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Defense Acquisition University - PowerPoint Presentation

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Defense Acquisition University - PPT Presentation

Defense Acquisition University Day of Cyber 26 June 2019 A Dialogue A Day Without Cyber Dr Daniel Rags Ragsdale Assistant Director for Cyber Office of the Undersecretary of ID: 772105

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Defense Acquisition UniversityDay of Cyber26 June 2019“A Dialogue: A Day (Without) Cyber?” Dr. Daniel “Rags” Ragsdale Assistant Director for Cyber Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, OSD(R&E )

Delloitte, “5G Deployment: The Chance to Lead for a Decade, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/consulting/articles/5G-deployment-for-us.html

Our MotivationDelloitte, “5G Deployment: The Chance to Lead for a Decade, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/consulting/articles/5G-deployment-for-us.html

Email Nick Leiserson (nick.leiserson@mail.house.gov) or Thomas Rice (thomas.rice@mail.house.gov)

Email Nick Leiserson (nick.leiserson@mail.house.gov) or Thomas Rice (thomas.rice@mail.house.gov)

Are We More Dependent / More Vulnerable than Our Adversaries?

(U) Questions About The Threat(U) What are our adversaries actions in the “Gray Zone?” Have our adversaries acted with near impunity? What has been their concern with collateral damage?Where are their Cyber training and mission rehearsal “Ranges?”Are adversaries using “Whole-of-country ” approaches? Are adversaries “re-purposing?”

(U) Blue QuestionsHave our frontlines become increasingly blurred? Do Cyber Operations offer a broader spectrum of effects? What kinds of effects?Do we need to relax/reform our constraints?Do we need cyber capabilities:Of varying sophistication? With greater predictability? With more discernable effects? How should DoD exploit agile DevOps / DevSecOps approaches? Can we “compete” with the criminal networks, grad students and industry? Is re-purposing a real threat ? The critical infrastructure dilemma….

Are we at a Distinct Disadvantage?[1] George Bellows, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=188530

Was there a Sea Change in 2018 ?All Cyber Mission Forces are FOC2018 National Defense Strategy Great Power Competition 3 Goals2018 National Cyber Strategy and DoD Cyber Strategy Released DoD Cyber Posture ReviewNDAA 2018 and US Code Title 10, Section 392, “Authorities concerning military cyber operations,” codifies cyber operations as a “traditional military activity (TMA)” Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 20 revoked National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 13 SignedGen Paul M. Nakasone

Guiding Light: 2018 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Cyber as a Strategic CapabilityFindings and RecommendationsCurrent cyber strategy is stalled, self-limiting, and focused on tactical outcomes Defense is a necessary foundation for offense Cyber forces, including leadership, require more experience and readinessThe DoD must integrate cyber into a whole-of-government approachCurrent policies often thwart cyber capability

Guiding Light: 2018 National Defense StrategyGoals Build a more lethal forceStrengthen alliancesReform DoD for greater performance and affordabilityModernization Areas: Accelerate modernization programs and devote additional resources to solidify US competitive advantages Nuclear forces Space and cyberspace C4ISR Missile defense Joint lethality in contested environments Forward force maneuver Autonomous systems Resilient and agile logistics A culture of innovation delivered at the speed of war

Guiding Light: 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy1US strategic competitors are conducting cyber-enabled campaigns to erode US military advantages, threaten our infrastructure, and reduce our economic prosperityDoD’s Cyberspace Objectives:Ensure the Joint Force can achieve its missions in a contested cyberspace environmentConduct cyberspace operations that enhance US military advantagesDefend US critical infrastructure Secure the DoDIN Expand DoD cyber cooperation partnersDoD components [must] “defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war,” enabling the Department “to compete, deter, and win in the cyberspace domain.” 2 “…defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source…” 1 “and “…confronting threats before they reach US networks.” 3 [1] DoD, “Fact Sheet: 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy and Cyber Posture Review - Sharpening our Competitive Edge in Cyberspace https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041659/-1/-1/1/Factsheet_for_Strategy_and_CPR_FINAL.pdf%20%5bmedia.defense.gov%5d [2] Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 14 February 2019, 125th Cong.(Testimony of General Paul M. Nakasone). [ 3 ] Dave Weinstein, “ The Pentagon’s New Cyber Strategy: Defend Forward,” L awfare , Sep. 21 , 2018 https:// www.lawfareblog.com/pentagons-new-cyber-strategy-defend-forward

