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Rational Oblivious Transfer Rational Oblivious Transfer

Rational Oblivious Transfer - PowerPoint Presentation

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Rational Oblivious Transfer - PPT Presentation

KaRTIK nAYAk XIONG fan What we learnt One cannot use Game Theory as a tool It is not easy to assign utilities to players and have an interpretation for these utilities Outline What is oblivious transfer ID: 353081

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Slide1

Rational Oblivious Transfer

KaRTIK

nAYAk

, XIONG fanSlide2

What we learnt

One cannot use Game Theory as a tool!

It is not easy to assign utilities to players and have an interpretation for these utilities.Slide3

Outline

What is oblivious transfer?

A 1 out of 2 oblivious transfer protocol

Applications and motivation

Define rational oblivious transfer using ideal world/real world paradigm

Bayesian Game for efficient 1 out of 2 Oblivious TransferSlide4

Oblivious transfer

Private database

(m

0

, m

1

m

n-1

)

Organization

Info related to wearable computing

Sell this information to a third party

Indices

σ

1

σk

(m

σ

1

,…,m

σ

k

)Slide5

Oblivious transfer

(x

0

, x

1

)

σ

= 0 or 1

x

σ

Bob does not know

σ

Alice does not know x

1-

σ

Protocol

πSlide6

Fully honest sender/receiver

Bob receives

σ

, sends x

σ

and then forgets

σ

Bob sends all its messages to Alice and Alice just picks the value she wantsSlide7

A 1 out of 2 Oblivious transfer protocol

m

0

, m

1

d

N, e

N, e

σ

r

0

, r

1

r

0

, r

1

k

v = (r

σ

+

k

e

) mod N

v

k

0

= (v – r

0

)

d

mod N

k

1

= (v – r

1

)

d

mod N

m'

0

= m

0

+ k

0

m'1 = m1 + k1

m'0

m'1

mσ = m'σ - k

Input messages

RSA key pair

Choice bit

σ

, random k

Random strings

Sender (Bob)

Receiver (Alice)

Involves exponentiations!Slide8

History of oblivious t

ransfer

How to exchange secrets – Rabin [81]

A randomized protocol for signing contracts – Even et.

a

l. [85]

Simulatable

Adaptive Oblivious

Transfer –

Camenisch et. a

l. [08]Efficient Fully-Simulatable Oblivious Transfer – Lindell et. al. [08]Slide9

Generalizations

1 out of n OT: The sender can have n messages instead of 2 messages (Brassard et. al. [87])

k out of n OT: The receiver can select k out of n messages (

Ishai

et. al. [03])Slide10

Applications in secure c

omputation

What is Secure Computation?

A

set of parties with private inputs wish to compute some joint function of their inputs.

Parties wish to preserve some security properties. e.g., privacy and correctness

.

Yao’s Garbled circuit - Yao [86]

Receiver uses 1 out of 2 OT to obliviously obtain keys corresponding to his inputs

GMW protocol –

Goldreich et.al. [87]To evaluate AND gate outputs (intermediate outputs of circuits)Slide11

Rational cryptography

Cryptographic definitions allowed arbitrary deviations for adversaries

Rational Cryptography considers

incentives

while defining adversaries’ actions

The protocols under this model tend to be more efficient

Helps to circumvent

some lower

bounds (Rational Fairness -

Groce

et. al.)Slide12

Bayesian games

Information

about characteristics of the other players

is incomplete

Players cannot compute their own payoffs and play based on “belief” about other players

G = <N, <A

i

,

u

i, Ti

, pi>i ϵ N >N: set of players

Ti: type of the player i

Ai: available actions for player i

ui: payoff function of player i (depends on A

i and Ti)p

i: view of the distribution over types of the other playersEach player plays action Ai

conditioned on his belief about the type of other playersSlide13

Thank You!