aliens really do disagree over what ought to be done, in the mostgener - PDF document

aliens really do disagree over what ought to be done, in the mostgeneral sense ofthe word ÔoughtÕ.It thus seems, then, that Davidsonian arguments cannot rule outrational incommensurability. As I have already argued, though,rational incommensurability is compatible both with realism andanti-realism; it does not determine one or the other. So, as Ipointed out earlier, a distinct argument is needed to establish anti-realism. And I hope that so far, I have shown how several ofthesearguments fail.Summary and ConclusionIn this paper, we discussed incommensurability worries raised bythe epistemic role the emotions play in morality. I argued thatincommensurability does not in itselfentail relativism; anotherargument is needed to establish that moral truths are relative. In anycase, in our dissection ofMcDowellÕs argument, and through theexample ofthe amoralist, we found no reason to suppose that onemust share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moralconcepts successfully. That is to say, the epistemic role played bythe emotions in morality need not lead to incommensurability.Finally, we briefly investigated whether the moral realist can seekaid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect thatincommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible. We decidedthat these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epis-temic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativizemorality.American University ofBeirutJeremy Randel Koons For more on how two parties can use a term to mean the same thingwhile disagreeing on the norms that ought to govern use ofthat term, seeMark Lance and John OÕLeary-Hawthorne, The Grammar ofMeaning: AnExploration ofthe Normative Character ofSemantic Discourse(New York:Cambridge University Press, 1997). I am extremely grateful to a number ofpeople for the feedback andcriticism that gave this paper its current form. Mark Lance, MargaretLittle, and Henry Richardson read numerous early drafts and providedoutstanding feedback. Mark Murphy and Steve Kuhn also read an earlydraft, and provided additional helpful comments. Later drafts benefitedfrom the comments ofKelly Jolley, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, and an audi-ence at the California State University, Northridge. I apologize to anyothers I have neglected to mention. disagreement still existsÑdisagreement over what action I perform. ÔShould I kill my mother or not?Õ is a question thatremains unresolved.Nor is this ÔoughtÕ strictly a moral ÔoughtÕ. (Ifit were, then onemight still say that we and the aliens arenÕt, in fact, disagreeing overwhat ought to be done, since their reasons arenÕt, strictly speaking,moral reasons, and their ÔoughtÕ is hence not a moral ÔoughtÕ.) Thereis a general, all-things-considered ÔoughtÕ that concerns which actionis to be done, once all reasons have been taken into account. Forexample, suppose that after a bit ofpractical reasoning, I concludethat I ought to recruit volunteers to participate in a double-blindstudy ofa medication. This ÔoughtÕ is not merely a moral oughtÑitreflects all relevant reasons (moral, epistemic, and so forth). Forexample, one might think ofthe action I ought to perform as a vec-tor, determined by the particular confluence ofepistemic norms (onlyifI perform a study can I know whether the drug is effective), moralnorms (I may think that studies in nature are immoral, and that eventhough they are epistemically sound, they are less morally sound thandouble-blind studies involving informed volunteers), prudentialnorms (I donÕt want myselfor my company to be sued ifwe put adangerous or ineffective drug on the market; nor do I want the badpublicity that has in the past accompanied various studies in nature),etc. My action may even be shaped by mystical or religious reasons,and so forth. Since this general ÔoughtÕ is not specifically moral, weand the aliens can in fact disagree over which action ought to be done(in the most general sense ofthe word ÔoughtÕ). Further, even ifyouand I disagree over what kinds ofreasons go into determining whatought, in this general sense, to be done, we still might disagree overwhat ought to be done, because we still mean the same thing byÔoughtÕ. For example, I may think that prudential reasons are relevantand religious reasons are not, whereas you think that religious reasonsare relevant and prudential reasons are not. The fact that we can thenargue over whether moral or prudential reasons affect what ought tobe done demonstrates that we are both still using this general ÔoughtÕin the same sense, even though we disagree over what sort ofreasonsdetermine what ought to be done. I donÕt think any philosophers really disagree with this last point.We have many sorts ofdisagreementsÑover what actions are free,what ÔmeaningÕ means, what is morally right, and so forthÑwherewe philosophers argue over the extension and meaning ofa term,while taking ourselves to be genuinely disagreeing. We can disagreeon how a term (including the term ÔoughtÕ) ought to be used whilestill using the term to express the same concept. Thus, we and theEmotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts the gods. Thus, the aliens might have a whole set ofbeliefs whichwe could understand (via discursive definitions or sentences usingthe borrowing Ôplonk*Õ)Ñand think to be falseÑeven though wecannot correlate these beliefs with true sentences in our own lan-guage. Thus, there are ways ofunderstanding a foreign tongue thatdo not involve radical translation. Since DavidsonÕs argument couldonly hope to rule out incommensurability (and, by extension,rational incommensurability) ifall such understanding wereing out rational incommensurability in ethics (not that he was try-ing to do so). Stated differently, ifwe hold sentences containingÔplonk*Õ to be false, then a fortiorithey are not vindicated by ourown theory ofthe world. Ergo, rational incommensurability is notruled out by Davidsonian arguments.The basic problem with the Davidsonian argument against thepossibility ofrational incommensurability is that it assumes that rad-ical translation is the only route to understanding: ifunderstanding aforeign tongue is always a matter ofcorrelating sentences held-to-be-true with sentences held-to-be-true, then whatever argumentsvindicate a sentence in our language will then vindicate whatever wedetermine to be the corresponding