire sub- text of historical application is devoted showing that the Second just, whereas exemplifies unjust, wars. Armed intervention, be justified" has to be justified." of proof justification is venor and heavy," owing to the value political sovereignty. other things the individual must cultivate his own virt~e."~' other things that intervention can When does the state question contains nations4iverse for secession the central is fighting to intervention from an outside merely be in support garden-variety disenchanted group. Outside forthcoming only that disenchanted minority clearly articulate will, have mobilized their people a significant basis, and have already an internal struggle government. sense, such secessionist movement has to what international lawyers often call "belligerent rights" to external recognition They have to prove themselves to speak, armed intervention on their behalf: their representativeness; action in favour their own independen~e.~~ justifying intervention for Walzer is counter- intervention, designed to offset another foreign power has already intervened unjustly, often in civil war it, is not to the war 96-100, 186-96, 296-303 309-15. Walzer cites the Vietnam denying that anticipatory attack one state another is ever justified; preventive war, sees it, is a the present for the sake maintaining the power, itself thought necessary for long-term peace and security. wars used Europe, especially the eighteehth frequently offered for preven- tive war are utilitarian, and his familiar contention that to ground preventive war are too fantastic to plausible. Furthermore, the danger to which war is intended too distant anticipatory attack all, the danger is aimed imminent, not distant; it must be a threat which is concrete, ab~tract.~' threat for justifying anticipatory attack, gests, is composed three elements. manifest intent to injure," revealed through a bitter history between the like the Arab-Israeli recent and explicit threats. Walzer that the a justi- anticipatory attack can only be "a demonstrably committed doing harm political community. second element sufficient threat active prepara- that makes the intent a positive given a conflictive history and/or hostile declarations, is ground anticipatory strikes. There must also be able military preparation the part forces along the the situation be one "in which doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk [of being attacked]." under all three conditions is an anticipatory attack justified. Walzer's favourite example is strike during War of 1967.38 In general, "states may use military force the face whenever the failure to do so their territorial political independence." Indeed, he goes to contend that, should faced with these three conditions involving Belli- cose State has already committed aggression against cause to an attack. force is a necessary condition for aggression to no less a violation state rights to pose "a serious risk" to the political sovereignty and territorial integrity a legitimate state is to launch an armed Though there are obvious serious concerns raised here with passage refers to nearly all his hellurn that the Nazis through their multiple aggressions, given just to the respond with war; that there was no choice, the last Allies to that the proportionality condition was fulfilled the Allies to Nazi aggression would have been awful." He could have men- tioned that the did seem to have the proper motivation to defeat Nazi Germany, enjoyed a right from start and that their resort to force publicly declared government^.^^ to the General Account Bellum admits that there need be at least three revisions to "the bellurn that he has thus far developed. cannot simply precisely because application appears classic cases war which be the past, and not the present future, face all know about the Second say, but what about recent civil wars in central Europe and Africa? What about Serbia on Koso- Walzer's theory wartime justice tell about these more relevant cases? discerning how Walzer amends his deal with such instances add that these amendments with the presupposes without all the other intention and resort to force still hold for the three revisions which follow. are all in the just cause for resorting to armed force beyond the responding to interstate aggression. This point underlines part the continuing rele- Walzer's just war theory thus far developed: the other cate- gories remain at play the judgment armed force, whether civil war, an armed intervention It is always relevant to reflect last resort and proportion- in any unleashing above to delve into the just bellurn anticipatory attack. Here, between two extremes: Walzer, "World 11: Philosophy and lic Affairs 1 (1971/72), 3-21; Walzer, Wars, 233-68; and A. J. P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamilton, 1961). challenges of proportional calculation ber and complexity, puts the the ques- tion. What costs and benefits in Only elements can quantify, like elements, like the value of sovereignty. Is there a distinc- tion between explicit and implicit costs? Short-term only the benefits of prudence that matter, or do those of morality well? How