Guiding Light: 2018 DoD Cyber Posture ReviewKey Themes Using cyberspace to amplify military lethality and effectivenessDefending forward, confronting threats before they reach U.S. networksProactively engaging in the day-to-day great power competition in cyberspaceRecognizing partnerships are key to shared success Embracing technology, automation, and innovation to act at scale and speedSupporting the defense of critical infrastructureRecruiting, developing, and managing critical cyber talent

Guiding Light: 2018 DoD Cyber Campaign Plan NDS 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy 2018 Cyber Posture Review 2018 Nine Lines of Effort (LOEs) 1 Integrate Cyber Operations 2 Tailor Cyber Intel 3 Transform Systems Architecture 4 Next-Generation Capabilities 5 Private Sector Partnerships 6 International Partnerships 7 Integrate Joint Info Operations 8 Cyber Workforce 9 Mission Assurance & Deterrence NCS 2018 NSS 2017

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Technical Directors and Assistant DirectorsAI/ML BiotechnologyMicroelectronic Networked C3Hypersonics Space Quantum Science Autonomy Directed Energy Cyber

This is a transition slide!

An Example AD Job Description The Assistant Director for Cyber will:Establish a DoD-wide, technology–driven, mission-focused approach for Cyber modernization…performing gap assessments for Cyber…establish a DoD-wide long-term modernization plan and technology investment strategy for cyber …advocate for funding required to achieve the long-term Cyber modernization portfolio plan C oordinate with the Services and OUSD(A&S) to ensure transition considerations are accommodated in the acquisition strategies and plans

NDAA20 (HASC Version)Section 232. Cyber science and technology activities roadmap and reports The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to develop a roadmap for the science and technology activities of the Department of Defense in support of the Department’s cyber needs and missions.The provision would also require the Under Secretary to submit an annual report on these activities. The committee believes that long-term science and technology cyber re- search is critical to developing capabilities that will enable the warfighter to maintain dominance in cyberspace in the long run.

NDAA20 (SASC Version)Section 232. Cyber science and technology activities roadmap and reports The SECDEF, acting through USD(R&E), will develop a roadmap of to cover the development of capabilities that will likely see operational use within the next 25 years to address cyber operations and cybersecurity.The Secretary shall develop the roadmap in consultation with the following:(A) The Chief Information Officer of the Department.(B) The secretaries and chiefs of the military departments.(C) The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.(D) The Commander of the United States Cyber Command.(E) The Director of the National Security Agency. (F) The Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency. (G) The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. (H) The Director of the Defense Digital Service . Annual Reports!

The Cyber Road to Dominance Strategy Strategy Ongoing “Listening Tour”Explicitly leverage decades-long efforts and SMEs DAU, Cyber Community of Interest (CIO), Supporting COIs, Services, Joint Staff, NSA, DISA, DARPA, DDS, USD(R&E), USD(A&S), USD(I), USD(P&R), SCORE, NITRD, PCA , J-Staff, DoD CIO, USCYBERCOM, Component Cyber Commands, Federal Agencies Academia, Industry etc. Directly address potential capability gaps AND i dentify promising capability opportunities

(Draft) Road to Dominance Capability Thrust AreasResilient Systems and Infrastructures Resiliency in OperationResiliency in DesignEnduring technical support for large-scale, full-spectrum, predictable, and discernable cyber and cyber-enabled operationsIntegrated C2/PlanningMulti-echelon Situation Awareness (SA)Rapid and Enhanced Attribution Predictable Access Predictable and Discernable Effects Cyber-enabled Military Deception (MILDEC ) and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Anti-repurpose World-Beating Cyber Mission Forces Training Technologies Human Developmental Programs Also, Enabling Technologies and Cross-cutting Capabilities

General Paul M. NakasoneOur efforts in defense of the 2018 elections taught us the value of persistent engagement to contest adversary campaigns, the power of enabling partners, and the ability to impose costs. The DoD Cyber Strategy notes we cannot afford inaction – our values, economy, and society are exposed and we must assertively respond at all levels. USCYBERCOM is working with the combatant commands, DHS, FBI, across the Intelligence Community, and in conjunction with private sector and foreign partners to improve understanding and act to contest and frustrate adversary cyber activities. [1] Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 14 February 2019, 125th Cong.(Testimony of General Paul M. Nakasone).

Questions Email USD(R&E): Daniel “Rags” Ragsdale – daniel.j.ragsdale.civ@mail.mil Congressional Cyber Roundup: Nick Leiserson ( nick.leiserson@mail.house.gov ) Thomas Rice ( thomas.rice@mail.house.gov )