sentence in the foreign tongue.But as I have indicated above, there are at least two ways ofunder-standing a foreign word that has no direct equivalent in your ownlanguage. The first way is to go native, and come to understand theforeign word from within the foreign language. The second way is toemploy a long, discursive definition ofthe sort employed by Evans-Pritchard. Both ofthese methods allow us to understand, and indeedtranslate, in a way that does not involve correlating sentences held-to-be-true with sentences held-to-be-true. Both ofthese methods allowus to construct sentences in our native language that we hold to befalse, but that are equivalent to some sentence in the foreign language:the first method allows this by employing a foreign borrowing, andthe second by employing a discursive translation.There is one last, related argument one might use in an attempt toshow that there has, in fact, been no disagreement between us and theMartians, and hence no real relativism. One might argue that wedidnÕt have any disagreement with the Martians in the first place,wasnÕt really a moral concept. Since wasnÕt really a moralconcept, then incommensurability doesnÕt lead to relativism; it merelyleads to the alien concept not being a moral concept in the first place.But the problem will not go away so easily. For even ifwe decideis not a moral concept (and that there is hence no strictlymoraldisagreement between us and the Martians), an importantJeremy Randel Koons This point should be familiar to anyone who has learned a foreignlanguage. Many foreign words have no direct equivalent in English.But the fact that, say, ÔgemŸtlichÕ has no precise English equivalentis not an insurmountable obstacle to my mastery ofthe termÔgemŸtlichÕ. Becoming fluent(as opposed to merely conversant) in aforeign language is not a matter ofcorrelating held-to-be-true sen-tences with held-to-be-true sentencesÑin fact, a sign ofgenuinefluency is that one no longer has to translate foreign sentences intooneÕs own tongue. One comes to be inside ofthe foreign language,and able to think in terms ofconceptsÑgemŸtlichforthÑthat have no direct equivalent in the speakerÕs native tongue.In short, radical interpretation overlooks the way in which comingto be genuinely fluent in another language involves a total involve-ment in that language, and a corresponding separation from oneÕsown languageÑat least when speaking or thinking in the learnedforeign tongue. DavidsonÕs mistake, briefly, is to think that inabilityto translate entails inability to understandÑthat is, to think thatinability to translate entails incommensurability.Another way ofunderstanding concepts such as ÔplonkÕ is via long,discursive translations ofthe sort offered by E. E. Evans-Pritchard.Evans-Pritchard discusses several Zande words for which there is noword in English. However, he explains the meaning ofthese wordsvia long translations. For example, is defined as Ô(1) WITCH-CRAFT SUBSTANCE: a material substance in the bodies ofcertainpersons. It is discovered by autopsy in the dead and is supposed to bediagnosed by oracles in the living. (2) WITCHCRAFT: a supposedpsychic emanation from witchcraft-substance which is believed tocause injury to health and propertyÕ.Thus, even ifa term such asÔplonkÕ or ÔmanguÕ has no equivalent in English, we can often give adiscursive translation ofthis term, thereby allowing English-speakersto understand this foreign concept.Since we can understand a foreign sentence, held to be true by itsnative speakers, without being able to correlate it with a true sen-tence in our own language, rationalout by DavidsonÕs argument. The tribe might well think that thingsare plonk, and they might think that the tribe itselfis superior.Further, they might support their claims ofsuperiority by adducingcertain unfalsifiable claimsÑthe gods anointed them as the chosentribe, and they are superior to all others because it was ordained byEmotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937). I am grateful to an anonymousreferee for directing me to this work. do it justice. However, I will present an example which seems toshow that DavidsonÕs argument doesnÕt rule out rational incom-mensurability in ethics.It is possible to understand a bit ofalien language without beingable to radically interpret that bit oflanguage. In other words, wecan understand an alien sentence, even ifthere is no correspondingsentence (true or false) in the translatorÕs languageÑat least, no sen-tence unless the foreign concept is imported into the translatorÕslanguage. One may simply Ôgo nativeÕ (SreenivasanÕs phrase) andmaster a concept within the foreign tongue, without there being acorresponding concept in oneÕs own native language. Here is anexample provided by Sreenivasan:[S]uppose that Q is [a language] spoken by a tribe, central towhose ethical outlook is a fierce communal pride. Underpinningtheir pride, let us say, is a beliefin the inherent superiority oftheir tribe. Suppose further that this pride is partly what givespoint to the tribeÕs practice ofapplying a certain one ofQÕs thickdescriptions, ÔplonkÕ. Calling things ÔplonkÕ is partly an expres-sion ofpride and that some things are plonk is also a source ofpride. It is a conceptual truth that ifsomeinterests count for no more than an animalÕs. Say the outsiderdoes not believe in the inherent superiority ofthis tribe.Whatever her beliefon this matter, the outsider hasÑifshe is tomaster the use ofÔplonkÕÑto know the role ofthe tribeÕs pride inthe practice, as well as knowing what they count as an expressionofpride, and what as a source ofpride.The important thing to note is that the outsider may come to under-stand ÔplonkÕ, but her language may lack the resources to constructsentences that have the same truth-values as all the sentences ofQin which ÔplonkÕ occurs. Now, the outsider may enrich her own lan-guage by adding a wordÑÔplonk*ÕÑwhich has the same conceptualmeaning as ÔplonkÕ. We do this all the time; every language hasnumerous foreign borrowings. But even ifthis is done, Q is not rad-ically interpretable. Since the outsider knows that sentences con-taining ÔplonkÕ or Ôplonk*Õ are false or without truth value (since shedoes not believe in the inherent superiority ofthe tribe) her under-standing ofÔplonkÕ is not a matter ofher correlating sentences heldto be true with sentences held to be true. This is indisputableÑthemembers ofthe tribe hold many sentences containing ÔplonkÕ to betrue, whereas the outsider