and benefits the costs are not the the bene- fits, as when the present price for the future independence manifest, and manifold, difficulties calculations are simply too wide-ranging. It devise a completely satisfying set cost-ben- with regard better, Walzer to stick and universal guide con- Walzer's final this issue seems to be that there the proportionality maxim." But insists that "it gross truth" which can only point to obvious considerations and utility as limiting conditions on the pursuit rights-respecting jus- wartime. Proportionality, at best, provides some checks and bal- some outside constraints, the drive a just that, even justice may have permitted other- proportionality that the United did not to war against the Soviet Union after it invaded gary in Czechoslovakia in 1968.35 The Second an Example of of Walzer's most fervent, and frequently repeated, beliefs the Second part of the Allies, was a just only was Nazi Germany a multiple aggressor, violating state rights through numerous invasions 1930s, itself was ultimate threat degrading even I1 see it the term evil objectified the world, potent and apparent that there have been anything to do somehow, been achieved. Such are the Walzer himself the initial successes of.the the Soviet invasion though, does not always turn out for the better. is that the armies September 1914, to Chri~tmas.~~ suggests that there are here, according which victims aggression ought to be permitted at least some resistance, should decide on it, as their strong objection to the aggres- sion and as their rights. thus seems reasonable to with Walzer given an act aggression and given that the there is armed response, even when the odds (however defined) seem the same time, this rule is not important that communities contemplating response to aggression still whether such reasonable probability success. That is the least, say, that they owe themselves. Proportionality is one the most contentious and challenging criteria. It mandates that a state war must weigh the universal benefits against the expected the projected benefits, securing the are at least equal to, and preferably greater as casualties may the war action proceed. Walzer wrestles with the difficulties presented this rule. the one hand, the aggression is greater evil" than also comments that "prudence can and has to be, accommo- within the argument His endorsement such crite- as last resort, and probability shows him making such accommodations. On the comments on "the presumption" behind cost-benefit comparisons implicit that even mimics such proportionality judgments. He asks rhetorically: "How measure the value country's indepen- an aggressive regime?" we pretend to measure, on value, the benefits defeating aggression against the body count needed it?34 33 Ibid., 67-74. 34 Ibid., xv-xxi. Walzer on Resorting seems much plausible to contend that war be the lit- eral last resort after all other means have been but, rather, that states ought not to be hasty their resort force. There ought to strong presumption against the resort to force. Article 2(4) United Nations' Charter is commitment to pres~mption.~' But beyond this general principle, much depends concrete details the actual situation in question. important, for when the aggressor is mounting a swift and brutal invasion, to respond effectively before all is lost. is also rele- to consider the nature the territory the victim it is country, like the need for a speedy and effective response against aggression likely be much greater than that country the and strength United States. the international community is likewise relevant. attention must always be focused the nature and severity aggressor and its actions, for international community is effective response to question this criterion always be asked, and the affirmative, is the proposed use force reasonable, situation and the nature success is another jus ad rule for which only general principles can be convincingly conveyed. prudential flavour explains this: probability always a matter taking reasonable within the constraints and oppor- tunities presented the world. lethal violence which is going is laudable and necessary for just war theory. himself endorses consideration "reasonable expectations success." 32 however, needs to be exercised rion, like last resort, not amount aggression, and especially that larger and smaller and weaker nations will face a greater task comes to acquiesce in expected probability resorting to after all, is incredibly difficult. The vicissitudes from history, among the most difficult Even when the odds seemed incredibly long, remarkable successes Regan, Cases, 214; and Reisman and Antoniou, eds., Laws, 5-9. 