Abby Stoddard, Ph.D., is a Senior Associate with the Center on Interna - PDF document

Abby Stoddard, Ph.D., is a Senior Associate with the Center on International Cooperation, New YorkUniversity.Adele Harmer, MSc., is a Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the OverseasDevelopment Institute (ODI). She is currently based in New York, working in collaboration with theCenter on International Cooperation.atherine Haver, MIA, is a Research Associate with the Center on International Cooperation.esearch team and contributorsThe following individuals and organisations made significant contributions to the findings of thiseport through their background field research and commissioned studies: Farahnaz Karim(Afghanistan background study); Joakim Gundel (Somalia and Somaliland background study);Andrew Harker (Chechnya and the North Caucasus background study); Alexandre Carle and HakimChkam (Iraq background study); and Andrew Durrant (Democratic Republic of Congo backgroundstudy). IRIN Nairobi contributed to the background analysis in Darfur, Sudan, Barnaby Willitts-Kingmade a significant contribution to the background research for Chapter 4 on the localisation of reliefefforts, and Dr Michael Gilligan of the Wilf Family Department of Politics at NYU, our statistical consultant, provided technical advice and performed statistical regression analysis on the studysdata, on which we drew for Chapter 2 and the overall findings of the report.Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute111 Westminster Bridge RoadE1 7JDebsite: www.odi.org.uk/hpgEmail: hpgadmin@odi.org.ukISBN: 0-85003-820-0© Overseas Development Institute, 2006 viding aid in insecure environments: trends in policyand operationsAbby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and atherine Haver HPG Report 23September 2006 olicy Group Overseas Development i AcknowledgementsAcronymsecutive summaryChapter 1 Introduction1.1 Overview and purpose of the study31.2 The changing security context for aid operations: reality, perception and response41.4 Related studies1.5 Structure of the reportChapter 2 Measuring insecurity: quantitative analysis of violence against civilian aid operations112.1 Overall findings2.2 Global trends in violence against aid workers122.3 Relative rates of risk and case-specific findings152.4 Intentionality: assessing the relevance of victimsaid worker status192.5 Conclusions and operational implications20Chapter 3 Operational security: a comparative analysis of policy and practice213.1 Recognition and reaction: approaches to aid worker security in the 1990s213.2 Security management today: towards a new professionalism223.3 New policy developments and evolutions in approach243.4 Inter-agency security coordination293.5 The critical role of security information mechanisms30 3.6 Accountability issues in security323.7 National staff issues3.8 Financing security and the role of donor governments323.9 International frameworks and responsibilities of states33 3.10 Conclusions and future implications34Chapter 4 Service delivery in insecure environments374.1 Problems of access in insecure environments374.2 Remote management as a programme adaptation to insecurity38 4.3 Benefits and challenges4.4 The ethics of localisation in response to insecurity444.5 Best (or simply better) practices for remote management? 464.6 Future prospects: towards the planned localisation of response capacity47Chapter 5 Conclusions and recommendations495.2 RecommendationsAnnex 1 List of intervieweesAnnex 2 Results of regression analysis59Bibliography HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page i ii HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page ii viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT DI and CIC would like to thank the wide range of organisations and individuals that assisted and supported thisstudy. We are especially grateful to the government of Canada and the donor governments of HPG for theirfinancial support for the research. We would also like to thank the UN Department of Safety and Security, withoutwhose valuable support the research on UN security reform would not have been possible. Thanks are due also toour peer reviewers: Shepard Forman, Barnett R. Rubin and Bruce Jones (CIC); Simon Maxwell, James Darcy, PaulHarvey, Thomas Muller, Victoria Wheeler and Kate Longley (ODI); Robert Painter (UNDSS), Elissa Golberg (DFAIT,government of Canada), Shawn Bardwell (USAID), Dennis King (US State Department), Anthony Val Flynn (ECHO),Pierre Gassmann (Harvard University) and Dirk Salomons (Columbia University), independent consultants NickDownie, Paul OBrien, Jonathan Littell, Guylaine Saffrais, Michel Noureddine Kassa and Mark Bradbury, FransBarnard (CARE Canada) and Simon Springett and Colin Rogers (Oxfam GB).The views expressed in this paper were informed by discussions with our interviewees and peer reviewers, but donot necessarily reflect the opinions of those individuals or their organisations. Responsibility for any errors of factor interpretation remains the authors. Acknowledgements HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page iii iv HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page iv viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT ACFAction contre la FaimANSOCommunity-based organisationComplex political emergencyDevelopment Assistance Committee of the OECDDFIDDepartment for International DevelopmentDRCDanish Refugee CouncilDRCDemocratic Republic of Congo FAOood and Agriculture Organisation of the UNFTSFinancial Tracking SystemHumanitarian Information CentreIASCInter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs IASMNInter-Agency Security Management NetworkICRCInternational Committee of the Red CrossICVAInternational Council of Voluntary AgenciesInternally displaced personImprovised explosive deviceInternational Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesInter-governmental organisationInternational non-governmental organisationInternational organisationInternational Organisation for MigrationIRCInternational Rescue CommitteeIntegrated Regional Information NetworksMinimum Operating Security StandardsMédecins sans FrontièresNCCINGO Coordination Committee in IraqNon-governmental organisationOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsODAOfficial Development AssistanceOECDOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOFDAOffice of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance ermanent Five Member of the UN Security Councileace Support OperationsSACBSomalia Aid Coordination BodySAGSecurity Advisory Group of InterActionteering Committee for Humanitarian Response Acronyms HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page v vi HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTSIRSSecurity Incident Reporting ServiceSMISecurity Management InitiativeSecurity Risk AssessmentDevelopment ProgrammeDepartment of Safety and Security UNFPAPopulation FundHigh Commissioner for RefugeesChildrens FundUNRWAelief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near EastUNSECOORDSecurity CoordinatorUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUnder-Secretary-Generaltual Research AssociatesWFPorld Food Programmerld Health OrganisationWVIrld Vision International HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page vi viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTJust before this report went to print, 17 aid workers from theorganisation Action contre la Faim were shot dead in Muttur, SriLanka. This horrific, execution-style killing came towards theend of a year that saw unprecedented numbers of attacksagainst aid workers in Darfur, and in the wake of surges ofviolence in post-invasion Iraq and Afghanistan. Not surprisingly,there is a widespread perception within the international aidcommunity that serious violence against aid workers hasincreased in recent years. This perception has prompted aidactors to change their approach to staff security and to theconduct of their aid operations. Yet no comprehensive empiricalanalysis exists to support or refute the claims of increasingviolence against aid workers on a relative scale, that is,measured against the numbers of aid workers operating in thefield. This gap in knowledge has meant that policy andoperational responses to security conditions have been largelydriven by impressions and anecdotal evidence, and importanttrends have not been identified.This report presents findings from a two-year study examiningaid in insecure environments. Drawing on the most com-prehensive global dataset to date of major reported incidents ofviolence against aid workers from 1997 to 2005, it provides aquantitative analysis of the changing security environment forcivilian aid operations. It then examines the related trends inpolicy and operations over the last decade, in particular howperceptions of increased risk to aid operations have affected thedevelopment of security measures. Lastly, it explores the way inwhich aid operations have adapted to working in highly insecurecontexts through a growing reliance on national staff.While the study relies on numerical data to provide a missingempirical basis to the security discussion, the authors areconscious of the fact that this data represents individualhuman lives and often tragic outcomes. (killings, kidnappings and armed attacks resulting in seriousinjury) committed against aid workers each year has nearlydoubled, with the increase growing steeper in the second halfof the decade. Overall, there were 408 reported acts of majorviolence against aid workers over the nine-year period,involving 941 victims and resulting in 434 fatalities.However, when the number of victims is compared to thepopulation of aid workers in the field, which increased by anestimated 77% from 1997 to 2005, the global incidence trendof violence against aid workers is found to have risen onlyslightly. The annual number of victims per 10,000 aid workersin the field averaged five in the first half of the period and sixin the second. Moreover, the relative rate has actually fallen inthe six countries or regions where violence against aidworkers is most prevalent (Somalia and Somaliland, Sudan,Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)and Chechnya and the North Caucasus). That the relative rate of attacks against aid workers overall ispractices have had a positive impact on staff security.However, the data analysis found a further trend. Thedecreased risk to aid workers in the six most violent contextshas accrued only to international staff. National staffpresent the majority of victims (79%) in all countries, andtheir risk relative to international staff is increasing in the mostviolent contexts. This finding correlates with anotherobservation in the study: that in times of heightenedinsecurity, international staff rely increasingly on national staffor local partners to manage aid programmes, in effect shiftingthe burden of risk. The study also found that insecurity is notimpinging on all institutions in the same way. While thenumber of incidents affecting UN and International Committeeof the Red Cross (ICRC) staff decreased over the time period,incidents affecting national Red Cross and Red Crescentworkers have increased in absolute terms, and those affectingNGOs have increased in both absolute and relative terms.The study found no correlation between the overall level ofviolence in a given context (as measured by the number ofconflict-related deaths per year) and the level of violence againstaid workers. Based on a regression analysis of the six mostdangerous contexts, the study also concluded that violenceagainst aid workers was no more or less likely to occur in relationto a range of factors, such as the presence of a UN integratedmission, interventions by the US or other great power forces, orthe presence of global terrorist cells. At the same time, however,the study found that most aid worker victims were deliberatelytargeted, for political and/or economic purposes, rather thanbeing randomly exposed to violence. Politically motivatedincidents have increased by 208% over the time period. Takentogether, these findings suggest that, while there is nocorrelation between the level of violence against aid workers andmilitary interventions are often a feature of (and can contributeto) extremely volatile environments for aid work, where politicaltargeting is increasingly a tactic of choice.olicy and operational approaches to securityBeginning in the 1990s, and accelerating in the years following9/11, humanitarian organisations have taken steps toprofessionalise and institutionalise security management.These efforts have included the development or upgrading ofsecurity guidelines, instituting training and creating seniorposts responsible for security, and developing technical and ecutive summary HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 1 2 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT systematic means to record and analyse security incidentinformation. Very few of these efforts have been undertaken ina coordinated fashion. At the headquarters level, whilecollaboration has increased within networks of US- and UK-based NGOs and among UN agencies, considerablecoordination challenges persist. In matters of security, thisstudy found that aid organisations are in fact highlyinterdependent, making coordination a critical feature ofsecurity management. Coordination remains informal andariable across countries and emergencies, however, andtends to be most effective when severe security pressuresdemand it. Although the reporting of security incidents hasbeen prioritised and has attracted significant investment inecent years, critical gaps in this area remain, and are cited bymany as a major impediment to good security analysis.The most significant changes in security management areseen at the operational level, reflected in shifts between thethree components of the security triangleparadigm:protection, deterrence and acceptance (Van Brabant, 2000).These terms have become ubiquitous in the aid communityer the last five years, although their meaning and value haveat times been lost. This study defines the terms as follows:: seeking to reduce vulnerability to targeted andDeterrence: presenting a counter-threat.: entails the aid agency becoming a familiar andtrusted entity by the host community and the beneficiarypopulation, cultivating a network of contacts and inter-mediaries to maintain open lines of communication andeception from the key (often belligerent) parties.In recent years, there has been a noticeable decline in thepractice of activeacceptance strategies by aid organisations,particularly in highly unstable environments. In addition, newtypes of protective measures have been adopted in certainolatile contexts, with some agencies adopting very low-profileor even clandestinemodes of programming. This is particularlythe case where there is a high risk of targeting due to anorganisations perceived association with certain political actors. The role of host states and governmental donors has perhapsbeen underplayed in the past, and their respective functions inproviding and supporting security measures for aid workersdeserve increased attention. For host states, clear challengesexist in situations where there is limited capacity, and wherethe state is a party to the conflict. For their part, donorgovernments report that they are willing and prepared to fundsecurity costs, but many agencies insist that available fundingis still inadequate. The lack of coordination among donorsthemselves on security issues has added to these challenges,as has the apparent disconnect in donor policies, notably inthe US, between support for aid agency security on the oneglobal counter-terror agenda. Despite reforms, the seriousness with which agencies nowspeak of security management is still not matched in practice.These weaknesses have influenced decision-making on aidprogramming in insecure environments over the last decade,as the final strand of the studys analysis explores.ocalisation as a response to insecurityaced with insecure operating environments that limit accessto populations in need, humanitarian actors have developedand employed differing approaches for service delivery sincethe mid-1990s. In recent years, such responses have involvedinternational staff working at a distance from the affected areaand increasing reliance on national staff or partnerorganisations in order to maintain operations. So-calledremote managementprogramming has the important benefitof allowing operations to continue. But it also creates anumber of challenges. These include less efficient servicedelivery, difficulties maintaining a strategic programme andplanning focus, corruption risks and accountability concerns.Considerations that influence agenciesswitch to remotemanagement include the level of insecurity and its expectedduration, the size of the programme, a desire to maintainpresence for solidarity or visibility reasons, the sector ofprogramming and the type of goods and equipment involved.Agencies also claim that levels of vulnerability and need arekey factors in determining whether to provide aid by remotesaving interventions that are prioritised; decision-making isalso influenced by a range of other factors related to politicalconcerns or agency image.Humanitarian organisations have largely failed to fullyconsider the ethics of transferring security risks fromexpatriate staff to national staff or local NGOs. One of the coreassumptions of remote management approaches is thatnational workers are at less risk than their internationalcounterparts. But this assumption is often unfounded, andnationals may find it exceedingly difficult to decline the workfor economic and/or altruistic reasons. Viewed against thesignificant rise in the relative risk of violence to national staffin the most dangerous contexts, this raises serious ethical andoperational questions for the international aid community.This study contends that passing responsibility to local partners, reactive measure. Instead, internationalhumanitarian actors should be encouraged to engage in priorstrategic planning and adopt guiding principles on how theseapproaches can best be undertaken. The report concludes witha series of recommendations to strengthen operational securityand aid management in insecure environments. It provides anoutline of what good remote management practices might looklike, and argues that the development of local capacity and thesecurity of national as well as international staff should becentral to future aid programming, at the global, regional andlocal levels. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 2 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT 1.1 Overview and purpose of the studyor people who work in war zones, the risk of death or seriousinjury is real and ever-present. The military have a clear meansto mitigate and absorb the consequences of this risk. When aserious incident occurs against civilian aid operations, however,it shakes the confidence not only of the organisation affected,but of the whole aid community. The aid programme invariablyloses impetus, and can come to a complete halt. When oneagency reduces its presence or withdraws following an attackothers often follow, either passing responsibilities over to localpartners or leaving the beneficiary population to cope alone.Alternatives to withdrawal are not readily apparent.International humanitarian law (IHL) and UN conventions aredesigned to protect civilians, including aid workers, fromviolence during conflict. IHL, however, has been increasinglyflouted, and the environments in which aid agencies work todaybear little resemblance to the experiences of war upon whichwas originally conceived. In fact, experience has led many tobelieve aid actors may be vulnerable in conflictsituations as potential targets for violence (interviews, 2006).In recent years, there has been a widespread perception of newand growing threats to aid workers, to their operations and totheir access to beneficiaries. There are multiple views about theextent and causes of the changed security environment for aidworkers. Most are based on anecdotal experience and a generalsense that the dynamics of security have somehow changed.Some see this change as a result of overly close cooperationS-led war on terror. Many note that humanitarian action hasbeen subsumed or co-opted by military campaigns in theservice of national and global security objectives, or hasbecome inextricably associated with state-building and relatedpolitical agendas. Others see new dangers from non-stateactors and movements that view aid operations as representingnorms of stability and order, and as such attack them in theinterests of sowing chaos, irrespective of these operationshumanitarian function or their relationship with military orpolitical actors. Although some observers maintain that, on thewhole, the relationship between humanitarian actors andconflict and insecurity remains unchanged, the generalconsensus holds that some combination of these developmentshas directly contributed to a deterioration in the securityenvironment for aid work.This consensus has spurred the international assistancecommunity into recognising operational security as a vitalpolicy concern, both for its own staff and for the success ofaid operations in general. This has resulted in investment inenhanced security capacity and coordination, addingimpetus to a trend that began in the mid-1990s to strengthenand professionalise security management within the sector.In particular, the UN system, along with some of the largerdevelopments in the way operational security for aid work isconceived and managed. At the UN, this has meant a newinstitutional structure … the UN Department for Safety andSecurity (UNDSS) … an increase in funding, additional andmore senior security staff and advances in methods of riskassessment, incident monitoring and response. Develop-ments among non-UN actors, though for the most partuncoordinated, have also been significant. A group of keyS-based international NGOs has developed inter-agencysecurity standards, and some NGOs have centralisedsystems for reporting and collecting information on securityincidents. Over the past few years, many aid organisationshave added dedicated security personnel to their staff, andnew provisions for security resources have been included ingrant proposals. Policies and protocols have also beenOn the ground, changes in security policies and practices haveet to be fully implemented, and in any case only partiallyaddress the problems at hand. At present, responses toinsecurity have included adaptations in programming, agrowing reliance on national staff and a shift to working withlocal partner organisations to maintain operations. Thesestrategies have had both positive and negative effects interms of meeting standards in programming, addressingpriority needs and overall impact. Organisations remain forthe most part reactive in their approach to changes inprogramming, treating each scenario as new rather thandeveloping a strategic approach and sharing lessons betweenorganisations. The steady engagement of local actors in reliefefforts over the past few years also brings into question thetraditional roles of international aid organisations in conflictenvironments.This study examines three interrelated elements of thechanging security environment for aid actors. First, itprovides an empirical basis against which to test theperception that aid workers face increased risk. Second, itexplores the implications of this perception in practice, andhow the development of security measures has beenaffected over the past decade. Third, it considers the impactof insecurity on the delivery of humanitarian assistance inhigh-risk contexts, with a focus on the increasing localisationof response. Introduction 1 The view that threats against aid workers had risen in the post-9/11political environment was expressed in numerous interviews with UN, IOand NGO representatives undertaken for this study. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 3 4 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT 1.2 The changing security context for aid operations:eality, perception and responseBy any measure, international aid work is a dangerousprofession. When we compared on-the-job death rates for aidworkers against the ten most hazardous civilian occupationsin the US, aid workers came in at number five, after loggers,pilots, fishermen and structural iron and steel workers.these other civilian professions, however, the high fatality ratefor aid workers is largely due to violent acts. It is an oft-epeated fallacy that vehicle accidents are the primary causeof aid worker deaths in the field. While they may account forthe largest number of safety incidents and insurance claims,statistical analyses by researchers at Johns Hopkins University(Sheik, 2000; Rowley, 2005) have found that the majority ofare caused by intentional violence.Unlike other research on this topic (highlighted at the end of thischapter), this study addresses intentional violence only, asopposed to the broader range of risks facing aid workers in thefield, including illness, accidents and environmental hazards. Aidworkers have historically faced two main categories of threat:1) Environmental threats. Environmental threats include boththreats, the so-called collateral damage incurredfrom operating in unstable and violent contexts, and parasiticthreats, where aid workers are targeted for their economicassets … in common crimes or via extortion, for instance.2) Political threatsor an associated political target for armed groups. Principalpolitical targeting involves attacks on aid operations andworkers to block or divert the delivery of aid to certain groups,or to exact punishment for that delivery. This includes terrorist-type attacks on aid workers designed to send a message, todisrupt stability and normality, to sow fear or to undermine trustin the current authority. Associated political targeting refers toattacks on aid operations and workers for their perceivedallegiance to, participation in or non-differentiation from anAs regards economic targeting, a rise in general criminality inmany developing countries has been observed since the mid-1990s. Some have attributed this to increasing inequality and(Bourguignon, 2001). Raised expectations, newly observedealth and more visible gaps between haves and have-nots,often accompanied by diminishing public sector services,create frustration, which in turn can breed crime. This is citedas one possible cause for the increased crime rates in citieslike Nairobi, where international workers once moved aboutfreely, but are now warned not to go out alone or at night(interviews with UNDSS and UN agency/NGO staff, 2006). Although most security and humanitarian professionalsinterviewed for this study agree that the most prevalentthreats to aid workers remain those in the environmentalcategory, particularly banditry, they also share a strong sensethat political targeting has increased in the past few years.There have been several grim watershed moments … incidentswhich have jolted the aid community into new ways ofthinking about security. Perhaps the first was the murder of sixInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workers inChechnya in December 1996, which drove home to aidpractitioners that humanitarians were no longer exempt fromviolence in war. Even earlier, in the Somalia and Bosniaemergencies, many aid workers had their first experience ofhigh-risk, militarised humanitarian relief efforts, where theiraid commodities were treated as spoils of war and theythemselves were frequent targets of combatants. More recentincidents have included the bomb attacks against the UNheadquarters and the ICRC offices in Baghdad in 2003. TheICRC attack in particular suggested that all aid workers, evenapproach, were deemed potential political targets. The Baghdad bombings represented, in the most extremeform, the severity of the security challenges emerging from thepost-9/11 security environment and the political polarisationsurrounding the US-led war on terror. Other factors … both newand old … complicating the security environment for aid workinclude the proliferation of conflicts that are at once internaland transnational; the challenge of failed or failing states thatlack any national security infrastructure; new tactics ofviolence, such as suicide bombings; and the prevalence ofactive militia groups, with no clear chains of command orknown interlocutors with whom to negotiate.Approaches to operational security for aid work have tendedto pass over the fact that the fundamental responsibility forthe security of aid personnel lies with the host state. Thisprinciple is embodied in IHL, and has been reaffirmed inseveral UN resolutions. It was also formally adopted by 79state signatories to the Convention on the Safety of UnitedNations and Associated Personnel in 1994. In practice,however, this responsibility has often not been discharged,not least because the most dangerous environments arefrequently those where the state lacks the basic capacity totake on this role, and/or does not have the political will to doso. New attention is focusing on this under-emphasisedaspect of security, particularly within UNDSS. 2 In 2004, the US Department of Labor reported that individualoccupations with high rates of fatal injury were logging workers (92.4 per100,000 workers), aircraft pilots and flight engineers (92.4 per 100,000),fishers and related fishing workers (86.4 per 100,000), and structural ironand steel workers (47.0 per 100,000) (US Department of Labor, 2005). Tocalculate the 2004 fatality rate for aid workers (both violent andaccident/illness-related) we extrapolated from our data on aid workerskilled in 2004 (56). Rowleys calculation of 60% violence-related deaths(Rowley, 2005) would yield an estimated total of 94 deaths from all causes.Against our aid worker denominator for that year, this gives a rate of 45 per100,000, just below that of structural iron and steel workers.3 The Sheik (2000) study data, excluding peacekeeping personnel, yields afigure of 72% of aid worker deaths resulting from violence between 1985and 1998, and Rowley (2005) shows 60% of deaths between 2002 and 2005as violence-related. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 4 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT Against this backdrop, this study has sought to illuminate thenature and extent of the threat to aid work as it has changeder the years, and to assess the responses adopted by theThe overall methodological approach of the study had fourcomponents: data collection and analysis; field research;documentation and literature review; and key informantinterviews. The data collection and analysis forms a criticalempirical basis for the reports overall conclusions. The fieldesearch provided additional sources of information for the datacollation and analysis, and explored key policy and programmingquestions with field-based personnel. The primary sourcedocumentation and literature review and HQ-based interviewsundertaken to complement the data analysis and fieldwork, and provided historical background, organisation-specificdevelopments and independent perspectives on changes in theerall security context for aid operations over the last decade.In this report, the term aid workeris used to describepersonnel working for humanitarian or multi-mandated aidagencies that operate in humanitarian relief contexts. Theterm humanitarian operationsis used to define the workprimarily being implemented in relief contexts, including life-saving, basic welfare and protection-related activities.The study constructed a global dataset of major incidents ofviolence affecting aid workers from 1997 to 2005. Using thisdata, it identified trends and correlating factors in theincidence, targeting and tactics of violence againsthumanitarian actors in various contexts. (This subsection andthe next describe in detail how the quantitative data wasgathered and analysed. Casual readers may prefer to skip toData sourcesIncident data was drawn from public sources and augmentedinternal organisational information provided to the study.evious compilations and chronologies of incidents provideda helpful starting point. One such contribution to this area ofesearch was made by Dennis King. As a consultant to theOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),King compiled a chronology of aid worker casualties (King,2002 and 2004) from 1997…2004, based on news and agencyeports collated from ReliefWeb,the worlds largestcentralised compilation of international news and organis-ational reports on humanitarian matters. The US StateDepartment also chronicles violence against aid workerswithin broader reports such as atterns of Global Terrorism(US Department of State, 2005a), and in the countrychronologies in the annual Country Reports on Human RightsPrac(US Department of State, 2005b). Additional lists ofaid worker fatalities, kidnaps and injuries were provided inDSS reports and other UN documents. Incident data wasassembled from these compendia, and sources wereindependently researched for cross-checking purposes. ther incidents were identified via web searches ofinternational wire services and news agencies, in local mediaports from the countries of occurrence and in the publishedports of aid organisations. Internal reports made availableto the project by aid organisations were also used. The studysesearchers also cross-checked the data with UNDSS incidenteports, local coordination mechanisms such as theAfghanistan Non Governmental Organisation Safety Office(ANSO) in Kabul, and Humanitarian Information Centres(HICs). Finally, information on additional incidents and specificdetails from six of the highest-incident countries or regions …Somalia and Somaliland, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Chechnya and theNorth Caucasus … was gathered by the projects fieldesearchers, described in section 1.3.3.The incident data was compiled for the years 1997…2005. Foreach incident, the dataset recorded the number of aid workersaffected (victims); their institutional affiliation (UN/RedCross/NGO/other (donor government, international financialkidnapped); the method of violenceused (ambush, armedincident took place. Where available, the motive for theincident was also recorded, although this was only possiblemore detail on motives).able 1 describes the parameters for the study, and defines theThe following types of incident were not included in the dataset:1.Rape. While it is well known that rape against humani-tarian staff in the field occurs, the research found very feweports explicitly citing rape or sexual assault. It isassumed, based on our reading of incident reports, thatthe stigmatising nature of the crime means that a certainnumber of these incidents went unreported, while otherseported simply as assaults. For these reasons, thisparticular type of major violent incident was not includedas a separate category of incident outcome or tactic. In thecases where a rape is specified in the incident report, 4 The ReliefWeb site is managed by the UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA): Recognizing how critical the availability ofeliable and timely information in time of humanitarian emergencies is, theGeneral Assembly endorsed the creation of ReliefWeb and encouragedhumanitarian information exchange through ReliefWeb by all governments,elief agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Resolution51/194 on 10 February 1997, www.reliefweb.int/rw/hlp.nsf/db900ByKey/AboutReliefWeb. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 5 6 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT Table 1: Categories and terms used in the dataset ictim-descriptive dataAid workers are defined as personnel attached to humanitarian or multi-mandated aidagencies and NGOs that operate in humanitarian relief contexts.Political and human rights workers and peacekeeping personnel are not included.ersonnel of commercial contractors are included if they were subcontracted by anagency providing emergency relief (such as private contractors delivering food for WFP),but not if they were working on reconstruction projects. Organisation… UN agencies and offices that engage in field-level humanitarian assistance,defined as agencies belonging to the IASC,plus IOM and UNRWA.ICRC… international and national staff of the ICRC.… national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and IFRC international delegates.… international and national/local NGOs that deliver services in humanitariancontexts. Incidents against staff of these organisations were included regardless ofwhether they occurred in a humanitarianor a developmentcontext. ype of staff… expatriate staff working in the field for international organisations.… includes both national staff of international organisations and aidworkers working for local organisations. Incident-descriptive dataThe nature of the violence in terms of its outcome for the victim:… held for at least 24 hours. If a victim was killed in the course of akidnapping, the incident is entered as a killing, not a kidnapping.… injuries sustained from intentional violence including landmines. The means or tactics used in the commission of the violent act have been divided intofive categories:… includes pedestrian…vehicle or vehicle…vehicle attack on roads.… attack by an armed group on a home, office or project site.Includes attacks with sticks, clubs, etc.Aerial bombardment… this category includes surface-to-air attacks on planes.… does not include de-miners killed by accidental detonations in theinclude personnel killed in the course of a robbery.Context-descriptive dataolitical environment of country/The types of political environment in which these incidents occurred were consideredemergency caseimportant in analysing which contexts may be more dangerous for aid workers. Contexts were:Inter-state war.Civil war, or ethno-nationalist/religious warfare (1,000 battle-related deaths/year).Civil violence: intermediate-level intensity (1,000 battle-related deaths/year).-level civil violence (25 deaths/year, but 1,000 over the course of the conflict).No active conflict/limited violence (can include development or transitionalscenarios, or a temporary lull).esence of a UN-sanctioned peacekeeping or peace-support mission.sence of a transnational terrorist organisation/cell. Military intervention by foreign forces of the same region.Military intervention by foreign forces of one or more great power countries.esence of armed groups: warlords/militias/insurgents.Use of integrated mission approach by the UN. 5 The full members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee onHumanitarian Affairs are FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFPand WHO.6 These classifications of violence levels are used by the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Uppsala Conflict Dataogram (UCDP). Armed conflict information by country is available atwww.sipri.org. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 6 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT the victim is counted as woundedin the outcomeDetention/harassment/threats. It is an unfortunate realityof humanitarian work that, in some environments, beingdetained or harassed at borders and checkpoints is a regularoccurrence. Verbal and written threats may also becommonplace. Arrests by officials, even if legally suspectand protracted, were not counted unless the arrestedperson was physically brutalised. (To be counted as akidnapping, the victim had to have been forcibly taken ordetained by a non-state actor and held for at least 24 hours.)Although many field reporting systems rightly track theseincidents for the purpose of mapping trends, they falloutside this studys focus on acts of major violence, and soare not included unless they resulted in physical injury. Mugging, robbery, looting, banditry, car-jacking,occurred as a result of these criminal acts, they were notTimeframeThe year 1997 was used as a starting point for data collectionprimarily for reasons of thoroughness and availability of data.eliefWeb was launched in October 1996 and, although itcontains some documents and records dating as far back as1981, it was not until after 1997 that it actively sought andobtained widespread contributions by governments,agencies, NGOs and media sources (including locally basedmedia in recipient countries). In addition, it is generally agreedthat reporting and record-keeping on security incidents, thenas now a highly sensitive issue, was scanty and uneven acrosssecurity and security coordination became an organisationalpriority.Setting the start of the timeline in the late 1990s has theadditional advantage of denominator comparability. Thepopulation explosionof aid agencies in complex politicalemergencies following the Cold War had already occurred, soincident data trends would not be as skewed by thisexponential jump in the number of aid workers in the field.How to measure relative risk: the challenge of getting the aidThis study represents the first formal attempt to calculate anincidence rate for violence against aid workers by comparingworkers in the field … a measure that has proved elusive. Otherstudies have also noted this as the principal missingcomponent in any comprehensive analysis.arriving at a valid denominator is why past studies have usedsample groups of self-selecting organisations, or have simplynoted the impossibility of calculating rates.describes the process by which we arrived at an estimate ofthe number of aid workers in the field for each year during thetime period … a figure that, by our calculations, has grown by77% from 1997 to 2005.As the first step, the study set out to construct a measure ofthe humanitarian footprintby mapping the aid agenciesoperational in humanitarian contexts from the UN system, thed Cross/Red Crescent movement and the international NGOcommunity. Aid agencies were then asked to provide thenumber of field personnel employed, disaggregated betweeninternational and national staff, for each year from 1997 to thepresent. Different methods used to count staff were acceptedas long as an organisations counting method was consistentOf the ten UN aid agencies consulted, five (the Food andAgriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Organisationfor Migration (IOM), OCHA, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA)and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees(UNRWA)) were able to provide full disaggregated staffingdata for all or most years. Three others (the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Childrens Fund(UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP)) were able toprovide partial data, while the remaining two agencies (therld Health Organisation (WHO) and the UN Developmentogramme (UNDP)) were unable to provide data for morethan two years. The ICRC provided full, disaggregated figuresfor all years, while the International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the national societies ofthe Red Cross and Red Crescent produced only minimal data.compile the total list of international NGOs engaged inhumanitarian response, the project consulted the membershipof the major consortia (InterAction, the International Council ofoluntary Agencies (ICVA) and the Steering Committee for 7 The lack of reporting on this type of violent act speaks to the largerproblem of sexually-based violence in the operational context. The threat ofape still receives little or no attention in most security assessments. Thecombination of a culture of stigmatisation and silence around the issue, andthe fact that the vast majority of security personnel in the field are male, hasesulted in dangerous ignorance and under-attention to a problem whichthe aid community is only just beginning to address (interviews with UNDSSand agency staff, 2006). 8 Sheik (2000) reports: Without denominators for field staff … which feworganisations could provide … we could not calculate risks or rates, makingit difficult to ascribe the increased number of deaths to increased risks.Similarly, Van Brabant (2000) notes that that: There can be no valid trendanalysis without a determined populationŽ (denominator): in other words,need to know the (changing) population of aid workers over time, perorganization, and across the sector, in order to see whether the number ofaid workers injured or killed by manmade violence/1000 aid workersincreases or decreases. 9 One notable exception is a PhD dissertation by Marianne Abbott of Ohiotate University, entitled Dangerous Intervention: An Analysis ofHumanitarian Fatalities in Assistance Contexts(2006). Abbott uses UNHCRdata on the number of IDPs in a given context as a proxy measure toestimate the number of aid workers present. While an innovative approach,this assumes that the size of the aid worker presence correlates with levelsof need, which past experience does not support. A more accurate proxy, inour estimation, may be donor funding levels, and these are included as apartial factor in the proxy calculations this study made for aid workerpresence in specific countries. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 7 8 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTHumanitarian Response (SCHR)), WFPs list of 257 NGO partnersand the rosters of USAIDs NGO grant recipients. The NGOs weredivided into five tiers based on their annual overseas programmeexpenditures.The first tier includes the largest and most ubi-quitous actors, with overseas programme budgets of over$200m (World Vision International, CARE International, Save theChildren Federation, Oxfam International, Catholic Relief Ser-vices and all sections of Médecins Sans Frontières). The secondcontains those with budgets between $100m and $200m, thethird $50m…$100m, the fourth $5…$50m and the fifth under $5m.Because some small international NGOs have come and goneagencies in the fourth and fifth tiers. However, their small size(with staff numbering in the hundreds or smaller) means thatthis should not significantly affect the overall denominator,which is in the hundreds of thousands. Additionally, some of theinternational NGOs (mainly in the fourth and fifth tiers) use onlylimited direct hires, and programme much of their expenditurethrough local NGO partners. By including the local NGOpersonnel whose positions would be funded through subgrantsand partnerships with international NGOs, this formula helpedthe calculations to arrive at a closer estimate of the actualhumanitarian presence worldwide. This was crucial because it isoutside the scope of this study to map the vast array of localNGOs operating in emergencies over the time period, much lessobtain staffing figures for them.A total of 54 international NGOs were originally consulted forstaffing figures.Of these, 15 provided full disaggregatedstaffing data for all or most years; 15 provided partial data; andthe remaining 24 provided data for two years or less. Sevenorganisations specifically confirmed that they did not keepstaffing records for more than two years prior: Save the ChildrenK, CARE US, the American Refugee Committee, Médecins duMonde, Action Aid, CHF International and Islamic Relief. Severalof these organisations indicated that they were upgrading theirhuman resource systems to address this problem.In total, 66 organisations were queried. Of these, only 32%able to provide full, disaggregated data for all or mostears; 26% provided partial data and 41% provided only veryminimal figures.Using this data, the missing figures were imputed through thefollowing method of systematic inferencing. For organisationswhere staffing numbers were available for some but not allears, the project calculated the ratio of their overseasprogramme expenditure to their field staff numbers for thears where the data was on record, and used that ratio to fillin the missing years for that organisation. (To get a breakdownof international versus national staff, we used the averagepercentage of internationals in that organisations datahistory.) For organisations where no staff numbers wereavailable for any of the years, an average expenditure-to-staffing ratio was applied based on the ratios of the otherorganisations in that tier for each year.alid estimate of employees and volunteers working for theRC and the numerous national Red Cross/Red Crescentsocieties. For this reason, the aid worker denominatorcomprises UN, ICRC and NGO numbers only. When incidentnumbers were measured against this figure to calculate rates,excluded incidents involving national Red Cross/RedCrescent workers. worker population (excluding IFRC and national Red Cross andd Crescent workers) had grown by 77%, from 136,204 in1997 to 241,654 by 2005.Agencies were also asked to provide their field staff figures forthe six cases examined: Afghanistan, Chechnya, the DRC, Iraq,Somalia and Somaliland and Sudan. However, the percentageof agency HQs able to provide these numbers was even lowerthan the small percentage that could provide the global figures. The agency-provided information was supplemented by thestudys field researchers, who relayed the figures they hadcollected and advised on potential sources for country-wideThe bulk of the remaining research wasaimed at gathering staffing figures directly from the in-countryoffices of selected UN agencies, NGOs and the IFRC andnational societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The staffnumbers for those organisations that provided data for all ormost of the years 1997…2005 were added together to producea sample of the aid worker population for each country. As a complement to the aid worker sample, total aid flows toeach of the six case studies for each year between 1997 and2005 were collected from the UN Financial Tracking System(FTS), including funds from consolidated appeals and fromoutside of the consolidated appeals process, and from the 10 Overseas expenditure figures were compiled from agenciesannualeports and USAID VolAg Reports. The figures were converted into 2004 USdollars and adjusted for inflation using an average annual US inflation rateof 2.4% for the years 1997 to 2004, as provided by the Consumer Price Indexof the US Bureau of Labor. 11 The final list of organisations used to approximate the total NGO footprintdiffered from this original list, however, because the decision to use budgetfigures to approximate staff sizes dictated a different and morecomprehensive selection of NGOs.12 Collecting and maintaining this information appears to present severalchallenges. Most organisations implement short-term projects andexperience high staff turnover, making staff numbers volatile over time anddifficult to estimate at any one time. We found a lack of centralised staffingecords, so that even if information was collected for previous years, it isoften not readily available today. Second, national staff are usually hired andmanaged by country offices, without the requirement that figures beeported to HQ. Third, organisations have little incentive to collect suchinformation, given that it is not explicitly required in reports to donors, themedia or the general public, and given the many other urgent priorities.13 Sources included government bodies, field representatives of OCHA,DSS and UN peacekeeping or assistance missions, as well as other aidcoordination bodies and independent research organisations in-country. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 8 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTDevelopment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD,including Emergency and Food Aid given by DAC countries andtotal ODA from all donors. Although both of these sources areincomplete, they provide in some places a helpful sense of theelative scale of aid operations, and this was used tocomplement the sample of actual staff numbers.small sample size and possible selection bias), the sample ofaid worker numbers was deemed reliable enough toapproximate the general trends in the aid worker populationer the time period.1.3.2 Regression analysisHaving obtained incident rates for the types of personnel andorganisations in the most violent contexts for aid workers(Afghanistan, Chechnya/North Caucasus, DRC, Iraq, Somaliaand Sudan), regressions were run on statistical software tocorrelations between these rates and the presence of politicaland conflict variables in these cases. For each regression, thedependent variable used was the year-to-year percentageariables were the presence/absence of political andcontextual factors as listed in Table 1, above. (See Annex 2:sults of regression analysis, page 59.) 1.3.3 Field researchThe six case studies were chosen based on an early analysis ofthe available data. The field research allowed for in-depthanalysis of the environment for aid programming and thebehaviour and practice of the operational agencies inadapting to changes in the security context. In particular, thecase studies allowed for a detailed exploration of the role localaid actors play in service delivery strategies wheninternational actors shift to remote management approaches.This involved looking at the programming and securitystrategies, arrangements and resources of the local NGOsengaged in humanitarian assistance, and how these aresupported by international entities.The choice of case studies also allowed for a cross-checking ofthe incident data through interviews and documentary review,thereby capturing additional, non-reported incidents. Thisesulted in a deeper analysis of the motives and circumstancessurrounding incidents of violence, in particular in determiningwhether victims were targeted primarily because they were aidworkers (or working for a particular aid agency), whether thiswas an associated motivation, whether there were economicconsiderations, whether the involvement of the aid worker waspurely incidental, for instance if they were caught in cross-fire,or if they were targeted for personal reasons.our background papers have been published from the fieldwork, covering Afghanistan, Chechnya and the NorthCaucasus, Iraq and Somalia and Somaliland. These can befound on the HPG website (www.odi.org.uk/hpg).1.3.4 Primary source documentation and literature reviewThe study examined primary and secondary material in sixmain areas:ast and current agency security practice, including policydocuments, guidelines, manuals and training materials.The evolution of UN security reform, including UN GeneralAssembly and Security Council resolutions, official reportson security and agency security materials.ends in local capacity-building and partnership efforts inconflict environments.Academic studies of aid worker security. Background literature on the changing security context,including the global war on terror, counter-terrorism, theimpact of UN integrated missions and civil…military relations.Country-specific studies and reports. 1.3.5 InterviewsAltogether, the study undertook over 350 semi-structuredinterviews with policy-makers and practitioners from the securityand aid sectors. Approximately 65 interviews were conductedwith personnel in headquarters, and the remainder were field-based. UNDSS provided the research team with particularsupport and granted full access to all relevant UNDSSheadquarters-based staff. The study researchers alsointerviewed UN agency, NGO, Red Cross/Red Crescent and donorepresentatives. Within the six case studies, approximately 250field staff were interviewed in capitals and in the operationalegions. Interviewees included UN officials, international NGOstaff, inter-agency representatives, staff from local NGOs, privatesecurity contractors and government officials.1.4 Related studiesrior studies have used different slices of the incident data toanalyse the issue of aid worker risk. Perhaps the mostfrequently cited source, an article in the Johns Hopkins researcher Mani Sheik andcolleagues entitled Deaths Among Humanitarian Workers,was published in 2000. This study looks exclusively atfatalities, using voluntarily supplied information on deaths ofstaff of the UN and NGOs in the 14 years between 1985 andmissions. It compares deaths by violence against other typesof fatalities, such as accidents and illness. This study usedSheiks baseline for aid worker fatalities to compare againstthe later time period, showing a considerable increase fromthe period 1985…1998 to 1997…2005. However, this increasemay be exaggerated due to incomplete data in the earlierstudy. As Sheik acknowledged: Some organisations had nodeaths or kept no records of deaths or their circumstances.Overall, 32organisations and their affiliates provided data,with only three declining. Incomplete data notwithstanding, HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 9 10 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTthe Sheik study provides some interesting findings, includingthat most deaths were due to intentional violence caused byguns or other weapons, and that many deaths were linked tobanditry. In addition, One third of deaths occurred in the first90days of service, with 17% dying within the first 30days; thetiming of death was unrelated to previous field experience.A study by another Johns Hopkins researcher, Elizabeth Rowley,evacuations provided by a sample group of 20 internationalNGOs between September 2002 and December 2005 (Rowley,2005). Key findings from this study include the fact that over60% of aid worker fatalities were the result of intentionalviolence, rather than accidents or illness. The Rowley studyplaces intentional violence in a broader context of potential riskfactors, allowing us to compare risk rates with other professions.Cate Buchanan and Robert Muggah of the Small Arms Surveyhave examined violence against aid workers via an analysis ofeapons availability and misuse (Buchanan and Muggah,2005). Their research focused on 96 countries in SoutheastAsia, the Balkans, the Great Lakes and the Middle East, andanalysed responses from over 2,000 questionnaires from UNstudy drew conclusions about the rate at which humanitarianpersonnel have experienced security incidents, these findingslimited (for this studys purposes) by the size andepresentativeness of the sample, and by the short timeperiod covered (2003…2004).1.5 Structure of the reportThe structure of this report mirrors the line of inquiry taken bythe research project. Chapter 2 begins with a presentation ofthe quantitative data on security incidents and risk in order toprovide a clearer picture of current trends and a point ofdeparture for policy analysis. Chapter 3 examines the securitypolicy response by aid organisations to the securityenvironment, and how policy developments in different partsof the humanitarian system relate to each other. Chapter 4addresses the implications of security risk and response onthe delivery of aid and access to needy populations, analysingin particular the effects on the role of local organisations andother entities. Chapter 5 presents summary conclusions and aseries of recommendations for institutional actors andproviding security for aid efforts.Arguably, a study on the issue of aid worker security misses thelarger point. If aid workers are in danger of growing violence andimpunity, the argument holds, the primary concern must be forthe civilians that the aid workers are there to assist, who aresurely facing the same or greater risks. The study is aware ofimportant work examining levels of violence and efforts toprotect civilians, and considers that this report serves as acomplement to those findings. It also takes the view that, whilstaid organisations have an important role to play in protection, itis a necessarily limited one given their mandate and capacities.Any progress in this area will require the joint efforts ofhumanitarian, human rights and political and military actors, asthe current responsibility to protectprocess reflects (UNSecurity Council, 2006; UN OCHA, 2004b). Furthermore, whilethe above assumption regarding the correlation between aidworker and civilian risks may hold true in certain cases, our datahas revealed some important divergences between the level oferall violence in a given environment and the incidence ofattacks on aid workers. The available data shows that there isno direct correlation in the six most dangerous contextsbetween battle-related deaths (many of them civilian) andviolence against aid workers. It is suggested here, however, thatcertain methods, principles and lessons in operational securitycan translate into and inform civilian protection efforts. Perhapsmost importantly, as this study shows in Chapters 3 and 4, highinsecurity for aid workers can drastically reduce the amount andquality of aid provided to civilians. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 10 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT This chapter presents the findings of the studys statisticalsurvey of violence against aid workers from 1997 to 2005. Thekidnappings and armed attacks against aid workers during thenine-year period. It also calculated an estimate of thedenominator, or number of aid workers in the field, whichallowed for an analysis of relative as well as absolute trends.The statistical analysis of this data has yielded the following2.1 Overall findings In line with the general perception, violent incidents involving aidworkers have indeed risen sharply … nearly doubled … over thepast decade. However, the study found that the population of aidperiod, with the result that the relative incidence of violence roseonly by a small amount (an average of five aid worker victims perin the second). In the most dangerous contexts, moreover, theerall incident rate per staff member decreased over the timeperiod. In other words, even as incident numbers in thesecontexts were rising, they were being outstripped by the numberof new field staff positions being deployed.oublingly, however, the benefit of decreased risk in thesecontexts appears to be accruing to international staff only.National staff, who already constitute the bulk of victims inabsolute terms, face increasing relative risk from year to year inthe areas with the highest number of violent incidents againstaid workers (Afghanistan, Chechnya, DRC, Iraq, Somalia andcontexts. The statistical analysis points overwhelmingly to theconclusion that aid work is becoming increasingly dangerous fornational staff, and safer for international staff.Another divergence in risk appears between types ofinstitutions. UN and ICRC aid workers have in the past fewears seen a decrease in major violent incidents, while NGOstaffers have endured increasing numbers of these incidentsin absolute, relative and proportional terms. Finally, the study found that aid worker violence does notcorrelate with the nature or intensity of the conflict.Surprisingly, statistical regressions of the incident data showthe most dangerous operational environments for aid workersare not those with the highest level of overall violence, asmeasured by conflict-related deaths per year. Incidents againstinternational staff in fact show a slight increased risk in areaswhere there is no active conflict, and where a UN-sanctionedpeacekeeping force is present, possibly indicating a sense ofincreased security leading to freer movement and possibly lessvigilant security measures. Nonetheless, violence against aidworkers is not random, but overwhelmingly directly targeted …and increasingly politically motivated. The study found thatviolent acts with political motivations rose during the timeperiod, exceeding the increase in (purely) economicallymotivated incidents by a factor of nine. Measuring insecurity: quantitative analysis ofviolence against civilian aid operationsable 2: Yearly breakdown of incidents earTotalTotal aid UNICRCIFRCNGODonor/otherKilledWoundedKidnappedNatlIntlincidentsworker347726910311398324334 2669242651403615185415 316616843802915204125 4194311005125825117420 2994281135202720476628 478817755813823257315 200362145318 208608649811827 6614018011107460552410931 721742445139261951715915 otals408947*215836357610434305202737210* The figure of 947 includes those killed in the bombing of the UNs Baghdad headquarters in August 2003, but not the estimated150 people injuredin that incident. Records are insufficient to determine the number and affiliation of the injured. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 11 12 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT2.2 Global trends in violence against aid workersBetween 1997 and 2005 the dataset recorded 408 separatekidnappings and armed attacks resulting in serious injuries),The global figures for both incidents and victims appear toshow a steep upward trend during the nine-year time period inabsolute terms, with a 71% increase in the number of victimsand a 92% increase in average violent incidents between thefirst half of the period and the second.taff members of NGOs constitute the largest share of thevictims of violent incidents in absolute terms, at 60%. Personnelof UN aid agencies represent the second-largest portion (23%),followed by Red Cross workers at 16% (9% ICRC staff and 7%RC and national Red Cross/Red Crescent society workers). Theagencies and other entities (e.g. the World Bank).Among aid worker victims, UN and ICRC staff represented adecreasing share of total victims in absolute terms, falling10% and 63% respectively from 1997…2001 to2002…2005. The share of NGO and national Red Cross anded Crescent society worker victims, on the other hand,increased by 161% and 133%. When comparing theincidence rates between institution types, this divergence isless dramatic but still observable. While UN humanitarianand ICRC personnel once constituted the highestpercentage of victims per staff member in the field, the pastfew years have seen a decrease in violent attacks againstthese groups. NGO staff, on the other hand, account for anincreasing number of these incidents in absolute, relativeand proportional terms.Possible explanations for the divergence include, in the firstinstance, a transition period after the bombings in Iraq in 2003,during which both the UN and the ICRC displayed a heightenedconservatism and a more risk-averse approach to operations.In the case of the UN, this refers to the 17 months after thebombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003,and before UNDSS was established in December 2004. The Figure 1: Trend in absolute numbers of incidents: 1997…2005 Figure 2: Casualty percentages by institution type, 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005UN ICRC 9%IFRC 7% HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 12 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT ICRC also went through what some have called a period ofhibernation, during which it held a far-reaching organisationaldiscussion about next steps. After this transition period,agencies in the UN system displayed increased securityawareness and enhanced adherence to pre-existing securityprotocols and policies, and this may have prevented incidentsor reduced risk to UN personnel. Another factor could be theincreased numbers of NGO operations in high-risk areasfollowing the spike in humanitarian crises and funding in thepast few years, including in contexts such as Darfur andAfghanistan. Finally, the shifting proportions raise the questionof whether a process of cascading vulnerabilityis at work.Many respondents interviewed for this study noted thisphenomenon, whereby when one potential object of violencehardens the target by visibly increasing its protective ordeterrent measures, others become more vulnerable. In certaincases, where international aid entities of all stripes may betargeted for their assets, for their perceived association withpolitical actors or agendas, or for symbolic reasons, it isbelieved that cascading vulnerability has taken place.2.2.2 Increase in fatalities All told, a reported 434 aid workers lost their lives to violenceduring the period 1997…2005, closely approaching the total ofpeacekeeping troops killed in action during the sameComparisons of the data for this time period against the previousdecade must be made with caution, given the widely acknow-ledged improvement in reporting over the past several years, butthe study by Sheik et al. offers perhaps the best availablebaseline. Sheik tallies a total of 375 deaths between 1985 and1998. Excluding non-humanitarian personnel (peacekeepers)and accidental deaths from Sheiks data gives a figure of 208 aidworkers killed, or an average of 12 fatalities per year for the yearsIn comparison, this studys data reveals an averageof 48 aid workers killed each year during 1997…2005.thermore, fatalities show an upward trend during the timeperiod, with the annual average rising from 38 (1997…2001) to 61(2002…2005), or an average percentage change of 62%.2.2.3 Increase in wounded/injuredThe study also counted victims who were seriously injured byviolent acts, meaning they were shot, stabbed or otherwiseassaulted badly enough to require medical treatment. Thenumber of wounded includes survivors of landmines andimprovised explosive devices (IEDs) (except staff of de-miningagencies killed in accidental detonations), as well as thosebeaten outside the context of a kidnapping. Victims who werebeaten or tortured while in captivity are counted askidnapped, not wounded. As mentioned, rape victims … inthose cases where the rape was explicitly reported … are alsocounted under the wounded category. Figure 3: Trends in casualty rates by institution, 1997…2005 14 The number of military and military observer troops killed by maliciousacts between 1997 and 2005 was provided by the UN Department ofeacekeeping Operations (unpublished source). 15 According to Sheik, between 1985 and 1998 slightly less than 50% of allhumanitarian workers killed were in UN programmes. A quarter were UN ICRCictims per 10,000 field staff1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 13 Not counting the estimated 150 people injured as a result of thebombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, 305 aid workersseriously hurt in deliberate violence during the time period.The smaller number of serious injuries compared with fatalitiescan be explained by the effectiveness of deliberate, targetedviolence or, perhaps more likely, by the fact that a wounding wasless likely to be reported than a fatality. According to theavailable data, however, serious injuries increased by 234% from2.2.4 Decrease in kidnappings/hostage-takingThe one outcome that shows a decrease from the first half of theperiod to the second was kidnapping. The dataset recordedkidnaps as cases where staff members were forcibly taken ordetained by non-official entities and held for more than 24hours, with the ultimate outcome being release or escape.Cases that ended in the killing of the abductee were counted asfatalities, not kidnappings. This category of incident fluctuatedkidnapped), but on average appears to be on a downwardtrend. On average, 28% fewer non-fatal kidnappings occurred inAccording to the data, the highest number of kidnappings waseported in Somalia, Sudan and the Chechnya/NorthCaucasus region. This form of violence appears to be favouredin certain contexts and locations. Over 80% of the kidnappingsduring the time period took place in just eight countries oregions, as shown in Table 3.kidnappings seem to be declining globally. The 28% decreasein kidnappings from the first half of the time period to thesecond seems particularly striking given that the numbers ofthose killed increased by 62% and those wounded by 234%,even when the Baghdad bombing injuries are excluded.Overall, internationals were ten times more likely to be2.2.5 Trends in methods/tacticsAmbushes at road blocks, firing on vehicles, banditry, car-jackings and other targeting of staff on the road remained byworkers. Both the proportion of this mode of attack comparedto others (44%) and its rate of increase from the first to thesecond half of the period (110%) indicate clearly just howexposed and vulnerable aid personnel and assets are while intransit. This was not, however, the fastest-growing method ofchoice among attackers. Armed incursions into organisations 14 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT Figure 4: Global trend in kidnappings, 1997…2005 able 3: Areas of highest aid worker abductions,Country/regionAid workers kidnappedPeak years Somalia421997, 2001 Sudan272004 Chechnya/251997, 2002 North Caucasusajikistan221997, 2001 Burundi122001 Iraq92004 Liberia81999 16 Excluding IFRC and national Red Cross/Red Crescent incidents (for whichdo not have staffing numbers to calculate rates), the dataset records 92time period. Measured against their average representation in the fieldduring those years (est. 156,928 nationals and 16,847 internationals) thisyields a rate of 0.6% international staff kidnappings as compared to 0.06%for national staff. Aid workers kidnapped1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 14 offices and residences, often culminating in lethal violence,grew at a greater rate than any other form of violence, by256% from the first half of the time period to the second.2.3 Relative rates of risk and case-specific findingsWhen the number of aid worker victims is compared againstthe number of aid workers in the field, a much more complexpicture emerges. By arriving at a reasonable estimate of theaid worker population, the study was able to calculate rates ofthe field, for each of the nine years. When compared againstthe growing number of aid workers operating in the fieldglobally, the incidence of violence is still seen to have risen,but the increase is far less precipitous. Taking the totalnumber of UN, ICRC and NGO victims for each year against theestimated combined field staff numbers for those institutionsyields an average annual incidence rate of five victims perrising to an average of six per 10,000 in the second. Thisamounts to a percentage change of 22% as opposed to thenear-doubling (92% change) of incidents in absolute terms.2.3.1 Estimating the global aid worker denominatorEmploying the methodology described in section 1.3.1, thestudy arrived at a global estimate for the number of field- viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT Box 1: Defining risk and threat organisation or assets) is a factor of the specific threats in theenvironment (for instance bandits or hostile militia groups) andones vulnerability/exposure to those threats. Some definitionsalso include the cost or consequences of the potential threat asfollows: Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x ConsequencesThreats are considered to be outside an agencys or individualscontrol, but risk can be reduced by specific behaviour (such asnot travelling at night) or inputs (comprehensive training forstaff or armoured vehicles) that reduce ones vulnerability.aced with evidence of a high or rising number of incidentsper field staff member, we say that a particular institution ortype of staff member is at riskor is facing increasing risk.different threats in some contexts, our analysis has shownthat nationals are being placed at risk, as evidenced by theirincidence rates.or further discussion of these concepts, see Van Brabant(2000) and ECHO (2004). Figure 5: Trends in tactics, 1997…2005 17 While both the relative and absolute figures increased, and the relativefigures increased much less than the absolute ones, it should be noted thatwords, it is possible that both increases are due to random variation eachear, rather than being indicative of an actual increase over the nine-yearperiod. Because of the wide variation in the numbers of incidents that occurear-to-year, it is particularly difficult to conclude that either the absolute orelative figures have definitively increased. However, it is clear that, from1997 to 2005, the relative rate grew much less sharply than the absolutenumber of incidents. 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Ambushes Armed incursions Landmines Individual attacks HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 15 16 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTbased aid workers from the UN humanitarian agencies, theICRC, and international NGOs as follows. These figures show amarked increase in the number of aid personnel overall, rising77% from 1997 to 2005. More specifically, NGOs were found tohave grown at 91% over the nine year period, while the UNexperienced an overall growth of only 54%. This large overallincrease in the number of aid workers, as well as the increasein NGOs relative to the UN, has important policy implicationsnot just for security but for a variety of other issues related to Figure 6: Trend in overall incidence: victims per 10,000 aid workers in the field Figure 7: The estimated global aid worker denominator ble 4: The estimated global aid worker denominator199719981999200020012002200320042005% change46,30548,67650,50153,25455,57760,67364,18166,25571,13654% ICRC8,8998,4079,44211,05110,47610,848 11,63612,44915,51874% 81,00086,00088,000110,000111,000116,000123,000140,000155,00091% otal136,204143,083147,943174,305177,053187,521198,817218,704241,65477% ictims per 10,000 field staff1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005ICRCTotal1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 16 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT It was not possible to arrive at a reasonable estimate of IFRCand national Red Cross/Red Crescent society workers; thus,when incidence rates were calculated, incidents affecting IFRCand Red Cross/Red Crescent staff members were excluded.The INGO figures have been rounded to the nearest thousandbecause of the process of systematic inference from budgetfigures that was employed, as described in section 1.3.1.Because of the approach used, it was not possible to calculateeliable confidence intervals around these point figures, butthese figures should be understood as reasonable estimates,ather than precise figures.2.3.2 The risk picture in the most insecure environmentsSome observers have suspected that the two cases ofAfghanistan and Iraq, which experienced a spike in incidentsafter 2001 and 2003 respectively, may have skewedperceptions about aid worker security globally. Indeed, whencontrolling for these two cases, the number of incidentsworldwide is seen to fall slightly (-0.2% change from year toear). However, while Afghanistan and Iraq certainlythe time period, particularly in 2003 and 2004, they are by nomeans the only drivers, and similar results could have beenachieved by controlling for any two other cases within thehighest risk category during this time period. Somalia remainsthe most violent context for aid operations in terms of totalnumber of incidents and in incidents relative to staffingnumbers in the field (with the exception of Iraq 2003…2004),followed by Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq. The other highest-incident regions or countries from 1997…2005 were Chechnya/North Caucasus, the DRC, Burundi, Angola, Rwanda and Sierraooking at the highest-incident environments (Afghanistan,Chechnya/North Caucasus, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia andSudan), the number of incidents per staff member actuallyent down each year during the time period. In other words,the total number of staff members deployed in field positionsin these dangerous environments grew faster than incidents ofenjoyed exclusively by international staff. When the data isdisaggregated, one sees that the incident per staff memberatio grows for national staff, while it shrinks forinternationals. The annual net percentage change in thenumber of international staff victims relative to the aid workerpopulation in the field stands at …41%. This diminishingnumber of international staff victims (again, relative to theestimated aid worker denominator in these cases) contrastswith an annual net percentage increase of 108% for nationalFigure 10 (overleaf) shows the differing incidence rates fornational and international staff. While the average rate isstill higher for international staff, the national incidenceate appears to be growing, while that for internationals isstable or decreasing.The study set out to examine whether there was a causalelationship between the level of violence against aid workers and the following variables: intensity of the conflict based on the number of battle-related deaths Figure 8: Countries/regions with the highest number of major security incidents, 1997…2005IraqNorth CaucasusDRCSierra Leone HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 17 18 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT per year;and the presence of certain conflict parties orstrategic approach, including UN peacekeeping forces, globalterrorist movement cells, regional force intervention, a forceintervention by a Security Council Permanent Member and theuse by the UN of an integrated mission approach.The incident data in the six cases was analysed in this way.When regressions were first run using country data onstaffing numbers, it appeared that one or two of theindependent variables had significant correlations with Figure 9: Absolute number of national and international staff victims globally Figure 10: National and international staff victims globally relative to their presence in the field 18 The project uses the measures employed by Uppsala Conflict Data Program,defined as follows: Battle-related deaths refer to those deaths caused by thewarring parties that can be directly related to combat over the contestedincompatibility. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities(e.g. hit-and-run attacks/ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of militarybases, cities and villages etc. Urban warfare (bombs, explosions, andassassinations) does not resemble what happens on a battlefield, but suchdeaths are considered to be battle-related ƒ Battle-related deaths, whichconcern direct deaths, are not the same as war-related deathsboth direct as well as indirect deaths due to disease and starvation, criminality,or attacks deliberately directed against civilians only (one-sided violence)(Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2006). Number of victims per 10,000 field staff1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Natl staffIntl staff1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 National staff International staff HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 18 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT violence against aid workers. However, when the estimatedpercentage change of the size of the aid worker populationwas considered, these correlations disappeared. In fact, oneof the most robust findings of the regression analysis is thatthese variables had no statistically significant impact on aidworker violence. It is safe to say that these variables are notimportant determinants of violence against humanitarian aidworkers in these six cases. The one slight exception seems tobe the presence of UN peacekeeping missions or UN-sanctioned peace support operations. Where this variable waspresent, we saw a slight, but statistically significant, increaseSeveral conclusions may be drawn from the above. First, ahigher level of violence/intensity of conflict does not seem tocorrelate with higher numbers of aid workers attacked. Rather,one most likely sees a defensive reaction in these conflictenvironments that appears to reduce exposure and/ormitigate the threat. The fact that internationals become moreexposed to violence when a peacekeeping or peace-supportforce is present (while incidents against nationals decline) islikely to stem from a feeling among international agencies thatthe force provides a measure of ambient security that allowsthem to extend their operational presence, and gives theirinternational staff greater freedom of movement than theywould otherwise have. Although the existence of this falsesense of securitywas not examined explicitly in the interviewsfor this study, the hypothesis seems reasonable given pastexperience of organisations and aid programmes clusteringaround peace operations, in cooperation or in parallel, anddonor funding for such programmes rising following theestablishment of the mission (as in Kosovo, East Timor andin cases of the lowest level of conflict-related violence, whichwould support the same hypothesis.Second, aid worker violence is not affected directly by thepresence or absence of particular conflict parties or agendas.It may be that risk is more directly correlated with factorselating to the rule of law environment providing the backdropto the given political and military interventions. It was notpossible to determine a hard indicator of rule of law aid worker security, but qualitative research supports thehypothesis that insecurity for aid workers increases where theesponsibility for security is not centralised in a singleauthority (e.g. a host government, a single military actor,DSS), but instead is diffused and weakly coordinated.2.4 Intentionality: assessing the relevance of victimsAlthough recognising it as by far the most slippery portion ofintentionality behind aid worker attacks, and to measure towhat extent aid workers were targeted specifically for reasonselated to their mission. To do this we developed threedifferent classifications of the relevance of the victimsaidworker status as follows:1. Political relevance rimary political target: aid workers were attacked with thepurpose of disrupting, diverting or punishing the act of aiddelivery, or the targeting of aid workers was used to send apolitical message, gain political leverage or sow general chaos.Associated political target: aid workers are perceived to bealigned or equated with another party (the US, the West, theN), and attacked for reasons of nationality or perceivedparticipation in the other actors agenda.2. Economic relevance obbery, theft or extortion of aid worker assets were theprimary motivation for major acts of violence.3. No relevance (incidental) Aid workers were in the proverbial wrong place at the wrongtimeand affected by crossfire-type violence (i.e. collateraldamage), landmine detonation or random attack, where theprofession of the victim is unknown or irrelevant to theperpetrator.It was not possible to assess the motivations of theperpetrators (or even to identify them) in every case. In 41% of408 total incidents, reports either lacked sufficient detail orambiguous even as to those directly involved, and had tobe classified as unknown. Even when the exact motives orcombination of motives were unknown, however, in manycases it was clear that the victims were targeted in some waybecause they were aid workers. By separating theseintentional acts from clearly unintentional ones … for instance,the random detonation of a landmine, fatalities from aerialbombardments that targeted whole towns, crossfire incidentsand when humanitarians happened to be present at massriots or attacks … one is left with very few truly unintentionalincidents. Such random incidents number only 13% of theOf the incidents where a reasonable judgment as tomotivations could be made based on details from the reportsand perceptions of those on the scene (only 159 incidents outof the 408 total met this standard), the majority had someform of political motivations attached, and only 28% (58incidents) were motivated exclusively by economic factors (inother words, common crime). The remaining 101 incidents,while some may have included the seizure of goods/money,also had significant political elements. This finding may seemto contradict aid workersinsistence that most of the threatsthey face are criminal rather than political, but it is not ascounterintuitive as it may first appear. This data considers onlymajor incidents of violence leading to grave outcomes, whileothers … robberies, banditry, looting … can be carried out HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 19 20 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTwithout the need for severe violence. Within this limited set of159 incidents, the occurrence of both direct and associatedpolitical targeting increased by 208% over the time period.2.5 Conclusions and operational implicationsOur analysis of the incident data has demonstrated that, whenthe aid worker denominator is factored in, the results debunkcertain common perceptions and beliefs. These include thatthe relative risk of violence against aid workers has risendramatically across the board, that aid worker risk increaseswhere an integrated mission approach is used, and that USand other great power interventions or global terrorist cellshave directly contributed to increased risk for aid workers. Nonetheless, the political targeting of aid personnel isindisputably a reality, and seems to be increasing relative toeconomic targeting. In extremely volatile environments …Afghanistan, Iraq and Darfur, for instance … the threats facing aidworkers (and other international workers) are clearly linked toerlying political contexts and processes, and are potentiallyexacerbated by the lack of a single locus of authority/esponsibility for the security of international actors. While it isno means a guarantee or even a strong likelihood thatoperational independence will make aid agencies safer in thesecontexts, the perception of association with political processesclearly exists in the minds of local belligerents. Seeking not toheighten this perception is thus a legitimate concern.On a practical level, NGOs should take note that theirpersonnel, relative to the UN and ICRC, have becomeincreasingly at risk of attack. This could understandably because for concern, especially in light of the fact that UNagencies are resisting efforts to include NGOs … the primaryimplementers of their programmes … in shared field andfunding arrangements for security.The most statistically significant finding overall was that, inthe most insecure cases, national staff members are beingplaced at disproportionate risk relative to international staff.cases of insecurity, nationals face lower risks thaninternationals, and calls certain remote managementprogramming adaptations into question. It particularlyunderscores that the discrepancy between nationals and internationals in their access to training and othersecurity-related organisational resources is increasinglyThe last two conclusions in particular point to a significanttrend within the international aid system, which might haveevidence: the level of risk in highly insecure environments hasbeen effectively (albeit unintentionally) transferred from UNagencies and international organisations to internationalNGOs, and from international NGOs to their national staff andlocal partners. The mechanics of this phenomenon becomeclear when one examines the background and development ofsecurity policies and practices across the aid system, and theincreasing reliance on localised aid responses in highlyinsecure environments. These are the subjects of the next two HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 20 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT currency in aid policy debates in recent years, both as a subsetto discussions of the linkages between aid and internationalsecurity, and as a practical response to the perception that aidworkers are being increasingly targeted. The development ofhaphazardly in the mid-1990s, and gained new momentum in thepost-9/11 context, when organisations seemed suddenly to befacing new threats in uncertain operating environments. Thisperception, and the variety of evolving policy responses to it, hasinfluenced operational approaches to security and aid delivery,with direct implications for the welfare of populations in need.This chapter maps policy and operational trends in securitymanagement across the international aid system. It examinesthe drivers of the new professionalism in security managementwhich derive from both intra-organisational and external,political sources. It then analyses developments in policies andguidelines over the past five years, including in the critical areasof security information management and inter-agencycoordination. It examines how security approaches are evolvingin the field, including a shifting emphasis on certain elements ofthe traditional security triangle, and the implications of thesechanges. Finally, it discusses the role that states have and couldpotentially play in aid worker security.3.1 Recognition and reaction: approaches to aid workerAlthough violent crime and collateral damage were by nomeans unknown to aid agencies before the 1990s, it was duringthat decade that an increasing number of organisationsbecame engaged in responding to situations of violent conflict,and thus became more exposed.eviously, the ICRC wasvirtually alone in working in active conflict zones, while otherhumanitarian agencies, such as the UN and internationalNGOs, remained largely at the periphery, working ingovernment-held territories or in neighbouring countries whereconflict-affected populations sought asylum as refugees(Duffield and Prendergast, 1994). As the Cold War thawed andthe great powers began to take a more interventionistapproach to addressing conflict in the developing world (Slim,1997), official donors began supporting a more diverse rangeof agencies in their efforts to reach populations on all sides ofa conflict. As a result, the UN and international NGOs becamemore prominent in conflict settings and, according to Duffield(1994), reached an accommodation with violencewhich madethem prepared to work within wars, not simply around them.Delivering assistance in situations of ongoing conflict meantincreasing security risks for humanitarian action and itspractitioners. These increasing risks were perceived to be notonly related to the increased direct exposure of aid workers toviolent contexts, but also to stem from the emergence of newprotagonists and armed groups with differing tactics andtargets; the increasing identification of humanitarian action as aestern pursuit, and its manipulation by belligerents in conflictsettings; a sense that the goals of humanitarian aid werebecoming blurred due to the increasing range of providers; andthe competing political and humanitarian agendas of the statesthat were funding assistance (Schmidt, 1997).A number of high-profile security incidents in the 1990s,including the killings of UN staff in 1999 in Somalia, Burundiand Kosovo, the assassination of ICRC staff members inBurundi, Chechnya and Cambodia, and a number of incidentsto recognise a significant gap in their thinking and practicalapproaches to staff security issues within their organisations.This deficit not only threatened staff, but also hampered aidefforts.In interviews, those international NGO staffers with longerwould result in a surge of heightened concern and momentum,but that this would gradually dwindle, leaving no systemicchange behind. In 1993, however, a group of programmestaffers from a few of the largest international NGOs active indangerous settings … CARE, World Vision, Save the Childrenand the IRC … established an informal expertsforum calledthe Security Advisory Group (SAG), which played a key role inmoving the agenda forward and addressing the growingchallenges of field security and training for staff. Although thecommunity as a whole was slow to institute major organis-the ideas that were incubated among NGOsduring this period paved the way for a significant developmentin security thinking and approaches throughout the sector,and generated products such as the security training now runedR, one of the leading organisations in this area. It alsoinformed Koenraad Van Brabants widely influential Goodactice Review, Operational Security Management in Violent Operational security: a comparative analysis ofpolicy and practice 19 In 1995, humanitarian agencies were responding to a total of 28 complexemergencies around the world, compared to five in 1985 (Bradbury, 1995, in 20 The one exception during this period was World Vision, which investedconsiderable financial resources and created a senior position charged withcorporate security. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 21 Environments(the Bible, as several international NGOsecurity managers referred to it). By the end of the decade, agrowing number of senior executives had recognised thecosts [in lives and liability] of doing nothing, and significanteforms began to follow in some of the major organisations.In a parallel development, the UN established the first SecurityCoordination Office (UNSECOORD) in 1988, with 13 staff in thefield and at headquarters in New York. UNSECOORD devised a obliged to follow the same basic rules and procedures. TheMinimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) wereestablished to provide a baseline for security in offices andesidences. MOSS apply to all UN entities once a security phaseAccording to UN agencies,however, the MOSS were more relevant for offices and activitieshumanitarian operations in the deep field. For agency staff, thelatter half of the decade was marked by a growing number oftemporary evacuations as a response to insecurity. From 1996 to2000, the UN fully or partially evacuated staff from more than 25countries (Powe, 1999). Meanwhile, resources were stretched.capacity for a 24-hour emergency service.Given theinadequacies of coverage, a number of UN agencies took stepsto ensure that additional resources were channelled into staffsecurity. In 1995, for example, UNICEF established an emergencyoperations centre in New York; in 1999, this was staffed 24 hoursa day, making it available for any crisis in any time zone. Formany years, this was the only 24-hour-a-day operations centre inthe whole of the UN system, including the Department ofeacekeeping Operations and UNSECOORD. WFPallocated all ofan additional $1.2m from the US government in 1999 to securitymeasures for its 4,000 staff. These investments sought to ensurethat agencies were not only MOSS-compliant, but alsopossessed additional security expertise in the form of in-houseadvisers and field liaisons. In addition to providing resources tobetter address their own security concerns, the larger UN aidbodies in many cases provided security resources to the wideragency community, including field security professionals,Other agencies were also taking steps to address securitychallenges. The ICRC, perhaps the most intrinsically vulnerableaid provider by virtue of its special mandate to work in warones, produced its safety and security guidelines … entitledStaying Alive… in 1999 (Roberts, 1999). Across the aidcommunity, aid agencies established protocols and guidelinesfor field-based personnel, generally in the form of securityhandbooks, vehicle safety and security measures andguidelines for surviving abductions and hostage situations. These initial endeavours notwithstanding, the aid communityduring this period (Van Brabant, 2001). The vast majority ofoften ended up with deaddocuments that were notconsistently updated or referred to, and were potentiallydangerous by leading agencies to believe they had alreadyticked the boxas far as security was concerned. Many agencydecision-makers were concerned about the costs ofequipment, training and insurance, and how these would besupported. Very few agencies wrote security expenditures intooperational budgets. Incident reporting, where it wasundertaken at all, was weak; field staff were concerned aboutsubsequent headquarters interference, or about the potentialdamage to career prospects if an incident was considered amanagement failure. Common rationales for not prioritising and investing in staffsecurity measures were that the agency in question was not inthe emergency or life-saving business, that it had no record ofstaff fatalities due to insecurity or, more commonly, that riskwas an unavoidable part of the work and there was no needfor additional or new measures (Van Brabant, 2001). In caseswhere investments were made, resulting instruments wereoften inadequately implemented, and rarely took into accountthe needs of the growing number of locally recruited staff (VanBrabant, 2001).or donor governments, the issue of security was not core todecision-making regarding partnerships with humanitariantheir own staff. This was partly becausesuch matters were deemed to fall exclusively within theesponsibility of operational agencies (and agencies wereloath to raise the issue with donors in case they used security-linked funding to influence where agencies deployed), andalso because very few governments were deploying their own3.2 Security management today: towards a newprofessionalismoday, the issue of aid worker security figures much moreprominently in the concerns of aid agency policymakers andpractitioners. A number of factors, both external and internalto aid organisations, have contributed to this. 22 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT 21 A 1996 SAG-organised conference on liability issues for NGO seniormanagers has been credited as the turning-point for NGO action on staffsecurity. As one founding SAG member put it: Once CEOs and lawyers gotinvolved things started happening.22 Security phases (which go from 1 to 5) are recommended by the in-countryDesignated Official. Within a country, any or all phases can be applicable todifferent locations at the same time. Phase 1 is precautionary, Phase 2 isestricted movement, Phase 3 signifies the departure of non-essential staffand all dependants, Phase 4 is relocation of all remaining non-vitalinternational staff members, with activities primarily carried out through thenational staff, if they are willing to do so, and Phase 5 is evacuation of allinternationals, with some programming continuing through local staff. Phases3…5 require authorisation from the Secretary-General.23 When the security professionals employed directly by each agency wereincluded, the total number of field experts available was about 1,000. Bycomparison, the US State Department employed more than 300 securityprofessionals on behalf of its 4,500 staff abroad (Powe, 1999). HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 22 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT 3.2.1 The changing security and political context for aidoperationsIf the revelation of the 1990s was that humanitarians were notexempt from violence by virtue of their motives, principles andotected statusunder international law, experiences inensuing years have led many to suspect that they may in factbe especially vulnerable for a variety of reasons beyond theircontrol. First, conflicts are increasingly being fought by non-state armed actors, which are generally less disciplined andless inclined to respect the rules of war. The shock value ofsingling out for violence organisations that are present in adistinctly non-violent, welfare-oriented capacity is surely notlost on conflict parties. In a highly politicised context, anattack on the humanitarian enterprise may simply be viewedas a strike against one of the toolsof the enemy. While it is far from the main source of threat againsthumanitarian operations, most respondents agree that theeligious and political polarisation that has developed,particularly post-9/11, has added a new, global dimension to theange of threats that were once specific to individual countries orlocalities. The sense of rising threat has been fuelled by recenthigh-profile incidents, including the bombing of the UNs office inBaghdad, and sudden peaks in insecurity sparked by incidentssuch as the controversy over cartoons depicting the ProphetMuhammad that were published in a Danish newspaper inSeptember 2005. While globally-connected terrorist cells haveseemingly proliferated, as have their violent acts, there is noevidence that they have especially targeted aid workers overother civilian actors, as the data analysis bears out. In Iraq, forinstance, incidents involving commercial contractors outnumberthose of aid workers by about eight to one.N, and more particularly of the ICRCs offices in Baghdad, madeclear humanitariansstatus as associated political targets, buthumanitarians have not been singled out to a greater degreethan other international targets, although it should be notedthat, by 2006, aid workers represented an almost negligibleproportion of civilian foreigners in Iraq(Carle and Chkam, 2006).erhaps unwittingly, Western donor governments havecontributed to considerable security pressures on aidagencies in recent years. Aid agencies have been expected toespond to certain strategic crises, signalling an explicitenterprise. This is perhaps best exemplified in Iraq andAfghanistan, underscored by the now infamous commentsfrom the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, whoidentified international NGOs in Afghanistan as forcemultipliersin the war on terror. This politicised their role inthese contexts, thereby exposing them to perceptions ofpartiality and threatening to erode the principles of neutralityand independence. US-based international NGOs in particularhave felt the effects of this politicisation in terms of publicperceptions and potential security risks, but so too have manynon-US NGOs, as well as the ICRC and the UN. Some arguethat, by incorporating humanitarian response into thestrategic agenda (and the willingness on the part of someagencies to be so co-opted), the post-9/11 US-led globalsecurity campaign has had the perverse effect of making aidactors and humanitarian operations less secure. In fact, assignificant statistical correlation between incidences ofviolence against aid workers and a force intervention by a UNSecurity Council Permanent Member. However, the fact thatpolitical targeting is a real and growing concern makes it aeasonable precaution for agencies to continue to stress theirindependence from political and military agendas. In addition, the study found that most aid actors consider themost prevalent threats to be those they have always faced,that is, economic crime and local political strife. In cases likeSomalia, DRC and to a large extent Afghanistan, field workersmaintain that the principal threats are economically motivatedand/or opportunistic, of the kind that thrive in a failed state-type environment, where there is a culture of impunity and nocentralised responsibility for security. This may well be trueoccur, both major and minor. For only the major violent actsthat this study examines, however, the data in fact points tothe opposite conclusion: that political motivations play a largeand growing role in targeted attacks. Specific institutional losses also continue to play a role infostering a sense of threat and a momentum for change. Onehumanitarian international NGO, for example, recently lostfive staff in just one year, all in differing contexts, bringing awide range of security concerns to the fore.Finally, within the international aid system, there has been afurther increase in the number and diversity of actorsesponding to complex emergencies over the last decade. Ashighlighted in Chapter 2, the number of aid workers in the fieldhas increased by over 77% from 1997 to 2005. A wide range ofpeacekeeping forces, political actors and private contractors arealso present. The increased footprint of aid agencies reflects thesignificant amount of aid being channelled outside the recipientstate in protracted crisis contexts (Macrae and Harmer, 2004). Italso reflects a strategic shift on the part of multi-mandatedagencies to increase their capacity and public profile in the reliefsector. The increased range of actors and engagement indiffering types of aid and relief work has contributed to aconfused understanding of the distinctiveness of the goals ofhumanitarian action in conflict contexts, and the principles thatguide the allocation of humanitarian aid. This trend has thusincreased the need within aid agencies to focus more concretelyon security and on how their operations are perceived (Donini et 24 Commercial contractors killed, wounded or kidnapped in Iraq in 2004numbered upwards of 269, compared to 33 aid workers (US StateDepartment, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004). Commercial actors havea larger presence than aid workers, particularly after the Canal Hotelbombing, but the exact ratio is not known. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 23 3.2.2 Intra-organisational factors in security reformCertain internal factors within some organisations created adeep ambivalence regarding the professionalisation ofsecurity. Some managers and board members saw securityand programming goals as being in direct conflict, and werefundamentally reluctant to shift attention and resources awayfrom aiding beneficiaries and towards securing staff andassets. Others feared that, by highlighting and emphasisingthe potential dangers to staff in the field, they would scareaway new recruits and create an overly securitisedenvironment in their field operations.In the end, a combination of financial imperatives and agrowing awareness of the need to fulfil a duty of careto staffin dangerous settings drove the development of securitymanagement structures and policies within organisations. Asawoke to the realisation that the insurance they provided forfield staff did not cover acts of war. A lawsuit brought by anC field staffer who suffered a double amputation after hisehicle hit a landmine was a cautionary tale for the entirecommunity, and agencies began to increase their insurancecoverage with additional costly polices and riders. Becausemost policies require evidence that the organisation maintainsand follows a set of security guidelines before paying out onclaims, the insurance industry was an important driver ofpolicy in many aid organisations (Bruderlein and Gassmann,oday, the majority of large international aid actors recognisethat change is needed to address the challenge of operationalsecurity, and most are in the process of self-assessment, orare establishing new structures and policies. The mostcommon problem cited throughout the community is that,while the instruments are sound, they have yet to be fullyattitudes have yet to be adopted at the field level. Indeed,many organisations have sought to upgrade or revisit theirpolicies primarily because documents were largely unknownwithin the organisation, and there had been no substantiveefforts to promote these policies and use them for decision-making or training. UNHCRs 2004 review of its security policyagency had failed to integrate the issue of staff security intothe organisations management practices, procedures andculture, and that it needed to promulgate a culture of securityin all aspects of its operations, both at headquarters and inthe field (UNHCR, 2004). Some agencies have identifiedspecific vulnerabilities of groups within their organisations.The SAG in InterAction and a number of individual agencieshave noted the weak approach to the management of nationalstaff security and the growing need for security measures forstaff are evacuated (InterAction, 2002). UNHCR has noted thatits policy requires updating in relation to gender and thespecific security needs of women (UNHCR, 2004), and aworking group on the subject has been created under theInter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN).security measures has taken place mainly in the majoragencies, that is the 20 or so largest and most ubiquitousinternational aid providers. The SAG participants are nowactively seeking to broaden the audienceto include smalland medium-sized agencies, which have reportedly not yetbegun to take any serious steps regarding staff security.3.3 New policy developments and evolutions in approachAid agenciesefforts to professionalise and institutionalisesecurity management have included the development orupgrading of security policies and guidelines, institutingtraining and resourcing senior posts as security managers andadvisers, and developing technical and systematic means tocapture security incident information. 3.3.1 From risk avoidance to risk management: UNDSS andthe goal of an enablingsecurity environment for relief workOf all aid providers, the UN has probably experienced themost far-reaching policy transformations regarding securityer the last few years. In 2000, on the basis of a sharpescalation in threats against UN personnel, staff securityprocedures were reviewed, and the Secretary-Generalannounced a two-year programme to reinforce the UNsSecurity Management System in his report to the GeneralAssembly, Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel(A/55/494). This did not result in any significant change inapproach to security management, other than encouragingeach UN organisation to develop and introduce a securitypolicy which mirrored a more generic policy statementdesigned at the inter-agency level (UN A/57/356, 2002).Three years later, in response to the Baghdad bombing,plans to reconfigure, strengthen and modernise the UNsecurity apparatus were seriously addressed. The processultimately began in early 2005 under a new department, theDepartment of Safety and Security (UNDSS), led by anUnder-Secretary-General (an elevated appointment) (UNNews Service, 2004). A number of UN agencies responded tothe Baghdad incident by establishing steering committeeson security policy and implementation (UNHCR, 2004; OCHA,2005; UN interviews, 2006).ith the help of over $85m in new resources allocated by theGeneral Assembly, UNDSS is attempting to staff andmodernise UN security. In particular, it has outlined a newapproach to operational security, stressing that its role is toprovide an enablingsecurity environment for programming,not a restrictive one, with a view to finding ways to continueoperating and safeguarding personnel in some of the worldsmost unstable situations. This has been driven by a growingecognition by agencies that security should no longer betreated as a technical support function or add-on, which 24 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 24 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT (UNHCR, 2004). The key mechanism in the enablingapproachanalysis and strategy. Thecentrepiece of the risk management framework in the field isthe Security Risk Assessment (SRA). The SRA examinesthreats and vulnerabilities, taking as a starting point agenciessecurity conditions, where possible, to allow programming tocontinue. UNDSS interviewees note that the SRA has becomethe fundamental element of all UN security activity, thelynchpin of the reform of the security framework and, in thewords of one staffer, the most important document in thedepartment. All tools used to mitigate risk in the field …MOSS, security clearance processes, staffing levels,equipment and funding … are meant to stem from the findingsof the SRA (UNDSS interviews, 2005).The adoption of a risk management approach in the UN is,however, far from complete. Many UN agency staff and partneragencies claim that restrictions on movement and evacuationemain the principal security strategy for the UN in the field.DSS acknowledges that the existing MOSS and phasesystem are limited in flexibility and timeliness, and areparticularly weak in the contexts in which humanitarian actorsoperate. Plans to develop a more subtle, updated mechanismwhich takes account of growing threats such as terrorism andintegrates programming concerns have been one of the moredifficult and delayed reforms UNDSS is aiming to achieve.Phasing was designed for situations of increasing internalunrest and ambient violence, with evacuation as the finaloption. In the post-9/11 world, with political targeting appearingto increase, it has become clear that risk cannot be managedthrough a process of evacuation. An evacuation plan would beof no help, for example, in dealing with the eventuality of a largetruck bomb detonating without warning. Furthermore,evacuation can increase risks to staff in the longer term. Whenan organisation evacuates an area, even briefly, staff lose asense of the political landscape and rapport with the hostcommunity and beneficiaries is disrupted. With a strong riskassessment mechanism, however, it ostensibly becomespossible to invest heavily in measures that will alloworganisations with specific life-saving programmes to continueworking, despite the risk. Resilience and continued presence insituations of risk is therefore seen as a security plus … the targethas hardened. This is what banks and airlines do. The currentMOSS may be a reasonable set of universal precautions whilemore sophisticated tools are developed, but it is a one size fitsallapproach and does not facilitate the necessary strategicinvestment of assets against the particular threats that arelikely in any given situation.longstanding and familiar problem. Host governments havebeen known to exert serious pressure to prevent a situationfrom being assigned a high-security phase, which sends anegative signal to tourists and investors, and may complicatepolitical relations and/or peace processes (UNDSS interviews,2005). Conversely, some have accused UN aid agencies ofusing UNDSS, MOSS and the security phase system forulterior purposes, for instance in cases where programmemanagers seek phase reductions primarily to release fundsand allow for new programming (with the implication that, ifanything happened, the programme would not be at fault,since the phase indicated that it was safe to operate).The most common complaints regarding the UN securityapproach point to an overly restrictive mindset, not attuned tothe programming needs and approach of relief work. UNDSShave been frank in acknowledging this particular shortcoming.In the words of one headquarters official:DSS is rightly accused of being overly risk averseand bossy. The easiest way to ensure security is tostop people from going out, but this is totallyunacceptable. Our ethos should be that we are hereto allow staff to do more things, not less. Our job isto come up with innovative ways to do that.DSS has set itself this mandate, but as with all paradigmshifts new thinking will take time to penetrate all levels of theorganisation. To be successful, all UNDSS officers in the fieldwill need to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of aidprogramming in conflict settings. Field security officers, whooften come from military backgrounds and suffer from a lack oftraining and familiarity with the role of UN aid agencies andNGOs in the field, are at the heart of much of the friction(IASMN, 2006). In addition to training, the recruitment processfor field security officers could be geared more towards seekingout professionals from within the humanitarian programmingsector, or those with experience of working with this community.Others point out that the responsibility for security also lieswith the operational agencies. Programme assessment,intended as the foundation of the SRA, remains agencieseakest area, simply because many are unable to articulatetheir operational strategy in a country, and communicate whatneeds. In cases where agencies cannot be clear about theirprogramming goals and life-saving priorities in crisissituations, an enabling security approach cannot beconstructed even by the most forward-thinking securitymanager. Adequate programme assessment has nothappened in a number of recent cases including Iraq, asoperational presence without clear plans and priorities(UNDSS interviews, 2005).3.3.2 From risk acceptance to risk control: refining andbuilding on the NGO approach to securityHumanitarian and multi-mandated aid NGOs have largelytackled security reform from a different direction, focusing theirenergies on risk prevention and mitigation. For many HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 25 organisations this has involved a recognition that certainincidents could have been prevented or handled better, and thatsecurity awareness in the field has not been as sensitive as itneeds to be. Most managers have also acknowledged that pastattitudes, which treated risk as simply an unavoidable feature ofaid work, needed to change. As a result, the assumption of riskhas come to be seen as institutional rather than personal, andmanagement responsibility has focused on developing moresystematic and comprehensive means to enhance staff securityin all aspects of programming. MSF sections, for example, are heavily reliant on the spirit ofolunteerism, and the MSF Charter reflects the individualesponsibilities staff are asked to bear. Only recently has therebeen a greater recognition of the boundaries betweenindividual and institutional responsibility. This has includedthe adoption of risk prevention strategies, includingidentifying the roles and responsibilities of management inensuring staff security, comprehensive security training and agreater appreciation of the security risks inherent in eachprogramme. Even so, MSF more than other humanitarianorganisations has had difficulty in reconciling theinstitutionalisation of security responsibility with its coreprinciples. Debates have arisen around whether it is ethical toestrict programme activities when a staff member hasindicated that he or she is willing to assume personal risk. Thequestion becomes whether the organisation can legitimatelycurtail that individuals right to take humanitarian action (MSFsection interviews, 2006).As previous literature on security management has noted,much of the business of enhancing security (and generalsafety) is procedural: as one respondent put it, making suredue diligenceon security is carried out throughout theorganisation. Many security officers insist that the majorityof incidents reported to them could have been prevented ifthe proper procedures and guidelines had been followed. Forsome aid agencies, this has resulted in an investment instandardising security procedures through plans andtemplates for risk assessments. InterActions SAG has itswn Minimum Operating Security Standards, which seek toassist members in their respective institutional approachesto security. Unlike the UNs MOSS, this is not a list ofoperational and material requirements corresponding tolevels of security in field settings. Rather, it is anacknowledgement of the issues critical importance to anorganisations operations and governance. InterActionsstandards also outline parameters for security policies,hiring policies and personnel procedures to prepare andsupport staff operating in insecure environments, as well asencouraging members to operate in a collaborative manner,including participating in security fora, working with UNstructures where appropriate, sharing security informationand maintaining awareness of, and when possiblemitigating, the negative impacts of operations on thesecurity of other members (InterAction, 2006). 3.3.3 Need versus risk: an evolution in thinkingan Brabants Good Practice Review defines all securitymanagement as essentially the practice of controlling risk oreducing it to an acceptable level. International NGOs andother international aid agencies have grappled with thequestion of where the threshold of acceptablelies. Acommonly used graphic asks managers to plot the likelihoodof threats on one axis, and the severity of their consequenceson the other, with an eye towards defining a comfort zoneinwhich programming may take place. Some have countered that it is not helpful to speak of absoluterisk thresholds (or the idea that staff safety is alwaysparamount). Risk assumption must vary according to thecontext, and programme criticalitymust be the keydeterminant. In other words, an organisation may decide that itis not worth risking staff lives to undertake educationalprogramming or to deliver non-essential items in areas of activesame area the risk would then become acceptable.There is something disingenuous, however, in the discussionof risk acceptance within humanitarian organisations. Despiteworking in some of the worlds most dangerous places and 26 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT Box 2: InterActions Minimum Operating SecurityStandards Standard 1: Organizational Security Policy and PlansInterAction members shall have policies addressing keysecurity issues and formal plans at both field and headquarterslevels to address these issues.Standard 2: Resources to Address SecurityInterAction members shall make available appropriatesources to meet these Minimum Operating Securitytandards.Standard 3: Human Resource ManagementInterAction members shall implement reasonable hiringpolicies and personnel procedures to prepare staff to cope withthe security issues at their post of assignment, support themduring their service, and address post assignment issues.Standard 4: AccountabilityInterAction members shall incorporate accountability forsecurity into their management systems at both field andheadquarters levels.Standard 5: Sense of CommunityInterAction members shall work in a collaborative mannerwith other members of the humanitarian and developmentcommunity to advance their common security interests.xtracted from InterAction (2006). HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 26 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT acknowledging a high level of risk, no organisation would beprepared to say openly that the loss of even one staff memberwould be acceptable in meeting programme goals. One reportthresholds of many agencies are not suited for the complianceof their mandates in hazardous areas(SMI, 2005). As aDSS officer observed, one could not realistically broach thetopic of estimating force depletionrates and casualtythresholds for humanitarian organisations, as is done inmilitary planning. However courageous, aid workers are notsoldiers, and nothing in their mission or their organisationalculture would allow for such a calculus. What this means inpractice is that the rhetoric of risk acceptance allows for an aidintervention to be launched, but when a major violent incidentoccurs it often shakes the resolve of the affected organisationand the aid community at large, causing some to pull back andthe overall aid effort to falter. Risk is acceptable only whenintolerable, and staff members are generally pulled out. Theseissues are explored further in Chapter 4.3.3.4 New dimensions to the security triangleChanges have perhaps been most significant in the practicaloperational strategies agencies have adopted … or adapted … tomaintain operations in insecure contexts. Traditionally, thetheory of enhancing the operational security of aid workers wasbased on a security triangleparadigm, comprising threecomponents … protection, deterrence and acceptance … witheach component emphasised to varying degrees by differenttypes of organisation and in differing security contexts (VanBrabant, 2000). seeks to reduce vulnerability totargeted and random attacks, by hardeningor reducing thevisibility of the agency. Deterrenceentails presenting a counter-threat, such as the presence of armed escorts or proximity tomilitary forces. entails the aid agency becoming afamiliar and trusted entity among the host community and thebeneficiary population, cultivating a network of contacts andintermediaries to maintain open lines of communication withkey parties. It usually requires a long-term presence before,during and after conflict. The three components were neverintended to be an either/or set of options. Rather, they were tobe used mostly in combination, but with an emphasis on theacceptancedimension.Acceptance and assumedacceptanceIn recent years, while acceptance has remained the bedrock ofthe approach of NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescentmovement to operational security, it has not been solidlyunderstood and applied. As Van Brabant observed six yearsago, acceptance cannot be assumed; it has to be won andactively maintained(Van Brabant, 2000). Yet the research forthis study revealed two fallacies regarding acceptance: 1)Passive or assumed acceptance … when acceptance isdefined merely by the lack or absence of deterrent orprotective measures. Many problems occur because NGOsassume acceptancewithout being proactive about it. Theacceptance approach in fact requires a strategy, resourcesand deliberate action … it cannot be treated as a defaultThe exceptionalist concept of acceptance … when anorganisation simply reiterates humanitarian principles andproclaims its neutrality and independence from allbelligerent parties. It is not enough for an aid organisationto be apart from political actors; to achieve acceptance, itmust belong to the community, in other words reaching out,not standing out. Moreover, acceptance grows out ofperceptions of the organisation, and is therefore dependentorganisational communications (Donini et al., 2005). As the Figure 11: A typical risk threshold analysis (tolerablerisk environment) Figure 12: Adjusted risk thresholds, accounting for Severity of consequencesLikelihood of occurrenceBurglaryArmed raidRisk threshold Severity of consequencesLikelihood of occurrence HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 27 ICRC security guidelines note, this depends on our abilityto listen, as opposed to preaching(Roberts, 2006).There are many reasons for a decline in the practice of activeacceptance strategies. First, many agencies have under-estimated the cost of acceptance … maintaining acceptance isery costly in terms of staff time and resources. Second,acceptance is especially hard to achieve amid the highly fluidlocal dynamics of war and conflict. In particular, a lack of unifiedinsurgency command in many situations has meant thatnegotiations with armed actors take considerable time, andagreements once secured have to be constantly reinforced. Thisis all the harder when agencies, particularly the UN andinternational NGOs, deploy staff with very little field experienceand an inadequate understanding of the dimensions of theconflict setting they operate in. That it would be impossible tofoster acceptance for international aid entities in post-invasionIraq, for example, was all but a foregone conclusion. The UN inparticular was perceived as political by Iraqis, seen first as theenforcer of sanctions during the years prior to the war and lateras a tool of US occupation. In this light, the UN was anunsurprising choice of political target, especially given theescalating threats, both verbal and in the form of attemptedincursions, that were levelled against the organisation, andwhich increased after the Special Representative of theSecretary-General made public appearances with the head ofthe Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer. en in less highly contested cases than Iraq, the UN inherentlyfaces a more difficult relationship with acceptance approachesbecause of its dual nature as both a political and humanitarianbody. In some cases, the presence of a UN integrated missionhas resulted in many non-UN agencies stressing high visibilityand branding to differentiate their mandates and goals frompolitical and military actors (Durrant, unpublished, 2006;interviews, 2006). Empirical and policy analysis to date doesnot suggest that a security implication necessarily follows fromassociation with a UN integrated mission. Evidence is also scantas to whether association with UN missions is as problematic ingeneral as NGO opinion has suggested. Nonetheless, theacceptance strategies of some non-UN agencies have focusedparticularly on differentiating and distancing themselves fromthe UN for these reasons.Third, some commentators have questioned whetheracceptance has ceased to be a useful concept to underpin asecurity strategy in highly unstable environments, where thereare uncertain threats and unknown adversaries. The threat ofterrorism, for instance, means that aid agencies face a riskthat may have an origin anywhere in the world, and as suchdoes not fit well into an acceptance approach to security thatemphasises local knowledge and analysis. As the head ofemergencies in one international NGO commented: even ifou accept the principle that all NGO strategies areindependent of political influence, if youre working in anenvironment where NGOs are seen as a soft target … it doesnteally matter how loud you shout your principles. Acceptancejust doesnt fly in these situations and you have to beef upour security apparatus(INGO interviews, 2006). In addition,in highly contested environments strongly brandedhumanitarian organisations such as the ICRC can be at greaterICRC makes a bigger point(INGO interviews, 2006). Finally, the explosion in the number of NGOs in contexts likeIraq and Afghanistan, with a multitude of multi-mandatedplayers, has made it difficult to carve out and/or maintain theindependent identity of an individual agency. This wasin the country in question, as in Iraq. Acceptance models inthese situations have focused on some basic principles,including only hiring internationals from the Middle East orMost security experts maintain that security management,and the acceptance approach in particular, must flow from adeep knowledge of the context. Factors that promoteong-term organisational presence and familiarity with thearea of operation.ocal language ability and cultural knowledge.Close relationships and communications with local staff.High staff turnover.ojects that deal only with beneficiary groups withoutengaging with or making inroads into the host or widerlocal community.Divisions and poor communications between internationaland national staff.Some of these challenges have been recognised andaddressed. The ICRC and a number of humanitarian agencies,including ACF and several MSF sections, have reaffirmedtraditional acceptance approaches. These organisations arguethat acceptance is the cornerstone of reducing risk, and that ifpeople are aware of the values of the organisation, and if theactivities being undertaken are relevant to the needs of thecommunity, this is a vital … albeit not cast-iron … guarantee oftheir security. These organisations have begun to invest moreheavily in negotiations with armed groups regarding access tonew areas. This approach has also involved paying greaterattention to local social norms being sensitive to perceptionsof aid workersrelative affluence or the wasteful use ofesources, and ensuring transparency in programmingIncreasing reliance on protection and deterrence measuresOther agencies have found it necessary to adopt protectivemeasures more extensively than was previously their custom. 