holds the equivalent sentences in her ownlanguage (containing Ôplonk*Õ) to be false or meaningless. Jeremy Randel Koons Ibid., 21Ð2. believe the sun is shining precisely when we take the sun to be shin-ing (since presumably our own beliefs about the sun are reliable). Itthus makes sense to translate S as ÔThe sun is shiningÕ, therebyattributing to the aliens a true beliefand correlating S with a truesentence in our own language. Since we must correlate their lin-guistic behaviour with their environment (with what we take theirenvironment to hold), we can only get the translation project offtheground by assuming that their beliefs about their environment aretrueÑtrue by our lights. The important thing to note, according toDavidson, is that the remaining differences between their languageand ours do not license us to say that the alien conceptual scheme isdifferent from our own, since Ôno general principle, or appeal to evi-dence, can force us to decide that the difference lies in our beliefsAccording to philosophers such as Susan Hurley, this argumentagainst incommensurability furnishes the materials for a demonstra-rationalincommensurability is impossible in ethics. Theprocedure for interpreting set E (consisting ofthe ethical utterancesin an alien language) is one ofcorrelating sentences in E with sen-tences we ourselves take to be true. But as one commentator, GopalSreenivasan, points out, the evidence which vindicates our ethicalsentences, which gives us reason to believe them true and which (per-haps) also explains why we hold them to be true, will a fortioricate the corresponding sentences in E. ÔIn that case, however, thereevidently exists a set ofconsiderations that is at once recognized bythe radical interpreter and the speakers ofthe alien language alike [as]sufficient, by their lights, to vindicate the truth ofa particular ethicaloutlookÑand so, a fortiori, the rationality ofadopting itÑnamely, thetruth conditions of[the alienÕs ethical sentences] together with thebeliefthat these conditions obtainÕ.Presumably (althoughSreenivasan does not say anything about this), ifthe aliens typicallypresent an odd bit ofevidence for a moral claim (say, the same bit ofevidence they produce to try to prove that the sun is shining), then wewill either have to decide that the claim really is not a moral claimafter all, or we shall have to reinterpret the evidence, or some othermove. Thus, genuine rationalbe ruled out by DavidsonÕs argument.Sreenivasan goes on to critique the Davidson argument in a num-ber ofingenious ways. I do not wish to get too involved in theDavidson debate; there is a huge literature on Davidson and incom-mensurability, and one section ofone paper is hardly sufficient toEmotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts Op. cit., note 25, 10Ð11. sophisticated ways. I would like to examine whether we can turn tothese arguments to help our moral realism along.Unfortunately, Ithink we cannot, but the issue arises rather naturally at this junc-ture, and so demands discussion.IfI am wrong, my argument inthis paper is hardly weakened. After all, ifit is possible to rule outrational incommensurability in ethics (or even just incommensura-bility), then my argument is that much stronger. So let us examinethese Davidsonian arguments.Incommensurability (I donÕt mean rational incommensurability),Davidson claims, is ruled out by the principle ofcharity we mustadopt when we are in the position ofthe radical interpreter, that is,when we are translating the speech ofspeakers ofan alien tongueand unable to assume anything about their beliefs. According toDavidson, ÔIfall we know is what sentences a speaker holds true,and we cannot assume that his language is our own, then we cannottake even a first step towards interpretation without knowing orassuming a great deal about the speakerÕs beliefsÕ.Since we do notknow the speakerÕs beliefs, we must assume general agreementbetween her beliefs and ours. Thus, we must assume that her beliefsare true according to our best theory ofwhat is true. This isDavidsonÕs principle ofcharity.According to Davidson, translating is a process ofcorrelatingsentences held true in the alien language with sentences held true inthe translatorÕs language. This combines with the principle ofchar-ity as follows: suppose the speakers ofan alien tongue utter a cer-tain sentence, S, when and only when the sun is shining. Accordingto Davidson, ifwe are to be able to translate their language at all,we must assume that they believe the sun to be shining when andonly when it is, in fact, shining. And so we must also take them toJeremy Randel Koons I will here be following the reconstruction provided by GopalSreenivasan in his ÔUnderstanding Alien MoralsÕ, Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, No. 1 (January 2001), 1Ð32.Earlier in this paper, I distinguished between incommensurability andrational incommensurability. At this point, things get a bit sticky, becausesometimes the way the term ÔincommensurabilityÕ is used in the followingdebate is ambiguous. This is because the general course ofthe argumentmade by Hurley and Cooper is the following: the impossibility ofincom-mensurability entails the impossibility ofrational incommensurability. Sowhen they conclude that incommensurability is impossible, they meanboth that incommensurability and rational incommensurability are impos-sible. Nevertheless, I will try to keep things as clear as possible.Donald Davidson, ÔOn the Very Idea ofa Conceptual SchemeÕ,Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), McDowellÕs position that we must adopt a Ôvia mediaÕ between cog-nitivism and non-cognitivism. And that is good, because McDowellis probably right that we must adopt such a position. It was never myintention to undermine McDowellÕs entire project, and I think thatMcDowell is right to think that to be a moral agent requires certainemotional responses.The actions ofan agent who lacked key emo-tions could not be said to fall under a moral conceptÑshe would notbe a moral agent. McDowell and I agree on that much. But in theabove-quoted passage from McDowell, he is arguing that someonewho didnÕt share our affective natures couldnÕt even follow the con-tours ofour moral conceptsÑthey couldnÕt predict applications ofthem. That, I have argued, is falseÑI have shown that his argumentfor this conclusion is unsound; and further, that abnormal psychologyprovides us with examples ofpeople who, although they lack ouraffective