32 Walzer, Wars, 107. Last Resort is obvious", "that measures short are prefer- to war always wants dipl~macy~tried the resort to is the last traditional last resort criterion, caveats. First, he points out that, strictly speaking, there is no such last resort. No matter fearful the situa- tion, there is always something else that can be negotiations, for to the resort to it would be in this literal sense, to say that states only as a last resort.28 second caveat concerns the fact that negotiations, threats and economic sanctions are frequently offered more compelling means solving than the use face value, claim is reasonable reso- lution to the crisis in question be had through credible and per- missible threat, or negotiating session, perhaps through then surely that is preferable to running the sizable risks Upon closer inspection, however, much the nature particular act aggression and the nature the aggressive regime Sometimes threats, diplomacy and sanctions will not work. leading up to the Persian Gulf as a point. Care must be taken that appeals to last aggre~sion.~~ Finally, Albert and Lori Damrosch that the levelling systematic economic sanctions often violates the bello noncombatant immunity, is most often innocent civilians (often the poorest and most bear the brunt embargoes. In the absence force directed against them, outlaw regimes always seem themselves; the Hussein Iraq, once more, is Ibid., xiii-xiv. See also L. Freedman and Gulf Conflict and War the New World Order (Princeton: Princeton W. Danspeckgruber and C. Tripp, (Boulder: Westview, 1996); Turner Johnson and G. Weigel, eds., Just War and Gulf War (Washington, DC: University Press A. Beyer and and the Gulf (Louisville: John Knox, 1992). Principles and Economic Sanc- and International Affairs (1996), 1 13; Damrosch, "The Collective Enforcement Norms Through Economic Sanctions," and international (1994), 60-80; and Cortright and G. Lopez, Economic Sanctions: Peacebuilding in Post-Cold War World? Westview, 1995). against each other, like can be and "punished"; states acting the right reasons, the proper motives? Walzer the first to reliance on what is analogy."26 that one the most useful ways vis-8-vis each other is to liken such behaviour to the way in individuals behave vis-8-vis to note that this analogy need not, and for Walzer not, involve any kind the state. domestic analogy, rather, draws its vitality from sheer difficulty speaking about the behaviour complex entities like employing simplifying assump- tions, such that they have a discernible identity, have face choices between alternatives, are thus responsible, and on. It emphasized that the domestic analogy is merely that: it is only generally persuasive and neither important dissimilarities nor to a monolithic and homoge- nous conception the state. main point here, as sees it, domestic analogy moral discourse about the ethics war and peace. is riven deepest structure talk about war, and understand what account which purports to be the best that discourse must itself to no mention public declaration proper authority. This seems an oversight his part. For beyond its apparent how it an important constraint on the power state mechanisms to risk the lives and liberties citizen members such a dangerous enter- prise as the human rights ground such state rights cannot lose sight just war criterion. public procedure, mean- ingfully consent to the launching behalf.27 Analogy and and 138-43; and Essays on zenship, War and Disobedience (Cambridge: Harvard University right intention which is whether it be part the justice the resort to that a state commit itself both publicly and as a right intention, to adhering to the wqr, contained in bello (the justice war) and jus post bellum (the justice idea here, Kant, is that a state certain rules conduct, and appro- war termination, its original decision to begin the start the process. Such would and forward-looking could run normative thread through the three just categories, tying into a coherent Kantian addition is compelling not only because the moral import an agent's intent but, moreover, to just behaviour throughout all three phases engagement.24 frequent criticism the right intention criterion is that it is impossible to know whether a state has fulfilled its requirements, given the vagueness intent. But it should be noted, that this is easily exaggerated. Intentions can be, and ought to be, reasoned examination publicly accessible behaviour, consideration incentives and plicit avowals are neither infinitely redescribable nor irreducibly connected to patterns evidence, as as constrained right inten- tion is criterion for moral judgment during difficult, it is possible to tell whether state is prosecuting war out ethnic hatred, for example, to vindicating self- defence. That dark motivation produces distinctive and notice- able results, such massacres, mass rapes and large-scale dis- have the recent civil wars the former evidence.25 Perhaps a deeper critical be raised here: can collec- have intentions at reasoning thus far a systematic analogy between the behaviour states and the behaviour individual persons. Does "crimes" that For more on this posited addition right intention, Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier more on the Bosnian civil 1992-1995, see Regan, Just War: Princi- ples and DC: America Press, 1996), 192-212; D. Reiff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia the West Schuster, 1995); Human Rights the only just for resorting response to aggression, here conceived. response may self-defence on the part state victimized other-defence, or other state coming aid the victim. Walzer is