28 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 28 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT In extreme cases … Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan … someagencies have adopted very low-profile or even clandestinemodes of programming. This involves no organisationalbranding, the use of private cars and limited movement. In thecase of Iraq, the practice in some agencies is that staff have nofixed operating address, do not use their real names andoperate without knowing the identities of their colleagues.Beneficiaries are not made aware of the source of assistance.en the ICRC had to resort to a covert approach in Iraq: whenacceptance is low and risk is high, the clandestine approach isunfortunately necessary(ICRC interview, 2006). This is notseen by the ICRC or others as a way of the future, and thereis no evidence of these extreme measures being replicated in other contexts; rather, it is viewed as an exceptional and time-limited means of conducting operations. A low-visibility approach is particularly hard to maintain whenfinancing comes from donor governments with a politicalinterest in maintaining their visibility as a funding source.Agencies have experienced such challenges in the Middle EastIn high-risk environments, the only alternative to the ultra-low-profile approach may be adopting its polar opposite: deterrencevia military cover and armed escorts. Indeed, recent years havealso seen an increase, albeit , in humanitariansrelianceon deterrence mechanisms, often in the form of commercialsecurity providers (Cockayne, 2006). This has been particularlythe case in high-risk environments such as Afghanistan, but ithas also been a standard mode of operations in contexts suchas Somalia and Chechnya. Once adopted, it is often very difficultto go back, to lower the agencys profile or encourageacceptance because the removal of these measuresautomatically signals that a target has become softer(Harker,2006). As one ex-INGO Country Director noted, most agenciesoperate like turtles: they roll up in as hard a shell as possible,and keep moving(INGO interviews, 2006).Implications for changing operational strategiesThe long-term impacts of these changing security strategiesemain unclear. All three approaches … heavy protection,deterrence and covert programming … are treated by mostagencies as a last resort when security risk becomes severe.However, like the evacuation option, these modalities can in factcompromise security in the long run. Once an organisation hassecurity umbrella or gone underground with clandestineprogramming, its access to security information becomesextremely limited (Anderson, 1999). Increased isolation fromincreasing programming challenges (via a decreased ability totarget and monitor aid deliveries, for instance), and distancingthe agency from the very sources of information that mightotherwise enhance its security. A vicious circle is createdwhereby the security picture becomes ever cloudier, analysisand planning are made more difficult and the distrust anddistance between aid providers and local communities increase.Additionally, by visibly increasing protective or deterrentmeasures, there is a possibility that other aid actors relying onsofter security measures will become more insecure …particularly in contexts where militant movements view aidoperations as opportune targets for violence. 3.4 Inter-agency security coordinationAlthough aid practitioners share a general understanding ofthe factors that have led to changes in the security context foraid operations, there is less agreement within the communitythat this might necessitate a more coordinated response topolicy-setting, information sharing and specific operationalstrategies. As one interviewee noted, we recognise we are allin the same river, though maybe not in the same boat(ICRCinterview, 2006). In general, humanitarian actors have apeculiar relationship with each other, one which issimultaneously competitive and mutually dependent (in thesense that no agency alone can meet even a fraction of theneeds in a humanitarian emergency). In security coordination,as in other aspects of humanitarian coordination, there areonly two reliable motivators to drive coordination … urgentneed and donor pressure. Yet even these have beeninsufficient to create viable security coordination structures.The key challenges that respondents identified include thesensitivity of the information being shared, as well as thepossibility of local sources being compromised and theirconfidentiality being breached. This makes agencies cautiousin their approach to security coordination.At the headquarters level, the SAG is one of the few examples ofa strong, consultative network on security issues. Since itsestablishment in 1993, it has assisted its diverse membership todevelop capacities in security, disseminate information and newthinking and promote security initiatives. The RedR trainingprogrammes, NGO security standards and earlier initiatives toincrease security measures for national staff members, forexample, are all due to the efforts of the SAG membership. Inthe UK a more informal group of security professionals wasestablished in late 2005. However, it is unclear whether thisnetwork will develop in the same way as the SAG.ithin the UN, the IASMN has provided a useful space for UNagencies and UNDSS (and previously UNSECOORD) toaddress issues of concern in inter-agency relations. It hasallowed the major operational aid agencies of the UN … thosemost likely to find themselves in insecure environments … toassert their concerns and priorities. The IASMN has alsoserved as a sounding board for tensions among agencies, andbetween agencies and UNDSS, and as such has illustrated theconsiderable coordination challenges that remain. A case inpoint is the disconnect between agency desires to see UNDSSbecome more responsive to the needs, capacity and resourcesof individual agencies, and UNDSStendency to prioritiseuniformity and standard approaches (UN interviews, 2006).Being an intra-UN body, the IASMN does not engage NGOs in HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 29 security dialogue … a serious deficiency in terms of operationalsecurity, since most UN agencies rely heavily on NGOs toimplement their programmes on the ground. In fact, there hasbeen marked resistance among UN agencies to engage NGOsin the consultation process around security financing.elations between the UN and international NGOs are morefraught. In 2001, the IASC, in close collaboration with what wasthen UNSECOORD, established a Menu of Options for securitycollaboration between the UN, NGOs and inter-governmentalorganisations. The Menu of Options was a list of potential risk-mitigating strategies to improve the collective security of thehumanitarian community. It was, however, ineffective due toesource constraints, diverse approaches to security, theindiscreet use of sensitive information, priorities and timeconstraints, and a clash of personalities between key actors,esulting in a lack of trust and understanding of respectivemandates and mission goals. There was also a significant lackof knowledge of the Menu in the field. There were someexamples of implementation, but these appeared to be limitedto situations of extreme insecurity. Furthermore, there was noevidence that lessons learned were shared or adopted routinelyas good practice. Nonetheless, the IASC Task Force onCollaborative Approaches to Security, established in 2004,decided that the Menu of Options still provided a framework forimproving security collaboration between humanitarian actorsin the field and, as such, should be relaunched. In 2006, it wasupdated, revised and renamed (it is now called Saving Livesogether: A Framework for Improving Security ArrangementsAmong IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field, to better reflect itspurpose and intent) (IASMN, 2006).Despite the re-launch and the newly re-titled framework, theDSS is unlikely to be able to provide a security umbrella to awide range of operational partners in the near future. UNDSSstill suffers from considerable distrust among internationalNGOs, both in terms of capability and intent (INGO interviews,2006). A change in perceptions will be based on performance inthe field which, as UNDSS acknowledges, is an area ofeakness at present. International NGOs have often beenfrustrated at the lack of openness on the part of UNDSS fieldstaff, and examples where the UNDSS…NGO relationship hasworked well are usually put down to individual personalities.DSS counters that international NGOs seem to want it bothways: they frequently rely on UN security structures and inputs,but resist any formal coordination. Most of those interviewedfor this study, on each side, expressed cautious optimism aboutfuture relations.Coordination and information-sharing among NGOs in the fieldemains for the most part informal, and varies across countriesand emergencies. There has been some progress through theestablishment of coordination bodies such as the AfghanistanNon Governmental Organisation Safety Office (ANSO) in Kabul,the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), the Centre deNetwork in Haiti. However, these have primarily acted as storagecentres for security incident information, not as security policy orprogramming coordination entities. The ongoing discussionser a coordination mechanism in Darfur perhaps best illustratethe challenges facing field security coordination for NGOs. Theand staff capacity to spearhead the initiative, as well as concernsaround how the entity would be perceived by the authorities.These challenges have resulted in two years of protracteddiscussions, despite the fact that resources are available from anumber of donor governments. ECHOs forthcoming (2006)guide to security collaboration in the field is being designed inpart to examine these challenges, and to offer practical guidanceto NGOs on establishing security collaboration mechanisms andapparatuses in the field. It is unclear, however, whether at apractical level many of the issues that hinder closer cooperationcan be addressed through this initiative.3.5 The critical role of security information mechanisms ithout exception, this study found, both in interviews and inthe six case-studies, that the lack of strong incident recordinghas created a major impediment in the conduct of securityanalysis. When an incident record was available in any givencountry going back for a year or more, this was generally dueto an individuals personal initiative rather than any system ofstandard practice. Institutional memories tend to be short insettings with high staff turnover, and the study found thateven some major violent incidents in the recent past wereunknown to current field staff. The value placed on reportingsecurity incidents has increased in the last few years, andthere has been significant investment in software to report,collect and share incident information at a central level. Threeexamples are the UN Security Incident Reporting Service(SIRS) initiative, the World Vision-led Virtual ResearchAssociates (VRA) system and the CARE-developed SIMS.Before the UN SIRS initiative began in 2003, there was nouniform, standardised way of reporting security incidents inthe UN. This meant that there was no way of rapidly accessinginformation and identifying trends. All reports went into paperfiles, where they mostly remained. SIRS provides incidenteporting templates for field security officers to enter incidentdetails according to preset parameters and definitions. Thislatter aspect has proven unexpectedly difficult, asinterpretations and descriptions of incidents vary widely. Forthat reason, SIRS has taken longer to establish than hoped,and it is expected to be some time before it is directlyaccessible by UN agency security focal points. In addition, it isnot clear how extensively NGO incidents will be included in theinclude incidents involving international NGOs under directcontract with the UN (i.e. implementing partners). This wouldlimit the systems capacity to comprehensively track and spottrends and to do forecasting … which is the ultimate goal of the 30 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 30 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTdeveloping a process to capture and analyse information fromfield staff under the Protection of Civiliansmandate, asubset of which concerns the safety and security of aidpersonnel (OCHA, 2006). orld Visions VRA system is a web-based interactive reportingplatform that can be used by any NGO. Similar softwareproducts have been developed by the Vietnam Veterans ofAmerica Foundation (the Operational Activity SecurityInformation System (OASIS))and by the Crisis ManagementInitiative (the Safety Information Reporting Service (SIRS))(VVAF, 2006; CMI, 2005). At the time of writing, both projectsstill in the very early stages of development. Unlike the dataset in this report, the majority of these systemshave no backdated incident data, and most started collationonly in the last year or so. All have struggled to get consistentdata input from the field, and acknowledge that moreinvestment in training field staff on standard ways to reportincidents would be valuable. Thus, while to date the newsystems show promise independently, it is not clear that theywill be able to communicate with each other and share data.Another critical concern is the lack of analysis of trends andassessments of the strategic implications of the incident data.As one field consultant noted, reports are often a merecollection of security events(Carle and Chakm, 2006). Boththese factors may be addressed over time, but both require achange in organisational culture and a willingness at the inter-agency level to cooperate and share basic securityinformation; this has proved very difficult. Inter-agency reporting mechanisms have also been developedspecifically for the field. ANSO in Afghanistan is one of the firstindependent bodies that focuses exclusively on NGO security.However, it has been criticised for being simply a data focalpoint, rather than a more analytical unit with the capacity toexamine trends and inform agencies in a more comprehensiveand strategic manner. In Iraq, security reports have becomehighly militarised and agencies suffer not from their absence,but from their abundance. The risk in Iraq is that agencies relyalmost exclusively on the security reports they receive frominternational sources, and have limited local information. Low-profile strategies have also hindered the exchange ofbetween agencies and other actors.Overall, while there is an acknowledged need for betterincident data reporting and analysis, incident tracking acrossthe aid community is still very weak … many organisationshave no systematic way of collating data and tracing trends,and those that have invested in this area have found that thisinvestment often does not facilitate analysis. The work istime-consuming and may not be the best use of scarceesources. Many incident reports are little more thancumbersome chronologies of disparate events. The resultingproduct often takes too long to read, let alone analyse anddraw conclusions from … a task that is left to the reader.thermore, the raw incident information, presented withoutnuance or gradation, can create skewed impressions of theactual risk environment. Many of the problems in sharing information and developingaccurate incident records are also present in general securitycoordination, as noted above. While admitting thatinformation sharing is vital to security, some organisationshave been reluctant to participate in field security networksbecause, in the past, there were occasions when informationshared in collaborative forums has turned up in the press(IASMN, 2006). Other concerns include personnel andlitigation/liability issues, and a reluctance to portray theorganisation in a negative light. However, given that securityfor the entire community stands to benefit from a complete,shared knowledge of incidents more than any individualagency stands to lose, it would seem imperative that ways toshare information … sanitised of certain details that mightprove sensitive … should be pursued. The goal of individualorganisations and the community as a whole should be bettersecurity management through better reporting and analysis.This is not just a technical fix: it requires a cultural shift in theprogramming. Box 3: essons from crime tracking? It may prove helpful to ask where lessons may be drawn fromother fields. During the 1980s, police departments in the USbegan to centralise their crime statistics on computerisedtracking systems such as CompStat. This approach toincident mapping has been credited with dramaticallyeducing crime in New York and elsewhere (Smith andBratton, 2001). Its three main principles are:getting the complete picture: understanding the type andsource of threats through a centralised statisticalanalysis/mapping of incidents; based on this analysis, strategically allocating resourcesto high-need areas; and accountability of area commanders for reducing incidentnumbers in their purview.In a policing context, reducing incident numbers wouldarguably (though not necessarily) rely mainly on a deterrenceapproach, in other words putting more officers on the street inplaces where crime is higher. This may have limitedprinciples could still apply. Getting the picture would be agood start. A strategic allocation of security resources couldinvolve protective measures, but could also pinpoint the needfor more community outreach and negotiation in certain areas.The third principle, accountability, is a more difficult issue, andneeds to be addressed within a wider policy framework. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 31 32 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTAnother key finding from Harvards Security ManagementInitiative project (2005) was that accountability frameworksand command structures are generally not suited tooperations in hazardous areas requiring adequate crisismanagement capacities. The question of accountability inhumanitarian security raises the concern that humanitarianaccess will be unduly impeded if managers take an overlyconservative approach in the belief that they will be blamedfor security incidents that occur within their area ofesponsibility. Nonetheless, it is widely agreed thataccountability is key to creating and enhancing field security,and methods have been found to institute accountabilityHCR stresses the concept of due diligence as a criticalfeature of an accountability system. In such an approach,esponsible parties need not answer for any and all securityincidents, but instead must show that all reasonable securityprecautions and protective measures were taken before,during and after the incident. CARE has a policy ofpoints in charge of incident reporting, dissemination andfollow-up. These focal points work under the staff memberesponsible for security, and they are not accountable forsecurity implementation and outcomes. Hence they have noincentive to hold back, downplay or otherwise reinterpretsecurity incidents. (The fact that national staff turnover islower and national staff have a better feel for the localDespite the critical role national staff have come to play insecurity management, their security needs do not figurehighly in agenciessecurity policies, nor do they attractfrom Harvards Security Management Initiative project wasthat security training is generally not made available tonationally recruitedstaff(SMI, 2005). Our case studyconclusions strongly support this view. In Chechnya, forexample, it was found that security and awareness training,when it takes place, is almost exclusively directed atinternationals first, and national management/coordinationstaff second. Security and awareness training rapidlydiminishes to zero outside of management/coordination staff(Harker, 2006). This is despite the fact that national and localstaff in highly insecure contexts experience a significantlygreater share of incidents than international staff, as outlinedin Chapter 2. In the DRC, for example, the study found that themajority of incidents affect national staff, but the majority ofsecurity procedures and most training focus on internationalstaff. Financial and procedural inputs for national staff werefound to be underdeveloped and of low priority(Durrant,Organisational culture may foster a separation betweennational and international staff. Further problems may stemfrom language barriers or an abiding distrust of engagingthe national staffer as a result, or more usually because ofbelligerents and place the agency at risk. The results of thissegregation are that local staff are not fully used as a securityesource, or as transmitters of the agencys message to thelocal population … a key tool of building acceptance (inter-InterActions SAG forum took up the issue of national staff in2001, and drafted a series of Essential Steps. These called onincrease the involvement of national staff in the formationidentify threats to national staff, then reduce theirvulnerability to these threats;establish clarity on security procedures and benefits,especially with regard to evacuation and relocationinclude national staff in preparedness, training and humanesource management procedures.These issues are explored in more detail in Chapter 4.3.8 Financing security and the role of donorgovernmentsThe costs of investment in security have always been weighedagainst programming costs, and security has often been thefirst to go when budget cuts are called for. Many agenciesargue that this has been at the behest of donors. However, incontrast to earlier years, there is greater consensus todayaround the need to dedicate resources to security. The majorgovernment donors, in particular ECHO, USAID and DFID, havesignalled that they will support the costs of security measures.However, challenges remain.In the case of the UN, donors have questioned the need tomaintain funding for the individual security arrangements ofagencies in light of the increased costs being incurred bythe centralised UN security function. Not surprisingly, donorsdo not want to be funding what are seen to be duplicatesystems. UNHCR warrants special mention in this regard.forefront of the UN presence in highly volatile environments,and for this reason has had to develop its own security systemsin parallel to … and in advance of … the rest of the UN system.HCR states that its security system was designed to bedecentralised and field-based (with no security focal point incapitals), and deals with issues unique to the agency. Thismakes it complementary to UNDSS, not redundant to it.Agencies have also raised concerns that the increasing costs HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 32 they must shoulder for a centralised system do not necessarilybring the required operational value. WHOs contribution toDSS, for example, has increased by 148% since 2002. In abroader cost analysis, WFPhas doubled its security investmentevery two years in the past six (UN interviews, 2006). Insurance costs have also dramatically increased … for UNagencies they have more than tripled since 2002 (WHOinterview, 2006).According to one UN agency, UNDSS offersan administrative service, but only very rarely supports agencyteams by deploying security personnel to assist missions.Instead, its staff are based in capitals, in Phase 1 and 2ery little of the extra security funding within the UN hasesulted in extra security budget lines for the UNs NGOimplementing partners. The major donors have financed jointtraining initiatives for international NGOs, and some supporthas been provided to coordinated security management in thefield. However, this has not been a core priority for NGOs. Donors with strong programming ties to international NGOs,and donors that have developed a strong field presencethemselves over the last decade, have also become moresensitive to issues of security, both for their partners and fortheir own staff. ECHO and USAID/OFDA have been among themost active in this context. With a large and diverse group ofnon-NGO partners, and an increasing number of staffdeployed to the field for assessment and auditing, ECHOstarted to examine security issues in late 2003. It supportspartners on hardand softsecurity, including training andadvocacy.OFDA provided all the funding for InterActionsSAG initiative to develop a security training curriculum andpilot courses, and continues to support security managementtraining through RedR (Rogers, 2001).SAIDs approach to operational security must be seenagainst the backdrop of the US governments hardeningsecurity profile overseas. Former USAID Administrator AndrewNatsios has reflected on the contradiction between the trendto make fortressesout of US embassies and offices in foreigncountries, and the recognised need to reach out to localpopulations. Victory in the war against terror will not beachieved because we have adequately protected ourembassies and our AID missions and their employees, hewrote in 2006. The victory we seek requires communicatingideas, values, and world views(Natsios, 2006). A cynicalinterpretation of US behaviour might conclude that, whilegovernment entities have been increasingly bunkerised, thenon-governmental aid providers that bear the USAID brandhave been tasked with spreading American valuesthroughtheir aid programming … and at their peril. As touched onabove, a conspicuous disconnect has appeared between thegovernments support for aid agency security and its use ofaid to win hearts and minds. USAID policies that emphasisebranding and visibility in contexts such as Afghanistan areconsidered life-threatening by many agencies receiving USAIDfunding. However, the agency can apply a branding waivertoaid providers on the ground.The research for this study found two opposing views on thehas been made available to enable implementing partners tomeet security costs; all international NGOs need to do isinclude security measures in their project budgets. OFDA hasgone a step further, with grant guidelines that requireinternational NGOs to note their security measures in theirproposals. On the other side, international NGOs insist thatavailable funding is still inadequate to meet security needs.Some managers complain that donors do not seem to realisethat security costs go beyond radios and lead floor mats. Insituations of high insecurity all programme costs go up. Thismight be dealt with more effectively if the UNs annualconsolidated appeals better accounted for and reflected thesecurity costs of the relief effort as a percentage cost. Finally, despite common concerns regarding access, protectionof staff and adequate resourcing, donors do not have an inter-governmental mechanism to coordinate specifically on issues ofsecurity policy. A shared understanding and coordinated fundingthe confusion and perceptions of competitiveness among3.9 International frameworks and responsibilities ofThe issue of governmental responsibility for aid workersecurity is, of course, much broader than the monetarysupport donor governments provide. Responsibility for aidof war, this protection is enshrined in the Geneva Conventions viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT Box 4: Innovations in financing security measures Some UN agencies, notable UNHCR and WHO, havesupported the training costs of international NGOsecurity posts, in return for additional standby capacity.has regional security budgets which serve as acontingency reserve for responding to new situations ofinsecurity.E builds security funding into project budgets as apercentage benefit per staff member.Mercy Corps International typically puts an extra twopercent on expatriatessalary lines, spreading the cost of 25 Through the Malicious Act Insurance Policy, the premium increased from$200,000 to $1m (based on the number of staff in the field) (WHO interview,26 ECHOs 2004 security review, the eport on Security of Humanitarianersonnel: Standards and practices for the Security of Humanitarianersonnel and Advocacy for Humanitarian Spaceench, English and Arabic. Security has been promoted to the level ofECHOs six key work areas in recent years. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:36 am Page 33 34 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTand the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).tates have a duty to disseminate IHL, train military and otherpersonnel to apply them and deal with individuals suspectedA number of key conventions and frameworks have evolvedsince the establishment of the Geneva Conventions whichhave sought to outline the security situation for aid workersand the responsibilities of states in providing adequateprotection to all civilians (see Box 5). These have beenprimarily driven through the UN. However, it is only recentlythat there has been a concerted attempt to engage memberstates on the issue of impunity and on the responsibilities forsecurity outlined in international frameworks. UNDSS hasdeveloped a programme of work to sensitise member states tosecurity issues, particularly through the mechanism of theHost Country Agreement. The G77 group of states and Chinahave noted that the guidance host countries are providedegarding their responsibilities remains inadequately defined(Bruderlein and Gassmann, 2006; G77 statement, 2003).A number of difficulties face host states in ensuring the safetyof aid workers. There are clear challenges where there is no …or limited … state capacity to ensure access and make facilitiesavailable. This is particularly the case when resources for thearmed forces and police are limited, officers are poorlytrained, salaries are low, corruption is high and there arefactionalised groups within the law enforcement service(Middlebrook and Sedra, 2005). An accountable and effectivejudicial system is also often lacking in such contexts. The lackof law enforcement and accountability reinforces a generalperception of lawlessness and impunity which increases thevulnerability of all civilians, including aid workers. In the DRC,for example, some argue that a weak state and inadequatesecurity structures is the biggest single contributor to causesof insecurity for humanitarian workers (IRIN, 2006b). Thereare also contexts in which, irrespective of capacity, there is aluctance to dedicate military or police resources to providefor aid workerssecurity. This poses an equal if not greaterthreat to field operations.Our data suggests that an international military presence canesult in both positive and negative security impacts. Inforces have been present: the US-led Coalition and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).coordination between these two forces has thwarted efforts toimprove overall security in the country and to hold warlordsaccountable, and has led to a reliance on local militias to fightthe insurgency. This has been detrimental to overall securityand the rule of law (Rubin, 2006; Karim, 2006).In any given context, but particularly where the state is abelligerent in the conflict, operational aid agencies aresensitive to the role of the state in directly and proximatelyprotecting humanitarian workers. For the most part, agenciesdo not want the state to provide protectionfor humanitarianworkers directly; rather, they prefer to distinguish between theprovision of ambient security (the general securityenvironment in which humanitarian work takes place) andproximate security (such as travel escorts and protection ofproperty). Overly protective state arrangements for aidagencies can, in fact, increase insecurity due to perceptions ofpartiality, and can in practical terms influence the ability ofagencies to respond impartially to the needs of the populationmaking them dependent on state police or military escortsfor time-bound access (Harker, 2006). 3.10 Conclusions and future implicationsooking back at security management over the past decade, itis interesting to ask how much has really changed. Therhetoric definitely has, and a number of new initiatives havepointed to the potential course a comprehensive, needs-oriented approach to security management might take. On theside, serious investment has been made in seeing newpolicy to fruition, and international NGOs have made progressin the ever-difficult realm of coordination. However, theseriousness with which agencies now talk about securitymanagement is still not matched by equally serious attemptsto develop and mainstream security management withinorganisations.most among the challenges aid agencies face is the factthat progress is not being made across the system. Security,more than perhaps any other sector, cannot be achieved by Box 5: Key conventions, frameworks and resolutionsConvention on the Safety of United Nations andAssociated Personnel (1994).Security Council Presidential Statement on the Protectionof UN Personnel in Conflict Zones (2000).Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel … Reportof the Secretary-General (October 2000). Security Council Resolution 1502, which condemned allforms of violence against those participating inhumanitarian operations and urged states to ensure thatcrimes against such personnel did not go unpunishedGeneral Assembly Resolution 59/211 on the safety andsecurity of humanitarian personnel and the protection ofUN personnel (2004).General Assembly Optional Protocol 60/123 (2006).27 The resolution creates no new laws, but reaffirms the existingobligations of all parties involved in armed conflict under existinginternational law. It does not mention the International Criminal Court orthe Rome Statute. 28 There are an estimated 11,000 ISAF soldiers and some 20,000 Coalitiontroops in Afghanistan. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 34 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTone agency in isolation, but requires a coordinated approach,particularly in the sharing of information. The host of newincident tracking systems are promising in their technology,but will be of little use if they each pick up only one piece ofthe overall security picture.Donor governments can do a great deal more to promote goodpolicy and practice and increased awareness around securityfor aid operations. This endeavour could start withestablishing a security dialogue among donors themselves.Host governments in particular have a major role to play infostering secure environments for aid operations. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security has stressed that,once the host country government resolves to take seriouslythe need to operationalise support for aid worker security,significant changes become apparent on the ground, even ifstate capacity is weak. From the government down to thepolice officers on the street, a more protective environment ofaid is tangible, and can be felt even in a reduction in the theftof aid resources and corruption.Coordination remains weak at the headquarters level, and isgenerally only effective at the local level when significantsecurity pressures compel agencies to work together. Levels ofaccountability vary and need to be strengthened within asecurity management framework. Across the board, trainingand security inputs to national and local staff and partners areat unjustifiably low levels.In sum, though promising developments seem to be on thehorizon, a great deal of security management is done by default,as a reaction to events that have not been forecast, planned for,mitigated or fully understood. The response by aid agenciesoften lacks a careful strategy, relies heavily on localisedsolutions and leaves a large burden of the risk with local staffand organisations. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 35 36 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 36 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT Both real and perceived changes in the security environmenthave significantly affected the conduct of recent humanitarianoperations. Faced with declining access, humanitarianorganisations have been forced to develop new strategies forservice delivery. While reductions in access and programming,temporary suspensions and evacuations are not new to thehumanitarian community, certain operational adaptationsappear more commonplace in recent years. In particular,esponses have involved increased reliance on national staff,or a shift to working with local partner organisations tomaintain operations. Remote management, as this has beencalled, has had both beneficial and negative effects in terms ofaddressing priority needs, meeting standards in programmingand overall effectiveness. Yet the prevailing feature of remotemanagement has been the reactive and unexamined fashionin which it has been employed by international aid agencies.The steady engagement of local actors in relief efforts over thepast few years brings into question the traditional roles ofinternational humanitarian organisations, while alsopresenting new opportunities and significant challenges.This chapter examines the obstacles that recent securitythreats have created for humanitarian aid programming, andthe changes in service delivery that agencies have adopted inesponse. The considerable devolution of responsibility tolocal actors is explored, along with its attendant risks. Thechapter also examines the broader issues facing local actors inphenomenon of localisationin the future. 4.1 Problems of access in insecure environmentsIn many conflict-related crises, aid worker insecurity poses themost significant challenge to accessing civilians in dire need.educed access due to operational insecurity comes aboutprimarily for two reasons. The first, explored in Chapter 3,depends on whether agencies decide that their staff are able tooperate with reasonable physical safety. The more insecure thesituation is deemed to be, and/or the more restrictive thedecide to initiate or expand its programming in order to reach thetarget population. The second, related, reason is to do with thelevel and nature of financial support for security inputs whichfacilitate movement in the field. In the DRC, for example, the UNhumanitarian coordinator, Ross Mountain, has frequentlyhumanitarian access and aid efforts (Mountain, 2000).There are, of course, a number of other factors that can limitaccess to those in need, which are not necessarily related to ordriven by security conditions. These include:oor infrastructure requiring expensive airlift capacity …often only provided by military actors.olitical and military controls on the movements of aidworkers, which might be enforced by the state or armedactors, and which seek to limit access both geographicallyand temporally.eak international support and pressure to negotiateThe general shift from refugee to internal displacementsituations in recent years, which has resulted in complexaid efforts that require political negotiations with the hoststate in order to secure access. In the last few years, many commentators have suggested that2006b). It is not easy to assess this claim objectively. There are,at best, only proxy indicators to determine levels of access. Asconcluded in Chapter 2, while security incidents against aidoperations have proliferated since the early 1990s, there hasbeen only a small increase in the insecurity of aid workerselative to their rising numbers in field. At the same time,however, there have been some significant shifts in securitypolicies designed to prevent and mitigate risks and enableprogramming in insecure contexts. These include moresophisticated risk and threat analysis, enhanced training,improved communications equipment and other inputs. Inaddition, there has been a policy emphasis on maintaining anoperational presence and staying engaged, rather thanevacuating staff and closing projects. It is reasonable to assumethat, in some insecure contexts, this has increased access. Theeality remains, however, that violence against aid workers hasthe power to rapidly and drastically curtail relief operations. Inone example, in August 2005, MSF Switzerland announced thatit was halting aid to 100,000 Congolese in the province of Iturifollowing the abduction of two of its staff members (MSF, 2006).The inherently reactive way in which the international aidsystem deals with operational insecurity has contributed tosevere disruptions of large-scale humanitarian responses. InDarfur in 2004…2005, for example, there was a dramaticincrease in staff presence, from 228 humanitarian workers inApril 2004 to 11,219, including 915 international staff, in April2005 (OCHA and IASC, 2005). This reflected the need for anurgent mass intervention to meet the humanitarian crisisstemming from the conflict there. Planned projects were wide-anging and ambitious, encompassing every sector andbillion (UN and Partners, 2005). Relatively vice delivery in insecure environments 29 This chapter draws on the significant contributions of Barnaby Willitts-King, who undertook background research and analysis on remote controlprogramming and localisation in insecure environments for this study. Italso draws on the findings from the six field study background papers. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 37 38 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT high levels of insecurity in Darfur did not overly limit thesecurity situation was considered, it was generally perceivedas more permissive than contexts such as Iraq andAfghanistan (interviews, 2006). However, shortly afterdeployment access was constrained in West and NorthDarfur. In these cases, there was a reactive programmingesponse: overall programme budgets were reviseddownwards, operations were temporarily halted and staffevacuated.In West Darfur, for example, UNHCRannounced a 44% reduction in 2006, from $33m to $18.5m,due to access and insecurity (UNHCR, 2006). Access was justas limited for local NGOs and the Sudanese Red Crescent asit was for international agencies (interviews, 2006). Likewisein Iraq following the US-led invasion in 2003, humanitarianprogramming was ambitious, and support for thehumanitarian response was unprecedented: the appeal forIraq was for $2.2 billion to cover the first six monthsworthof emergency needs after the invasion (OCHA, 2003). Fourmonths after the invasion, there were 4,200 national andapproximately 650 expatriate UN staff in Iraq. InternationalNGOs numbered up to 200 by July 2003. After the bombing ofthe UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, thenumber of UN international staff in Baghdad fell to 40, withanother 44 in the safer northern governorates.International NGO numbers also fell rapidly (Carle andThese two examples illustrate the influence of insecurity onprogramming and service delivery. Whilst aid agenciesoperating in conflict zones are keenly aware of the challengesthey face, there has been surprisingly little effort toincorporate security-related factors into pre-programmingdecision-making, or to develop more strategic, policy-basedesponses to operating in highly insecure contexts. There hasalso been a significant shifting of the burden of programminglevel of access local actors may have as compared tointernational staff, and their security needs. The rest of thischapter explores these issues in more detail. 4.2 Remote management as a programme adaptation to4.2.1 Terms and definitionsThere is no commonly agreed terminology or classification ofthe various means by which aid agencies maintain theiroperations in highly insecure contexts. Approaches generallyfall into one of two categories: off-site programming, which isariously known as long arm programming, remote control,remote management, remote supportor the increasinglypreferred term partnership; and cross-border or one-offoperations, described in the past as hit and run, aid on therun, give and go, or window of opportunity.Operating with reduced international staff presence and aeliance on other means to provide aid is by no means a newphenomenon. One of Oxfam GBs earliest responses, to thedroughts in Bihar, India, in 1951, was through local partnersand had some elements of the type of programming that isevident today in insecure environments. Cross-borderprogramming was also used in Ethiopia and Eritrea in the1980s. For aid agencies in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s,low visibility and increased reliance on local staff andpartnering with local agencies were widespread both duringand the Taliban periods (Karim, 2006). Longarm programmingwas a term familiar to agencies conductingoperations in Somalia in the early 1990s and in Afghanistan inthe late 1990s during the US bombing campaign. Quick runs …hit and runand aid on the run… were used by OperationLifeline Sudan in southern Sudan during the late 1990s.Remote controlprogramming has been used in recentcontexts, such as Iraq (where programmes have beenmanaged from neighbouring Jordan) and northern Uganda,but the term is resisted by some on the grounds that it has anegative command and controlconnotation. For this reason,some agencies have recently opted for more benign phrases,such as remote managementand remote support.Despite the variety of labels, the actual tactics employedgenerally have one common ambition: to ensure that aidcontinues to reach the beneficiary population despite securityor access constraints. Most involve international staff actingas the key decision-makers designing and programming thehumanitarian response at a distance from the crisis-affectedarea, or in some cases outside the country in question. Theyinvolve national staff taking on increased responsibility or insome cases a shift to working with local partner organisations,local authorities, private contractors and community-basedorganisations (CBOs). This broad set of approaches is referredto here as remote management.The principle behind remote management is that local actors,through their (assumed) greater knowledge of local conditionsand greater acceptance within the local community, canmaintain a presence at a reduced level of risk than that facedinternational staff. When an agency adopts the remotemanagement approach, it is generally with the understandingthat it is suboptimal and temporary. While programme quality,monitoring and impact might suffer, it is deemed better thanproviding no support at all.It is important to distinguish between deliberate localpartnering and capacity-building, for instance in the context ofdevelopment or natural disaster preparation, and the reactiveoperational modifications examined here. Many organis- 30 See, for example, media releases by ICRC (January 2006), UNHCR (March31 As of April 2006, the UN mission had about 140 staff in Iraq, the majorityof them security personnel (Carle and Chkam, 2006). 32 A further type of adaptation involves suspending service delivery andfocusing instead on advocacy or witnessingefforts on behalf of victims. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 38 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTations, particularly multi-mandated ones, have increasinglysought to work through national staff and local partnerorganisations as part of their overall organisationalobjectives.This phenomenon is seen particularly amonginternational NGOs, which have decreased their percentage ofinternationals in field positions over the years, from about10% international staff in 1997 to 8% in 2005. The major UNhumanitarian agencies, by contrast, have kept a stable ratio ofinternational field staff over the past decade, at around 12%.In general, the older and larger the NGO, the larger thepercentage of national staff. The six largest international NGOfederations had a combined average of 7% international staffto 93% national in 2005, and the two largest, World Vision andE, now have just 2% and 3% internationals respectively.One exception is MSF, which maintains a large expatriate fieldpresence of about 11%; this organisational structure probablyeflects MSFs philosophy of which requires international staff to be present so that theycan speak out on behalf of vulnerable populations. In contexts as diverse as northern Uganda, Chechnya, Somalia,Afghanistan, Iraq, northern Pakistan, Aceh in Indonesia andSudan, a range of remote management approaches have beenimplemented, from short missions to the affected area to Approach Agent Description Potential benefits Potential weaknesses emote control*National staff Agency senior staffdirect programming andmanage local employeesfrom a distance Better oversight problemsNational staff bear greatesponsibility but havemote support National staff Local staff assumeMore flexibility Lack of oversight Dearth of experiencedSub-contractingarrangements cal NGOs Programmes formerlymanaged byturned over to local NGO (organisations)Greater acceptance Better targetingscreen Community partnershiparrangementsarranges for communitygroup or leaders toimplement some portionof its programme (e.g.More stable and familiarpresence to localBetter targeting ofCommunity ownershipMore resilient toepresentative Risk of elite capture Governmentpartnership arrangementsOutsourcinggovernment authoritiesCommercial contractors NGO developsprogramme ingovernment authoritiesand/or hands overexisting programme asexit strategyee for servicearrangement withprivate firm (e.g.trucking company) to dobasic provision developmentMay promote securityvia increased communityMore suitable fordevelopment aims thanemergency reliefIndependence, neutralityGovernment may nothave local support Corruption risk* Although remote controlhas negative connotations to some, we include it as the most appropriate term of reference, particularly to distinguish the directmanagement nature of these arrangements from more hands-off remote supportoperations.able 5: Types of remote management and other programming approaches 33 Some organisations operating in protracted crisis contexts may alreadybe implementing programmes via partner agencies and/or governmentalstructures according to more long-term development models. Increasedinsecurity causes them to rely more heavily on those partners. 34 As described in the methodology section of Chapter 1, these figures wereobtained from agency interviews, annual reports and systematic inference.Figures cover field staff only, not headquarters staff. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 39 40 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT Strategy Modality Implications for security, acceptance and qualityision of funding and/or in kind goods forhumanitarian response to local NGOs, churches,mosques and/or the national Red Cross or RedCrescent society. There are some examples ofinternational NGOs handing over programmes toMay generate acceptance.Quality of programming and financialmanagement may suffer. National staff run programmes, and internationalstaff may make occasional visits to bring funds,monitor programmes and give technicalassistance. A variation on this model is the use ofexpatriates from developing countries, who maybe less at risk than Westerners. visiting due to lack of security infrastructure/carrying cash for programme.Normally to a town or city where security can bemanaged more easily. This may be temporary ormay access programmes by travelling themselves. Beneficiaries exposed to risk in accessingUse of contractors to deliver assistance. Quality of programming may suffer.able 6: Remote control working (adapted from ECHO, 2004) emoval of all or emoval of expatriateemoval of programmestaff and infrastructurefrom insecure areaemoval of programmestaff from insecureareas handing over programmes to national staff to working with localpartners, the local community, local or national governmentauthorities or private contractors. Table 5 provides a typology ofemote management approaches.There has been little policy formulation or strategic thinkingbehind the varying remote managementstrategies that havebeen employed over the past few years. There are very fewdocumented policies or published evaluations on remote man-agement or any other form of remote control/support approach.This is true for both donor governments and operationalagencies. In part, this is because the approach has been seen asa last resort, or as an anomaly. Yet analysis suggests that itoccurs with a level of frequency, for considerable periods of timeand in such a variety of locations that a more strategic approachis necessary. Only ECHO and Oxfam GB have tried to map out thediffering approaches (see Tables 6 and 7). These classificationsare useful attempts to catalogue the differing operationalesponses over the years, and the risks involved.4.2.3 Multiple motivatorsThe factors that drive agencies and sometimes donor govern-ments to consider a remote management approach are multiple. First, the level of insecurity and the expected duration ofinsecure conditions are critical. Most agencies note thatinsecurity for staff is the foremost reason for adopting a remotemanagement approach, alongside whether the insecurity isjudged to be an aberration or more permanent (interviews,2006). Temporary insecurity or expectations thereof oftenprompt staff, including international staff, to go intohibernation, or see the programme being temporarilysuspended and then resumed as before, while the expectationof prolonged insecurity involves investing in a new mode ofprogramming. The size of the programme is also aconsideration. Some agencies note that they would be lesslikely to hand over a large programme to a local partner, butthey might try to manage a small programme remotely throughnational staff (interviews, 2006). The need to maintainpresence for solidarity and/or visibility reasons … what Worldision calls keeping the light on… also encourages a remotemanagement approach, rather than the complete closure of theprogramme (interviews, 2006). This was OCHAs rationale inAceh during the period of martial law, and provides much of theimpetus for agencies maintaining an aid presence in Iraq.The sector in which agencies are programming appears to havea bearing on the decision to shift towards remotemanagement, although opinions as to which sectors aresuitable for remote management differ between agencies.ood aid, for example, is seen as particularly vulnerable toattack. It is easily identified, targeted and redistributed,particularly if in transit, compared to smaller, higher-valueinputs such as water or office equipment. These featurescombined with the fact that food is bulky, often of low value byeight and requires transport logistics, means that someagencies choose not to subcontract to national staff or a localNGO. Instead, local private contractors are often used (as inWFPbegan using private contractors for food transportation in1997, which enabled the agency to avoid direct involvement in HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 40 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT esence Opportunity Issue Risk ExamplesAll staff are able to remainor nearby Solidarity and acceptance Monitoring very difficult Northern Uganda Hit and runCan take advantage offlexiblespace to aidPoor targeting South Sudan Aid on the runNeeds assessmentOutputs rather thanSouth Sudan Give and goNeeds assessmentNo monitoring North Korea indow of opportunity Solid planning required Poor contextual analysis Angola itnessing Solidarity and ability toInsecurity due to lack ofprogramme delivery National staff are able toSolidarity Profile/perceptions Afghanistan Coordination of fieldMust have well-trainedLack of back-stoppingganda itnessing Possible limited ability toInsecurity due to lack ofprogramme delivery Southern Iraq organisation)tnerships Transferring exposure Poor contextual analysis Iraq Consortium Channelling money Transparency andneutrality Eritrea emote controlprogramming Security of national staff Staff targeted Kosovo emote controlNational staff exposure Staff or office targeted DRC emote controlcoordination National staff exposure Requires goodIraq Arms length Solidarity Cash Angola emote controlcoordination Lack of staff consent Arms length Poor monitoring/recordLack of transparency Chechnya tnerships Solidarity Lack of impartiality DRC tnerships Quality of work Poorly trained stafftnerships Solidarity andLack of impartiality Uganda tnerships Access to population inuelling war economy DRC atronage Transparency Monitoring very difficult Southern Sudan Contractorsemote controlInspection of works Monitoring very difficult Ugandaable 7: Classification of programming responses to insecurity (Oxfam, 2006) security incidents (Gundel, 2006). Goods are also more securebecause Somali transporters are protected by armed vehiclesand their local knowledge, membership of the clan system andaccess to traditional jurisprudence mechanisms (Gundel, 2002and 2006). Distribution and some monitoring are then usuallypassed on to CBOs or other local organisations, which canperform these functions more cheaply than private contractorsor INGOs (Gundel, 2006). At other times, the type ofequipment and transportation is a factor. Heavy infrastructureand equipment are considered difficult to channel throughnational staff or local partners. For example, when West Darfurwas declared a Phase 4 area by the UN, water remained themost important activity for UNICEF. But because heavy rigsand pipes could not be moved with a helicopter (the onlytransport mechanism available), very few new pumps wereinstalled. Instead, bringing in petrol to keep the existing waterpumps running was the priority, as well as the rehabilitation ofexisting wells (interviews, 2006). HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 41 42 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTIn contrast to food aid and heavy infrastructure projects,several agencies have found that soft servicessuch aseintegration and psychosocial programmes may be moreeasily undertaken by local entities. In northern Uganda, forexample, with no access even for national staff, World Visiontrained community volunteers to carry out a child soldiereintegration programme (interviews, 2006).Agencies claim that the level of vulnerability and need amongaid by remote management. As a general rule, most agenciesclaim that life-saving interventions are prioritised as long aspossible, and if this is the service delivery goal then the rationaleto maintain delivery by some means is much stronger than itwould be if development work was being undertaken. Inpractice, however, it is not the case that only life-savingprogrammes are prioritised. In Iraq, for example, many aid actorshave chosen to concentrate on areas which are fairly safe andstable to the detriment of the most difficult areas in terms ofaccess and security. Indeed, most agencies tend to work in areaswhere their resources and capabilities have the greatest chancesof yielding results, and where they are able to assume securityesponsibilities for their staff. This has led agencies to distancethemselves not only from the humanitarian imperative, but alsofrom the principle of impartiality (Carle and Chakm, 2006). It hasalso hindered the collection of reliable data on livelihoods,vulnerabilities, internal displacement and basic welfare needs.Donor governments with programmes in Iraq have contributed tothis tendency by not always supporting basic welfareprogrammes, and by preferring capacity-building programmesthat foster democratisation, the rule of law and goodgovernance, because their own political agendas deem these toactors influencing whether an agency switches to remotemanagement can also be highly context-specific. The range ofpossible local partner organisations and the quality of nationalstaff and their freedom and capacity to operate in a given countryor region are factors. In Colombia, for example, WFPworksentirely through 1,700 church groups and local communitygroups. By contrast, in Chechnya, very few local NGOs work asimplementing partners due to the general level of mistrust thatexists there, although working through national staff is common(Harker, 2006). In the DRC, many international NGOs have foundit difficult to identify viable national NGO partners, citingconcerns about lack of capacity, political affiliations and theopinion that many NGOs are in fact private enterprisesestablished for financial gain (Durrant, 2006). In the DRC,international NGOs have in some cases embraced partnershipswith local government authorities not only because they believethat such initiatives will be more sustainable, but also due to thedearth of capable local NGOs (Durrant, 2006).There are a number of evident benefits to remote management.First, it avoids the complete closure of operations and allowsfunding to continue to flow (a particular imperative for manyagencies with operations in Iraq). Second, the securityenvironment is sometimes better upon re-entrybecause localknowledge has not been completely lost, as might have beenthe case if the office and programme had closed. It can alsocreate an opportunity for closer community involvement inprogrammes. In Afghanistan, for example, a greater level ofinvolvement on the part of local authorities and shuras inprogrammes has been shown to have the potential for greaterbuy-in (Karim, 2006). However, remote management in all itsdifferent forms also creates a number of challenges. These areconsidered below.4.3.1 Established relations and communication ong relations with the local partner or national staff arefundamental to successful remote management. In situationswhere country programme managers and key international staffare well known to national staff, the organisation has been in-country for several years or even decades, expatriate staffturnover is stable and some travel to the country is possible,trust can normally be maintained between the field andepositioned staff. By contrast, in cases where internationalstaff are young and inexperienced, based in a different countryand working with local staff they have never met, in a countrythey cannot visit, establishing the trust required for successfulemote management will be very difficult. This has been theexperience of many organisations with no programme history inIraq prior to 2003 (Carle and Chakm, 2006).sits of national staff to the remotelocation were the mostcommon response to foster relationships. Visits by internationalstaff to the country programmes were also consideredessential, if they could be carried out: in Iraq, for example,mote management was described as working almostexclusively when expatriates can meet regularly with their staffin Iraq(Carle and Chakm, 2006). However, opportunities forcontact can remain limited when movements are restricted,visas are hard to obtain or staff are not issued with a passport.Cultural and linguistic differences appear to be given littlepriority in staff training and support, and this is a significantchallenge for the future. On the positive side, the rise of emailand mobile phone communication enables remote managersto keep in contact with staff or partners in ways that wereimpossible in the past. The challenge may be to surmount aner-reliance on such mechanisms, which can be problematicwhen such technologies function only intermittently. Theremay also be a tendency to focus on technological fixes at theexpense of addressing some of the other issues in distancemanagement described below.4.3.2 Strategic planning and coordinationMaintaining a strategic focus and direction to the overallplanning and programme can be difficult when managers areabsent from the country and unable to conduct needs HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 42 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTassessments or measure impact. There is a tendency for remotemanagement programmes to maintain the status quo, ratherthan responding to emerging needs. This is due to a range offactors, including the information deficit (there is little sharingof information between agencies, or with the authorities),movement and access restrictions and a low-profile securityapproach. Remote managers are generally cautious when itcomes to making radical changes. There can also beconsiderable coordination challenges, and several intervieweesmentioned constraints around networking with decision-makers outside of the context of operation. There are, however,examples of how these constraints can be overcome.Networking may be more straightforward in contexts whereagencies are clustered together, as they are in the Somaliaprogramme based in Nairobi, for example (Gundel, 2006).mote management also poses challenges for fundraising.Although in some cases donors are willing to reducemonitoring and evaluation requirements in situations of highinsecurity, a programme that cannot be effectively monitoredis unlikely to attract sustained donor interest, and futurefundraising may be difficult. 