responses and canÕt in any way be said to be moral agents,can nevertheless follow and apply our moral concepts. And that is allthat is required for my argument. I do not need to claim that some-one lacking affect could be a moral agent, or that her actions couldcount as falling under a particular moral conceptÑI only need toargue that such a person might nevertheless be able to follow thecontours ofour moral concepts. And I hope I have done this much.On the Very Idea ofa Moral Conceptual SchemeAll this talk ofincommensurability and untranslatable conceptsshould call to mind that great foe ofconceptual schemes, DonaldDavidson. In his article ÔOn the Very Idea ofa ConceptualSchemeÕ, Davidson argues that incommensurability can be excludedgrounds. It has been suggested that DavidsonÕs argumentagainst incommensurability can be used to exclude the possibility ofrationalincommensurability between different ethical outlooks.The argument in the moral case has been developed in variousEmotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts Although I argue in op. cit., note 7, that there is no particularexperience to count as applying a particular moral concept. Manydifferent emotionsÑeven alien emotionsÑcan do the work ofmaking usmoral agents.As I noted in the last footnote, someoneÕs actions could still fall underour moral concepts ifthey had a different set ofaffective responses fromus. This is, again, a conclusion I argue for in my op. cit., note 7.See Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons(Oxford University Press, 1989);David E. Cooper, ÔMoral RelativismÕ, Midwest Studies in Philosophy III:Studies in Ethical Theory, French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds) (NotreDame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1978). ing understanding ofemotional depth in others while being appar-ently so ÒcoldÓ themselvesÕ;and David Shapiro, who writes ofapsychopath manipulating a prison psychologist: ÔHis awareness andhis interest [in the prison psychologist] were probably limitedessentially to what was immediately relevant to his own currentrequirements, but it was sensitive awareness nonethelessÕ,aware-ness which allowed him quite successfully to manipulate the psy-chologist. Stocker himselfwrites that Ôwe see little reason to thinkthat incorrect emotion or lack ofcorrect emotion, must precludeevaluative knowledgeÕ.Referring back to the passages quoted fromKernberg and Shapiro, Stocker continues: ÔAs suggested [earlier],successful scam artists and interrogators can have evaluative knowl-edge without having the relevant emotionsÕ.At the very least, suchemotionally defective people can correctly apply our moral con-cepts, even ifyou think that their lack offelt obligation precludesfull-fledged moral knowledge. But that is all that my argumentrequires: people lacking the relevant emotions can nevertheless fol-low the contours ofour moral concepts. So not only doesMcDowellÕs argument fail to show that one needs a particularaffective nature to understand our moral concerns, the literature ofpsychology provides us with examples ofpeople who understandour moral concerns, without at the same time sharing our affectivenature.At this point, someone might want to object as follows: ÔThe pas-sage you quoted from McDowell is only one part ofhis argument.But McDowellÕs argumentÑessentially, an argument for the con-clusion that we should embrace a middle ground, a third optionbetween cognitivism and non-cognitivismÑis much broader thanthis one argument regarding the Ôdisentangling manoeuvreÕ. Hisargument is that we can understand neither the phenomenology ofvalues nor moral psychology in general without adoptingMcDowellÕs middle position. As you have only addressed this oneargument ofMcDowellÕs, you can hardly claim to have refutedThis objection is right, up to a point. I havenÕt refutedJeremy Randel Koons Otto Kernberg, ÔFactors in the Treatment ofNarcissisticPersonalitiesÕ, Journal ofthe American Psychoanalytic AssociationEssential Papers on Narcissism, Andrew P.Morrison (ed.) (New York University Press, 1986). The above quote istaken from p. 218 ofthe latter.David Shapiro, Neurotic Styles(New York: Basic Books, 1965), 153.Op. cit., note 1, 203.I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. in naturalistic terms in a way that would allow one to go on to newcases. But this seems false. For example, it seems likely that an infi-nite variety ofdifferent machines could manifest a state correctlycharacterizable as a belief; and it also seems likely that the onlything these states would have in common is that they were all belief-states (in other words, we could give no non-mentalistic account ofwhy all these states formed a kind, ifyou will pardon my doublenegative). But it also seems likely that we do not need any particu-lar affective capacity to correctly apply the term ÔbeliefÕ. Pick yourfavourite supervening term: even ifthe extension ofthis term isshapeless at the supervened level, we need not conclude that a purelycognitive faculty should be incapable ofdiscerning its contours.Indeed, one ofthe stock characters in the philosophical literature,the amoralist, gives us good reason to think, contra McDowell, thatone need not share the communityÕs concerns to follow its moralconcepts. Consider the case ofRobert Harris, a thrill killer whoknew that what he was doing was wrong, but did not care.words, he could apply our moral concepts even though he did notshare our moral concerns. It looks, then, as though we could follow an alien communityÕsmoral concepts even ifwe did not share their affective nature. Thisis not a surprising result, I suppose; the one reason we had for sup-posing that we could not so understand the Martians rested onMcDowellÕs argument about the shapelessness ofmoral concepts atthe natural level. As we saw, this argument entailed only that wethat we needed a particular affective capacity to grasp the concept.I must conclude, then, that McDowell has given us no reason tosuppose that emotion plays a critical role in the understanding ofmoral concepts. Further, examples such as the amoralist give us rea-son to think that one can apply a communityÕs moral concepts with-out sharing that communityÕs concerns.Even Michael Stocker, who is quite emphatic that emotions playan important epistemic role in our moral lives, denies that one mustshare our emotions to follow the contours ofour moral concepts.Arguing that one can understand our emotional mindset