adamant such thing as a both sides. All things considered, he believes, the evidence can point two directions: one side is the unjust aggressor, the other the that the war Right Intention Considering this second rule observes that pure good will [is] . . political illusion." also notes unclarity in the tradition regarding whether this rule can be there is purity to secure the just is possible only that right intention amongst the ordinary mix motives which animates state himself opts for the course: he believes it is possible, and the nonmoral motives that going to while still motive. But be present: Walzer that right cause is necessary aspect the justice resorting to war.22 fails to answer is must the moral motivation merely animating force the mix? Consider, for example, the mix coalition, led the United States, might have against Iraq: the repul- from Kuwait; the punishment Iraqi aggression; the desire to secure the oil supply the Persian region; the desire its unsurpassed superiority following the end the Cold with the Soviet Union; and the drive military to latest weaponry conditions. While Walzer to requirement that the moral inant in the mix, there are serious difficulties involved in one dominates, as see here regard to the Gulf might make it more plausible, though less interesting, moral motive need only real and present amongst the various nonmoral motives criterion to fulfilled.23 Ibid., xix. xix-xx. For more on the Decosse, ed. The Morality of Walzer's own opening essay, "Justice the Gulf rights violations," such enslavement." Such a violates the thin and universal moral contained within all thick moralities, judged an outlaw regime entitlement to noninterference on the part other states. But a wherein the "a genuine contract3'--offering both Hobbe- sian self-protection and a Burkeian "community characterv-is a state entitled to territorial integrity and political sovereignty.19 Walzer any violation unjust, consti- invasive boundary crossing into the territory legitimate, "genuine contract" state counts as as does any grievous domestic political choices. While Walzer does focus on aggression which involve invasion and attack, strictly speaking true say that, for him, aggression physical assault, the deployment armed force. Though such is a useful conservative presumption to have about shall see he does allow for exceptional anticipatory attack. helpful, albeit partial, list aggression in the twentieth century: Germany against Bel- against Ethiopia, and Japan against in the 1930s; Germany against Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Bel- gium and the late against Hungary and against Czechoslovakia 1968.20 aggression, thus conceived, "are always most cases, the morally preferred is this that most a large and powerful state deploying its coerce a less powerful state to make concessions? Is the aggressor a defensible response from the victim? Is not neutrality parties a legitimate choice? ultimately, the decision resist aggression, third party vindicators, can only a free choice the state follows from the right sovereignty. But lates his preference resistance, especially the victim. For resistance "confirms and enhances . . our common common national pride, self-respect, freedom "diminishes Sometimes both appeasement and constitute "a failure resist evil unchallenged triumph "a greater evil" than war.2' 1; and Walzer, 5l,67-72, and 233-38. implausibly, include access to material a secured space allowing for free political the world have value," dimen~ion."'~ His second answer to the question derivation is more complex. admits that is a complex one" "is best understood . . social contract tract, however, is not between self- interested rational choosers: "The rights rights indeed] rest the consent their members. But this consent a special association and mutuality." Through "shared experi- and cooperative given territory time to "shape life."16 This common life is something all consent to, that we participate interpretation to recognize ourselves its context. both its ators and its creatures. shared life we forge together a common space. "The social contract," Walzer says, "is agreement to reach decisions together about what goods are to our common life, and then to provide those It is union that transcends all drawing its strength from history, culture, religion, language and on.)? 17 u Contract," he writes, "is a metaphor" referring to a relation, character," between living, the dead metaphor referring to the fact that people always banded together, both for self-protection and to enjoy those other goods that they could not enjoy all were they not community, surrounded the protection afforded a state. contends that community is "the primary the means which all other goods get produced, distributed, defended, interpreted and enjoyed.18 is crucial to note for Walzer, the moral standing a state is contingent upon its protection both individually state's legitimacy upon the reality common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices that protection willingly accepted and thought worthwhile." no common life exists," he says, state doesn't defend the common life that its own may have ethnic