4.3.3 Service delivery and advocacyemote management does not necessarily overcome theoperational constraints to service delivery that encouraged itsadoption in the first place. Insecurity is likely to still restrictthe movement of local partners, staff or equipment in certainareas at certain times. The additionalmanagementstructures imposed as part of remote management may alsocreate additional operational burdens. Decision-making mayslow down due to the need to contact the remote manager,and more time is spent travelling to and from the projectareas. More fundamentally, the ability to undertake effectiveneeds assessment is often compromised, as is accuratetargeting. Reduced standards sometimes have to be accepted.In the North Caucasus, for example, the British Red Crossintroduced blanket coverage instead of targeted aid as theonly way to avoid national staff being pressurised or put atrisk for delivering aid to the wronggroups, even though thisapproach resulted in poorer targeting.Advocacy strategies are also affected by a remotemanagement approach. Agencies undertaking a low-profileapproach may be unwilling to advocate in public forums forthe needs of those they serve. On the other hand, thoseagencies that do undertake advocacy have been consideredsome to be putting other operating agencies atconsiderable risk when their strategies have been targeted atone of the parties to the conflict, or generally giving too muchvisibility to aid activities when a low-profile approach might bepreferable (interviews, 2006). or donors and aid organisations, the absence of internationalstaff creates concerns around the quality and accountability ofprogrammes, as well as corruption (Willitts-King and Harvey,2005). These concerns are more relevant for donorgovernment-funded projects than for work financed privately.All of the organisations interviewed reported a reduction intheir capacity to monitor programmes or ineffectivemonitoring … whether by international or national staff … andmost also cited evidence of corruption. At the level ofporting, agencies also identified a lack of capacity amonglocal partners to prepare reports, both financial and innarrative form, though this is highly variable across contextsand between local NGOs. A few respondents reported caseswhere an international agency required more stringentporting practices from their local sub-grantees than wasdemanded by the primary donor (interviews, 2006).Finding a reasonable way to ensure accountability whileaccepting that quality and programme standards may drophas been paramount in programme decision-making. For themost part, this has focused on upwards accountabilitytowards donors, in terms of reporting and monitoringsystems. One international NGO in northern Uganda set upsystems of cross-checking between different national staff,but corruption was still observed on a donor visit in the formof uncompleted work that had been paid for. Anotherinternational NGO in Uganda used photographic evidence bycontractors, although this is not always applicable since notall projects lend themselves to such documentation.Downwards accountability towards beneficiaries has hadsignificantly less attention than it deserves, despite the factthat, in remote management contexts where upwardsaccountability is more difficult, such mechanisms …transparency over entitlements, or community monitoring andsystems for complaints redress … may be especiallyinformative and useful for programming. In the NorthCaucasus, the Danish Refugee Council has implementedsuccessful beneficiary complaints procedures for fooddistribution (Willitts-King and Harvey, 2005). While arguablymore difficult without the presence of international staff,4.3.5 Human resources … recruiting and retaining good-taffing capacity is a common limitation to remote management.This is not, of course, limited to local staff … the dearth ofqualified staff globally was identified in the Humanitarianesponse Review (2005), and recruitment in high-risk contexts isan even greater challenge than in more stable environments. InSudan, Iraq and the DRC, it is not uncommon for programmes tooperate with empty international staff positions, or withThe case studies in the DRC, Iraq, Somalia and Chechnya alsoidentified major human resource constraints in workingthrough local partners and staff. Recruiting national staff inSomalia, for example, is fraught with clan-related difficulties … HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 43 44 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTthe case study highlighted contractualissues as one of themajor challenges, be it the need to employ members of aparticular clan/ethnic group or the risk of retribution if a staffmember is dismissed. Retribution was a potential risk inChechnya and Iraq too. Coercion was also a theme in mostcontexts. In Chechnya, for example, local NGOs are seen asmore likely to be influenced by local clans. In Iraq, the lowprofile adopted by local agencies has meant that advertisingtransparently for posts is impossible, so new personnel havetended to be recruited through existing staff, increasing theopportunities for nepotism and coercion (Willitts-King, 2006). 4.4 The ethics of localisation in response to insecurityOne of the core assumptions of remote management is thatnational staff and local partners are at less risk thaninternational staff, or at least have a higher threshold for riskand thus are more likely to deliver against programme goals.This assumption is open to question, however, given the findingof increasing casualty rates suffered by national staff describedin Chapter 2. In particular, in the areas with the highest numberof violent incidents against aid workers (Afghanistan, Chechnya,the DRC, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan), the risk to national staffappears to be rising significantly year on year, while the riskfacing international staff is declining. Qualitative evidence fromunderestimate the risk to themselves. While their superior localknowledge and information networks will provide them withmore detailed situational awareness, it is also true thatfamiliarity can breed over-confidence. Individuals who havelived in a place the longest often find it most difficult toecognise new or growing threats. In Iraq, for example, someinternational organisations urged more caution and controlser the movement of their local partners than local staff at firsttly due to reliance on such assumptions, the ethics oftransferringsecurity risks away from expatriate staff towardsnational or local NGO staff have not been fully considered.ather, decisions are driven partly by organisational culture,and partly by individual managers on the ground. As ECHOsSecurity Review (2004) makes clear, however, handing overprogrammes to local staff or organisations raises inherentlyThe delegation of programming activities toanother organisation is an explicit recognition ofdifferent levels of tolerance for insecurity. Somehumanitarians feel that this strategy takesadvantage of the differences between humani-tarian organisations in order to effectively meethumanitarian need, and that it is the preserve ofeach organisation to set its threshold of acceptablerisk. Others feel that there is a serious abrogationof responsibility in supporting the exposure ofhumanitarian personnel in another organisation torisks which have been deemed unacceptable forour own organisation (ECHO, 2004a).organisation to ask local entities or personnel to exposethemselves to threats that they are unwilling to face themselves?The presumed answer of course would be no: remotemanagement will only be employed when the risk is lower forlocal organisations or staff members than for internationals. Buthow is this determined? Most agencies do not have set criteria toassess risk or to guide the decision to shift to remotepart, is a desire not to disrupt funding flows and to maintain afoothold in the area. There are sound programming principles asell as financial reasons to justify this position, but theseconsiderations must be examined alongside honest appraisalsof potential threats to national staff, in order to determinewhether or not they outweigh the risk. International decision-makers not only have a responsibility tolevelof risk to national staff; they also have adifferent kindsof risk faced bynational staff. It must be remembered that local staff aremembers of the community in ways that expatriates are not, andwill stay long after expatriates have left. They will facequalitatively different risks, including the potential loss ofincome for themselves and their families should a programme beterminated. Both local as well as international staff areautonomous individuals who have the right to take risks in orderto provide aid to those in need. And yet, because of theinterdependence of security threats faced by members of thesame organisation (and indeed, between different organisationsoperating in the same area, as Chapter 3 demonstrates), thisright is not limitless. For these reasons, policies and guidelinesshould govern staff behaviour in ways that promote the securityof staff as a whole. To date, however, most guidelines andpractice do not fully take into account the unique threats,incentives and circumstances faced by national staff. Thisamounts to a failure by agencies to fully consider the ethicalIn addition, as Chapter 3 argues, national staff are typicallyunder-represented in security training and in thedisbursement of assets, and local partneragencies are givenless, and often no, support. Very few agencies have a specificpolicy on what security-related equipment, such as vehicles ordios, would be handed over to national staff and/or localpartners when security deteriorates and international staffhave to leave. Some argue that this is primarily due to thespecific nature of different programme contexts and thediffering capacities of national staff and local partners. Manyagencies stated that they do not hand over any equipment tolocal partner organisations in cases where there is a reductionin expatriate staffing levels (Willitts-King, 2006). This generaldearth of security inputs is a grave concern considering notonly their increasing vulnerability, but also the fact that a HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 44 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTsignificant source of security information comes from localand national staff. There were a few exceptions to this lack ofinvestment; Oxfam, for example, has run a securitymanagement programme for a local organisation in southSomalia. The programme included identifying risks, teachingstaff how to undertake security assessments and developingsecurity plans and procedures. The ICRC and IFRC also providetraining to national societies. Box 6 highlights elements ofICRCs Safer Access framework (Leach and Hofstetter, 2004). A second assumption that drives a shift towards remotemanagement is the belief that local staff are perceived morefavourably and have greater acceptanceamong the host andbeneficiary communities simply by virtue of their being of theplace(UN and NGO interviews, 2006). Reflecting thiswidespread belief, ECHO states that acceptance has beenecognised as key to enhanced security, and having localorganisations at the frontline of humanitarian action is one wayto achieve enhanced acceptance(ECHO, 2004). Becausenational staff are seen to enjoy increased acceptance, securitymeasures employing the other elements of the security triangle(protection and deterrence) are viewed as less necessary.Assumed acceptance(Van Brabant, 2000), however, is just asdangerous when applied to a particular segment of staff asorganisation as a whole. As an example, a national staffmember hired by an international agency and sent to work ina distant part of the country would be no more of the placethan his or her expatriate colleagues. National aid workersmay also face greater local resentment or perceptions ofpartiality. Whatever the reasons, it is clear from the highalways benefit from unfettered acceptance by thecommunities in which they work. Whether a failure to achieve acceptance is rooted in a failureto adhere to the humanitarian principle of neutrality has beenthe subject of considerable debate. Examples abound in whichperceived or actual breaches of neutrality seem to have playeda role in prompting attacks. In Sudan, for example, nationalstaff were targeted more often when considered bygovernment or militias to be working for the other side(interviews, 2006). This was also the case in Aceh during theperiod of martial law. The Iraq case study, and Greg Hansensevaluation of NCCI, identified major risks in this politicallycharged environment, where relatively minor lapses [in actualor perceived neutrality] can have major consequences(Chkam and Carle, 2006; Hansen, 2004b).More specifically, some acceptancestrategies employed bylocal actors may breach humanitarian principles by involvingquestionable levels of accommodation to the interests ofbelligerents, such as payment for access and the diversion oflarge quantities of aid. The risks presented by such actions areamplified when remote management practices are employed. Box 6: ICRCs Safer Access framework for nationalNational Societies in a conflict environment should incorporatethe nine elements for safer access into their operations. Theseelements are:Conflict environmentUnderstanding the general characteristics and trends ofconflict, as well as the factors which comprise the existingconflict, is critical knowledge for a National Society to have inorder to maintain its safety and have continued access toNational Society legal and policy base for actionKnowing the legal base of a National Society to providehumanitarian assistance and protection in all types of conflictis crucial foundational knowledge for any National Society.Acceptance of organisationOne of the most important and essential actions is for aNational Society to work towards positioning itself in such amandate in conflict response, should the occasion arise.Individual staff and volunteers of all components of theMovement are viewed as representatives of the organizationfor which they are working, on and off duty.Inappropriate use and protection of the Red Cross or RedCrescent emblems in peacetime can seriously hamper theimage and acceptance of the National Society and otherMovement components during conflict.National Societies must have a clear external communicationplan and guidelines, and train their personnel accordingly inorder to avoid any potential use of information aspropaganda, any misinterpretation and/or confusion.systems are fundamental to the effectiveness of ahumanitarian conflict response operation, not only todetermine what actions are required where, but also infacilitating safer access to beneficiaries.Security regulationsAll National Societies, even in peacetime, should havesecurity/safety regulations to protect their personnel andassets. These regulations are one important aspect of anerall security management approach.otective measuresotective measures can be described as additional securitymeans to ensure the physical protection of people, goods orplaces against identified threats or dangers. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 45 46 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTIt may be especially important for local actors to achieveacceptance by adhering to the principle of neutrality given thattheir rootedness in the community makes them more likely tobe partial, or to be seen as partial. Internationals, by the verynature of their foreignness, may … in certain contexts … bemore readily accepted as neutral actors. Despite evidence ofthe particular importance of neutrality for local actors, thisstudy suggests that international agencies do not give seriousprinciples. Rather, local entities are assumed to have highlevels of acceptance, and insufficient attention is devoted tohow and why this may not be the case.4.5 Best (or simply better) practices for remoteAlthough there may be a scant supply of experienced andtechnically proficient local professionals in many crisis contexts,there is unlikely to be a shortage of local actors willing to takeup the mantle of humanitarian response. On both anorganisational and an individual level, there are powerfuleasons why these actors will be ready to assume the additionalpartnership arrangements with international organisations areseize every opportunity that arises. Other local organisationsare formed around given emergencies and aid influxes.Individuals also have economic reasons to engage in reliefwork. The importance of humanitarian organisations as localemployers in areas of conflict and/or dire poverty is well known.Individuals will also feel a strong altruistic drive to help theirneighbours and countrymen, and may forego opportunities toleave or to pursue more lucrative work in order to do so.The history of humanitarian operations reflects a long andsteady movement from simply trying to do good, to trying todo good well. From the days of dumping food off the back oftrucks, the aid system has advanced considerably in everysector, as expertise and professionalism have grown, andstandards and best practices have developed. It is fair to saythat, before each such improvement, there was a prevailingattitude among aid practitioners that lack of time andsources prevented them from doing any better. Securitymanagement in general is one of the most recent (and perhapsmost difficult) areas for enhancement, and the practice ofemote management in particular may be on the frontiers ofcollaborative improvement. emote management may be seen as an unfortunate necessity,a difficult option in difficult situations, but it need not be bereftof prior planning and guiding principles. Specifically, eachagency must ensure that its duty of care applies equally to all ofits employees, regardless of nationality. This duty of careextends in some degree to partner organisations as well. Thislast point will no doubt prove contentious, but it should beemembered that the international aid presence begets thelocal aid presence in many contexts. Many local organisationswould not be operational or even exist without international aidfunding. In this sense there is a relationship, and thus aesponsibility, from the international donors all the way down tothe local end-use providers.The following basic guidelines may serve as a starting-point:An agencys risk threshold can rise in line with the severityof need, but should apply equally for all staff regardless ofnationality. Security assessments should differentiate between risksfor national and for international staff, while consciouslyavoiding faulty assumptions regarding the level ofexposure national staff can tolerate. Although national andinternational staff will face different specific threats (i.e.,kidnapping or political targeting), the level of risk toleratedshould be the same for both groups.So that they can make informed and equitable choices,national staff deserve transparent policies on evacuation,termination pay and the transfer of security equipmentafter the departure of international staff.ecurity plans should include contingencies forprogramming with reduced staff presence or from remotelocations. These plans will ideally be shared andationalised with those of other agencies within inter-agency security fora.As part of the planning and preparedness process, theagency should identify potential local partners in the eventof a reduction or withdrawal … recognising that the mostappropriate partner for remote sub-contracting may not bethe agencys current partner, but rather the local NGO, CBOor local authority with the greatest capacity to operateindependently and/or with the least exposure to the giventhreat.emote sub-contracting arrangements should include thetransfer of security assets, including appropriate com-munications equipment and vehicles, to partner entities.Outsourcing of programme services to commercial contrac-tors should include a security surcharge, to allow contractorsto purchase additional protective inputs as necessary.Agencies should develop specific and monitored policieson contractorsuse of payments for access.Ultimately, a set of standards and best practices for remotemanagement should be developed by agencies, andmaterially supported by donors. These guidelines would haveaid effort. In this regard, a helpful resource is a 2001 report forThe Security of National Staff: TowardsGood Practices, by John Fawcett and Victor Tanner. Theirproposed steps to enhance national staff security echo manyof the points raised in this chapter, and are worthy ofeiteration here. They also note that, while it is important toallow space for innovation and adaptation at the local level,the lack of policy on the security of national staff often HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 46 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTindicates an agencys failure to fully consider or develop aprincipled approach to this issue.4.6 Future prospects: towards the planned localisationof response capacityCurrent remote management practices often shift programminga lower level of risk than international entities or personnel. Ashave seen, this assumption is frequently faulty, and simplyshifts the burden of risk to the locals that have stepped into thebreach (and without many of the security inputs enjoyed byinternational organisations). At the same time, this studysfindings support the idea that a localised response capacity … ifplanned and invested in strategically … could lead in some casesto greater security for humanitarian operations.A large part of the humanitarian endeavour is underpinned bythe belief that an international aid intervention amounts to morethan the sum of its goods and services. It is often asserted(though without direct evidence) that the presence of inter-national aid entities can lend a measure of protection to civiliansand even help to stabilise volatile situations. While this may wellbe true in some cases, in others, particularly in the currentsecurity environment, the reverse can apply. Somalia is onespecific example where actors on the ground have seen how aidinputs in some locales have destabilised the security situation,increasing criminality and exacerbating the daily threats facingall inhabitants (Gundel, 2006). In Iraq, where virtually all foreign-based entities are under intense threat, the national RedCrescent has maintained a degree of acceptance and access(Chkam and Carle, 2006). Localised relief response in such casescan be the best way of maintaining critical operations.The difficulty, however, comes down to the humanitariandilemma of lack of capacity to build capacity. Whilst there isclear evidence of a growing national component to aid efforts, ittends to be dominated by efforts towards capacity-building indevelopment contexts and in natural disaster risk mitigation;assistance capacity for response in conflict environments(Christoplos, 2005). In relief contexts, the majority ofelationships are primarily about the delivery of specific reliefitems through a sub-contracting relationship, and capacity-building often only extends as far as training to meet theequirements of the contracting agency in terms of financial andnarrative reporting (Smillie, 2001; Christoplos, 2005). Supportfor local preparedness for emergency response has tended tobe limited to stockpiling warehouses with plastic sheeting andother asset distribution responsibilities. Even in contexts suchas Chechnya, where the development of national staff capacityis a relatively high priority among international NGOs, and isviewed as important preparation for possible future insecurity,agencies rarely have in place contingency plans on exactly hownational staff would function should a shift to remotemanagement take place (Harker, 2006).Organisations that explicitly have local partnership as part oftheir modus operandi (not merely their rhetoric), includingsome of the church-networked NGOs which have a lowexpatriate footprintin the field, have made considerableinstitutional investment in building long-term relationships.or example, Christian Aids programme in Afghanistan overthe past 20 years has arguably contributed to thedevelopment of local NGOscapacity to become major servicedelivery organisations, and to scale up in response to acutecrises. CAREs Somaliland Partnership project is anotherexample of an initiative that explicitly aims to buildinstitutional capacity within local NGOs (Willits-King, 2006). Inaddition, organisations with a specific capacity-buildingmandate, such as the IFRC, which has a responsibility to workwith national societies, show what can be achieved in complexemergency contexts. These examples are, however,exceptions to the general rule of an internationally driven andinternationally managed response system.aced with changing security threats, international relieforganisations have both constrained humanitarian operationsand developed new strategies for operational engagement.The implications for humanitarian policy and programming areserious and wide-ranging. The positive and negative effects ofemote management are, in themselves, worthy of greaterpolicy consideration and lesson-learning between organ-isations. More importantly, the increasing reliance on nationalstaff and local entities as implementing partners, combinednational staff, raises both ethical and operational issues forthe international aid community. In particular, the premium Box 7: Extract from The Security of National Staff:wards Good Practicessecurity of all staff without differentiation, and backs upits commitment with measurable resources. National staff fully participate in security managementprocedures, and in some cases even lead them, from thedesign of security plans to training and decision-makingon the main issues concerning the security of all staff.evaluating the performance of managers and supervisors.acuation should not be the cardinal issue of nationaltimes of crisis, and is often not expected by national staff.The agency is transparent in its security and personnelprocedures, and is clear on its expectations of nationalstaff; this is critical to promoting the security of all staff.Agency-wide policies lay out the agencys generalsecurity and personnel philosophy, but consistently deferto field-based practices that integrate local realities. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 47 48 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTplaced on service delivery rather than investment in thecapacities of partners is highly questionable, and implies anunacceptable heightening of the risk threshold for non-international staff. More needs to be done by way of strategicpolicy formulation, to ensure that the development of localcapacity is an objective rather than a by-product of such aesponse, especially where life-saving work is not beingundertaken. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 48 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORT5.1.1 The trickle-down effects of risk controlThis report has found that, whereas overall incidents of violencehave increased across the globe, the overall relative risk to aidworkers has risen only marginally. Moreover, in the most violentper aid worker in the field has declined over time. One may con-clude from these findings that there has been a net improvementin field security management, and/or that operational policesand practices have become increasingly restrictive.However, other findings indicate that improvements and/orestrictive practices have not been universally adopted. Whilstthe risk to international aid workers has declined, the relativerisk for national staff and partner organisations has increased.Although by no means intentional, some of the risk burdenhas in effect been transferred. UN personnel have becomemore secure than international NGOs, and international NGOshave in turn seen their international staff become safer, whiletheir national staff and partners suffer increasing casualties.5.1.2 Significant reforms, but fragmented progress stillinvesting in security policies and guidelines, institutingtraining and the provision of additional security posts, as wellas the increased reporting, collating and storing of securityincidents, have occurred over the last decade. Although thelevel of incident reporting, recording and analysis remainspoor overall, a few notable initiatives (such as the SIRS andVRA reporting systems) have the potential to substantiallyimprove security. However, the incentives and drivers forsharing information and analysis between agencies remaineak, especially at the headquarters level. This threatens toderail progress in the security field, which requires a highdegree of coordination and information sharing to besuccessful. The aid community stands at a crossroadsbetween substantive security enhancement for the system asa whole, and overlapping, uncoordinated and unproductiveefforts, which could do more harm than good.tates have only recently focused on their responsibilities incontexts of insecurity … whether as aid donors or as hosts.Meeting the security challenges outlined here also dependson how security measures are financed, and whether and howdonor governments support more coordinated inter-agencyefforts, and coordinate security policy among themselves.More critically, the pressures to maintain donor branding andvisibility of funding sources, as well as the general pressure onpartners to remain engaged in areas of strategic interest, needto be reconsidered.5.1.3 The challenges of providing aid in insecure contexts Contrary to conventional wisdom, the most dangerousoperational environments for aid workers are not those withthe highest level of overall violence. Nor do external,contextual factors … such as the presence of internationalforces or a UN integrated mission … appear to have a strongbearing on the incidence of violence against aid workers. Thatsaid, the security behaviour of aid actors may change becauseof certain external influences (such as the arrival ofpeacekeeping forces), and this should be carefully consideredin future operational and security planning. Although no single political variable appears to cause higher aidworker insecurity, the threats facing aid workers (and otherinternational workers) are clearly intertwined with overlyingpolitical contexts and processes. While it is by no means aguarantee that the principles of operational neutrality andindependence will make aid agencies safer in volatileenvironments like Afghanistan, Iraq or Darfur, aid agenciesshould be concerned not to heighten still further the perceptionthat they are associated with political processes in thesecontexts. International agencies have not prioritisedhumanitarian principles in identifying partners in thesecontexts. This requires further consideration. The increased use of protection and deterrence is evidentwhere a high risk of political targeting is perceived. By visiblyincreasing protective or deterrent measures, there is apossibility that other aid actors, including local partners, maybecome more insecure by default … particularly in contextswhere militant movements view aid operations as softtargets. Generally poor information sharing and com-munication on approaches, tactics and security analysisbetween agencies only heighten this risk. In addition, theincreased isolation from beneficiaries and the host communityentailed in the use of low-profile protective measures or moreexplicit deterrent measures has the dual effect of increasingprogramming challenges, and distancing the agency fromsources of information that might enhance security. Whilst acceptance remains the bedrock operational approachfor agencies in most contexts, passive approaches toacceptance … whereby acceptance is assumed rather thanbrokered and maintained throughout the duration of themission … have had difficult and sometimes fatalconsequences. Subsequently, some humanitarian organis-ations have increased their investment in this strategy,political economy of conflict, and to negotiate with anincreasingly diverse range of armed groups to ensure and Conclusions and recommendations HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 49 50 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT5.1.4 A hazardous practice: the need to improve remoteIt should be emphasised that security is not a zero-sumproposition. In other words, enhanced security for inter-nationals does not necessarily cause or entail an increased riskfor nationals. Nor is it a conscious decision by internationalagencies to increase national staff exposure when securityconditions deteriorate. However, the widespread practice ofmoving to remote managementin times of heightenedinsecurity is currently and unplanned. This creates bothphysical and ethical hazards. Risks to national staff arefrequently underestimated … both by international agencies andnationals themselves. The relative lack of security trainingand equipment provided to nationals reinforces falseassumptions about their inherent security. Therefore, it seemssafe to say that international agencies bear some degree ofesponsibility for the increase in violence against national aidworkers. The solution is not for UN agency and internationalstaff in general to take on more risk, but for aid providers,donors and governments to focus efforts on improving theoperational security environment for national aid workers.Security-adapted programming such as remote managementalso requires greater policy attention as a programmingapproach in itself, especially as it looks set to remain in place inmany contexts. Whilst it avoids the complete closure ofoperations and allows funding to continue to flow, it posesprogrammatic challenges, including for needs assessment andtargeting, monitoring, accountability and strategic planning.More needs to be done by way of strategic policy formulationto ensure that programme effectiveness is maintained, andthat the risk to national providers is accurately assessed andmitigated. These findings point to a need to address theproblem of building local capacity. The development of localcapacities should be seen as an objective, rather than a by-product of operating in insecure environments, requiring afundamental shift in the way the humanitarian responsesystem is driven and managed. This is not to ignore theattendant risks that come with more localised responses, butto suggest that the current operating environment is anuncomfortable and unsustainable halfway house.5.2 RecommendationsThe recommendations below attempt to address some of thekey areas of weakness identified in this report. The researchteam did not consider it helpful to address the full range ofpolicy and operational issues that merit consideration by aidproviders and donors. While numerous, many of these gapshave already been considered by previous studies, andguidelines for action can be found in the existing literature onoperational security (which remains, unfortunately, well aheadof practice). Rather, we have identified areas for action whichflow from the main conclusions of the study regarding securitymanagement, coordination and financing; overall approachesto aid in volatile and politicised contexts; and the security ofnational aid staff and partners. The recommendations focus onfour main stakeholder groups: individual operational agencies,inter-agency networks, the UN and its humanitarianprogrammes and funds and donor governments. Thecommendations conclude with a section identifying issuesequiring further study and strategic thinking.5.2.1 Operational agenciesithin each agency, develop incentives for field securityincident data reporting. Rather than developing additionalparallel systems, make use of software platforms alreadyavailable (e.g. VRA) to promote centralised data sharing andDevelop and invest in proactive acceptancestrategies,which are continually pursued and maintained through thelife of the programme.dentify and support an equitable level of security inputsfor local actors, including national staff. This shouldinclude proportionate representation in security trainingand briefings and the provision of security materials in thenational language, as well as access to security assetsIncorporate security-related adaptations such as remotemanagement options into programme planning andpreparedness exercises, and develop criteria coveringwhen to deploy them. Ideally, this should be done in inter-agency security fora at the field level, so that plans can beshared and coordinated.Develop guiding principles and a practical knowledge baseon remote management and other adaptations inprogramming used when international access declines.Guiding principles will include considerations of how toaccurately assess risk to local staff and ethical issues toguard against the shifting of the risk burden on local entities,who may be less able to ensure their own security and mayeasons. This should be a particular consideration whenprogrammes are not life-savingactivities.Where possible, explore programmatic ways to emphasiseand invest in capacity rather than simply project delivery.5.2.2 Inter-agency stepsIncrease the sharing and storing of desensitisedincidentinformation and analysis … based on indicators agreedthrough inter-agency fora. This should be done in such away that it is non-resource intensive.Inter-agency field security services (such as that of ANSO)should be set up for this purpose. This should involve moreanalysis and identification of patterns/trends. Where pos-sible, government authorities should be involved to increasethe host states awareness and overall responsibility.Include security resource requirements in the ConsolidatedAppeals Process as programme-related costs; standardisingthis costing at the sector level would be helpful. HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 50 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTAddress shortcomings in the dissemination, utilisation andunderstanding of existing security tools and methods. Forsurvey and promote the sharing of recent innovationsin the financing of core and programme securityesources;survey and increase the common development of agencypolicies and procedures in security management andtraining; andomote and engage in more explicit sharing ofoperational approaches and security behaviour in high-Share and document experience of engaging commercialsecurity providers. This should lead to a baseline forpromoting standards in usage. 5.2.3 The United NationsMake clear what services UNDSS can provide to UNhave sub-field and implementation costs that need to besupported independently. A joint IASMN…donor processmight be useful to determine the appropriate division oflabour, the comparative costs and possible shortfalls.Support UNDSS in its dialogue with UN member states overa clearer set of guidelines on the roles and responsibilitiesof host governments. A means to incentivise and hold hoststates to account could be explored.5.2.4 Donor governments Consider and address the implications for partner agenciesof insisting upon donor branding and the visibility of fundingsources, as well as the pressures placed on agencies toespond or stay engaged in contexts based on strategicinterest, rather than according to need.Engage systematically with the implications of remotemanagement in terms of costs, quality and impact. There isa general acceptance that quality will suffer when working ininsecure environments, but little appreciation of innovativeprogramming approaches to mitigate these effects.Given that insecurity is likely to persist in some contexts,and local actors will remain at the forefront of servicedelivery, consider mechanisms for partnership similar tothose in relation to natural disaster preparedness andmitigation support for local entities. These could includeencouraging access to multilateral funding pools, such asthe Common Funds being trialled in Sudan and the DRC. Establish an inter-governmental donor forum to sharesecurity information and develop more commonorientation across UN agency executive boards andproposal guidelines on security issues. Possible fora forthis discussion include the Humanitarian Liaison WorkingGroup (HLWG), OCHAs Donor Steering Group (ODSG), orwithin the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.Assist in efforts to better define the roles and respons-ibilities of host states, and support UNDSSefforts toencourage host states to live up to their obligations(through the Host Country Agreement).5.2.5 Areas for further studyfirmer, empirically based understanding of what works insecurity management, including the effectiveness of securitytraining, is critical to positive developments in the sector.The allegedly increasing use of private security companies,along with other deterrence measures, is poorlyunderstood, and warrants an open examination anddialogue among aid actors. The scarcity of data on rape and gender-based violenceagainst aid workers limits our understanding of how aidoperations are affected. International organisations andacademic institutes have done considerable work over thepast decade on researching and reporting violence againstwomen. This could prove useful to aid organisations ininvestigating and establishing a means to report thisparticular type of violence, while respecting ethical andprivacy issues and questions of safety. The study found that the road remains the most dangerousoccurring in the context of ambushes or the targeting ofmoving vehicles. While not a surprising finding, safealternative (and cost-effective) options could be exploredfor the transport of staff and goods, along with a renewedemphasis on practical measures and inputs such asdefensive driving training and travel protocols.Invest in policy analysis around the implications of low-profile and deterrence strategies … both in terms of their HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 51 52 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 52 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTGeneral studyBill Gent, UNICEF Security Co-ordinator, Office of Emergencyogrammes, UNICEF,eon Terblanche, Security Focal Point, UNDPatrick Beaufour, Security Focal Point, WHOJanie McCusker, Security Focal Point, UNFPAAndrew Lukach, Security Focal Point, WFPSebastian Rhodes Stampa, Security Focal Point, OCHASarah Muscroft, Protection of Civilians, OCHAUnited Nations Department of Safety and Security John Almstrom, OIC, Division of Regional Operations, GlobalAlan Brimelow, Desk Officer, Asia, Pacific & Middle East Regionence Burke, Chief ofWest Africa SectionGerald Ganz, Director, East Africa Regionephen Gluning, Desk Officer, East Africa RegionGraeme Membrey, Security Coordination Officer Asia, Pacificand Middle East Region, including Tsunami affectedobert Painter, Humanitarian Security Adviser &Michael Phelps, Special Projects CoordinatorRichard Floyer-Acland, DSS policySir David Veness, USG for Safety and Securityary D. Ermutlu, Head, Threat Assessment Unitatrick Brugger, Head of Security, ICRCLars Tangen, Manager Security Unit, IFRCINGOs and inter-agency foraSam Sherman, InterAction (formerly IRC, Senior TechnicalMaret Laev, Security Programme Manager, RedRobert Laprade, SCF USMichael ONeill, SCF USandy Martin, Mercy CorpsDominic Crowley, Head of Emergency, ConcernCarolyn Miller, CEO, MerlinLinda Doull, Health Adviser, MerlinDavid Wightwick, Head of Operations, MerlinIan Gray, Head of Humanitarian & Emergency Support, Worldision UKKiruja Micheni, Security Manager, Christian AidHeather Hughes, Security Adviser, Oxfam GBSimon Springett, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for theMiddle East, Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth ofIndependent States, Oxfam GBSophie Battas, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for Horn,East and Central Africa, Oxfam GBank Catania, Americares aymond Bonniwell, Global Rapid Response Team SecurityAdvisor, World VisionMike Weickert, World Vision CanadaOtto Farkas, World Vision Canadaoger Perschino, AAH, NYPorter, Head of Emergency, SCF UKevin Ulmer, CAREnny Gluck, ex Head of Operations, MSF Holland Pierre Salignon, Director of MSF FranceMarc Poncin, Deputy general director, MSF SwitzerlandMarilyn McHarg, Director of Operations, MSF SwitzerlandNick Downie, Global Security Advisor, Mercy CorpsSuzanne Keatinge, Humanitarian Policy Officer, Trócairea Smets, DRC, Oxfam GB, enneth Flemmer, Bureau Chief for Internal Control andCompliance, ADRADonor governmentsShawn Bardwell, Head of Security, USAID/DCHA/OFDAMiriam Lutz, Humanitarian Coordination Specialist(UN/NGO/Donor Coordinator) Office of the Director,SAID/DCHA/OFDAInformation Unit, US Department of State Anthony Val Flynn, Head of Security, ECHO Matt Baugh, PCRU, UKMeinrad Studer, Senior Advisor, Division of MultilateralAffairs and Special Assignments, Department ofHumanitarian Aid c/o Permanent Mission of SwitzerlandPierre Gassmann, Program Advisor, Program on HumanitarianPolicy and Conflict Research, Harvard University incenzo Bollettino, Program on Humanitarian Policy andConflict Research, Harvard UniversityShaun Bickley, independent consultantDirk Salomons, Director, Humanitarian Affairs Program, Schoolof International and Public Affairs, Columbia UniversityChristopher Alexander, DSRSG, Pillar 1 … Political Affairs,UNAMAAnne Falher, Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction / CivilAffairs Officer, UNAMA (Gardez)Jacques Mouchet, Country Director, UNHCR List of interviewees HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 53 54 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTSultan Muhammad, Security Assistant, UNHCRHaris Wahidi, Assistant Field Security Advisor, Jalalabad,UNHCRUnited Nations Department of Safety and Security Gert Keulder, Area Field Security Coordinator Kabul, Centralegion, UNDSSJean Lausberg, UN Field Security Coordinator, Afghanistan,UNDSSCraig Harrisson, Senior Data Analyst, UNDSSashid Osman, Database Officer, UNDSSChristian Friedrichs, Area Field Security Coordinator,Jalalabad, Eastern Region, UNDSSodney D. Cocks, Area Field Security Coordinator, Kandahar,UNDSSaul Barker, Country Director, CAREChristian Willach, Operations Coordinator & Head of Office,Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO)ed Muzaffar, Operations Manager, Mercy CorpsThomas Loreaux, Head of Mission, Action contre la Faim (ACF)Eng. Bahadur Khapalwak, Program Coordinator, CoordinationAbdul Ghani Kazimi, Secretary General, Afghan Red CrescentSociety (ARCS)obert Kluyver, Director, Foundation for Culture and CivilAnja de Beer, Director, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanelief (ACBAR)ashtun Atef, Administrator, COOPIahmatullah Kakar, Head of Office, Mercy CorpsVARADr. Ghulam Sakhi, Head of Office, ADA Dr. Khalilullah Hikmati, Head of office, NDI (NationalDemocratic Institute)Nelofar, Head of office, RASAJean Nicolas Marti, Deputy Head of Delegation, ICRCMuhammad Naim, Security Officer, GTZInternational, local and umbrella NGOsKhisrow, Deputy of Regional Office, Jalalabad, AfghanistanNGO Safety Office (ANSO)Ammo Wais, National Safety Advisor, ANSOEng. Ajab Khan, Field officer, MADERAEng. Razi Sha, Director, MSSAADr. Abdul Salam Talib, Director, SHARQMir Emadudine, Coordination officer, ACBARNick Marinacci, Director of Civil Military Affairs, USAIDJohn Myers, Head of Office, ECHOGovernment H.E. Eng. Zarar, Acting Minister of Interior and DeputyMinister of Interior, Ministry of InteriorAndreas Schild, Team Leader, Oversight Consultant, MRRD/GTZ, National Solidarity ProgrammeDr. Humayon Deputy Governor of Kandahar, KandaharGovernorate Dr. Muhammad Asif Qazizada, Deputy Governor of Easternegion, Nangarhar GovernorateMilitaryatih Ulusoy, Political Advisor to NATO, Senior Civilianepresentative, NATO/ISAFCaptain Dave Mcallister, PRTOperation Officer, Kandahar, Sgt. Steven Kling, Head of PRTJalalabad, PRT(Jalalabad)ersonalities and/or Afghan veteransaul Fishstein, Director, AREUJolyon Leslie, CEO, Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC)obert Kluyver, Ex-Director, UNAMA Kandaharrivate entitiesazi Darici, CEO, Cukurova, Turkish contractorMuhammad Omar, Director, MCCEng. Khan Muhammad, Director, DEGRANajiba Ayubi, Manager, The Killid GroupShir Bahadur Hemat, Manager, Spin Ghar RadioField personnel … Chechnya/NorthJoseph Hegenauer, Head of UNHCR NC, UNHCRHenry Chamberlain, Head of Sub Office, WFPNevan Burzic, Head of Sub Office, OCHAMadina Shanayeva, Assistant, OCHAslan Elmurzaev, Field Security Coordination Assistant,UNDSSVladimir Petrov, Field Security Coordination Assistant,UNDSSMaxim Kamarzaev, Field Security Coordination Assistant,UNDSSArea Security Coordinator, UNDSSMohammad A. Ammar, Head of Office, Islamic ReliefEmir Shomakhovso, Security Officer, Islamic Reliefzamat Ulbashev, Program Manager, Islamic ReliefZalina Tsatsaeva, Program Coordinator, ACFAdam Susarov, Security Officer, ACFZhakhman Akbulatov, Head of Centre, Memorialamerlan Akiev, Lawyer, Memorial HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 54 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTuslan Zyazikov, Head of Office, CHAEdilbek Mulaev, Staff Member, CHAMichael Young, Country Director, IRCBatyr Parchiev, Director, Open Continenteila Dzeitova, Director, VestaMadina Kodzoeva, Program Coordinator, VestaSandrine Pont Turco, Program Coordinator, CPCDAishat Balkhaeva, Administrator, CPCDyudmila Nikulova, Education PC, CPCDDavid Womble, Program Director, World Visioner Albert Ilsaas, Country Director, DRCKhamzat Kurbanov, Liaison Officer and Interpreter, MSFans Barnard, Country Representative, CARE (Canada)Askar Umarbekov, Regional Field Delegate, ICRCzkan Beceren, Head of Office, Ingushetia, ICRCeter Mikula, Attaché, RF Humanitarian Coordinator, SwissAgency for Development and CooperationField personnel … DRCAnneke Van Woudenberg, Senior Researcher DRC, HumanRights WatchGuy Marriott, Ground Truth Consultingobert Roots, Desk Officer, BRCS ancois Grignon, Head Joint Analysis Cell Kinshasa, MONUC David Lewis, Correspondent, Reuters a Smets, Policy/Advocacy Coordinator, Oxfam GB achel Scott Leflaive, Head, Field Coordination and AnalysisLaurent Guepin, Deputy Head CAS (HAS), MONUC Simon Ashmore, Assistant Head of Delegation, ICRC tephen Blight, Program Director, SCUKLise Grande, Assistant to DSRSG, MONUC os Cooper, Human Development Advisor, DfID oger Arsenault, CSO, MONUCuc VanDamme, Deputy CSO, MONUC Jay Nash, Representative, OFDA Richard Snellen, Head CAS (HAS), MONUC evin Ray, Liaison Officer, World Vision Joseph Gomis, UNDSS/FSODaniel Augstburger, Head of Office, OCHAatrick Vercammen, Head of Office, ECHO David Goetghebuer, Head of Mission, MSF-BelgiumXavier Bardou, Assistant Director, IRCEric Le Guen, Global Security Advisor, IRC Michel Kassa, Representative, Woodrow Wilson InternationalSarita Bingeman, Information Officer, Goma, OCHAatrick LavandHomme, Head of Office, OCHA Demba Dicko, UNDSS/FSOLinda Edwards, Country Manager, Merlin Philippe Rougier, Assistant Country Director, Concern trick Evrard, Head of Project, AAA Nagette Belgacem, Coordinator, Protection Cluster, UNHCR Anna Kumodzi-Agbeviade, Head of Sub Office, UNHCRya Shneerson, Head of Sub Office, WFPJannes van der Wijk, Director, CIFEarn Grimes, Deputy SO, MONUCBarrow, Investigations, MONUCancois Bellet, Country Director, Solidaritesen Bjornestad, Country Director, NRC Johannes Wedenig, Head of Office (East), UNICEFJean-Charles Dupin, Good Humanitarian Donorship Officer,Hangi Binni, Directeur, B.E.E.D. Eper SuisseDelphine Ittongwa, Secrétaire Exécutive, GEADEd Vreeke, Directeur, ASRAMESubuya Muhangi, Secrétaire Exécutif, CRONGDeopold Rutinigirwa, Chargé des Programmes, Pole Instituteyne Lusi, Programme Manager, DOCstangala Lumpa, Président du CA, Réseau CREFNestor Musumba, Coordinateur, BOADylvie Zawadi, Coordinatrice Adjointe, Antenna TechnologiesField personnel … IraqNote: Over 40 additional people were interviewed for thiseport who wished for themselves or for their organization toemain anonymous; they are not listed here.arry Vardon-Smith, Police AdviserBritish Embassy, BaghdadHostage Working GroupMajor Heide Bronke, MNFI CMO, Executive Coordinator, NCCI,Information Officer, NCCI, Baghdad Coordinator, NCCI,Security Officer, NCCIJohn Pace, Former Head, UNAMI Human Rights Officeacoub El Hillo, UNAMI Deputy SRSG on Reconstruction andJoost Hiltermann, Middle East Project Director, InternationalCrisis GroupMartin Ocaga, IDPProgramme Manager, IOMEman Siam, Programme Officer, Civil Society, UNOPSHazel Siri, Programme Officer, IDPs and Refugees, UNOPS,Security Officer, UNOPSSchoeman A., UNDSS Ammanincent Kennedy, Chief of Iraq Desk, UNDSSPhillippe Lazzarini, Head of Office, OCHAafaa Saeed, Head of Suboffice, Wajid, OCHAAbdulaziz M. Ahmed, HA Officer, Mogadishu, OCHAeena Ghelani, Protection Officer, OCHAussuf Abdi Salah, HA Officer, Wajid, OCHASidi Zahabi, ROLS Programme Manager, UNDPSafia Jama, Hargeisa Liaison Officer, UNDPChr. Balslev-Olesen, Head of UNICEF, UNDPHC (Acting) HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 55 56 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORTZlatan Milisic, WFPIbrahim Conteh, Wajid, WFPAli, Wajid, WFPNadir Benguernane, Security Officer, UNICEFChr. Balslev-Olesen, UNICEFobert McCarthy, UNICEFDanielle Keulen, Wajid, UNICEFAmina Ibrahim, UNICEFAbukor Sheikh Madobe, Wajid, UNICEFMahimbo Mdoe, Hargeisa, UNICEFAddo Aden, Baidoa, FAO/FSAUAbdulaziz Aden, Wajid, FAO/FSAUSimon Narbeth, Nairobi, FAO/FSAUJoe Gordon, Head, UNDSSArve Skog, Deputy, UNDSSakrama Siriwardana, Hargeisa, UNDSSSalah Omer, Nairobi, UNDSSIsaak Subuk, Wajid, UNDSStrick Udeh, Wajid, UNDSSex Kassenberg, CAREascal Hundt, ICRCJeff Ohanga, Security Officer, NGO SPASusuf Abdi Hassan, Security Officer, Hargeisa, NGO SPASBarry Steyn, Program Manager, NGO SPASoe Daniels, Country Rep., Mercy Corpsosemary Heenan, Director, Gedo Health ConsortiumGraham Davison, World VisionZabebew Zellek, Save the Children/ UKEl-Khidir Daloum, Save the Children/ UKeiseal NiCheilleachair, Concern WorldwideAbdirashid Kahaji, Mogadishu, Concern WorldwideGunnar Kraft, DRCHugh Fenton, DRCXavier Duboc, ACFomain Lasjuilliaras, ACFJosep, MSF/E/NL/B/CHEdwin Mbagati, ADRAAbdikadir Diad, Admin/LogisticsSara Reggio, NovibDegan Ali, Horn ReliefMohammed Gani, Hargeisa, Academy for Peace andDevelopmentHassan, Mogadishu, Centre for Research and Development Gemmo Lodesani, Humanitarian Coordinator for NorthSudan, UNMISPhilip Shetler-Jones, Office of the Principal DSRSG, UNMISNiels Scott, Head of Regional Office for Darfur, UNMISDaniel Toole, Director of the Office of Emergencyogrammes, UNICEFoshan Khadivi, Spokesperson North Sudan, UNICEFJonathan Veitch, Programme Officer Darfur, UNICEFuc Lam, Spokesperson North Sudan, WFPadhia Achouri, Spokesperson, UNMIStephen Gluning, Field Security Coordinator Sudan, UNDSSieland Mulders, Security Officer, UNMIS/UMACMark Deasy, Security Officer, WFPMark Kelly, Security Officer, WFPon Turnbull, Senior Security Officer, UNICEFilliam Harrison, Field Security Coordinator, North Darfur,UNDSSGrainne OHara, Head of Office, West Darfur, UNHCR ZalingeiMohamed Mazjoub Fidiel, Country Director Sudan, PracticalIbrahim Mudawi, Chairperson, Sudan Social DevelopmentOrganisation (SUDO)Bishop Adi Ambrose, Vice President, Sudanese Red CrescentHashim Zakaria, Director-General, Sudanese PopularCommittee for Relief and Rehabilitation (SPCR), SouthINGOs/ICRCasmine Praz Dessimoz, Head of Darfur Operations, Inter-national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)trick Hanson, Senior Safety and Security Advisor, CAREEllie Salkeld, Project Manager, RedR-IHEMark Schneider, Country Representative, Catholic ReliefServices (CRS)Mia Beers, Team Leader Darfur Field Office, USAIDGlyn Taylor, Humanitarian Advisor for Darfur, DFIDyprien Fabre, Darfur expert, ECHOaya Kezele, Field Coordinator, IRCrl Frey, North Darfur Programme Coordinator, OxfamMartin Onjerinwa, Security/Logistics Officer, ReliefAnne Masterson, Darfur Emergency Director,CT/Caritas/NCASarjo Keita, Security Officer, American Refugee Committee(ARC)ob Gedachew, Head of Mission, World Vision Internationalone Clausen, Program Manager, Danish Refugee CouncilAbdikadir Mohamud, Head of Office Zalingei, Mercy CorpsCherine Pollini, Head of Sub-Delegation Zalingei, ICRCNick Guttman, Head of Emergencies, Christian Aid HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 56 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTliver Burch, Iraq Programme Manager, Christian AidJock Baker, Quality & Accountability Coordinator, CARE Inter-Simon Springett, Regional Coordinator, Oxfam Colin Rogers, Oxfam Tjossem, IRC Deputy Regional Director, E AfricaManisha Thomas, ICVAEd Schenkenberg, ICVAola Gostelow, Ex-SCFAnamul Haque, Head of Emergencies, Islamic ReliefDr Costatinos Berhe-Tesfu, Africa Humanitarian Actionarious Iraqi LNGOs via Christian AidDr Waqfi, CHA AfghanistanSheila Grudem, Emergencies Unit, WFPInayet Madani, OCHA AcehJoanna Macrae, DFIDEva Grambye, DenmarkMikael Lindvall, SwedenKristen Chenier, CanadaMiriam Lutz, OFDAAlex Mahoney, Rick Quinby, OFDA Middle East/Europe deskJoost Andriessen, NetherlandsMoira Reddick, International Programme Advisory, BritishRed Crossarious desk officers, British Red CrossFlemming Nielsen, IFRC Operational Support AdvisorJamila Ibrohim, Former Head, IFRC AfghanistanMatthias Fraser, ICRC SomaliaChristophe Driesse, ICRC ChechnyaJuan Saenz, Latin America/capacity buildingJohn Telford, TEC synthesisGreg Brady, Director, IWG Emergency Capacity Building Proj HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 57 58 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 58 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTUsually this variable hada positive effect on each of the dependent variables. Thisesult does not hold for international victims, however.Controlling for other factors, an increase in the percentagechange of the denominator did not lead to an increase in thepercentage change in the number of international victims; infact, it led to a slight reduction (although this effect is notAgain, in all cases except the percentage change ininternational victims the presence of civil war led to a reductionin the percentage change of the number of victims. This result isperhaps counterintuitive … there are fewer victims when there isa civil war.This variable led to a marked increase in thepercentage change of national victims and separate incidentsas well as total victims, but again was not at all significant forCivil violence led to a smaller percentagechange in the number of victims at the national level and in thenumber of separate incidents, but it led to a percentageincrease in the number of international victims. The absence of violent conflict led to a percentageeduction in the number of national victims and total victimsand the number of separate incidents. It seems to have led to aslight increase in the percentage change in the number ofThe presence of a UN peacekeeping missionsignificantly reduced the percentage change in the number oftotal victims. However, it also seemed to lead to a slight, butstatistically significant, increase in the percentage increase inthe number of international victims. The effects were notsignificant for the percentage change in the number ofnational victims or the number of separate incidents. The effect of transition was not statistically significantat conventional levels. These statistically insignificant resultshint that transitions seemed to reduce the percentage change ineign intervention, regional:This variable caused amarginally significant reduction in the percentage change independent variables.The rule of law variable never worked. It reducedthe sample size to only 15 observations because it does notinclude Somalia, Sudan or Chechnya (half of the contexts forwhich we have a denominator) and there is some missing datafor the three countries it does include (Iraq, DRC andpercentage change in victims.Military intervention by foreign forces of one or more greatpower countries; presence of a transnational terroristorganisation; presence of armed groups; use of integratedmission approach by the UN.One of the most robust findingsof the analysis is that these variables had no statisticallysignificant impact on any of the dependent variables. It is safeto say that these variables are not important determinants ofcan be understood as the baselinepercentage change in theelevant dependent variables. All of them are positive, sug-gesting that there is a baseline upward percentage change incategories. However, the constant term for internationalaidworkers is negative, suggesting a generally downward trend invictims in that category (precisely the opposite of the othercategories). The other factors listed above lessen thisdownward trend.In summary, the results for Total, Nationaland SeparateIncidentsbehave in an explainable way. The results for Inter-nationalsappear to be the exception. The results areconsistent with the results from the descriptive statistics,which indicate that two different processes are going on.Being a humanitarian aid worker is becoming more dangerousfor nationals and less dangerous for internationals.eacekeeping missions and the absence of civil violence aremitigating factors that reduce this general trend. esults of regression analysis HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 59 60 HPG Report 23 HPG REPORT otalNationalsInternationalsSeparate incidentsDenominator11.533***1.621**…0.0280.972***(% change)(3.558)(0.695)(0.346)(0.300)Civil…44.538***…7.620**1.188…3.346**war(15.660)(3.059)(0.787)(1.322)Intl47.604***6.705**…2.725*(15.916)(3.109)(1.344)Civil…36.061**…6.446**1.361*…2.591*iolence(15.351)(2.998)(0.701)(1.296)No…39.409***…6.945***1.542*…3.123***iolence(12.715)(2.484)(0.742)(1.074)eacekeeping…14.918*…2.0750.903*…0.615(7.391)(1.444)(0.501)(0.624)ansition…22.538…4.664……1.926(16.162)(3.157)(1.365)Intervention…1.543egional(1.031)Constant42.568**8.090**…1.531*3.343**(15.836)(3.093)(0.752)(1.337)Observations41412641R-squared0.730.620.300.62tandard errors in parenthesesable 5: Results of regression analysis HPG Report 23 3rd 20/9/06 11:37 am Page 60 viding aid in insecure environments HPG REPORTNote: Incident data for the global dataset for 1997-2005 was alsoobtained from news reports, press releases, internal organizationdocuments and field and headquarters-based interviews. 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