withoutsharing it, Stockercites psychoanalyst Otto Kernberg, who writesthat people with Ôobsessive personalities É may develop a surpris-Emotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts This case is discussed in Gary Watson, ÔResponsibility and the LimitsofEvilÕ, Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in MoralPsychology, Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.) (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1987), 256Ð86.Op. cit., note 1. certain observations, and allows us to make new observations. Inmany cases, this total set ofobservations is gerrymandered; it doesnot form a recognizable kind at the level ofobservation. Ifthis is so,the observations we have made so far will not allow us to predictfuture observations, or, more to the point, justify those predictionswe do makeÑwe import theoretical considerations whichboth explain the observations made so far and allow us to make newobservations. Thus, the theoretical concept is made essential by theshapelessness at the empirical level ofits set ofconfirming obser-vations.McDowellÕs picture should now be a bit more clear. We cannotconceive ofutterly distinct cognitive and affective faculties, with thecognitive faculties discerning genuine features ofthe world and theaffective ones projecting value on to them, because the extension ofour moral terms does not form a kind characterizable in naturalterms as a recognizable kind. There is no reason to suppose thatthere is a genuine feature for our cognitive faculties to discern; theextension is a recognizable kind only when viewed from the super-vening level, but not when seen from the level supervened upon.Thus, as McDowell puts it, the Ôdisentangling manoeuvreÕ cannotbe pulled off, and we must reject non-cognitivism and the Humeanphilosophy ofmind as unable to account for our application ofmoral concepts. More important for our purposes, no purely cogni-tive faculty can follow the contours ofa moral concept, and suc-cessfully apply it in new cases; a creature must share our affectivenature to follow our moral concepts. But the more McDowellÕs picture comes into sharp focus, themore its flaws become apparent. Let us suppose (for I think this istrue) that the extension ofa supervening concept does not form akind which we could recognize as a kind ifwe were to use only thevocabulary ofthe level supervened upon. Thus, ifwe wish to go onto apply the supervening concept in new cases, we must use thesupervening concept itself; we cannot go on in the same way ifweavail ourselves only ofthe language ofthe level supervened upon.But all this shows is that we need the supervening concept to graspthe supervening concept; it shows nothing about what affectivenature we need to do so. The assumption is that a purely cognitivecapacity could not grasp a concept whose extension did not form arecognizable kind at the natural level, a kind that could be describedJeremy Randel Koons ment is nicely reconstructed in Marc Lange, ÔSalience, Supervenience, andLayer Cakes in SellarsÕs Scientific Realism, McDowellÕs Moral Realism,and the Philosophy ofMindÕ, , No. 2/3 is that we are able correctly to apply moral concepts, and it is theargument he gives for this conclusion that we shall examine.Some philosophers have argued that even though a concept mightsupervene on the natural world, the set ofobjects it picks out isÔshapelessÕ ifconsidered purely at the natural level. In other words,viewed purely naturalistically, these objects donÕt form a recogniz-able kind. To see why these objects belong together essentiallyrequires the concept under which they fall. McDowell argues that itis so with moral concepts. That is, the set ofactions that are cor-rectly categorized as ÔcruelÕ appears shapeless and gerrymandered;only when one is competent in the use ofthe concept ÔcruelÕ can onesee any shape to this set ofobjects. There is no such shape at thenatural level. Here is McDowell, responding to the reply that apurely cognitive faculty could follow the contours ofmoral con-cepts, because moral properties supervene on natural properties:Supervenience requires only that one be able to find differencesexpressible in terms ofthe level supervened on whenever onewants to make different judgments in terms ofthe superveninglevel. It does not follow from the satisfaction ofthis requirementthat the set ofitems to which a supervening term is correctlyapplied need constitute a kind recognizable as such at the levelsupervened upon. In fact supervenience leaves open this possibil-ity, which is just the possibility my scepticism envisages: howeverlong a list we give ofitems to which a supervening term applies,described in terms ofthe level supervened upon, there may be noway, expressible at the level supervened upon, ofgrouping justsuch items together. Hence there need be no possibility ofmas-tering, in a way that would enable one to go on to new cases, a termwhich is to function at the level supervened upon, but which is togroup together exactly the items to which competent users wouldapply the supervening term. Understanding why just those thingsbelong together may essentially require understanding the super-vening term.Arguments like this one have been used in areas other than moralphilosophy. For example, Wilfrid Sellars uses such an argument forscientific realism.Suppose a particular theoretical entity explainsEmotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts This doesnÕt mean that McDowell is arguing for cognitivism; rather,he is arguing for a third way, a Ôvia mediaÕ between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.Op. cit., note 2, 145.Wilfrid Sellars, ÔPhenomenalismÕ, Science, Perception, and Reality(Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1991). SellarsÕ argu- I think McDowellÕs argument that our contingent affective natureplays a crucial and necessary role in moral cognition is unsound.There is a crucial and, I believe, unsupported step in his argument.Let us see ifwe can bring out this step by closely examining theform his argument takes. Let me begin by briefly outlining the views McDowell isattempting to discredit with this line ofargumentation. The first isthe Humean philosophy ofmind, Ôa philosophy ofmind whichinsists on a strict separation between cognitive capacities and theirexercise, on the one hand, and what eighteenth-century writerswould classify as passions or sentiments, on the otherÕ.state can be either a cognitive belief-state, or a non-cognitive