division, for example, could face questions about its legitimacy. Likewise a state government turns against its and engages Basic Books, 1983), "The Moral Public Affairs (1979/80), 2 1 rights," Walzer declares, "are . . . [the] collective form" individual human rights.12 Individual human rights are rights to life and liberty, entitlements we all have we are to treat as "something like absolute rights are at the that interpretation morality Walzer offers the most authoritative: "Individual (to life and liberty) underlie the most important judgments make about About the foundation these rights themselves his own admission, has little say. "It is for his "to say that they are somehow entailed our sense a human are not natural, then but natural palpable feature our moral world."13 It is ironic weight is put human rights Walzer's just war theory about their nature or their justification. In human rights for him are fundamental values riven into what he calls "the thin theory morality" shared all "thick," everyday moralities. thin theory, he contends, is uni- that it is the overlapping consensus the world's diverse ethical traditions. rights to life universal and mainly negative prohibi- gross cruelty and tyranny that insists are Human rights, like absolute" entitlements we all to be sub- to such treatments. have these entitlements home and abroad-inter- the moral world. Walzer's contention is its deepest level, the best will feature bedrock commitments to life and l4 How, exactly, it that "ultimately derived" from individual human rights, thus outlined? Walzer offers two answers. that individual human rights cannot, world, be real- ized outside a secure like that which the can offer. if we want individual human rights be realized, then to authorize states to claim those elements need to pro- with the human rights. Those elements, With regard the universality human rights, Walzer that "the language . . and Thin, reflecting on Walzer's largely negative conception human rights. For trast, see Rights: Subsistence, AfJIuence and US. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); and California Press, 1987). the right a political community seek its tic destiny. the right people freely associated together mine those citizenship, representation, taxa- production, distribution, exchange, regulation and their lives and frame their f~ture.~ these state rights Aggression is both "morally forcing men and women to fight their lives rights for no good Aggression is behind all unjust wars. unjust war because is hell." imposing enormous costs and outrageous sufferings ple without their Thus, to cause such an such serious danger-without sufficient son is unjust. to do is to violate "rights which we attach enormous importance . . rights that are lo Why, exactly, are state rights sovereignty considered be worth dying for? the foremost values the international system, the violation constitutes "the only crime states can commit against other believe that collective associations, like states, can have rights at all? Is Walzer's stance the product sloppy thinking, false generalizations the sobering strictures methodological individualism? Is he advocating what statism without foundations"?" these state rights "derive mately from the rights individuals, and take their force." Walzer not believe that they "mystical unions." A state nothing more less than a given territory, their government. "The deepest purpose state," he . . This sense Walzer, is own individual life and liberty; life one other members state. "State always clear. Neither Walzer nor deal with this perplexity. tists have argued that the old left-right continuum 10 Ibid., 53. 11 "The Romance 392-97, and Doppelt, "Statism without Foundations," both in state must, prior initiating a war, weigh from it, such securing the just against the evils expected the benefits are proportional to, the costs just resort to which Walzer strikingly similar to, though times importantly six traditional norms. omissions, amendments, explanations and justifications result in his own and substantive contribution through it, war convention itself. Walzer, the to war is to resist economic conquest, religious crusade, revolutionary conversion thus subject criticism, resistance constitutes aggression? Walzer defines aggression the territorial integrity and an independent Walzer defines political associa- tion of land, composed the gov- erned and g~vernment.~ an independent not to another state: "[Tlhe nation not to life its have made this piece "It is the coming together people that lishes the integrity of territory," Walzer "[olnly then can drawn the crossing of which is plausibly called aggres- quickly adds two first is that not every boundary dispute cause for national boundary invading army, for example, would be such Walzer's view of aggression "focuses narrowly on invasions and physical assaults. Otherwise, it is feared, the would have no determinate mean- second caveat arbitrary. In asserts that "[n]nevertheless, establish a habitable world. Within that world, men and safe from attack; once the lines gone."