affec-tive state; no mental state can combine elements ofboth. The otherview McDowell is trying to discredit is non-cognitivism in ethics.On this view, our cognitive capacities discern genuine, non-evalua-tive features ofthe world, and in some cases, an affective capacity orother ÔpaintsÕ or projects value on to these features. McDowelldescribes the view in question as follows:Typically, non-cognitivists hold that when we feel impelled toascribe value to something, what is actually happening can be dis-entangled into two components. Competence with an evaluativeconcept involves, first, a sensitivity to an aspect ofthe world as itreally is (as it is independently ofvalue experience), and second,a propensity to a certain attitudeÑa non-cognitive state whichconstitutes the special perspective from which items in the worldseem to be endowed with the value in question. Given the disen-tangling, we could construct explanations ofthe character ofvalue experience on the same general lines as the explanations ofcolour experience that we have in mind when we are tempted bythe argument about secondary qualities: occupants ofthe specialperspective, in making value judgements, register the presence inobjects ofsome property they authentically have, but enrich theirconception ofthis property with the reflection ofan attitude.I will not discuss whether this is an accurate portrayal oftypical non-cognitivism, or whether his arguments against this conception areadequate. I wish only to discuss whether his response to this positionestablishes the claim that one needs certain affective capacities to fol-low the contours ofour moral concepts. McDowell is attempting todemonstrate that the classical non-cognitivist cannot Jeremy Randel Koons Op. cit., note 2, 143. the difference between Martian and human affective states makes itimpossible for us to communicate and rationally resolvemoral disputes, even via a third party (the Venusians). Third, evenin-principle inability to resolve disagreement (such as might arisewith the Venusians, who can only think in Euclidian terms) does notentail the claim that there is no fact ofthe matter. It is a fact thatactual space is Riemannian, whether we could ever convince theVenusians ofit or not. Thus, as stated above, epistemological rela-tivism does not entail ontological relativism or scepticism. Ifwe areto be convinced ofmoral relativism, the anti-realist will have tocome up with a different argument for the truth ofmoral relativismIn short, the argument discussed by McDowell hasgiven us sufficient reason to regard morality as relative.In a moment, we will discuss Davidsonian reasons for thinking thatincommensurability is itselfin principle impossible. But first, let usbriefly turn our attention to the question, Does evaluativeknowledge really require particular affective capabilities? Concepts and ÔShapelessnessÕI included the above discussion about incommensurability becauseofmy own uncertainty as to whether we can in principle rule outsuch incommensurability.However, there is one reason to supposethat our moral concepts need not be so local as one might suppose.Emotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts And elsewhere I have gone about undermining those claims advancedby the anti-realist which are supposed to accomplish this. See my op. cit.,note 6, op. cit., note 7.It seems likely (to me, at least) that such incommensurability cannotbe ruled out. For example, neuroscientists report that stroke victimsoften lose certain concepts. Damage to the left parietal lobe can result inÔleft-right confusionÕ, in which the victim loses the concepts ofÔleftnessÕand ÔrightnessÕ. Victims ofleft parietal lobe lesions often suffer from acomplete inability to perform even the simplest mathematical calcula-tions, suggesting a loss ofvarious mathematical concepts. It is at leastconceivable that the human race is systematically incapable ofgraspingcertain concepts that are, to other intelligent races (ifany there be), justas basic as the concepts ofleft and right are to us. It is true that we couldawareofsuch a deficit, but to conclude from this that there can beno such deficit is to conflate epistemological with metaphysical issues (asI think Davidsonians sometimes do, in arguing for the impossibility ofincommensurability). These sorts ofbrain-damage induced cognitivedeficits are fairly well-known; these examples are drawn from theUniversity ofMassachusetts Medical Center Strokestop Glossary(http://www.umassmed.edu/strokestop/Glossary.html). Earth Society is both wrong and not justified. I take it that the factthat the Flat Earthers and the Martians are stubborn and irrationalhas no dire consequences for scientific or moral realism.(IIB), iftrue, would clearly bode ill for moral realism. But how isour example supposed to entail (IIB)? We have two races ofcreatureswho need some subjective state (in this case, an emotion) to be able tofollow the contours ofa concept, and we canÕt reach an agreementwhen our judgments on a particular case cut different ways. Considera parallel case: suppose I am interacting with a race which, whileblind, has an extremely advanced and sensitive faculty ofecholoca-tion, much like that possessed by bats or dolphins. When observingsomeone who is embarrassed, I note that she is turning red and say,ÔShe is blushing; clearly, she is embarrassedÕ. This race ofcreatures,lacking any ability to sense colour, denies that any change hasoccurred; nor can I convince them that the individual in question haschanged in any way. But the fact that (a) colour perception requires aspecial faculty and (b) I cannot convince a person lacking this facultyofa certain colour claim (namely, that the person before us is blush-ing) donÕt entail that there is no fact ofthe matter regarding whetherthe person in question is blushing. Indeed, the claim that epistemo-logical localism (i.e., that certain facts are only knowable by certainindividuals, and not by others) implies factual or ontological localism(i.e., that what is in fact the case is relative to the individual/cul-ture/etc.) requires some sort ofsubjectivist and verificationistaccount ofmeaning. This race ofecho-locators (and perhaps also theMartians) canÕt see all ofreality, but that is an epistemological prob-lem, not an ontological one. As I argued a moment before, even iftheMartiansÕ claims are justified, that doesnÕt entail that the Martians areright, or that there is no objective fact ofthe matter.There are three