* sovereignty is the right a state policies within its borders, free foreign coercion political theorist Michael Walzer's work cited. Given, deals mainly conflict between states, just war remain relevant intrastate conflict and armed humanitarian intervention seem to common occurrences than wars This article responds suggesting that Walzer's just war our peril, since contains conceptual tools, abiding values, that are both useful and to any force on the international stage. RCsumC. L'ouvrage de Michael Walzer I'ithique source de rtftrence pour de nombreux Compte tenu principalement des conflits entre ~tats, on peut se demander s'il est toujours valide B notre tpoque, alors que les conflits internes et les interventions mtes B humanitaires sont dev- courantes que guerres entre Etats. rtpond par I'affirmative, suggkrant qu'il est risquC ne pas tenir compte de la thtorie guerre juste, qu'elle des concepts Ctemelles, sont utiles pour toute eflexion relation entre le recours B la force B I'tchelle intema- tionale et la justice. Walzer's understanding just war theory the just follows that one instructive interpret Walzer's theory be to compare and con- trast it jus ad war tradi- contends that, for the resort to force to be justified, a state must following six requirements: launch a only for the right reason. frequently mentioned include: self-defence from exter- nal attack; innocents; and punishment for wrongdoing. that all the proffered just causes be subsumed under re~eived."~ Right intention. intend to the war only for the just cause. Having reason for launching a actual motivation the resort to is aimed at securing the just cause. go to has been the appropriate authorities, to the proper process, made public, notably to its own citi- zens and state(s). may resort to war only has exhausted all to resolving the conflict diplomatic negotiation. not resort to war see that doing will have measurable impact on the situation. aim here mass violence which is going be futile. in Walzer, Interpretation and are addressed, first and political leaders order armed forces into action are to be held accountable that responsibility, then they Nuremberg prosecutors, aggressive leaders who commit "crimes constitutes a to armed force war convention." defines this war convention set of norms, customs, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, reciprocal arrangements that shape the ethics war and war convention provides the material from which the best our core commitments in wartime. Walzer believes that this interpreta- guide the conduct states. He to this the rules just war theo~y.~ most influential reading the war belongs to war tradition. tradition refers to llke-minded thinkers who employed similar concepts and construct a moral regarding wartime has enjoyed a long distinguished pedigree, including such notables Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Suarez, Hugo Grotius credit for being the most comprehensive and formidable member tradition. Many the rules developed the just tradition have been codified into contemporary international laws governing armed conflict. tradition has thus ing both moral and legal discourse surrounding ~onflict.~ Just and Unjust Wars, Interpretation and Social Harvard Press, 1987); Moral Argument at Home and (Notre Dame: Notre Press, 1994). On the W. Reisman Antoniou, eds., War: A Compre- Primary Documents Governing Armed Conflict 1994), 317-405. For more see J. Elshtain, ed., Just War Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Wasserstrom, War and Wadsworth, 1970); W. V. O'Brien, Just and Limited War Praeger, 1981); War Be Press, 1984); Just War: and Political Responsibility best historical this corpus are Ideology, Reason the Limitation and Secular Princeton University Press, 1981) and Just War Tradition and the Restraint Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton Press, 198 on Resorting OREND American political theorist Michael Walzer is a prominent on the landmark study, a modem cla~sic.~ given that this oft- 1977, what, today? Consider, for Walzer's controversial bellum, traditionally referring the justice to war. this account around assumptions about aggression between sovereign a result, his theory might the world's pressing conflicts have much with wars between as with states, or forcibly intervening examples include (1993), Bosnia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1994-1995), (1994-1996; 1999-2000) Sierra Leone (1999-2000), as the armed intervention by NATO the Kosovo province 1999. Kalvi Holsti has determined, this regard, that in a recent rep- resentative period from 1989 to 1996 there were armed conflicts, which were classic cases between sovereign states3 this article is to the justice resorting to bellum-remains only relevant important for our times. thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments. (2nd ed.; New York: [I 9771). State, War (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1996). Orend, Philosophy, University Waterloo, Waterloo, bdorend@ watarts.uwaterloo.ca Political Science I Revue canadienne de science politique XXXIII:3 (SeptemberISeptembre 2000) 523-547 O Canadian Political Science Association (I'Association science politique) andlet la Soc~ktt quibicoise de science politique