important things to be gained from this conver-sation. First, we judgeaffective impediments to moral behaviour; wedonÕt let them be the criteria for moral rightness or wrongness.Second, our inability to grasp the contours ofalien concepts cannotforce us into relativism. Even in cases where we cannot understandcertain ofthe aliensÕ moral concepts, we can still argue about whatone ought to do. And in any ofthe above cases where we and theMartians fail to come to an agreement, we can envision a future timewhen we become sufficiently well-acquainted with Martian cultureto follow all their moral concepts (or vice versa), and agreement isreached then. Or we can imagine a third race ofcreatures, theVenusians, who can understand both human and Martian moralconcepts, coming along and adjudicating our interplanetary moraldisputes. In short, McDowell has not (indeed, cannot) show thatJeremy Randel Koons consider the Venusians, who donÕt have the cognitive apparatus tograsp Riemannian geometry; they can only conceive ofEuclidiangeometry. Such a group might be perfectly well justified in claimingthat parallel lines never intersect, but the fact that they believe thisdoesnÕt bode ill for Einstein (since actual space is Riemannian, notEuclidian). We might regret this groupÕs lack ofsmarts, but thisdoesnÕt mean that geometric truths are local, or that there are nogeometric truths. It may well be that the Martians use a differentaffective state to track moral concepts; and that this cognitive make-up stands as an impediment to their perception ofmoral truths.But the fact that there is some cognitive impediment to theMartiansÕ grasping ofcertain moral truths doesnÕt bode ill for moralrealism any more than the VenusiansÕ cognitive shortcomings bodeill for scientific realism.Consider the problem this way: there is no possibility (it seems)ofrational convergence on a particular moral question between theMartians and us, but this in itselfdoesnÕt entail that there is no(non-relative) fact ofthe matter. There is no possibility ofrationalconvergence on the answer to the question, ÔIs the number ofneutrinos in the universe odd or even?Õ, but only a verificationistwould deny that there is a fact ofthe matter on the answer. In otherwords, convergence worries are, at least on their face, epistemologi-cal worries, not ontological worries. So the inability ofthe Martiansand humans to rationally resolve this moral dispute does not entailthat there is no fact ofthe matter as to whether or not I should killmy mother. If(IIA2) is the case, then there is again no problem. There is afact ofthe matter about what I ought to do, and the Martians arenot justified in denying it. This is something which arises all thetime in scientific discourse. For example, a member ofthe FlatEmotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts meaningful way, in a way that would shape discourse. This would result innumerous unfortunate consequencesÑwe could not distinguish betweenscience and pseudoscience; we could not sort beliefs among those to bebelieved and those not to be believed; etc. For a discussion ofthe prag-matic importance ofepistemic discourse, see my ÔDo Normative FactsPacific Philosophical Quarterly, No. 3 (September One might worry, though, that this affective state plays more than justan epistemic role in morality; one might argue that this state plays a con-stitutive (truth-determining) role. I argue that this is not the case inÔResponse-Dependence in Morality: Scary, Tame, or Just False?Õ (manu- might say to the Martians that my mother really doesnÕt want to die,and that when someone really wants something, thatÕs at least primafacie reason to let them have it. Or we could argue that the Martiansbecause it requires them to domorally bad things, such as kill peopleÕs mothers.In any case, wecan clearly argue with the Martians over what we ought to do: evenifwe can only take the MartiansÕ word for it that killing my moth-er would be a case ofa action, we can still argue about whetherthat is sufficient reason to kill my mother. Let us examine the pos-sible outcomes for such an argument. To smooth our progress, Iwill put the possible outcomes in the form ofan outline:I. One side is convinced that the other is correct.II. Neither side is convinced.A. There is a non-relative fact ofthe matter about what I oughtto do (say, not kill my mother).1. Martians are wrong, but justified in their beliefthat I oughtto kill my mother.2. Martians are wrong, and not justified in their belief.B. There is no (non-relative) fact ofthe matter about what Iought to do.I will consider each ofthese possibilities in order. It seems clear thatif(I) is the case, then there is no problem: ifthe Martians and I cancome to some agreement (say, that I ought not kill my mother), thenthe impetus McDowellÕs argument provided for the claim that ourmoral systems will be rationally incommensurable is removed. Now consider (IIA1). I donÕt think we have to concede that thisis a worry for moral realism. Consider the example ofthe brain in avat. It seems to me that the brain is justified in thinking that it isinteracting with people and objects; but it also seems to me that thebrain is wrong. The brain is just unfortunate in this respect.Jeremy Randel Koons Feminists, for example, sometimes argue that we ought not employconcepts such as ÔchasteÕ, since they imply a certain moral code that manyfeminists reject.Mark Lance suggested this way ofbreaking down the possible out-comes ofsuch a debate.Ofcourse, many externalists would deny that the brain in a vat is jus-tified in thinking that it is interacting with real people. But the brain in thevat seems among the strongest counterexamples to externalism. Ifthebrain in the vatÑdespite all the evidence at its disposalÑis not justified inbelieving it is interacting with people, then justification has all but col-lapsed into truth, and we cannot carry on our epistemic practice in any Consider a certain particularly important Martian moral concept,. Periodically, a human will perform an action that causes all theMartians in the area to run away screaming and kill themselves.Unfortunately, the class ofactions that produces this responseappears shapeless to humans. We cannot grasp its contours; we can-not predict when one ofour actions will violate this moral rule.Does this mean we have no obligation to avoid being ? I wouldthink that instead we would have an obligation to defer to those whowere competent in the application ofthe concept . Imagine that Iwas interacting with a group ofMartians, and one warned me thatI was running the risk ofbeing . What would the human moralresponse to me be ifI were to say, ÔSo what? I have no obligation toavoid being Õ. Clearly, I would be thought to be morally bad: I hada chance to defer to a Martian competent in the use ofthe concept, thereby avoiding a particularly bad outcome, and I failed to doso. Notice that ifMcDowellÕs thesis entailed relativism, my flippantresponse would have been correct: I would be under no obligationto avoid being But it seems clear that my response is morallybad. Thus, it would seem that inability to follow the contours ofamoral concept does not entail that one has no obligation at all vis-ˆ-Unfortunately, matters are not that simple; we will not always beable to merely defer to the Martians. Our inability to grasp Martianmoral concepts will often lead, it seems, to an inability to rationallyresolve moral disputes. Suppose a Martian informs me that I havean obligation to kill my mother. I refuse, saying it would be cruel.The Martians counter that they just canÕt grasp this cruelty wehumans are always going on about, but one thing they do know isthat it would be ofme to kill my mother, thereby presenting mewith another moral concept whose contours I cannot grasp. Clearly,in this case I cannot simply defer to the Martians. Nor can I arguewith them. Since neither can grasp the othersÕ moral concepts, wecannot rationally debate which one correctly applies to my killingmy mother. Is it cruel or ? is a question we cannot, it seems,rationally resolve.But perhaps we can rationally resolve the issue. Normally, whenconflict arises in our practice, we move to the explicit giving ofrea-sons (what Sellars calls the Ôgame ofgiving and asking for reasonsÕ).ItÕs not clear that we couldnÕt do this in the above case ofdisagree-ment; itÕs not clear we couldnÕt start arguing. How would that go? IEmotions and Incommensurable Moral Concepts Or to avoid performing actions which Martians would call been pointed out to me that I wouldnÕt have the conceptual resources to act community. Ifthe disentangling manoeuvre is always possible,that implies that the extension ofthe associated term, as it wouldbe used by someone who belonged to the community, could bemastered independently ofthe special concerns which, in thecommunity, would show themselves in admiration or emulationofactions seen as falling under the concept. That is: one couldknow which actions the term would be applied to, so that onewould be able to predict applications and withholdings ofit innew casesÑnot merely without oneselfsharing the communityÕsadmiration (there need be no difficulty about that), but withouteven embarking on an attempt to make sense oftheir admiration.McDowell doubts that this Ôdisentangling manoeuvreÕ can be pulledoff. He doubts that a purely cognitive faculty could follow the con-tours ofour moral concepts. Thus, a divergence in emotional make-up between two species might well result in incommensurabilityinability ofone group to understand the other groupÕs moral con-cepts. (I will restrict the term ÔincommensurabilityÕ to inability tounderstand alien concepts. Thus, incommensurability is to be dis-rationalincommensurability, which is when twopoints ofview lack common standards for the rational resolution ofdisputes. Many claim that incommensurability entails rationalincommensurability, but I merely wish to emphasize that they aredistinct positions, and I will label them accordingly. Finally, bymean mere inability to translate a wordfrom one language into another. As I will argue later, untranslata-bility in no way entails incommensurability.)Before I continue, let me hasten to correct a possible misunder-standing. My discussion ofMcDowell might (and has) lead readersto think that I am accusing McDowell ofbeing a closet believer inconceptual schemes. I attribute no such beliefto McDowell. Imerely wanted to find the most persuasive argument for the con-clusion that moral cognition requires the participation ofaffect.The strongest argument supporting this view turns out, in my view,to be the one advanced by McDowell. Back to the argument. At first, one might doubt whether thisincommensurability entails any relativism at all. Suppose we cameto interact with a community ofMartians, a group whose affectivenature was different from our own. Suppose, further, that therewere human moral concepts they could not grasp, and vice versa.Jeremy Randel Koons ÔNon-Cognitivism and Rule-FollowingÕ, Wittgenstein: To Follow aRule, Holtzman and Leich (eds) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, JEREMY RANDEL KOONSMany authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role inour moral practice.such a role. But at least one author (John McDowell) has taken theepistemic connection to be so strong as to make creatures who donot share our affective nature unable to grasp our moral concepts.Further, this incommensurability, or inability to understand certainmoral concepts, might lead to relativism: you might think that ifIcannot follow your moral concepts, then those concepts are notbinding on me, and it might even be the case that moral claims thatare true for you are not true for me. I would like to discuss thealleged incommensurability introduced into morality by emotionÕsepistemic role, and its feared consequences. I conclude thattice, this role does not lead to the incommensurability feared. In anycase, such incommensurability would not entail moral relativism.Thus, ifthe argument ofthis paper is right, the epistemic role ouremotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality.McDowell and Concept ApplicationThe problem to be discussed has been suggested by John McDowell(although he doesnÕt take it to be a problem). McDowell argues thatone who didnÕt share our characteristic concerns and affectivenature couldnÕt follow the contours ofour moral concepts. We canÕtÔdisentangleÕ our evaluative concepts and our affective responses;they are bound up with each other so intimately that competentapplication ofthe former requires possession ofthe latter.McDowell writes:Consider, for example, a specific conception ofsome moralvirtue: the conception current in a reasonably cohesive moralPhilosophy2001585 See, for example, Martha Nussbaum, LoveÕs Knowledge(New York:Oxford University Press, 1990), chapters 6 and 14; and Michael Stocker,Valuing Emotions(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).